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Abstract 
This research seeks to understand the Chernobyl accident at the material level and this is 
achieved through a sustained engagement and use of Latour’s Actor-Network Theory. The 
primary research question asks how has the accident travelled through various worlds: 
impacting upon them, reorienting their structure, and at times, creating new nuclear worlds in its 
wake. The ambiguous nature of the question is designed to allow the research to approach the 
expansive topic from several angles, thus accounting for the very real material spread 
radioactive fallout and, crucially, the material action engendered by the agency of RBMK no4, 
the central actant in the network in question. The nature of this work is quasi-scientific; that is, the 
majority of the empirical data is the discourses of the ‘hard sciences’, the disciplines tasked with 
understanding and mitigating one of the worst accidents the world has ever witnessed, and 
safeguarding against another similar occurrence. The reassembling of RBMK no4’s network, 
and its travels, hence ‘renders visible’ the lessons learnt by the nuclear industry in the wake of 
the event of April 1986. The spectre of Chernobyl has loomed over the industry for 3 decades. 
This research attempts to create a pragmatic context. It is not interested in the epistemological 
‘sensationalist’ representations of the accident. Instead it embraces the complex intricacies of the 
physics, engineering and radiological sciences — the very essence of the materiality of RBMK 
no4, and its risky network. 
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Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the 
beginning. (Winston Churchill) 
There he goes. One of God’s own prototypes. A high-powered mutant of some kind never even 
considered for mass production. Too weird to live, and too rare to die. (Hunter S Thompson) 
I have always quite enjoyed writing these opening statements, they feel like the pleasant reward 
after a job well done — the final chance to be dually thankful and whimsical after an odyssey of 
serious network reassembling.  
As I sit here on a Tuesday afternoon, the realisation that I have actually finished this thing hasn't 
quite sunk it. Thus, I shall turn to words of gratitude, before attempting some poignant statement 
about this process, my work, and an ill faded nuclear power station in north Ukraine.  
First and foremost, I want to thank my parents for their eternal support throughout my thirty 
revolutions around our friendly solar system fusion furnace. I would not be in this position, nor 
the man I have eventually grown into, without them. Next up is my Polish lioness, Monika. She is 
the best thing that ever happened to me and her love and support has kept me on track and 
sane during this process. A section expressing gratitude would not be complete without 
mentioning ‘the Dream Team’: Dr Ian Shaw and Professor Chris Philo. We made it boys, with the 
aid of Mr Latour we took the materiality of RBMK no4 seriously and learnt a lot along the way. 
I will forever be thankful for your attention, guidance and friendship throughout this enjoyable 
ride.    
Finally, I can’t forget about CD Projekt Red. During the last 4 years, this little upstart Polish 
development studio raised the bar of gaming quality to heights that I had only dreamt of, and 
subsequently allowed this Glaswegian geek to walk the path of a Witcher — an indispensable 
form of escapism during this long and challenging journey. I salute you Geralt of Rivia, and you 
shall never be forgotten, Vesemir of Kaer Morhen. 
I digress. 
Doctoral training is privilege awarded to the dedicated, intellectually gifted and tenaciously 
motivated. For the lucky few, funding is gained to research a phenomena close to their personal 
interests and/or passions. I am a member of this group. As I detail in chapter 1, Chernobyl, and 
by extension, nuclear technology, has fascinated me for years. This PhD has allowed me to 
indulge this obsession to the Nth degree. It is not a traditional human geographical or social 
science piece of research, as it deals, almost exclusively, with the discourses of the ‘hard 
sciences’. The disciplines tasks with understanding, rectifying and mitigating one of the worst 
accidents our little blue space ship has ever witnessed.  
It is a ruthlessly pragmatic piece of work. It is not attempting to claim that the accident of 1986 
was anything else other than horrific, but it takes seriously the materiality of the event, the 
nuclear nonhuman of RBMK no4, and the science of its fallout, in an attempt to create an 
account that is devoid of ‘sensationalist’ representations. The network reassembled within allows 
the reader to make up their own mind, or, at the very least, provide them with information to 
make a more informed opinion of impacts of the Chernobyl accident.  
I am an ANT scholar of nuclear risk and technology, and this is my account of how the agency 
of a nonhuman overtook human action within the network of a level 7 nuclear accident.
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Chapter 1 
The Chernobyl Effect: From Urban Explorer to ANT Detective  
——————————————————————— 
1.1 Chernobyl and I 
Good evening, comrades. 
As you all know, a misfortune has befallen us - the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant. It has painfully affected Soviet people and caused the anxiety of the 
international public. For the first time we encountered in reality such a sinister force as 
nuclear energy that has escaped control… 
We evaluate in a fitting manner the objective attitude to the events at the Chernobyl 
nuclear power station on the part of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its 
Director General, Hans Blix. 
In other words, we highly appreciate the sympathy of all those who treated our trouble 
and our problem with an open heart.  
But it is impossible to leave without attention and political assessment the way the event 
at Chernobyl was met by the governments, political figures and the mass media in certain 
NATO countries, especially the U.S.A ‘Anti-Soviet Campaign’. 
They launched an unrestrained anti-Soviet campaign. It is difficult to imagine what was 
said and written these days - ‘Thousands of casualties’, ‘mass graves of the dead’, 
‘desolate Kiev’, that ‘the entire land of the Ukraine has been poisoned’, and so on and 
so forth.  
Generally speaking, we faced a veritable mountain of lies - most dishonest and malicious 
lies. It is unpleasant to recall all this, but it should be done. The international public 
should know what we had to face. This should be done to find the answer to the 
question: What, in actual fact, was behind that highly immoral campaign? (Gorbachev, 
1986) 
The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station accident of April 26th 1986 saw two massive steam 
explosions rip apart the core of reactor number 4. These catastrophic blasts turned a huge part 
of the facility into nothing more than cinder, started several nuclear fires, and spread the 
reactor’s dangerous radioactive innards across the landscapes of Europe, thus forever etching 
the name of the once-little-known power station in northern Ukraine into the global psyche. It 
was the type of accident that defied belief and preemptive planning: an uncontrolled release of 
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radioactivity coupled with the total destruction of every innate reactor safety mechanism, 
resulted in the worst nuclear accident the world had ever witnessed. In 1990, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) introduced the International Nuclear and Radiological Event 
Scale (INES), a system that classifies events that occur outside of normal operating practices on 
a scale of 1 to 7. The IAEA (2008, 10) describes a level 7 incident as one that features a 
“Major release of radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects 
requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.” Chernobyl was the 
world’s first level 7 accident, and the only other is the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident in 
Japan. The severity, magnitude and geographical implications of the accident are not easily 
understated. The event of Chernobyl was so disruptive that it arguably created a new paradigm 
of risk, and produced an unwelcome benchmark that materially depicted the worst nuclear 
accident imaginable. The stricken reactor paid no attention to international boundaries as it 
billowed its radioactive innards across huge swathes of the European landscape and, in many 
places, 30 years later, its toxic legacy continues to impact upon the daily lives of many. This is 
the material reality of the accident, the byproduct of a malfunction within a nuclear non-human/
object situated in a remote part of Ukraine. 
Power stations are vast machines, requiring, in some cases, thousands of workers to operate, 
care for and maintain them. Yet, the general principle through which they actually produce 
electricity is surprisingly simple. Whether dealing with a gas, coal, oil or nuclear facility, the act 
of boiling water into steam to spin turbines remains a constant. Thus, regardless of the type of 
fuel being used, the sole purpose of the beating heart of an electricity generating facility is the 
creation and sustainment of a heat source. This governing principle may be easy to grasp, but 
proceedings become much more complicated as soon as the materiality of the object tasked with 
creating/sustaining said heat source is brought into analytical focus. Akin to washing machines, 
computers, cars, filing cases, mobile phones and any other series of technological objects, 
designs of nuclear reactors are numerous. The model of reactor used within the Chernobyl 
facility was the pride of the Soviet nuclear industry. Officially known as the ‘Реактор Большой 
Мощности Канальный’ (Medvedev 1989), or the RBMK, these mammoth non-humans are, 
even to this day, still some of the most powerful electricity generating machines ever created 
(Ancius et al 2005). A complicated mass of super strength steel, reinforced concrete, graphite 
and uranium, with a design ethos that allowed for theoretically limitless scalability in terms of 
megawatt production and, as was painfully highlighted by the accident, the unintentional ability 
to succumb to terminally critical malfunctions.  
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Nuclear technology is wildly complex, and the physics that underpin its deployment, 
exclusionary. For many, due to the towering knowledge barriers of the industry, their opinions of 
the accident have been co-formed by media and governmental appropriation of it, 
representations guided by the geopolitical pressure cooker of the Cold War, interested 
stakeholders, environmentalists, the oil and gas industry, and so on. As can be seen from the 
above extract, from the former General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, during his first public address after the accident, Chernobyl was a source of 
pain and suffering for the Soviet Union - a critical malfunction which irreparably dented their 
technological and engineering pride. Chernobyl is many things to many people and this 
research project reflects what it has come to mean for me. 
	  
The central research question asks how has Chernobyl travelled? There is a very literal answer, 
in that its radioactive cloud spread radio caesium-137 across the countries of central and 
northern Europe, and this material traversal is accounted for in one of the empirical chapters 
below, but this is only part of the answer. The use of the ambiguous verb ‘travelled’ within the 
primary research question is tasked with opening up the heterogeneity of the accident; in that 
there are a multitude of typically unseen trajectories of the event, outwith the spread of 
radioactive material. Scientific and engineering domains shrouded by disciplinary knowledge 
barriers and clandestine activities of international agencies/governments have all experienced 
the travels of RBMK no4. Thus, in order to explore these unsighted, yet, not invisible 
associations, a theoretical and methodological apparatus capable of accounting for these 
traversals must be utilised.  
The primary theoretical underpinnings of this project are Ulrich Beck’s (1992) risk society 
approach and Ian Shaw’s (2012) notion of evental geography; the former has a very real 
connection to the accident, in that Beck routinely utilises the spectre of Chernobyl as a means of 
vindicating his concept of manufactured risks, and the latter is a theory of monumental events 
and the creation of new worlds in their wake. Throughout this thesis, the two theories work in 
unison, with evental geography providing the means of identifying the new worlds created by 
the event of the Chernobyl accident, while Beck’s approach facilitates the characterisation of 
these worlds; that is, it renders visible the impacts that the disaster had upon conceptualisation 
of risk within the nuclear industry and the wider public sphere. The amalgamation of these two 
analytically bountiful theoretical constructs, and the underlying methodological architecture, 
shall be covered in detail in Chapter 2. The engine powering this endeavour is Bruno Latour’s 
(1996; 1999; 2005; 2013) Actor-Network theory (ANT), an ontologically insistent methodology 
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that argues for, among other things, agency overtaking action. To answer how the accident 
travelled, a detailed account must be fashioned of how its agency; that is, the agency of the 
nuclear non-human, RBMK no4, the central actant of the network, has engendered action. 
Therefore, an account is needed for how this stricken machine in Ukraine sparked new, 
spontaneous and purposeful human action in the wake of the accident, thus highlighting how its 
agency has overtaken the resulting human action. Or, in other words, the task is to render 
visible the travels of this most unique non-human hybrid throughout a host of different domains 
since the event of 1986. The actions accounted for within this project range from the cauldron of 
panic during the immediate clean up operation, to the scientific practices of actors tasked with 
assessing the continued validity of the current gold standard system of radiological protection. 
As a result of this heterogeneity, a discursive ordering ripples outwardly in space and time from 
the event of 26th April, 1986. The project hence requires the use of a diverse range of Latourian 
tools, methods of enquiry provided by Latour to aid an ANT scholar in their quest to ‘follow the 
actors’. The adaptable concepts of mediations, translations, panoramas, networks, associations, 
actors and actants, are the primary lexicon of the approach, and, once again, the role of each 
will be detailed during the exploration of this research’s theory and methods in Chapter 2.  
	  
Prior to the theoretical, methodological and empirical heart of the project, let me account for 
two more nodes of action produced by RBMK no4; three, if one considers the writing of this 
chapter. These two instances are my personal excursions to the site of Chernobyl, once as an 
Urban Explorer, and once as a scholar of nuclear risk, science and technology. For this 
researcher, Chernobyl has featured prominently during two distinct phases of self-identification. 
As I was born on the 1st June, 1986, I am a ‘Chernobyl baby’, and as time marches on we, 
Chernobyl and I, will always share chronological milestones. This synchronisation is not a 
governing agency behind my fascination with the facility in the Ukraine; rather it is nothing more 
than a coincidence. Throughout my younger years I had been made aware of the accident as a 
result of reading/watching anniversary news pieces recounting aspects of the disaster, and the 
ever present ban on the sale of livestock/produce from spaces across the UK as a result of 
RBMK no4’s deposition of radionuclides, routinely alerted me to the accident’s existence. Its 
captivatingly mysterious allure only caught my inquisitive nature, however, during the years of 
my undergraduate degree in Geography at the University of Strathclyde.  
	  
At that time, I was fond of ‘going places I was not supposed to go’; that is, I was a participating 
member of the UK’s Urban Exploration community — a group of people accounted for by 
Garrett (2010). Urban explorers are people who transgress the spaces of abandoned buildings, 
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industrial facilities, military complexes, underground tunnel systems, disused hospitals and so on, 
and photographically document the consequential adventure. Governed by the mantra of ‘take 
only photographs, leave only footprints’, these urban ghosts feed upon the forgotten avenues of 
our urban fabric. Initial fascination mutated into my willing participation, and a byproduct of my 
new hobby was a unique case study for my undergraduate dissertation - Take only Photographs, 
Leave Only Footprints: the reclamation of space by Urban Explorers. During the empirics of the 
project, I interviewed Scotland’s premier ‘Urbexer’, and at one point conversation turned to 
Pripyat, the ‘Atomic City’ built specifically to house the workforce, and their families, of the 
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). This city once housed 50,000 people and was purpose 
built at the same time as the NPP. It thus led an interconnected existence with the Chernobyl 
facility, and this Urbexer described the now ghost town as the ‘Mecca of Urban Explorers’. At 
the time the name meant nothing to me, but the promise of an entire city, abandoned for 
decades, was enough to convince me that I had to make the trip.  
	  
Upon completion of my undergraduate degree, I used my newly gained research skills to 
operationalise the logistics of this adventure for myself and the aforementioned Urbexer. Flights 
booked, permits unscrupulously granted, and a feasible route through the Exclusion Zone, a 
formally sectioned off area around the power plant and Pripyat, was charted by means of 
Googlemaps. Even at this point, the accident itself was of little interest to me; rather, it was the 
agency of Pripyat’s rows of high rise flats and community structure that drove my foolhardy 
actions. My former lecturers and supervisor advised me against the trip, citing radiation as a 
major concern, yet I paid no attention. I felt that I had done enough research to assert that the 
higher-than-normal levels of radiation would not kill me during this visit, and, crucially, the 
illusionary sense of immortality a youthful male can experience is a powerful motivating catalyst. 
I have managed to get myself into several difficult situations over the years, and I have always 
got myself out of them, so I felt no fear at the chance of staging an excursion into one of the 
world’s most inhospitable spaces — only excitement. Furthermore, the ‘prestige’ of the 
exploration within the Urban Exploration community had no bearing on my decision, I just had 
to see the city for myself. Why travel hours within the UK to see single factory, when a 
supposedly vacant urban landscape lay within reach? 
	  
What follows is a brief reminiscence reassembling of my first trip to the Zone, a highlights reel of 
experiences and memories of Pripyat, that will feed into my most recent excursion back to the 
Zone. From Urban Explorer to scholar of nuclear risk, science and technology, the Chernobyl 
Nuclear Power Plant has been the driving agency behind my personal transformation.  
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1.2 Lost in Translation 
Figure 1.1: Warning signs at the entrance to the Exclusion Zone (source: researcher’s 
photograph 2015)  
The main entrance to the Zone is an intimidating place. The road is flanked on both sides by old 
Soviet military buildings and rusting signs warning against trespassing without proper permits 
(figure 1.1). We were granted access by the Minister of Energy within the Ukrainian 
government, and one of the only pieces of advice he gave us was not, under any circumstances, 
take pictures of the checkpoints. Pictures from my first excursion are something of a rarity, due to 
a chance meeting and unavoidable altercation that rendered the pictorial delineation of the trip 
‘lost to the Zone’. Thus, it should be noted that every picture presented in this chapter was taken 
during my most recent trip, as a fully fledged scholar of nuclear risk, science and technology. 
The first checkpoint, as with every point of access within the Zone, is relentlessly ordered and 
overseen by a military sensibility. As I arrived, a tour bus had just been cleared to enter and the 
guardsman turned to me and impatiently gestured for my permit. Prior to embarking on this trip I 
had received an email containing a letter in pdf form, written in Ukrainian, by the 
aforementioned Minister of Energy - the total expenditure required to gain this discursive pass 
was roughly 80 pounds Sterling. As the sheet of paper left my hand I suddenly realised that I 
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had no idea what the letter said, and the reality of the situation momentarily dawned on me. I 
was standing at the entrance to one of the world’s most inhospitable spaces, with an Urban 
Explorer I had met only three times previously, and I had just handed over a letter from a 
governmental official paid through the Eastern European Money Transfer system. I had not even 
told my parents where I was going as I knew they would have disapproved of my plan. The 
naivety of my actions and youthful mindset that brought me to this unusual situation troubles me 
to this day.   
	  
The guardsman read the letter with a look on his face that I could not easily gauge. After a few 
tense minutes he called over to a colleague, a towering man wearing full military attire and 
carrying a short stock AK-47 (as did all of the checkpoint personnel). They conversed for a 
moment and then the second man proceeded to use his radio to request the presence of 
someone else. Stress is a difficult emotion to manage; in an instant it can turn into panic, and if 
one does scurry down that rabbit hole the resulting actions rarely result in an improved situation 
from the one that sparked the stress in the first place. You learn a lot about yourself in truly 
stressful situations; I have always attempted to be pragmatic in the pursuit of emotional 
management. What is the point of panicking? Nothing constructive will ever result from it. 
Granted this is easier said than done, but as previously mentioned, I had a few years of Urban 
Exploration experience under my belt, and it is certainly not an activity for the easily frightened.  
	  
After a silent and prolonged optical examination by the two guards, a door opened in the 
larger building on other side of the road, and an older member of the military staff appeared. 
Due to the ornateness of his attire, and the fact that the other two men had radioed for him to 
inspect our paperwork, I can only assume that he was an officer. He strode across the road and 
greeted the two guards with a cheery demeanour. Ukrainian was spoken, the letter inspected, 
and he turned to me and asked, in surprisingly good English, how we planned on traveling to 
Pripyat. Relief washed over me in a calming wave. We native English speakers enjoy many 
benefits; our mother tongue is spoken all over the world, and in most European countries they 
even provide English signposts, menus and the like. This adventure to Ukraine was my first time 
in a country that spoke a totally different language, and as soon I arrived in Kiev my linguistic 
ignorance became painfully apparent. The Cyrillic alphabet is as intimidating as it is charming. 
Typically one can hazard an educated guess at the meaning of a word when in France, or 
Germany, or any country that uses the Roman Alphabet for that matter, but the Cyrillic alphabet 
obscures its meaning behind an array of ‘symbols’. Upon reflection, my total lack of preparation 
with regards too the language barrier was a major oversight, and with every passing 
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unsuccessful social exchange my confidence in being able complete this journey wained. So, at 
this most important juncture, to hear the Queen’s English through a thick Eastern European 
accent was akin to being thrown a life vest in a vortex.   
This relief must have been reflected on my face as the officer beamed a smile at me as he 
repeated his question. I told him that I had charted a route to Pripyat and we were planning on 
simply walking there and back, a tactic he found incredibly funny. After he translated my 
answer to his subordinates, they too found it amusing that we planned on attempting to walk the 
20 or so KMs to Pripyat. Even to this day, after several more trips to the Zone, I do not see why 
this was perceived as a joke. Granted the journey was in fact a lot longer than I anticipated, but 
it could easily be completed in a few hours. Regardless, once the officer had regained control of 
himself, he motioned over to a car parked outside the building from which he emerged and told 
us to get in it. I thought nothing of getting in a vehicle with a Ukrainian military official and 
driving into Chernobyl’s Exclusion Zone; in fact I was quite happy as our bags were extremely 
heavy and the decreased journey time meant we would have longer to explore Pripyat. The car 
itself was a decrepit Soviet era relic, sporting a manufacture’s logo that I have never seen 
before and its stank of petrol.  
Figure 1.2: Road leading away from the main checkpoint of the Zone (source: researcher’s own 
photograph 2015)	  
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The road network of the Zone plunges through the dense forests of the region in arrow straight 
lines. The site is roughly two hours north of Kiev, and, prior to the power plants’ construction, 
this entire area was sparsely populated, with the traditional Jewish town of Chernobyl being the 
main population hub (Waskow 1986). The directness of the road network alludes to the history 
of the space and the isolated positioning of the facility. The roads connect one place to another 
with minimal deviation from the primary artery. 
Figure 1.3: Radiation warning sign at roadside (source: researcher’s own photograph 2015) 
Yellow and red radiation warning signs pepper the wooded road sidings (figure 1.3), and the 
occasional abandoned building peers through the foliage. The Zone is split into two regions, the 
30km and the 10km, each with its own military check point and dosimeter station - large rows of 
machines tasked with scanning for radioactive contamination. All that has been accounted for 
thus far took place at the outskirts of the 30km zone. There is one main road that connects the 
NPP and the town of Chernobyl with the outside world. This is the road I had planned on 
travelling, but it was not the one chosen by our military taxi driver chose. After roughly two 
KMs heading down the main road, he took a left onto a small single track and proceeded to 
hurtle along it close to the limit of the car’s performance. I have always been a fan of speed, it 
is one of life’s most primitive of pleasures, but this vehicle felt dangerous at normal levels and 
positively suicidal when pushed to its limit. Regardless, I saw no way of asking the driver to slow 
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down without breaking some form of social norm; thus, I quietly gripped the door handle and 
focused on the thin ribbon of tarmac as it sieved through the trees. When contrasted with my 
most recent trip; that is, in the format of an official tour, this route seems like an extremely 
strange decision. However, the entire excursion, from start to finish, was not by the book, so a 
modicum of poetic licence with the roads travelled is perhaps of little significance, although 
arguably it coloured my experience and interpretation. The main outcome of this backroad was 
indeed our lack of exposure to the reality of the Zone. In the years since this adventure I have 
speculated that this route was a deliberately designed choice to keep us off the main roads, and 
out of sight from the normal activities of the Zone. If one does not pass through the town of 
Chernobyl, or near the reactor facility, and instead only spends time in Pripyat, then it is easy to 
leave thinking of it as a totally desolate place. Nothing could be further from the truth, but I 
only discovered this years later.  
	  
Conversation was at premium during the car journey, and I spent the majority of the time 
mentally tracking our route in preparation for the return trip. Monotonous perfectly 
characterises this landscape. The Zone has many spaces: abandoned nurseries, crumbling town 
halls, historic churches, huge pieces of the nuclear power plant’s infrastructure, and yet on this 
journey we witnessed none of them. Due to the density and height of the trees, it is near 
impossible to situate oneself within the landscape, and even the massive Duga 3 radar complex, 
standing over 150 meters tall is obscured until the very last moment. However, this forestry 
tunnelling effect produced one of the best surprises of the trip: the moment when we emerged 
from our wooded enclosure with Pripyat front and centre. Set against blue Ukrainian skies, the 
crumbling rows of flats and overgrown shrubbery were a beautiful sight for an Urban Explorer.   
	  
The journey took 45 minutes to reach Pripyat’s most north easterly point. This is by no means the 
main entrance, and it appears, in retrospect, to be a back road into the city. At the time I had 
no idea that Pripyat has a military checkpoint at its primary entrance, and we passed no such 
regulatory outpost on this journey. This knowledge would have made our exploration even more 
‘special’ as it appeared that we had been snuck into the city - a true transgression of the space. 
Regardless, our military taxi driver pulled up at the side of the road, offered us the use of a 
small hand gun, to which I declined, for him to insist that I take his nightstick, before he left us 
with one piece of advice, “Just remember to stay off the grass”.  
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1.3 Exploring an atomic city and the demise of the Urban Explorer 
Figure 1.4: Satellite view of Pripyat (north west corner) and the Nuclear Power Plant (south east 
corner) (source: GoogleMaps) 
The above image (figure 1.4) delineates the landscape of the 10km inner section of the Zone. 
The rectangular facility in the south east corner is the nuclear power plant, and the vibrant 
section of greenery to the north west is the city of Pripyat. The distance between the two is 
minimal when viewed in this format, and this spatial proximity highlights the symbiotic 
relationship between the two entities. Today, it is difficult to make out the structures of Pripyat 
due to the density of the foliage, but one can still make out the slender outlines of the high-rise 
flats peering out of the trees. The road travelling from the bottom of the image, in a north 
westerly direction, is the main access point into Pripyat, but, as stated above, my first visit did 
not use this route. Rather, the two of us were deposited somewhere in the north east of the city, 
and we journeyed from that point into the heart of the city — the slightly brown area in the 
centre of the greenery.    
I barely knew the Urban Explorer with whom I traveled to the Zone. He is a small and very 
quiet man, and rarely offered anything in the way of emotive feedback to proceedings. 
However, as soon as we left the confines of our Soviet taxi he began to bound about like a child 
at Christmas, and I happily partook in the festivities. Urban Exploration is a form of escapism; 
for me, it brings back memories of childhood adventures with my friends where we would 
venture into the fenced facility that houses two huge wind turbines a few miles south of the 
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village where I grew up. These feelings were magnified by the sheer vastness of Pripyat. 
Nothing can really prepare you for the sight of an urban landscape totally devoid of a human 
presence and activities. The juxtaposition between its rows of grey, rotting buildings and what 
one has come to expect from a city is initially very jarring, even for a veteran Urban Explorer. 
Due to a lack of field notes, and a winding path, I am unable to account for the totality of our 
excursion through Pripyat. Furthermore, reassembling everything could be perceived, for want 
of a better term, as rather dull to anyone who is not attuned to the delights of urban 
abandonment. Thus, a highlights reel shall be provided, and a reassembling of the most 
immersive experiences detailed.  
	  
Pripyat is a lonely space, a sad crumbling relic, and the world’s premier example of the 
destructive power of the atom. It is also a seemingly devious space, one that plays tricks on the 
senses of anyone who explores its deteriorating urban fabric. Buildings creak and moan under 
the stresses of disrepair, with several suffering catastrophic structural damage over the years.  
Figure 1.5: A collapsed School in North West Pripyat (source: researcher’s own photograph 
2015) 
This image (figure 1.5) is of a school situated in the north west of the city that has seen a 
collapse due to unchecked water damage. During my first exploration I came across this 
damage as I walked through the green arched door into the classroom on the top floor. It was 
quite a surprise at the time, but, in hindsight, I should have expected it, as the entire building 
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seemed to shudder under my footsteps as if it was trying to tell me it was dangerous. Upon 
reflection, it was probably not the safest structure in which to stage an exploration.  
	  
The visual aspects of the space are easily represented, but the soundscape is not. If anything, 
the milieux of strange and, at times, rather unsettling sounds of Pripyat left the largest impression 
on me. One may think that when humanity evacuates a city it lies silent, and I certainly did prior 
to inhabiting such a space; however, the reality is very different. Pripyat is a city of large 
boulevards, all leading to the central square, and monolithic high rise flats line these large 
streets. The majority of the windows of these structures have been smashed over the decades, 
and the openings created by the lack of glass allows the wind to funnel through the buildings’s 
carcasses. When there is no ‘human-made’ noise, the hum of the heterogenous constellations of 
objects which help comprise the materiality of most cities, nature’s orchestra, takes precedence. 
As the wind increases its bellow, so does the strange whistling noise made by its interaction with 
the buildings. It dominates the boulevards to the extent that one can focus on nothing else. 
Furthermore, as there are still so many things residing within every structure, the wind 
perpetually displaces them from their lodgings which results in worrying noises coming from all 
directions.  
	  
Pripyat is a space that demands strong mental fortitude, especially when exploring the site 
without the comfort and security of a tour or large group. I was acutely aware that we were 
totally outside of conventional protective systems; my colleague and I were the only people 
within at least a 3 km radius; neither of our phones had signal, and even if they did, who would 
we call if we encountered trouble? At the time I found the isolation exhilarating, it felt like I was 
in truly uncharted territory. Regardless, the constant barrage of unsighted noises coming from 
the thousands of windows above us routinely challenged my youthful confidence.  
	  
The central square was our primary destination; firstly, as some of the most iconic buildings 
reside there; and secondly, it features heavily in ‘All Ghillied Up’, a level within Call of Duty: 
Modern Warfare, a popular video game at the time. As we journeyed south towards the square 
we arrived at the Cultural Palace, a building of great social importance within the city. It is a 
vast structure, complete with swimming pool, cafes, theatres and gymnasiums. The grandeur of 
the architecture has stood the test of time and decay. Its clean sweeping lines are supplemented 
by double height rooms and floor to ceiling windows, now shattered on the floor (figure 1.6).  
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Figure 1.6: The main hall of the Cultural Palace (Source: researcher’s own photograph 2015) 
Due to the labyrinthian layout of the building, on several occasions we found ourselves arriving 
in a pitch black room, when we thought we were heading into the next massive opening. After 
an hour of guesswork exploration, we eventually arrived at a small door that opened out onto 
the main gymnasium, a doorway that revealed a view I shall never forget.  
Figure 1.7: View from the mezzanine of the gymnasium in the Cultural Palace (Source: 
researcher’s own photograph 2015) 
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The above image (figure 1.7), taken during my most recent trip to Pripyat, is of this view, and it 
encapsulates so many aspects of Pripyat. The patchwork of ruined decor, the relentless 
reclamation of the space by nature, and material snippets of the city’s life before April 1986, all 
contribute towards a distinctive character that I have never experienced again. The yellow and 
red ferris wheel has become an icon within Chernobyl discourses, notably within video game 
representations of the space and the countless Urban Explorer accounts of the site, and its 
colourful presence within a landscape of grey, white and brown is a sight to behold. Due to my 
Google map pre-planning, I roughly knew the location of the amusement park, but I had made 
a pleasant miscalculation and was rewarded with this surprise framing of the wheel. My 
exploration colleague and I must have stood in silence, gazing at this visa for ten minutes before 
I suggested working our way down to see it close up. 
	  
As can be ascertained from figure 1.7, the gymnasium was situated on the first floor of the 
Cultural Palace, and as we ventured back down into its bowels we came across piles of 
discarded Soviet propaganda, rooms with plants actively growing on the floor, entire sections of 
the collapsed celling, and a room filled roughly half a meter high with old books. If one could 
visit only one place within Pripyat, it should be the Cultural Palace, as it is akin to a microcosm 
of the entire city. As one would expect from any building left to the wrath of nature, structural 
rigidity has been replaced by creaking weaknesses. The only instances when I felt sure footed 
were on the concrete of the streets or solid stone staircases, and the byproduct of the resulting 
slow pace of exploration was a lengthy journey time. This is a hallmark of the Zone, and one 
that cannot be gauged or experienced without actually inhabiting the space. Every activity takes 
much longer than initially anticipated: whether simply traveling from point A to B or actively 
exploring a building, the pre-planned designated time allowance is never enough. Urban 
Explorers are well trained in slowly working through an abandoned building, but when the 
number of available sites is increased to the levels present within Pripyat, time seems to pass at 
an accelerated rate. Thus, it took roughly a hour to travel from the gymnasium to one of our 
chosen landmarks, prior to reaching the amusement park; that is, to the swimming pool - a 
journey which should take no more than 5 minutes. Once one of the city’s premier attractions, 
the 50 meter pool now lies filthy and broken (figure 1.8). We did not spend long in this room as 
the allure of the amusement park was pushing us forward. After a purposeful retracing of our 




Figure 1.8: The swimming pool of the Cultural Palace (source: researcher’s own photograph 
2015) 
	  
Figure 1.9: The amusement park (source: researcher’s own photograph 2015) 
The wheel is accompanied by three other fair ground rides, but they are so rusted that one can 
barely make them out against the dense trees (figure 1.9). As it was set officially to open on 
May Day of 1986, this rare feature of Soviet urban landscapes was never used as the 
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population of Pripyat had been evacuated almost immediately after the accident. The frame of 
the wheel sways in the wind, and the carriages seem to be in perpetual motion caused by their 
entanglement with the surrounding trees. Due to its ‘popularity’ among those who have ventured 
into Pripyat, it seems almost cliched to state that this eerie and ultimately depressing space was 
the main highlight of my first trip.  
The remainder of our first day was filled with more mundane urban exploration activities, 
journeys through the less interesting buildings such as flats, cafes and hotels. It was brought to 
an abrupt end by an altercation close to the block of flats where we had chosen to sleep — a 
chance meeting that soured the rest of the journey. Tired and weary from our busy day 
exploring, my Urbex partner and I returned to our designated sleeping spot, but just as we 
turned a corner towards the entrance, we were met by four men seemingly waiting for us. Due 
to their lack of military attire and menacing demeanour, I knew their intentions were unsavoury. 
I am a son of Glasgow, and have encountered situations of this nature over the years (obviously 
not staged within the emptiness of a Ukrainian ghost town). When outnumbered and 
approached by seemingly confrontational assailants, I knew from experience that physical 
hesitation only empowers the other party; thus in this instance, my autopilot took over and I 
grabbed my Urbex partner by the jacket and strode towards the four men. They looked weak, 
tired, and desperate, anything but physically intimidating, but when those agencies are 
combined the end result is the unpredictability of action.  
I am not sure how they thought this encounter would play out, but I doubt they expected staunch 
Glaswegian resistance in the face of their superior numbers. The smallest member of the group 
appeared to be their spokesman and he barked Ukrainian at the two of us in an impatient tone, 
motioning towards my Urbex partner’s very expensive camera with a rather pathetic looking 
kitchen knife in his hand. As I stated above, my exploration partner is a small, quiet man, 
perfect for covertly infiltrating abandoned buildings, but ineffective in a charged situation of this 
nature. Against my instructions he readily handed over his camera, then his wallet, phone and 
passport — I do not hold this against him, he was terrified and seemingly wanted this ordeal to 
conclude as quickly as possible. With an unprecedented bounty in hand, the group’s ringleader 
turned to me and barked further orders, no doubt believing that he would achieve the same 
result. For numerous reasons, most notably my pride, I was not ready to hand over my 
essentials, especially in this most remote of locales. Instead, I took the nightstick our military taxi 
driver insisted I take from my belt, pointed it at every member of the group, and informed them 
to remove themselves from this situation. Well, words to that effect. Obviously, the language 
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barrier rendered my warning as futile, and the ringleader moved a few steps closer notably 
bolstered by his previous ‘victory’. I am not a violent man, but in this situation I saw no other 
option and as he approached I used the nightstick as it was designed. The small provocateur 
crumpled on the ground, and, for what seemed like an eternity, I stared off with the remainder 
of the group in silence. Eventually, with their ringleader incapacitated, they started to retreat, 
dragging their fallen comrade away to a small car parked on the other side of the opening.  
My partner and I quickly entered the block of flats where we chose to sleep in as soon as the 
group reached their vehicle. In hindsight, we should not have gone straight to our home base, 
and as a result, my first night in Pripyat was spend awake with my back pressed against the 
flat’s door as my Urbex colleague slept. After the adrenaline had faded the reality of what had 
transpired dawned on me, the worry set in. Our second day featured none of the joyous 
discoveries of the first, and instead the majority of it was spent wandering back to the main 
checkpoint of the 30 km zone. Instances of this nature are never welcome, but I was content as 
we had encountered all that the Mecca of Urban Explorers had to offer, both good and bad, 
and I left feeling extremely relieved but fulfilled. We shall return to the city of Pripyat in Chapter 
4.  
1.4 A paradigm shift: from explorer to detective and the toolset of discovery  
Figure 1.10: View from Pripyat high-rise flat (source: researcher’s own photograph 2015) 
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Shortly after returning from Ukraine, I submitted a PhD proposal that sought to further my 
research into the UK’s Urban Exploration community. It was unsuccessful. Obviously this was 
disappointing, but in the same breath I was perhaps relieved. After the trip I had lost interest in 
the activity, as it felt like I had accomplished everything I could as an Urban Explorer; and so I 
began to think about other aspects of the accident, most notably, what actually happened to 
create the space of Pripyat. This shift in personal interest began on a rooftop in the southern 
quarter of Pripyat. The above image (figure 1.10) reassembles the vista that I witnessed prior to 
returning to the main checkpoint of the zone. In the summer months, Pripyat is more forest than 
city, and thus the rooftops of the high-rise flats are the best way to appreciate the scope of the 
city’s urban landscape. As I stood gazing at the view, my attention was drawn to the mammoth 
complex on the horizon, the hulking mass of steel and concrete almost dead centre of figure 
1.10. I knew what it was, yet I was surprised that I knew very little about it. I felt a little ashamed 
that I had travelled to a distant corner of Europe to see nothing other than a ruined city, but not 
the cause of its desolation. Pripyat is a form of ‘disaster pornography’, the epitome of the 
‘disaster tourism’ industry (Shondell Miller 2008; Kelman & Dodds 2009), a window into a real 
post-apocalyptic landscape and the material end product of Beck’s “manufactured 
risks” (1992). Focusing solely on the city is akin to a detective fixating upon the victim of a 
crime, when the real task at hand is seeking to understand the perpetrator.    
	  
This inceptive interest in the material cause of the accident; that is, the creator of Pripyat’s 
current condition, turned into fully-fledged obsession and I subsequently began to investigate the 
accident of 1986. This groundwork was conducted during my Masters degree, and towards the 
end of this year I submitted a second PhD proposal that sought funding to research the accident. 
This proposal was successful, and, as I stood at the outset of the largest project that I have ever 
undertaken, the necessity of a robust methodology presented itself. Phenomena akin to the 
Chernobyl disaster are innately heterogenous due to their evental nature, potent agency and 
the diversity of the actions engendered. Furthermore, recalling the Gorbachov speech at the 
outset of this chapter, it can be inferred how this material malfunction in a remote site in Ukraine 
has been internationally appropriated. He speaks of “a veritable mountain of lies” or, in other 
words, a raft of (mis)representations that, in his eyes, have unfaithfully accounted for the 
accident and its material byproducts.  
	  
These mediations represent an ‘end product’, the final form of discursive delineations of the 
materiality of the accident, and their creation is imbued with the agencies of interested 
stakeholders. In other words, representations of this kind are the epitome of a Latourian 
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‘panorama’ (Latour, 2005), a purposefully slender window that seeks to cast a happening in a 
specific manner. Such representations did not satisfy my interest, predominantly as I hoped to 
discover unmediated — or less mediated — accounts of the accident, ones provided by human 
actors present at the event and centrally involved in its unfolding, as well as ones provided by 
the likes of engineers and scientists for whom, ideally at least, the ‘maths’ of the nuclear non-
human should be translated not mediated. I also wanted to account for the lessons supposedly 
learnt by the nuclear industry, to learn of the actual risks associated with this Soviet type of 
reactor, and to ascertain the dangers really associated with the spread of radiation from the 
belly of RBMK no4. Moreover, I needed to understand how the accident was mitigated, both in 
the Ukraine and internationally. Thus, I required a methodology that enabled me to situate my 
analysis, as far as possible, within the material realm of objects/devices/hybrids and their 
documentation, for only then could I produce an account that spoke to the complexities of the 
situation, facilitating a charting of how the accident ‘travelled’ through these areas of enquiry. 
The shape of my conceptual and methodological apparatus shall be provided in the following 
chapter, and the purpose of this subsection here is to twin the practical methodological 
underpinnings with material sites at the Chernobyl facility. In effect, I am purposefully situating 
the analysis within the material realm, and highlighting how my methodology traced outwardly 
from its constituent objects and spaces.   
	  
As stated above, Actor-Network Theory (ANT) provided the conceptual and methodological 
toolbox for this endeavour, and, akin to a detective looking to solve a crime, the approach 
necessitates the discovering of material evidence to support any claim made (Latour 1996, 
1999, 2005). Thus, the first empirical chapter of this project (chapter 3) accounts for the scene 
of the ‘crime’, or, rather, the epicentre of the event: that is, RBMK no4 of the V.I Lenin Nuclear 
Power Station. This massive object is the central actant of the network in question, and 
discovering how it has travelled necessitates, to begin, an account of its ontology. This is a 
challenging task as a nuclear reactor is an unapologetically complex object, one that demands 
certain levels of nuclear engineering and scientific knowledge to understand its form, and so 
sustained reading of academic journals and reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) was conducted. Sources of this nature form the empirical backbone of this research 
project. ANT, among other things, has “developed a science studies that entirely bypasses the 
question of ‘social construction’ and the ‘realist/relativist debate’” (Latour, 1996, 22), in that it 
affords social scientists a means of accounting for the material practices of the ‘hard sciences’ 
without seeking to explain them by means of social theory. Or, in other words, it potentially 
sidelines the addition of epistemological elaborative layers. Thus, when detailing the discursive 
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outputs of nuclear scientists and engineers, related to the RBMK design of nuclear reactor, the 
role of social-science explanatory agent is vacated, or at least radically reconfigured, and the 
task of tracing the material pathways of the actant through its network is arguably centralised.   
In terms of operationalised methods, Latour’s Science in Action (1987) provided a means of 
identifying the battleground within and tracing connections through the pages of said journals 
and reports. This orientation required accounting for the creation of the ‘black box’ that 
explained how the accident manifested itself within RBMK no4, and necessitated a process that 
‘rendered visible’ the actant, namely the object of the reactor itself. This task was made easier 
by the immutable nature of its ontology; that is, the finalised form of the of reactor - there can be 
no polemical discussion about the structure of an object when its discursive blueprint has been 
translated into material existence.  
Today, when seeking to account for an academic network, Google Scholar’s ‘cited’ function 
represents an ideal window into its nature, structure and key actors. It provides a means of 
rendering visible the connections between articles and their authors - be it negatively or 
positively. Several key phrases were used as the starting point of enquiry: ‘RBMK design’, 
‘inefficiencies of the RBMK’, and ‘causes of RBMK malfunctions’ were the three primary 
searches. Note that the word ‘Chernobyl’ was not used, but rather the official name of the 
reactor. The reasoning here was to test the agency of RBMK 4 within this academic domain; in 
essence, inceptively to discover how influential the explosion had become within the areas of 
academic enquiry tasked with researching the accident. Every article discovered by these 
searches referenced RBMK no4 and the Chernobyl facility, and subsequently it appears that an 
entire trans-disciplinary sub-field has been created by the nuclear non-human in Ukraine. To an 
extent, this literature - spanning academic, technical and political texts - becomes a material 
object for my project: in that I chart my moves through it, my ‘following’ the network, in a 
manner analogous to how I track the motoring, breaking and travelling of RBMK no4 as a 
material thing (dispersing into countless smaller material ‘things’). The steadfast and extensive 
use of the ANT’s lexicon throughout this research should be viewed as the researcher’s attempt 
at being rigorously Latourian, even, occasionally, at the expense of discursive clarity. Again, to 
underline, Chapter 2 addresses the utilised conceptualisations and methodology — it represents 
the terminology ‘roadmap’, one that details why these terms are being used, and the analytical 
purchase they pertaining too. 
My most recent trip to the Zone featured none of the isolation and danger of the first. Rather, 
due to University risk assessment protocols, and a much more mature mindset, I returned with 
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the aid of the Solo East Tours company. This tour company is the oldest, most reputable in the 
Chernobyl tour industry, and it is the one of choice for news agencies, television shows (Top 
Gear used them to film in the Zone) and international agencies. Due to their experience, every 
aspect of the trip is professionally catered for, and the safety of customers is of paramount 
importance. The concept of radiation, the invisible and sometimes dangerous entity, sparks fear 
in most, and rightly so in many cases, but as shall be highlighted in later chapters (chapters 5 
and 6), low-doses are rarely damaging, especially when a person is subjected to them for a 
very brief time. One must remember that the Chernobyl facility was in operation until 2000, with 
units 1, 2 and 3 remaining relatively undamaged by the accident. Thus, for 14 years, thousands 
of people lived and worked in the Zone every day. Even today, approximately 3000 people 
work within the confines of Zone (Rothbart 2012). The only way that this influx of people could 
be sustained is through a comprehensive clean up operation, which was achieved in a matter of 
months by the Soviet Union. The main network of the Zone features lower levels of radiation 
than Kiev (and most cities in Europe), and even the reactor facility itself has only slightly higher 
than normal levels. During the journey to the Zone’s entrance, the tour company showed several 
films on the bus, one of which accounted for an interesting experiment. One of their employees 
was travelling to America by plane, and had a geiger counter with them. Throughout the flight 
this person took periodic measurements, revealing that the levels experienced during this normal 
transatlantic flight were significantly higher than any ambient doses that a visitor encountered 
during their time in the Zone. Thus, it appears that situational context, when fused with scientific 
rationale, casts aside perceived/imagined risks, and renders visible the reality of a situation. 
Figure 1.11: The Golden Corridor (source: researcher’s own photograph 2015) 
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During my most recent excursion to the Zone, I was lucky enough to gain access to the reactor 
facility itself. This rectangular building houses units 1, 2, 3 and the doomed number 4 in a linear 
pattern. Figure 1.11 is of the ‘golden corridor’, a passage that runs through the entire facility 
and at the far end of this picture is the makeshift wall that was built to close off the ruined unit 4. 
Therefore, roughly 100 meters away from where this picture was taken lies the object of the 
reactor, including the ruined control room where the sequence of events that produced the 
explosion took place. It is a sobering experience to traverse the space, especially after 
consuming a huge amount of information detailing the days, months and years preceding and 
succeeding the accident. The aforementioned documents elaborating upon the reactor type, and 
the material pathways to the accident, speak in purposeful efficiency and scientific terminology: 
“Zirconium alloy E635 as a material for fuel rod cladding” (Nikulina et al 1996); “computer 
code RELAP5 validation with RBMK-related separate phenomena data” (Urbonas et al 2003); 
“evaluation of the activity of irradiated graphite” (Plukiene et al 2005). These are just a small 
sample highlighting the nature of the works conducted upon these machines; that is, the intense 
materiality of the nuclear non-human and its ontological characteristics.  
	  
Addressing discourses of this nature allows one to gain a fuller understanding of the object, and 
consequently facilitate a mapping of its network, although they can cloud one’s perception. The 
role of a social scientist within a scientific network is not one of practical participation, but rather 
our duty is found within synthesis: synthesis of the heterogenous range of scientific actions being 
performed and meta-evaluation of the process. Once again, akin to a detective standing at the 
scene of a crime that she does not fully understand, our role is to piece together the disparate 
puzzle, thus reassembling component parts that obscure their connections. A means of keeping 
oneself ‘on track’, and focused upon the material phenomena in question, is to experience it first 
hand. I certainly found this ‘ontological witnessing’ very helpful when seeking to keep RBMK 
no4 firmly within my analytical crosshairs.  
	  
The first empirical chapter (chapter 3) resists the temptation to provide a detailed account of the 
constellation of human actors that conducted research work upon the RBMK fleet. Granted, their 
research forms the backbone of the chapter, but the nuclear non-human of RBMK no4 is the 
centre of the network and the project - it is the most important actant. Human actors play a 
central role within the remaining empirical chapters, but their actions are a product of the ruined 
reactor’s new agency, and the way they act are material example of how the non-human has 
travelled. Thus, the first chapter is tasked with taking seriously the role of the object, its 
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materiality and its breaking, and affording it a space of its own without infringement by human 
actors.  
The second empirical chapter (chapter 4) accounts for the hours, days, weeks and months after 
the accident, and the heroic actions of the liquidators, firemen, pilots, construction workers and 
military personnel asked to tame a nuclear inferno, the likes of which the world had never 
witnessed before. It is an anatomy of the event, in its chronological immediacy to the explosion. 
This chronological movement is coupled with a spatial shift outwardly from the reactor site, 
albeit one that does not leave the 10km exclusion zone. It is at this point that human actors take 
a more central role, and the first-hand accounts of the facility’s key staff members can be 
analysed. Actor led contextualisations of this period are rare, with only a few ‘unmediated’ 
iterations existing. Dozens of books detail the plight from afar, and such texts have been 
utilised, but the first-hand accounts of both former Chief Engineer of Unit 1, Grigor Medvedev 
(1991), and Deputy Chief Engineer Nikolai Karpan (1986) provide the most vivid account of the 
immediate aftermath, and also too of the bureaucratic struggle to mitigate the event and the 
new world that it had created. The lack of detailed first hand accounts is an empirical issue, one 
that cannot be overcome. Thus, the above mentioned accounts feature prominently throughout 
this thesis due to them being the only available.  
Figure 1.12: Pripyat City Sign (source: researcher’s own photograph 2015)   
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The Soviet reluctance to admit that something had happened is well documented, and the 
latency of the Gorbachov address at the outset of this chapter provides evidence of the well-
practiced Soviet propaganda machine (the speech took place on the 14th May, over two weeks 
after the accident). This innate secrecy has resulted in varying levels of dissemination of 
information regarding the initial mitigation period. Glasnost, Gorbachov’s programme to 
promote a more informatively open political system, was a positive movement for the Soviet 
government, but the Chernobyl accident highlighted the hollowness of the sentiment. Regardless, 
enough information exists to reassemble several nodes of action during this evental period. The 
aforementioned first-hand accounts were cross-referenced by means of secondary information 
from reputable texts, written by credible actors, in a bid to guard against inaccuracies within the 
account. This was a challenging task as there is no consolidated discourse detailing this period, 
each individual text providing instead a patchwork of information, although the accounts of 
these two important actors helped to unify the discontinuities.  
As the accident rippled outwardly from the reactor facility, Pripyat, the power plant’s symbiotic 
Atomic City, was forced to take on a new form, a new role, one outwith its inceptive design. 
With its human inhabitants swiftly evacuated, the urban landscape of the atomic city was 
transformed into the site of intense military and airforce activity, a hub of panicked action 
engendered by the new agency of RBMK no4. During my most recent trip to the Zone, I did not 
see it as a space that once housed 50,000 people, but rather the launch pad of the helicopter 
sorties tasked with suffocating the nuclear fire, or the place where the firemen were initially 
treated after they fruitlessly fought the fire from the roof of the reactor hall. The city is littered 
with remnants of this epoch, telling of the struggles of the actors drawn to the nuclear non-
human. These objects provide a trail of evidence that helps to reassemble the first two weeks of 
the clean-up operation, thus awarding an ontology to the above-mentioned first-hand accounts. 
These diverse ‘things’ range from large pieces of military infrastructure left abandoned in the 
haste of completion, to the small and personal affects of the people who, in reality, gave their 
lives to mitigate the accident.  
Figure 1.13 shows a firefighter’s balaclava in Hospital no 2, in the southern point of the city, an 
innocuous rag on a table by the main door that emits 107.9 mSv of radiation, a dose several 
thousand times higher than normal levels. As an aside, later in this thesis, I will explain and 
debate in detail how radiation is measured, its effects on biological organisms, and account for 
the international radiological protection systems. During this trip I was informed by the tour 
guide, the owner of the hand in figure 1.13, that the first firefighters on the scene were taken to 
 26
this hospital as it was the geographically closest to the reactor, and that their clothing had been 
stored in the basement. However, a hospital staff member had foolishly taken a large 
percentage of the clothing from the basement for washing, and subsequently strewn them 
around the hospital in a panic. As a result, certain areas of the space are indeed now not 
advisable to be explored. 
 
Figure 1.13: Fireman’s Balaclava in the entrance of Hospital 2 (source: researcher’s own 
photograph 2015) 
The primary driving agency behind Chernobyl’s international infamy was the material spread of 
RBMK no4’s radioactive innards - the most literal dimension to how the accident traveled. At this 
point, chapter 5, the empirics of the thesis take another spatial step away from the site in 
Ukraine and chart a course over central and western Europe. In order to understand this 
movement, and the entity of radiation, a sustained account of both the atmosphere and ionising 
radiation had to be produced. Risk is a central analytical theme within this endeavour, and the 
primary means of assessing the risks associated with Chernobyl’s radioactive dispersion — that 
is, accounting for its unmediated materiality — is to synthesis the works of the sciences charged 
with researching the physical entity. Furthermore, in order to assess the risks, those insinuated 
within both ‘popular discourses’ and academic research, an exploration of how ionising 
radiation interacts with biological organisms was conducted. These fields are a relative unknown 
to a social scientist; so, in order to construct a knowledge base, a purposeful ‘scaling up’ of 
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material was performed. This process started with undergraduate textbooks on the subjects, and 
consequently moved to more advanced material when a competent level of understanding was 
achieved.  
	  
Once this knowledge base was established, and the account moved on to Chernobyl-specific 
material, a similar methodological system to the one featured in chapter 2 deployed. The 
Google Scholar search, ‘Chernobyl’s radioactive dispersion’, unearthed a vast network of 
thousands of texts - once again, the reactor’s agency has produced a huge sub-field of study for 
a variety of scientific fields from biology, to environmental radiation to policy-relevant studies. 
The reasoning behind the use of the word ‘Chernobyl’ was purely provided since ‘radioactive 
dispersion’ was too ambiguous as it could pertain to Three Mile Island, Sellafield, and the recent 
Fukushima accident - the three worst nuclear accidents outside of the Chernobyl accident. The 
radioactive cloud featured a variety of fission radionuclides, but caesium-137 was found to be 
the material ‘breadcrumb trail’ that most researchers sought to follow. Thus, these invisible 
shards of material from RBMK no4 have dispersed this nuclear non-human’s agency as they 
traversed Europe, shaping human action in their wake. 
	  
The European Commission’s (1998) Atlas of Caesium Disposition on Europe after the Chernobyl 
Accident was utilised in conjunction with the above-mentioned texts. Significantly for this thesis, it 
also represents the collaborative work of a diverse network of academics throughout Europe, 
and one of these actors was interviewed about his participation. Ethical approval was sought for 
the interview with Professor David Sanderson, of the Scottish Universities Environmental 
Research Centre. Taken on the surface, without said actor’s contextualisation, The Atlas 
represents a comprehensive account, country by country, of the spatial dispersion of the 
radionuclides; but with Sanderson’s help, I could identify the nature of its representations, gaps 
in the methods and the unusual cases of absence. Thus, the combination of all these elements, 
especially the situated knowledge of an influential environmental physicist, allows this account to 
probe the ‘unmediated’ materiality of the situation: that is, to render visible the actual risks at 
play without deformation.  
Once again, I can return to the Zone for alignment. The below image (figure 1.14) is of a 
‘hotspot’ close to the cooling tower of the never finished unit 5. The reading of 117.5 mSv is 
higher than the firefighter’s balaclava, yet, without the geiger counter, one would have no idea 
that this particular spot is dangerous. As an aside, it should be noted that prior to embarking on 
this tour orientated excursion to the Zone, risk assessment approval was gained from the School 
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of Geographical and Earth Sciences’s Risk officer. Granted this ‘hotspot’ features several times 
the normative level of radiation, but the tour guide only kept the group in this location for a 
matter of minutes before moving on. Furthermore, as shall be highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5, 
even high levels of radiation only become ‘dangerous’ with prolonged physical exposure. The 
figure spotlights the obvious, yet easily forgotten aspect of environmental radioactivity; namely,  
humans’ inability to account for its presence. Environmental radiation, much like nuclear 
reactors, demands scientific knowledge in order to account for its presence and innate risks. The 
output of the relevant scientific actors and their machines is dense and filled with discipline-
specific terminology that is beyond most of the general public. That is, people lacking situated 
knowledge of the science of radiation rely on mediations of these findings/measurements to gain 
an understanding of the situation faced. This is not the place to explore the deviations between 
said findings and their representative appropriations. Rather, the point is to highlight an 
empirical necessity of social scientists working within technical fields. The only way to account 
for scientific outputs, in an unmediated manner, is to learn how to consume them and to train 
oneself within their lexicon. This is not an easy task, but, if the intrepid detective is to compile an 
airtight case, they must encroach into areas outside of their comfort zone. The end product, 
outwith the account itself, is a new ability to work within the realm of these scientists, converse 
with them and, in the process, follow them as they move within their network of professional 
residence. 
Figure 1.14: Geiger counter depicting the levels of radiation present within a ‘hotspot’ at the 
makeshift entrance to the never-finished cooling tower of unit 5 (source: researcher’s own 
photograph 2015)
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The final empirical chapter, chapter 6, accounts for the actions RBMK no4 has since engendered 
within international institutions, agencies and organisations. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations (UN) are the two of great relevance here. One of the 
major byproducts of the new world created by the nuclear non-human was a recalibration of 
risk; closely associated with the validity of the Linear No-Threshold (LNT) model of radiological 
protection. Interestingly, this phenomena featured contradicting directions within the construction 
of risks, one representing an increase within proactive measures to mitigate the machine’s risks, 
and the other featuring a sustained academic battleground that sought to decrease the risk 
(taken to be) associated with low level radiation. This empirical chapter marks the end of RBMK 
no4’s journey within these domains of enquiry, and the analysis jumps forward chronologically 
and spatiality. The purpose of accounting for this phenomena last is due to the agency, and 
potential action of the institutions involved. Both the UN and the IAEA are hugely influential 
entities, and the actions, reports and recommendations which they made as a result of RBMK 
no4’s agency have had the longest-lasting impacts upon both the nuclear industry and 
radiological protection sciences.  
Figure 1.15: Sign pertaining to employee risk at the construction site of the new containment 
structure (source: researcher’s own photograph 2015) 
This final substantive chapter features another academic battleground, and, once again, the 
same Latourian methodological apparatus was deployed. ‘LNT debate’ and ‘Linear No-
Threshold validity’ were the key word searches, and only articles that directly referenced 
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Chernobyl or RBMK no4 were used. This is a huge arena of enquiry, with two sides vividly 
arguing for the pros and cons of the model. The reasoning behind the inclusion here of this 
relatively unknown polemic is down to the role that RBMK no4 played within its inception. Prior 
to the accident, there had not been any reason to deploy LNT on a large scale, and thus its 
hypothesis was untested. Due to the large release of low-level radiation across Europe following 
the Chernobyl accident, some members of the scientific community began to question the 
assumptions of LNT, and thus the debate began. 	  
	  
This final chapter marks the point where hugely influential actors and stakeholders enter RBMK 
no4’s network, their interests becoming inextricably infused with the event. The IAEA and UN 
are regarded as the international gatekeepers of humanitarian protective standards, with the 
former focusing upon nuclear technologies and the latter catering for the entire spectrum of 
human ‘rights’. Due to the restrictive nature of the UN and IAEA’s publications, it is difficult to 
access any of their ‘workings’ as only their finalised reports are available, and so, there comes 
a moment where even the most inquisitive detective reaches the limits of available evidence. 
Regardless, shying away from these under-researched, and hugely important aspects of the 
Chernobyl accident runs the risk of producing an asymmetrical account. The methods remain 
unchanged, but their effectiveness is eroded by institutional firewalls.  
Figure 1.16: West side of the new containment structure (source: researcher’s own photograph 
2015) 
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1.5 Concluding remarks 
This introduction has attempted to set the scene, create an initial window into the site of the 
Zone of Alienation — one which draws upon my first experiences of the space. At this time, some 
10 years ago, to me, it was a place of wonder and excitement, a site of mystique and the place 
I felt I had to go for the sake of my Urban Exploration background. Over the course of this 
research, the site and my own perception of it has changed. The empirical chapters chart the 
site’s journey, how its materially spread across the landscapes of Europe, but also 
philosophically, with its agency engendering action within countless collectives around the 
world. Outside of the photographs, my most recent trip to the Zone has been purposefully 
omitted from this introduction. I felt it was important to depart from my initial understanding of 
the site and the accident, as this thesis represents not only the travels of RBMK no4, but also my 
evolving interests as an ANT scholar. During this latest excursion I spent my time accounting for 
the intricacies of the site, learning of its daily routines and evaluating how it has progressed 
since April 1986. In effect, attempting to reassembling its network and understand how the 
materiality of the site has been augmented to contain one of the worst nuclear accidents the 
world has witnessed. This foundational question is manifested within all of the empirical chapters 
described above. From the evaluation of the object of RBMK no4 itself, to the creation of the 
sarcophagus (the original steel shelter of RBMK no4), to the sustained account of how the 
atmosphere transported radionuclides around the world, each empirical chapter seeks to 
understand how the site has travelled and evolved over the last 3 decades.   
This change in personal analytical obsession was caused by the nature and overall direction of 
the empirics of this piece of work — the decision I made at the outset of this journey. The 
insistence of attempting to situate this work within the realms of nuclear science and engineering 
subversively influenced me (in conjunction with an ANT mindset), as a researcher, to account for 
an ever moving target, one which was once shrouded in secrecy, subterfuge and myth, but is 
now, by means of my adopted ANT methodology, rendered visible in sharp scientific clarity.  
The concluding passage of this introduction reflects upon the totality of the material and my 
attempt to synthesise it into a meaningful insight into the accident. This research involves the 
location and interrogation of a ‘travelling archive’: a diverse and comprehensive collection of 
documents that span the last 3 decades. One that has been identified, constructed and explored 
as a means of understanding the Chernobyl accident. In other words, this involved a huge 
systematic literature review of several complex domains of scientific and engineering study. Due 
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to RBMK no4’s unprecedented ability to ‘surprise’, destroy and contaminate, it has engendered 
countless nodes of evaluative scientific and engineering action. The study of ‘Chernobyl’ has 
almost become a discipline in itself. Consequently, there is no shortage of material, but 
deciphering it from a social science perspective was a challenge. The identification of the 
leading experts within each field was the inceptive mission, and this was achieved by a tracing 
of the most influential articles within the areas I sought to explore, and identifying the leading 
members of international programs tasked with evaluating the accident. From there, the entire 
bibliographies of said actors were read, and reference mined. This in turn lead to the 
identification of more influential scientific actors, and another abundance of articles. This process 
was repeated dozens of times.  
Over the course of this research I came in contact with several experts within the fields of 
research applicable to the Chernobyl accident. The knowledge gained through the exploration 
of my travelling archive allowed me to converse with these actors, using the lexicons of their 
areas of study. My knowledge of these areas is the product of my systematic literature review 
process, and I was only able to communicate with these actors in an informed manner due to 
the strengths and thoroughness of my date gathering methods. 
With the passing of the event’s thirtieth anniversary, RBMK no4 is still being readied for its final 
entombment. The above image (figure 1.16) is of the new shelter structure, the largest moving 
object on earth. The original sarcophagus, the hastily erected steel shelter, was only designed to 
last for 5 years, yet it has stood for 30. The new containment structure, the result of an 
international consortium, marks the end of the event itself, the point when the next two hundred 
years are catered for and the material source of the accident mitigated for several lifetimes. It 
symbolises a ‘putting the genie back in the bottle’, returning RBMK no4 not to what it was 
originally, but rather a spatially sealed-off entity, a dot on a map, a cap-stone on the event (and 
indeed this thesis). Of course, much that has traveled outwardly from RBMK no4 and the site 
can never been recalled, but this new aluminium and concrete sarcophagus represents the 
closing act of the Chernobyl saga, the pragmatic means of finalising the worst accident 
imaginable.  
The simple fact that it has taken 30 years to get to this point of entombment highlights the 
severity of the event, and the difficulties, both engineering and bureaucratically, that had to be 
overcome. Nuclear technology has numerous advantages in an era of increased atmospheric 
carbon deposition, but Chernobyl will always stand as a chilling reminder of its unparalleled 
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disruptive potential. It is fitting summation to end the account at the feet of the new shelter, as it 
provides a means of looking forwards with the lessons learned fresh in the mind.  
Figure 1.17: As close as one can get to the external wall of RBMK no4 (source: researcher’s 
own photograph 2015).  
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Chapter 2 
An ontology of risk in the wake of Geoevent: the conceptual and 
methodological coordinates 
——————————————————————— 
The central research question of this project asks how the Chernobyl accident has traveled (that 
is, to account for its trajectories through a host of different domains of reality, and this goal will 
be achieved by means of an Actor-Network Theory (ANT) methodological toolset). ANT was 
chosen as it facilitates the production of a distinctive ontological description, unabashedly 
anchoring the analysis within the material realm, in all its intricacies. Specifically, for this project 
the ‘material’ equates with the nuts and bolts of machines, the flesh and blood of living beings, 
and even the paper and pages of documents. However, the method, by design, cannot provide 
explanations. For Latourians convinced by the claims of Latour to be examined below, creating 
a full description is analytically sufficient, but this supposition is not universally shared. Thus, 
conceptual augmentation must be applied to the ANT methodological framework, incorporating 
theories and concepts capable of capturing still more fully the material extent of RBMK no4’s 
agency and network. 
This chapter represents the inner workings of this research project, the engine that powers the 
vehicle. As such, it details Beck’s risk society approach as an adjustment to the Latourian 
intellectual project, subsequently exploring the relationship between Latour’s methodological 
apparatus and the concepts of sites, worlds and risk. Thus, this chapter merges the research’s 
literature review and methodological sections. Commonly, the two are dealt with separately, 
but, as a result of the ‘packaged’ nature of the central theory, Latour’s ANT, conceptual and 
methodological interests form a mutually reinforcing whole. Varied in application and diverse in 
theoretical contributions, ANT provides a researcher with a comprehensive toolset for any 
analytical endeavour, and its tenets shall be covered in due course.  
	  
The purpose of the chapter is hence to explore the governing principles of this research project; 
that is, to render visible the conceptual and methodological tools required to explore the 
Chernobyl accident, and to indicate the areas of academic enquiry to which it seeks to speak. 
This mélange of ideas, concepts and methods has produced an arguably unique outlook, and 
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led to unusual areas of investigation for a social scientist outside of certain specialised fields 
(such as science and technology studies (STS)). Accounts of nuclear reactors, ionising radiation, 
environmental physics and radiological protection systems form the empirical core of this 
research: complex, conflated and expansive hybrid objects/entities, imbued with controversies 
over their nature, ferocity and risk. The concept of risk features prominently, due to the impacts 
of the Chernobyl accident upon risk’s discourses and articulations. In order to account for this 
connection, and all of the above phenomena, a researcher must prioritise the ontological above 
all, believe that ‘we have never been modern’ (Latour 1993), understand the inner workings of 
scientific controversies, embrace network thinking, and evaluate the Beckian risk society. 
Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern (1993) is my starting point. It features the building 
blocks of ANT, and renders visible the connections between Latour’s philosophical negotiations 
and hallmark Latourian methodological tools. The move into the methodological discussion 
borrows from two further Latourian texts, namely Science in Action (1987) and Reassembling 
the Social: An introduction to Actor-Network Theory (2005). Works offering detailed 
summations of how to analyse the discourses of the hard sciences - as well as showing and how 
to utilise ANT; that is, how to become an ANT scholar. The discussion here also features extracts 
from Latour’s latest work, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns 
(2013), as a means of providing linkages between my appropriation of ANT and the most up-to-
date version of the approach.  
The next key text for me is Beck’s Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992), an influential 
book delineating his sociological approach for the evaluation of the concept of risk. The 
Chernobyl accident features prominently within Beck’s book, being used to vindicate aspects of 
his arguments. Beck’s work is rooted within social science analysis, but, it arguably lacks 
scientific credibility, as will be recounted later. Thus, through the use of an ANT analysis, the 
secondary objective of this research is to provide an ontology to Beck’s risk society formulation, 
with specific regards to the nuclear industry; that is, to attempt to connect Beck’s epistemological 
master narratives to the ontological works of the hard sciences. For this reason, at various points 
in what follows, I will deploy the slightly odd-sounding term ‘quasi-scientific’ to capture my own 
preferred position; that is, as a critical social scientist attempting to take seriously the ontological 
discoveries by the engineers/scientists of nuclear worlds. A traditional social science critique of 
the Chernobyl accident might shy away from the discourses — the papers, reports and bulletins 
— of the hard sciences, and instead focus on political/cultural representations. Thus, this quasi-
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scientific evaluation of the phenomenon attempts to fill what this thesis (as a whole) identifies as 
a lacuna present within social science’s understandings of the accident and RBMK no4. 
The final key text is Morton’s (2013) Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the 
World, a philosophical outlook on the new types of objects created in the present epoch. 
Generally speaking, Morton’s work seeks philosophically to explain how these ‘hyperobjects’ 
permeate throughout society, complicating existence by means of their unique materiality. At 
root, the notion of hyperobjects is used here to explain certain aspect of the Chernobyl accident, 
in that it highlights how RBMK no4’s evasive accomplice of radiation facilitated its infamy, and 
helped to engender the actions account for within the empirical core of this research. Finally, a 
short discussion will be provided, focusing on Schatski’s (2002) notion of the site, and Shaw’s 
(2012) concept of eventual geography, analytically bountiful conceptual constructs that have 
helped guide the methodological crosshairs of this research.  
2.1 The wider theoretical landscape: have we ever been modern?   
	  
So, where to begin? — why the middle of course — in Latour’s so-called ‘Middle 
Kingdom’ (Latour 1991). His pinpointing of the inherent paradox and subsequent conceptual 
blind-spots within the modernist constitution is captured by the assertion contained within the title 
of the text, We Have Never Been Modern (1993), paving the way to his amended ‘constitution’, 
a nonmodern constitution, one seeking to provide a permanent place of residence for the 
hybrids that the moderns have created but denied ‘official’ existence: ‘quasi-objects’ that 
invariably lead to the collapse of the moderns’ ‘invincibility’. Thus, what follows is a retracing of 
Latour’s key insights into the modern constitution, with reflections on the ramifications of these 
theoretical negotiations, as well as on the resulting methodological techniques. This account will 
be supplemented by an exploration into the varying spatialities implicated within ANT, the full 
picture then being the one that shapes the logic of how the empirical chapters that follow — and 
the respective spaces therein tackled — have been conceived. 
2.1.1 The Modern Constitution. 
	 	  
For reasons that will become clear, attention must first turn to separation: the ever present 
insistence of modernism. Latour contends that what he terms the ‘Modern Constitution’ insists 
upon a distinct separation between Nature and Society, all endowed with capitalised first letters 
to emphasise their supposed importance. This divide between the natural and the social worlds, 
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for the moderns, forms two distinct poles which must always be kept separate in order to be 
comprehensible. Moreover, the very concept of ‘modern’ also indicates a separation in terms of 
the passage of time, as the word’s meaning designates a break from what has come before. 
Latour argues that this ‘chronological separation‘ evokes notions of combat, in that the moderns 
(of the later twentieth century) have been victorious by defeating the premoderns and that their 
‘victory’ has led to the start of the modern era. This split results in one of many asymmetrical 
aspects of this school of thought. Latour goes so far as to state that the hypothesis of this entire 
intellectual project is that “the word ‘modern’ designates two sets of entirely different practices 
which must remain separate if they are to remain effective, but have recently begun to be 
confused” (1993,10). These two practices are the works of ‘translation’ and the works of 
‘purification’. The former is the process whereby new forms of mixtures are created from 
different aspects of nature, culture, and technology — the merging of these things creates 
hybrids, not quite natural nor totally social. The latter engenders what are taken to be two 
ontologically distinct zones with humans (Culture) on one side and nonhumans (Nature) on the 
other. To be truly modern one has to consider these two practices separately. Latour creates two 
terms, firstly to represent the product of the former process, networks; and secondly to 
summarise the character of the latter, “the modern critical stance” (1993, 11). 
	  
For Latour, the two practices of translation and purification within the modern constitution form a 
distinct spatial configuration. The first dichotomy between the two works of purification takes 
place ‘on the top’ and for Latour this division is vertical. The second is spatialised horizontally, 
situating it ‘below’ the first; this is the space where the works of translation occur. Thus, the first 
dichotomy keeps Nature and Culture, human and nonhuman, independent from each other, and 
the second keeps the works of translations distinct and separate from the first. Latour deploys a 
host of diagrammatic styles to visualise his arguments throughout We Have Never Been Modern 
(1993) to great effect — figure 2.1 delineates the works of purification and transition.	 
Figure 2.1: Latour’s graphical delineation of the works of purification and translation (Latour 
1993, 11) 
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This constitutional double separation results in the moderns’ denial of any link between these two 
processes; but this denial, for Latour, is untenable. He argues that we must reconnect all that has 
been separated within the modern critique, both ‘above’ and ‘below’, and only then will we 
have the ability to conceptualise a space for the complex mixtures of Nature and Culture — 
hybrid objects that have multiplied in number and complexity in the current epoch. At this 
juncture Latour introduces the prospect of the methodological concept of comparative 
anthropology. The fundamental ideas of such a method are alien to anyone who considers 
themselves to be truly modern, as only ‘premodern’ societies, ones which do not separate 
Nature and Culture into two distinct poles, can be analysed using the tenets of anthropology. 
Hence, to deploy a form of comparative anthropology to assess the current epoch, one must 
admit that they are not modern and embrace the works of purification and translation in 
tandem. In this sense, then, the present project is a pre-modern (or better amodern) 
anthropology of the Chernobyl event.  
This is not the place to elaborate upon the intricacies/guarantees of the Modern Constitution, 
but one crucial insight made by Latour alights upon the works of mediation, the processes which 
happen ‘down below’. The Modern Constitution facilitates the work of mediation, but it does not 
permit the conceptual merging of elements of Nature and Society, for the guarantee is in place 
to keep them permanently separate. Latour (1993, 34) argues that “the essential point of this 
modern Constitution is that it renders the work of mediation that assembles hybrids invisible, 
unthinkable, unrepresentable”. Thus, the hybrids that are created by mediation are therefore 
denied any form of official existence by the moderns, even though their constitution facilitates 
their creation. The dual processes of translation and mediation are closely linked to Latour’s 
concepts of intermediaries and mediators, covered below. For now, attention must be trained 
upon mediation. Within We Have Never Been Modern, Latour is rather vague when he cites the 
concept of mediation, with a fully realised account of his process of mediation provided in the 
years following this seminal text. His concept of “technical mediation” (Latour 1994) should be 
viewed as a means of clarifying the relationship between humans/machines and the process of 
mediation itself. In order to grasp this phenomena, the concept of translation must be brought 
into the equation. For Latour (1994, 32), translation is a “displacement, drift, invention, 
mediation, the creation of a link that did not exist before and that to some degree modifies two 
elements or agents”. Here, translation is the mutual modification between two entities, and thus 
mediation is now understood to be the product of an association — the link between, for instance 
human and machine. A mediation is therefore an association that alters an entity, changes its 
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form, orientation or ontology. The association between a master craftsman and a log of wood 
enacts a detailed mediation that results in a chair, table or bookcase.   
So what does all this mean? It may be accepted that if anyone considers themselves to be truly 
modern, they must believe in the promises laid out in the Modern Constitution. Latour has gone 
to great lengths to show the fallacy of such a belief, for, if we are convinced that the works of 
purification and mediation have no relation, that Nature, Society and God are forever to be 
kept separate, we realise that the Constitution creates two unsolvable paradoxes and denies the 
hybrids engendered during the processes of mediation any form of official existence (as Nature 
and Society never mix). Crucially, for this research, if we were to take the moderns at their 
word, believe fully in their doctrine, we would be unable to conceptualise the very object under 
analysis, the ruined, thoroughly ‘impure’ RBMK no4 of the Chernobyl NPP. As previously stated, 
the moderns, due to their need to break from all that has come before, cannot accept that any 
form of anthropology could be conducted in their era. However, the methodological framework 
of comparative anthropology would allow this piece of research firstly to represent the networks 
which swarm around the Chernobyl’s RBMK no4, and secondly, as a consequence, to 
reassemble how this nuclear non-human has travelled. 
	  
2.1.2 Hybrids and quasi-objects  
This section above has accounted for how the Modern Constitution allows for the proliferation of 
hybrids and guarantees their denial of official existence, and now attention turns to the 
significance, make-up and the importance of nonhumans/quasi-objects. Latour argues that the 
proliferation of hybrids has “saturated the constitutional framework of the moderns” (1993, 51), 
and at the outset of the book he uses the example of the hole in the Ozone layer to illustrate the 
potential make-up of a hybrid, shedding light on the heterogeneous — as in varyingly composed, 
materially multiple — networks that contribute to the engendering of this mixture of Nature and 
Society. The degrading of the Ozone above the physical Poles is a mixture of both the Natural 
and Social worlds. Swarming around it is a vast network, one which connects subjects, objects, 
places, institutions, governments and international agencies. 
	 	  
Objects are crucial to provide an ontology for hybrids. To avoid the pitfall of transcendence and 
the condemnation of these hybrids, and their networks, to the realm of epistemology, Latour 
introduces, and furthers, Serres’s (1993) concept of ‘quasi-objects’ and quasi-subjects. In short, 
this conceptual apparatus awards elements of hybrids a material form: Serres provides the 
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example of a game of football to highlight that quasi-objects are neither Natural nor Social, but 
are in fact a delicate mixture of both. He argues that the ball used in a game of football draws 
people together into particular sets of relations, also creating subsequent relations with other 
humans and nonhuman entities. Latour elaborates on these relationships thus: 
A ball is not an ordinary object, for it is what it is only if a subject holds it. Over there, on 
the ground, it is nothing; it is stupid; it has no meaning, no function, and no value.... 
Playing is nothing else but making oneself the attribute of the ball as a substance. The 
laws are written for it, defined relative to it, and we bend to these laws. (1993, 225-226) 
	  
From this extract we can begin to see the importance of quasi-objects and their potential to 
influence human action. Our (human) collectives are formed around objects; they bring them 
together and hold us in space. Each object has its own set of rules and functions which impact 
on how we interact with space, the object itself, and also each other. Levels of complexity 
inherent within an object’s configuration/manufacture do not automatically translate into higher 
amounts of impact or influence on human subjects.  
	  
Size is another issue: “Could the macro-actors be made up of micro-actors?” (Latour, 1993, 
121). Latour poses this question in relation to examples of huge institutions or companies, but the 
question still has relevance when posed in relation to quasi-objects, for their inclusion as actants 
within his theory forces one to ask identical questions to those directed at human actors. The 
quasi-object at the heart of this research, RBMK no4, when taken as a whole, was colossal in 
size and complexity; it drew thousands of people to it on a daily basis, and the only way for it 
to function safely, and correctly, was through the labour and care of skilled professional actors. 
Thus, these people were fundamentally connected to the object: they fed it, emptied it, repaired 
it, lived in it and risked their lives for it when it was sick. The purpose of drawing attention to 
‘global’ companies was Latour’s means of highlighting that the myth “of the soulless, agent-less 
bureaucracy” (1993, 121) offered nothing conceptually. The only way to explore the networks 
that stretch across the globe is to find instances when they are materially situated — physically 
sited and arranged — within space. Only then will we be able properly to represent their 
networks. This process is identical for the quasi-object of RBMK no4 — its physical spread of 
fallout was global, as was its ideological reach, yet one can readily identify the points in space 
where it ‘touched down’; this could be its radioactive fallout, or when its agency produced 
nodes of human action in distant sites. The site of the plant in Ukraine is where it all began, the 
space that played host to the geoevent, to be elaborated upon shortly, and the importance of 
the micro level actors/actants within this site must be reassembled in order to achieve a ‘faithful 
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representation’, one showing as much fidelity as possible to the heterogeneous materials, 
composed within the site and then subsequently scattered elsewhere. 
	  
In an attempt to visualise what effect these quasi-objects have on the Modern Constitution, 
Latour uses another diagram (figure 2.2). As the proliferation of hybrids (down below) results in 
the saturation of the traditional split between the two poles, Latour indicates that we must resist 
the moderns’ desire to think only in horizontal terms and instead chart quasi-objects on a new 
vertical line, one which awards them a place in both of the processes of translation/mediation 
and purification. This insight is vital to the entire quest to award hybrids and their quasi-objects 
an official place of residence, reconnecting of all that is separated in the Modern Constitution. 
The moderns have always practised the two processes of mediation and purification, but they 
have never been explicit about the interrelationship between the two of them. By thinking in 
both longitude and latitude terms, the tracing of any given hybrid’s coordinates will render this 
relationship visible, a core goal for the empirical chapters that follow. 
Figure 2.2: Latour’s graphical delineations of the proliferation of hybrids and quasi-objects 
(source: Latour 1993, 51) 
2.1.3 Expeditions in the ‘Middle Kingdom’	  
	  
Until this point my comments have alluded to Latour’s rejection of the inherent double separation 
of the Modern Constitution. Thus, armed with this logic, the ability to recognise the importance 
of the Middle Kingdom is awarded through careful adaptation:  
	 …the middle, where nothing is supposed to be happening, there is almost everything. 
	 And at the extremes - which according to the moderns house the origin of all forces, 	
	 Nature and Society, Universality and Locality - there is nothing expect purified agencies 
	 that serve as constitutional guarantees for the whole. (Latour, 1993, 123) 
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Imperative to this thesis project is the realisation that Latour is not calling for a ‘revolution’, 
because, according to him, the term has lost its impact. The notion of ‘adaptation’ is a far better 
means of articulating what he hopes to achieve. As he seeks to create the context for the 
application of a symmetrical comparative anthropology, he insists that the works of translation 
must be taken into account. This mode of thought reverses what the moderns proposed, for the 
works of purification should be treated as a final outcome, entities to be critiqued/analysed and 
not the starting point of enquiry. Nature and Society are therefore now, alternatively, cast as 
satellites revolving around collectives which produce things and people. They revolve around the 
Middle Kingdom. The general rule of symmetry has been partially explained above: “Nature 
and Society are to be explained. The explanation starts from quasi-objects” (Latour, 1993, 95). 
	  
This expedition into the Middle Kingdom, as should be clear, is a sustained assault on many 
principles of the Modern Constitution, for in its place Latour proposes what might instead be 
called the Nonmodern Constitution - drawing inspiration from the premodern (in their readiness 
to live and think hybridly) and also from those who can be deemed postmodern (in their 
readiness to critique modernity’s stark binaries). From all nonmoderns, he wishes to learn about 
the non-separability of things and signs, the multiplication of nonhumans and their belief in 
transcendence. The Nonmodern Constitution offers certain guarantees. The first insists upon the 
non-separability of quasi-objects and quasi-subjects. This guarantee places the work of mediation 
in the very centre of the two poles of Nature and Society, and through this promise networks 
come out of hiding: “The middle kingdom is represented. The third estate, which was nothing, 
becomes everything” (Latour, 1993, 140). The second guarantee is in place to stop us 
transgressing back into the realm of the nonmoderns, and it allows us to retain the first two 
guarantees of the Modern Constitution; with one crucial recognition, that they are not to be 
separated. In other words, Nature can be transcended (during the final analysis) and Society 
can be immanent. This guarantee is in place so that the networks rendered visible by the first 
guarantee are identifiable and controllable. The third guarantee is focused around temporal 
flow. It states that we should be free to combine associations without being restricted by having 
to choose between “archaism and modernisation, the local and global, the cultural and the 
universal, the natural and the social” (Latour, 1993, 141). This represents a distinct break from 
what Latour identifies as modern epistemology as we are no longer tied to ‘pre-packaged’ forms 
of knowing. The fourth guarantee is articulated as the most important. It states that the 
clandestine nature of the proliferation of hybrids is to be replaced by an agreed upon 
production system. In other words, it allows them to inhabit the now visible Middle Kingdom. 
This move results in the meticulous ability to assess and sort the proliferation of quasi-objects and 
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the networks that swarm around them, and, crucially, all of this can now happen ‘officially’ if 
we, researchers, recognise and believe in the Nonmodern Constitution. 
	  
Through these proposed guarantees, we, researchers, can begin to identify the analytical 
purchase designed into Latour’s philosophical project. Objects, particularly of the non-human 
varieties, have traveled a long and difficult road in their quest to be taken seriously within social 
science research, and We Have Never Been Modern signals an influential turning point. For the 
study of the Chernobyl accident, the ability to identify and assess a quasi-object is of imperative 
significance, as the entity at the centre of the network in question is a nuclear non-human, a 
hulking mass of nuclear grade metal and concrete, a crucible of irradiated material, a 
bewilderingly complex combination of Nature and Society. Thus, when the significance of 
objects to this research is articulated, we can clearly see the value in reassembling the 
philosophical negotiations of Latour, as they render visible the means to award such non-humans 
a legitimate place within an analytical endeavour. The relevance and proof of this claim will of 
course only become plain in the empirical chapters that follow. 
2.2 Uncertainties, associates and the wolf of context: the ANT methodological toolbox   
Much has been spoken about ANT methodology and this section delineates its key tenets. 
Reassembling the Social: An introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Latour 2005) masterfully 
represents Latour’s logic during the middle years of his intellectual project. Within the book’s 
pages, the approach of ANT is meticulously articulated, philosophically legitimised and 
relatively accessible practical directions are provided. Akin, if certainly not identical, to Marston 
et al’s (2005) flat ontology of scale ANT should be viewed as a ‘bottom up’ approach, a 
talisman of the material turn, one which facilitates the material landscape’s influence upon the 
narratives, theories and concepts of the ‘meta level’ (rather than the opposite way around). Of 
primary concern to Latour are the theoretical blockages that restrict an ontologically insistent 
study, or, in this instance, an ANT analysis. He argues that these blockages must be 
conceptually bypassed prior to analytical departure; and, when this new perspective is 
achieved, an ANT scholar can trace the material connections/associations of the network in 
question.  
	  
The first of these theoretical blockages revolves around the ambiguous epistemological construct 
of ‘the social’. Latour (2005) argues that the traditional, or ‘default’, approach in sociological 
research evokes a distinct conceptualisation of ‘the social’, one that affords it the ability to be 
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utilised as an explanatory term. This movement away from epistemological ‘explanatory 
concepts’ is a key feature of Latour’s intellectual project. For Latour, this understanding of the 
social has facilitated its use as a stabiliser of sorts, a type of ‘material’ that comes pre-packaged 
with ties, expectations and ready made ‘contexts‘ to account for the social aspects of non-social 
activities and phenomena. In other words, the social pertains to a domain somehow separate 
from the specific and detailed claims of economics, psychology, geography and so on — one 
that has the slippery ability to insert itself into the existence of any phenomenon, ‘social’ or non, 
in an attempt to explain aspects of it. This fundamental theorisation of the social is the bedrock 
upon which the commonsensical approach within sociology is erected: Latour refers to this 
default method as a “sociology of the social” (2005, 10).   
	  
By insisting that the social can be viewed as a material form of glue that holds our societies 
together, as well as a stabilising agent, the concept designates two separate and entirely 
different things: “first, a movement during a process of assembling; and second, a specific type 
of ingredient that is supposed to differ from other materials” (Latour, 2005, 1). This taken-for-
granted tenet of the default approach creates troublesome ontological issues: asking how the 
mysterious entity of the social can indeed form a distinct domain of reality, one which has the 
ability to stabilise and explain non-social phenomena, and yet its composition is not comprised 
by elements inherent within the periodic table? It has no objective existence. It could be argued 
that regarding the social in such a manner places it in the same perplexing category as dark 
matter and energy — astrophysicists think we know that it exists, we think we know it has an 
effect on us, but we are unable scientifically to identify its ontology. 
	  
Latour’s means of combating these issues inherent within the default method of sociological 
enquiry is the creation and promotion of a second approach. He states that his new mode of 
analysis emphatically rejects the tenets of the first. Akin to his ‘recalibration’ of Nature and 
Society within We Have Never Been Modern (1993), he is now attempting to show that the 
social can never be used as an explanation. To put it rather crudely, it must always itself be 
explained, a reversal of usual social-scientific thought. Gone are the ideas of the social being a 
circulating adhesive capable of grouping society, to be replaced with the recognition that the 
‘social’ is what is glued together by a heterogeneous range of connections and associations. In 
other words, the social is never to be conceptualised as a ‘thing’ or ‘entity’, but instead treated 
as “a type of connection between things that are not themselves social” (Latour, 2005, 5). This 
philosophical negotiation is important for the wider ANT project, as it characterises the very 
character of the approach; that is, phenomena cannot be explained by means of non-
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identifiable epistemological constructs, but rather these once ‘useful’ theoretical apparatuses are 
precisely what have to be explained through material analysis.  	  
	  
Latour (2005, 20) calls this new approach a “sociology of associations”. He proposes that 
sociological enquiry should be focused upon tracing connections and associations in an attempt 
to describe a reassembling of the social. This new intellectual project has the ability to cast aside 
the belief that hidden forces lurk behind our reality and formation of social aggregates. It 
problematises the often taken-for-granted understanding of what it means to be social. It is 
important to state that the rejection of said ‘hidden forces’ results in a much slower paced form 
of research. The habit of appealing to the ‘social’ or ‘society’ demands “a sudden acceleration 
in description” (Latour, 2005, 22), but ANT studies do not enjoy such luxuries. A sociology of 
associations does not traverse the landscape through means of ‘aviation’, imposing grandiose 
meta-level framing prior to field work; instead, it has to hike the trails and back roads of the 
material landscape — taken seriously its piper and vents, bodies and biomes — in its attempt to 
reach the analytical goal of a full(er) description. This version of sociology results in a 
fundamental reversal in the role of the actors within ANT, as it is believed that they are the only 
ones with the legitimacy to define, order and reassemble the social. 
	 	  
One of the fundamental ideas of Latour’s intellectual project is the differentiation between 
‘intermediaries’ and ‘mediators’. The origin of these concepts occurred in We Have Never Been 
Modern (1993), but Latour has finessed their conceptualisation, significance and utilisation over 
the years (Latour 2005, 2009, 2010). For Latour, an intermediary is a person or object that 
transports meaning without transforming it. He links this concept to that of ‘black boxes’, 
introduced in Science in Action (1987). As intermediaries do not transform or translate the 
information that they transport, we can view an intermediary as a provider of a faithful 
representation, a singular ‘voice’ supplying a validated meaning. Mediators, on the other hand, 
are arguably more interesting, being the translators of input; and we must always assess their 
specificity and positionality when attempting to assess their input-output nexus. To put it rather 
plainly, ANT scholars are most interested in mediators, while practitioners of the default 
approach, the Modern Constitutionalists, seek to research intermediaries. This statement is a 
little misleading as both approaches could be looking into the same phenomena or actor. Thus, 
in an attempt for clarity, we must understand the importance of how one treats or recognises the 
varying tools and methods deployed by the actors during the construction of social aggregates. 
For ANT, mediators are the rule and intermediaries are the rare exception. Indeed mediators 
can be ‘dangerous’, as in the case of the Chernobyl NPP accident, where the Soviet Union and 
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the station’s chief operators routinely mediated the severity of the accident for their own 
interests.  
	  
A recurring theme within ANT, and its methodological toolset, is the insistence that anything 
accountable within the research process must be visible or at least accessible to the senses (to 
be sense-ible). Therefore, if one seeks to account for an agency that has affected the action of 
an actor, it cannot be ‘hidden behind the scenes’ — to appeal to such an entity would not be in 
keeping with the ANT corpus. If someone mentions an agency, then, if they consider themselves 
to be an ANT scholar, they must provide an account of its resulting action, which can be 
achieved by means of following the observable traces left by both the agency and the action. 
Latour (2005, 53) summaries this insight as follows: “If it has no vehicle to travel, it won’t move 
an inch, it will leave no trace, it won’t be recorded in any sort of document”. This recognition is 
linked to the aforementioned ‘infra-language’ of analysts and the rejection of the belief that they 
are the only ones capable of possessing the conceptual skills to identify a context. By awarding 
situated actors the ‘privilege’ of accounting for the agencies that have influenced their actions, 
an ANT scholar lets the actors do the work. Latour offers the concept of “practical metaphysics” 
(2005, 51) in a bid to characterise this new mode of enquiry. 
	  
Latour introduces a third uncertainty that awards the objects of our collectives a form of agency, 
a radical departure from the sociology of the social. For the study of the Chernobyl accident, 
this third uncertainty is of key relevance, for the dominant actor within the network here is an 
object, otherwise referred to as the nuclear non-human. Akin to his attempts at achieving a 
symmetrical departure point for analytical enquiry in We Have Never Been Modern (1993), 
Latour not only elaborates upon the agencies within objects, but also casts the work of power 
and domination in the same manner as the social — they need to be explained. Much like the 
two poles of Nature and Society, the asymmetries created by power and domination should be 
the end product of the research process, never confusing the “explanandum with the 
explanas” (Latour, 2005, 63). To paraphrase Latour, if we are to account for the asymmetries of 
power and domination, without appealing to ‘social forces’, we must expand our analysis to 
other actors, namely objects. These non-social entities lend their ontological existence to our 
collectives, and they are the things that to help bind them together. If ANT is the method of 
following the actors, then we, as researchers, should extend this injunction to assess how they 
negotiate the material landscape, assessing how they interact with the many objects which they 
use and with which they live in tandem.  
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Latour’s further concept of ‘actant’ finds conceptual footing when queries about the agency and 
‘legitimacy’ of objects come into focus. Latour states that any thing which has an effect on the 
state of affairs but has yet to be subjected to figuration is an actant. Laurier and Philo state that 
the purpose of this term is to set it apart from actors, thus “signal[ing] a definition of the term 
that does not rule out nonhumans as valid (social) agents comparable with humans” (1999, 
1048). One of the fundamental tasks that an ANT scholar must perform before the analysis has 
begun is the identification of who and what form of the grouping surrounds any form of action. 
This is not to say that ANT wishes to group participants into a neat preordained ‘system’, but is 
more of a practical methodological point. In order to begin a research project on any topic, 
prospective ‘participants’ must be identified. Once the exploration of the actors has begun, the 
pool of actors (both human and non) will be directed and expanded by the data collected in the 
field. The inclusion of non-human actors thus creates a symmetrical framework for ANT’s 
conceptualisation of actors. That said, ANT is not proposing a symmetry between the 
philosophical ‘standing’ or value of humans and objects: they are not somehow taken to be 
exactly the same, equivalent order of ‘stuff’ in the world. All that is being proposed is a 
symmetrical starting point which rejects notions such as the priority of human intentionality and a 
material realm filled simply with causal relations.   
	  
The key issue presented by the inclusion of objects within the concept of actors is that they only 
help trace social connections intermittently, since their actions may be continuous or 
discontinued, and the nature of the object determines to which of these modes of action it 
conforms. ANT must be able to account for when objects give ‘weight’ to social ties, as well as 
the points when nonhumans fade into the background. Much like invisible agencies and non-
performative groups, if an object leaves no trace and has no discernible effect on the state of 
affairs, it cannot be accounted for by ANT. To counter this issue, Latour adds several tools to the 
ANT repertoire as a means of rendering visible the multiple associations when objects act, but 
when their visibility is compromised by time, space or mediators.  
	  
One such tool is attention to occasions when objects break. When an object rapidly changes its 
ontological existence, it also flips from intermediary to mediator. In keeping with the Chernobyl 
example, when the station was functioning as designed, its input/output nexus could be classed 
as a ‘black box’ — uranium went into the core and, electricity was produced by the turbines (an 
incredibly simplified version of the process of creating energy from nuclear fission). Other than 
the actors tasked with feeding and caring for the station, it faded into the background and the 
network swarming around it was limited. However, after the disaster its ‘black box’ status was 
 48
relinquished; its input was the same but the products of its output were markedly different from 
its original design. Now its network grew exponentially to encompass a vast range of native and 
foreign actors and mediators. Thus, the explosion and resulting change in the station’s agency 
mobilised actors within its material landscape, but also attracted a vast new network of 
mediators, all of which left vivid traces of the new associations as they attempted to mitigate the 
accident.  
2.2.1 Latourian tools (and questions of scale/space) 
	  
A material turn demands the rejection of epistemological categories, a priori conceived 
categories with vague world referents, and a reclamation of ontological concerns. Marston et 
al’s (2005) critique of scale and consequent promotion of a site-based ontological approach to 
geographical enquiry sought to reject the epistemological categories of local/global when 
understood ‘hierarchies’ (the latter determines the former) and somehow clearly distinct from 
one another  — a task that Latour has also taken up. He states that, although we inhabit a 
‘local’, we cannot deny that many influences within such a spatial zone come from other, more 
distant sites. In other words, agencies from distant sites transgress space and inhabit ‘local’ 
settings. Latour hence argues that to concern oneself with local ‘interactions’ is not befitting of 
an ANT enquiry (Latour 2005, 2011), perhaps a slightly strange statement about a theory that 
insists upon the following of actors within the material landscape, but to view it in such a 
simplistic manner does not do the logic justice.  
	  
Once again, this logic returns to Latour’s critique of the default approach, the Modern 
Constitution and its desire to ‘meta-up’ in a bid to explain aspects of the material world. Hence, 
when a sociology of the social meets a phenomenon within the ‘local’ setting, it seeks to explain 
it through the imposition of context; but this move, for Latour, is untenable as the abstracted 
(analyst-led) contextualisation has no ontological existence. Thus, the analysis is dragged from 
the material world into the epistemic planes of the meta or the global. This binary between the 
two scalar constructs offers nothing analytically and results in a flawed approach. For, when the 
research focuses upon the ‘local’, a contextual setting is seemingly required, and when said 
structured context is invoked it necessarily departs from the real and embodied experiences of 
the actors (or actants). This micro/macro debate renders several modes of enquiry lacking, but 
the fundamental principles of ANT provide a solution. If one is to consider the actor and the 
network that swarms around it simultaneously, the ability to traverse space from the one site to 
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another is granted. The traces left by the interactions and associations of actors not only link 
previously ‘local’ and ‘global’ concerns, but also facilitate the actor-led contextualisation of their 
situation. This results in Latour arguing the impossibility of staying in either of the binary 
opposites:  
If there is no way to stay in either place it simply means that those places are not to be 
reached — either because they don’t exist at all or because they exist but cannot be 
reached with the vehicle offered by sociology. (2005, 170) 
What this means for ANT is the identification of yet another controversy upon which to feed. The 
desire to ‘scale jump’ from the micro to the macro should be viewed as an opportunity for ANT. 
As it is impossible to inhabit either of them for any length of time, they instead form an entirely 
different phenomenon. The pace of an ANT enquiry is slow and methodical, since the scholar 
has to trail constantly across the nooks and crannies of the material landscape; thus, appealing 
to the macro scale is another means of speeding up enquiry, as it represents an attempt to 
explain by means of a prior epistemological construct. If we accept that interactions within the 
material landscape are overflowing with diverse and far-reaching agencies, they can therefore 
be traced by means of their application and consequential existence in distant sites/spaces. 
Subsequently, this process articulates the network during the methodological practice; that is, 
the act of tracing associations between actors discloses the network, hence resisting the desire to 
contextualise.  
	  
The rejection of meta-level explanations thus renders the research two-dimensional; for, if one 
cannot appeal to the vertical plains, in essence a rejection of the hierarchical model of scale, 
one must gain ANT-compatible data within the flatlands of the material landscape. In other 
words, through the insistence on accounting for the ontological, the desire to appeal to the 
epistemological is quelled, and the analysis can reside comfortably within the material realm. 
The final part of this section is hence tasked with elaborating on the last three Latourian 
methodological tools, finalising the methods deployed in this research. The first tool seeks to 
localise the global, the second attempts to redistribute the local, and the final utensil of the ANT 
toolbox connects the sites of the first two tools. 
	  
The first tool for connecting sites together involves following the processes of translation covered 
above. This alludes to the necessity of following mediators as they transport translations across 
space and consequently describing the networks in which they participate — a time-consuming 
and difficult empirical exercise. The main analytical pitfall that must be resisted here is indeed 
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the desire to ‘jump’ up to an analyst-designed context. As ANT prefers to inhabit a flat, two-
dimensional material landscape, the transportation metaphor finds further relevance, for the 
ANT scholar must be able to identify the means, or vehicle, through which any action is 
transported. “The tyranny of distance” (Latour, 2005, 174) implicit within a flat ontology of 
scale is the main methodological stumbling block that ANT has to overcome, and Latour creates 
a series of ‘clamps’ as a means of keeping said flat ontological framework. These clamps do not 
describe what is being mapped, they simply facilitate the process and, rather, they are simply 
practical tools. 
	  
The first clamp is the concept of the Oligopticon (2005, 181). This tool provides a framework for 
mapping the relations between the micro and the macro scale. ANT seeks to dispel the belief 
that the micro scale is encased within the macro, but instead promotes the logic that everything 
happens on the micro scale and that the traces left by the interconnectivity of sites are the key 
empirical data for ANT. Thus, a “structure-making site” (2005, 176), one which would have 
traditionally been classified as playing an important ‘macro’ role, must be shown to have 
linkages and connections to other sites. If these links are invisible, or non-existent, it ceases to be 
a structure-making site. In other words, to achieve relativist scale, we have to describe a site as 
being neither above nor below the interactions that we seek to explore — there is only flat 
interconnectedness. 
	  
It is no surprise that ANT stemmed from the study of the hard sciences as there is no better 
example of this process. A laboratory is an incredibly ‘small’ spatial site in the grand scheme of 
things, but what it produces could have the potential to connect sites across the entire world. A 
university research facility which finds the cure for cancer will in effect connect all cancer 
treatment centres of the world. To categorise these types of sites, Latour introduces the concept 
of Oligopticon, an inversion of Foucault’s (1977) use of Bentham’s Panopticon. Oligopticons are 
the exact opposite of the idealised prison, being sites that see too little to feed the 
obsessionalism of those in charge and the paranoia of the inspected, but what they do see they 
see with unrivalled clarity and focus. Their narrow view can lead to their easy identification in 
space and time, and as long as the ANT scholar can trace how their translations overcome the 
tyranny of distance to describe how they are connected to other sites, they form the first clamp 
of flatness. Thus, Latour (2005) states that, if one can see the effects of their connectedness, an 
ANT scholar should ask stock questions about the material location of their existence in a bid to 
locate the Oligopticons. 
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The second clamp is referred to as Panoramas (Latour 2005). These methodological constructs 
grant actors the privilege of defining their own context and relative scale, consequently 
rewarding the analyst with data during the process. Latour argues that scale is in effect a zoom-
like function and one that should be put in the hands of the actor situated in the site/network. It 
is through their use (or misuse) of said function that the importance of Panoramas comes into 
focus. Unlike the Oligopticons, Panoramas see everything, but they also see nothing at the same 
time since what they delineate is a mediated version of events. These could take the form of a 
documentary, a newspaper article or editorial, a travel guide, or a report of an international 
body seeking to account for the radioactive deposition from RBMK no4. Panoramas use the 
zoom function of scale to connect the material landscape to macro level forces, consequently 
‘educating’ on how to consume them. Their totalising view of the state of affairs should be taken 
seriously and handled with care. They are local sites that translate information and 
(mis)represent it in a manner which fits the ideological viewpoint of their creators; an ANT 
analysis must always treat Panoramas as complex and dangerous mediators. Once again, in a 
bid to capture the presence of a Panorama, ANT must ask the same materially locating 
questions covered above.  
	  
The two tools of the Oligopticon and Panoramas allow ANT studies to localise the global within 
the two-dimensional flatlands of enquiry and trace their associations and connectedness. Of 
crucial importance is the realisation that, if these two tools are rigorously deployed the 
asymmetries of power, hierarchy and domination can be described as a final product. This move 
results in the reclamation of ‘context’, again only as a final product, never an explanation. The 
Latourian project of seeking symmetry rears its head once again when dealing with the second 
tool tasked with redistributing the local. For if the global/macro does not exist unless it has been 
brought back to the material level, how is the local generated? To answer this question, Latour 
states that the local has to be “re-dispatched and redistributed” (2005, 192). In other words, his 
promotion of a doubly symmetrical process paves the way for the realisation that the connectors 
between the two processes comprise an entirely new phenomenon for research purposes. 
	  
Latour argues that simply believing local interactions to be shaped by existing elements tells us 
nothing about their origin or nature. Thus, if one rejects this belief, an ANT study can then 
search for the materially traceable existence of connections between sites of production. This 
mode of thought must recognise that the course of action is invariably affected by a diverse 
range of human and, more importantly, non-human actors. An ANT scholar must reserve the 
right to pursue a wide range of agencies, and to resist the temptation to pre-impose a limit on 
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what can and cannot be considered an actor or actant. Latour introduces the terms of 
articulators or localisers (2005, 194) in an attempt to articulate how the influence of local sites 
can be transported into other ones. This transport can be achieved through the agencies of non-
humans as they are bestowed with a form of quasi-agency from their human creators. For 
example, the seats at a football stadium partially dictate the actions of the people who attend. 
This point connects the spaces of the architect’s workshop and the designer’s agency to that 
specific location, linking the two local sites through the movement of subtle, yet effective 
agencies. These background agencies begin to highlight the analytical pitfall of face-to-face 
(human) interactions, as every local space embraces a diverse range of influences and agencies 
which will affect the actions of the actors in question. 
	 	  
The final methodological tool of relevance here is focused around how the ANT corpus connects 
the sites relocated and redistributed by the previous two tools. The first tool/move relocated the 
macro/context into the local, which allowed it to form a two-way process. The second tool/move 
allowed for the transportation of sites into one another through the diverse agencies which span 
space and time. Now that we have an understanding of the necessity of utilising these two tools, 
Latour states that the prize for ANT becomes visible, a third phenomenon. Sites have been 
implicated and transformed into actor-networks, and so the connections and their vehicles come 
into focus. Now it is hypothetically possible to account for every translation, mediation and 
assembling without jumping to a meta-level explanation. The price that must be paid for this new 
ability is slow and meticulous research. Nothing is taken for granted and everything must be 
reassembled.  
	  
In the context of the Chernobyl accident and the analysis of the transgressions of RBMK no4, 
ANT provides a scholar with the necessary theoretical and methodological tools to take 
seriously the agency of this infamous nuclear non-human. The method’s insistence upon situating 
analysis within the material realm, alongside its lineage within science studies (Latour 1987), 
allows a research project to resist the temptation of trying to explain this complex scientific/
engineering phenomena by means of social theory, and instead facilitates the following of the 
actors drawn to the accident. These actors are highly educated within scientific/engineering 
domains, and they are therefore professionally attuned to the intricacies of the accident. What 
must indeed be apparent at this stage is that ANT promotes a following of actors, as they are 
the best placed people to reassemble the situation within which they find themselves. In the case 
of a techno-scientific accident of the magnitude of Chernobyl, this direction finds relevance to the 
effect that the researcher’s role is then largely as a mediator; an act of constant slow retrieval, 
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reordering and redescription, seeking to preserve material ontologies in the face of demands for 
epistemological apriorism.    
2.2.2 Latour’s clarification 
The methodological apparatus covered thus far could be classed as ‘middle Latour’; that is, the 
delineation of ANT from the works he produced during a distinct period of his intellectual 
project. He has, however, provided numerous clarifying statements in the years since, 
culminating in his most recent book An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the 
Moderns (2013). This section is tasked with reinforcing the researcher’s appropriation of ANT 
by means of Latour’s later clarifications — most notably, his refined network concept. Latour’s 
Modes of Existence is a masterful call to arms and summation of his intellectual project. It could 
be viewed as an ambitious request from a philosopher to his readership to help him to complete 
the work that he started, but which he is unable to finish, alone. In order fully to prepare his 
potential research assistants, he further hones his methodological apparatus, and most relevant 
to this research is his updated delineation of a network — his network — and how it can be used 
for analytical purposes: 
The advantage of the term, despite all the criticisms to which it has been subjected, is that 
it can easily be represented in material terms (we speak of sewage networks, cable 
networks, spy networks); that it draws attention to flows without any confusion between 
what is being displaced and what makes the displacement possible (an oil pipeline is no 
more made ‘of’ gasoline than the internet is made ‘of’ emails); and, finally, that it 
establishes such a powerful constraint of continuity that a minor interruption can be 
enough to cause a breakdown (a leak in an oil pipeline forces the operator to shut the 
valves; a three-meter displacement in a WiFi zone results in a lost connection: there is no 
longer any ‘network coverage’) (Latour, 2013, 31) 
From this extract one can deduce that a double movement exists, in that a network is the product 
of a network. Thus, when viewing a network in this manner, two distinct stages appear: one of 
construction and one of functionality. Take, for example, the Ukrainian electricity national grid, 
prior to the Chernobyl disaster. This electrical network was indeed not made of electricity, but 
rather comprised a vast and complex melée of wires, transformers and power stations. If, say, 
one sought to study the electrical usage of each household in Kiev, this network of things, object 
and non-humans, would have to be functioning as designed, while the end product of the labour 
would be the second stage; that is, the network of electricity itself that fed into each household 
and the consequential human practices that it enabled.  
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Latour (2013, 32) clarifies this simple, yet somehow deceptively elusive, distinction by stating 
that “what circulates when everything is in place cannot be confused with the setups that make 
circulation possible”. Thus, the identification of which network is under analysis is of paramount 
importance, although Latour states that a comprehensive ANT analysis will incorporate both 
senses of a network. This conceptual reconfiguration provides ANT with a more accurate reticle, 
but it is of limited applicability to this research. Rather, the analytical purchase is found when 
Latour details situations when networks, in the second, complete sense, break, and the two 
stages subsequently converge. When the supply of a service is unexpectedly cut off, the 
logistical network tasked with performing the delivery of the service is brought into focus, and 
attention moves on to its ontological form. When situations like this occur:  
	 Everyone then sets out to explore all over again the set of elements that have to be 	
	 knitted together if there is to be a ‘resumption of deliveries’. Have you anticipated that 
	 link between the Ukraine and cooking your risotto?… Behind the concept of network, 
	 there is always that movement, and that surprise. (Latour, 2013, 35) 
The need to be analytically accurate and mobile is a prerequisite of a research project of this 
kind; in that, different domains must be visited, depending on the ‘state’ of the network under 
scrutiny — network of construction or functionality. In order to maintain freedom of movement 
across the network, Latour states that one must remain attentive to the heterogeneity of the 
visible associations and identify the types of value that are circulating within the network in 
question. It is at this juncture that the concept of risk becomes central.  
Risk, in the discourse — the arguments, the texts, the pronouncements — of both the social 
sciences and the hard sciences, permeates throughout every empirical chapter below, each 
dealing with a different domain’s identification, articulation and mobilisation of risk. Every 
action taken after the explosion was tasked with mitigating risk on some level, be it minimising 
the risk of radioactive exposure to the surrounding populations (or further afield) or the 
mitigation of the risk of another mechanical malfunction. Thus, when fused with RBMK no4’s new 
agency, risk, in its numerous manifestations, is the value of the network. It is the finalised 
property that explains the diverse and complex nodes of actions accounted for throughout this 
research. Actor A travels to site X, she then speaks to Actor B and subsequently performs action 
Y upon object Z. This action is technical in nature and involves assessing the materiality of object 
Z, and the end product of this series of associations between humans, sites and non-humans is 
the translation of the accrued information into a risk assessment format; that is, the language 
that connects the ontological to the epistemological, the nuclear non-human to the risk. 
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The final tool of relevance here is the significance that Latour places upon passes and 
continuities/discontinuities. Each domain of concern has its own language and systems of 
conveying meaning, and Latour uses the example of the legal domain to illustrate this point. For 
Latour, a ‘pass’ is an association that only members of that domain can identify; that is, the 
transportation of value in a format that only trained actors can understand. Latour (2013, 39) 
states that: 
       …a pass particular to law; something that leaps from one step to the next in the work of 
	 procedure or in the extraction of means. In short, there is a particular type of connection, 
	 of association, that we are going to have to learn how to qualify. 
In this instance he is referring to meaning that is conveyed in a manner that usually only lawyers 
can understand, feeding into his arguments around continuity and the reaching of it through a 
series of discontinuities. Latour argues that, for an outsider to a domain, continuity is reached by 
means of a seemingly unconnected series of discontinuities — the language/terminology that is 
deployed is obtuse and, without prior knowledge, said outsider is unable to decipher how 
continuity has been reached. A probabilistic calculation of a specific risk represents a continuity; 
for instance, the end product of a series of actions. These actions are performed by actors 
trained with the expertise required to make the calculations for reaching this end goal. When 
this process is either discursively represented, or even merely heard during a conversation 
between said actors, the linkages between these specific actions, discontinuities and the finalised 
continuity will not readily present themselves. For the outsider, the puzzle of how A + B + C = D 
cannot be solved without first understanding the meaning of the passes being made. The only 
way to render visible the intricacies of the riddle, and to identify the values of the associations, is 
to envelop oneself within the discourses and literatures of the domain under scrutiny. In the case 
of this research, it resulted in my immersion in the teaching of nuclear engineering, nuclear 
physics environmental physics, and diverse sciences of radiological protection. This process has 
resulted in my ability to identify how A + B + C = risk.  
2.2.3 The era of the nonhuman 
As the central entity of this research is a vast machine, the nuclear nonhuman of RBMK no4, 
more attention must be placed upon philosophical projects that take seriously the role of objects 
within worlds. This subsection tackles a possible lacuna within the literature covered in this 
chapter, as it assesses the works of influential human geographers operating within the area of 
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object-orientated ontology, scholars who explore the turbulent existence of nonhumans within 
both geographical research and more general philosophical life. An influential figure within 
human geography’s movement away from reductionist dualisms (and also embracing of ANT) is 
Hinchliffe, who has written extensively within the realms of posthumanistic geographies. In his 
book Geographies of Nature: Societies, Environments, Ecologies (2007), Hinchliffe approaches 
the heterogenous topic of ‘Nature’ and its complicated relationship with human geography. At 
the outset he states that, “Simply put, this book is about how nature is ‘done’, how it is practised, 
how it materialises as an active partner in and through those practices” (Hinchliffe 2007, 1). 
Generally speaking, the book is Hinchliffe’s attempt to argue a place for nature in human 
geography, in so doing its conceptualisation through a distinctly Latourian lens, and arming the 
discipline with new theoretical and methodological equipment to analyse ‘nature’ in the more-
than-human era. Hinchliffe argues that the term ‘nonhuman’ should not be viewed as a direct 
reinscription of ‘nature’, but rather signals “a worldliness of worlds, suggesting that cultures and 
societies are shaped by more than human geographies” (Hinchliffe et al 2005, 3). The 
emphasis, once again, is to break from the binary choice between human action and the ‘pole’ 
of nature, and instead to pursue an understanding of the interaction between the worlds of 
humans and nonhumans. For Hinchliffe (2007), the traditional possibilities of independence and 
dependence — that is, a nature that is independent of human agency, and one that is a construct 
of society — have to be replaced by a realisation that these supposedly once separate constructs 
are in fact two sides of the same coin. He argues that “there are numerous ways in which the 
world is read that are socially sensible, but the world itself carries on regardless… once you get 
beyond these surface scratches, nature stays the same” (2007, 36). These philosophical 
negotiations are influenced by Latour’s thinking on the separation of the poles of Nature and 
Society, emphasised by Hinchcliffe’s routine citing of Latourian arguments. He reaches similar 
philosophical conclusions to Latour, with regards too how ideologies surrounding nature and 
society have traditionally been used as a means of explaining situations, phenomena and events 
in the world. He consequently argues for a methodological trajectory that problematises these 
once static explanatory categories. Here, the metaphor of hybridity takes on a renewed 
importance: 
  
	 …it allows for novelty to be produced. Novelty that is not reducible to component parts.                 
	 Indeed, parties do not simply interact to produce a new (impure) form. Rather, in 	
	 relating, the parties and the product must change too… Nothing remains unaltered in the 
	 event of relating. (Hinchcliffe 2007, 51) 
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The concept of hybridity thus facilitates the recognition that both human and nonhuman entities 
are moulded and shaped by relations, becoming hybrid through interaction with others. This 
interest in more-than-human geographies has prompted Hinchliffe to tackle several areas that 
feature distinct mixtures of humans and nonhumans, ranging from: explorations on ‘living 
cities’ (Hinchliffe and Whatmore 2006) that reorientate traditional urban analysis, so as to take 
seriously the desire to abandon spatial/philosophical divisions; to ecological examinations of 
urban areas and their green spaces (Hinchliffe et al 2005), as well as the wider landscapes 
(Whatmore and Hinchliffe 2010). His more recent works explore the concept of biosecurity, an 
ambiguous construct that, once again, firmly places nonhuman agency within the realms of 
human existence and practice.  
For Hinchliffe, the active practices of biosecurity vary from country to country, but at root, the 
term refers to the actions taken to limit the transgressions of biological nonhumans into the 
human population (Bingham et al 2008).  The term ‘biosecurity’ can be used as a means of 
justifying, characterising, explaining or rationalising practices that limit and order the lives of a 
population. In the UK, the foot and mouth outbreak represents a prime example of 
biosecuritisation of livestock, human practice and policy (Hinchliffe and Bingham 2008). One 
could say, for example, that, in the interests of ‘biosecurity’, livestock from farm A, B and C, 
must be culled in order to limit/eradicate the potential human exposure to a transmutable 
disease. The term becomes an umbrella means of grouping together heterogeneous nodes of 
action that span several spheres of social life, but ultimately result in limiting the movements of 
humans and nonhumans. Thus, as with so many aspects of this research, Latourian logic is 
relevant; that is, analytically, the term ‘biosecurity’ must never be used as an explanation. 
Instead, it is precisely what must be explained, its network charted and actors followed to 
reassemble the relations and associations that co-mingle to produce the restrictions on human 
and nonhuman existence.  
The above UK example features a mixture of human and biological nonhumans, notably 
livestock, and aspects of the Chernobyl disaster could be classed as action pertaining to 
‘biosecurity’ matters. Chapter 5 accounts for the material spread and deposition of caesium 
from the NPP across Europe, or, in other words, the invasion of a nonhuman into the spaces of 
human populations. The resulting measurements of deposition, the mapping process, and the 
subsequent restrictions on livestock, and farmland, could be framed as actions tasked with 
insuring biosecurity in the face of a radioactive nonhuman agent. Furthermore, chapter 6 
accounts for the LNT debate — the gold standard of radiological protection and the debate 
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around its continued usefulness. This debate features a melting pot of issues, interests and 
agencies, all focused around the biological impacts of ionising radiation at low doses. This 
phenomena links nonhumans (ionising radiation), the human population, and a vast array of 
national, international and research institutions, all in a delicately interwoven network of 
biosecuritisation.   
Diseases are of primary concern within biosecurity matters, and as a result they permeate 
Hinchliffe’s work. He argues (2013, 201) that the emergence of diseases:  
[l]inks together financial institutions, consumer habits, populations growth, environmental 
change, large food corporations, viruses, genetic and breeding technologies, chickens, and 
so on.  
For Hinchliffe, the agency of an emergent disease impacts throughout a host of domains, the 
reverberations of which are felt by humans and nonhumans alike. This attention to how a 
microscopic nonhuman, that of a disease, can dictate large swathes of human action renders 
visible the necessity of taking seriously the impacts of nonhumans, big and tiny. Traditionally, 
such a role has been only been filled by a human actor, a sentient being that is capable of 
tailoring its action output to operate in, through and among the spheres of existence mentioned 
above. More-than-human geographical research, particularly that which explores biosecurity 
matters, highlights that the agency of some nonhumans can be even more impactful than that of 
their human counterparts; in that they cannot be reasoned or bargained with, and come 
packaged with very real, and dangerous material consequences for biological entities. Thus, in 
some rare instances, nonhumans should be viewed as at the very centre of being: without such a 
recognition, their damaging impacts can be underestimated.  
RBMK no4 is the central actant within this research — a broken mass of twisted steel, nuclear 
grade concrete, graphite and uranium. It cannot speak, ponder the purpose of life or 
independently move any of its appendages. It is not a sentient being, but, as this research 
highlights, its lack of interventional human agencies has not stopped it traveling and impacting 
upon its sentient counterparts in countless different ways. It has shattered and created worlds, 
helped mould new paradigms of risk, evoked biological mutations in human populations, and 
sparked debates within the sciences. It is one of the most influential human-made nonhumans 
that the world has ever witnessed, a status ‘earned’ by means of its material potency and the all-
encompassing nature of its travels. More-than-human geographical research has highlighted that 
biological nonhumans, mere garden plants and trees, can ‘direct’ human action in surprising 
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ways. This research adds to the opposite end of the spectrum, accounting for the not-very-
surprising tsunami of action created by an explosive malfunctioning nuclear reactor.  
2.3 Risky Networks: a meeting of Beck and Latour 
This section marks a more tailored discussion, one tasked with encompassing the overarching 
theme of this research project. The impacts of the Chernobyl accident are heterogenous, and its 
travels extensive. To the lay public, the stricken nuclear power station adopts many guises, but 
this research project is uninterested in popular appropriations of the accident; rather, it is 
focused upon the more clandestine — or at least specialist and often somewhat obscure — 
domains of science, engineering and bureaucracy. These areas of actions and interest are 
separated in many instances, but within the context of RBMK no4’s network, the concept of risk 
crosses their boundaries.  
	  
Risk: an ambiguous, broad and contested concept. Elusive in definition and powerful in 
application, this term has sparked the interests of the social and hard sciences for decades, at 
least since the Second World War. It is constructed within scientific, economic, political, social 
and moral spheres, and the agency of the final product is consequently interwoven throughout 
them all (Beck, 1992, 1995, 1999; Jarvis 2007; Mythen 2004; Wynne 1996). The risk industry 
has engendered a diverse and complex lexicon of systems, parameters and procedures tasked 
with identifying the adverse potentiality within a situation. Generally speaking, this assemblage 
revolves around the scientific construction of risk; that is, the quantitative assessment of the 
probability of an event occurring in a specific location from a specific hazard (Cidell, 2012). Risk 
in this guise, moreover, has arguably now become widely disseminated through many facets of 
what is specified as ‘risk society. 
The ‘risk society’ perspective, the major contribution of Beck (1992, 1995, 1998, 1999), and 
furthered by the likes of Giddens (1998), has become hugely influential within the academy and 
beyond. The focus of the risk society entwines the process of modernisation within a climate of 
ever-escalating risks produced by the omnipresent development of technology. Due to its notable 
spread throughout the academy and given its analytical clout, the basics of Beck’s theory shall 
be covered in detail below, and indications given as to where it can be of use to this study. 
	  
An interesting aspect of Beck’s thesis, highly relevant to this thesis, lies in what prompted him to 
produce this approach, with several scholars (Mythen 2004; Wynne, 1996) citing the Chernobyl 
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disaster as the driving force behind his ideas. As Beck’s thesis was being written in the 
late-1980s, when the nuclear industry was routinely deployed as a spectre of catastrophic risk, it 
does not seem too much of a reach for this claim to be accepted. In a relatively unknown essay, 
published in 1987 but originally written in May 1986, a few weeks after RBMK no4 exploded, 
Beck himself evaluates the impacts of the Chernobyl disaster upon his thesis. Titled, ‘The 
Anthropological Shock: Chernobyl And The Contours Of The Risk Society’ (1987), this short 
piece affords a glimpse into Beck’s reasoning around an event previously unseen in human 
existence. He had been working on the book Risk Society (1992) for two years prior to the 
accident, and the book already contained his prophecy about the catastrophic potentiality of 
nuclear technologies, but he was forced to incorporate the new ‘case study’ into his text, which 
then went into “its fourth edition after only nine months” (Beck, 1987, 154). Chernobyl provided 
Beck with a vindicating example, the ‘ideal’ worst accident imaginable, for transporting his 
thesis into the wider public consciousness and to strengthen his arguments. Even here, then, it is 
possible to see evidence of how RBMK no4 ‘travelled’. Therefore, it is fitting that Beck represents 
the conceptual core of the present project’s attention to risk. To underline, each of the empirical 
chapters features an area of RBMK no4’s network, and these segregations each speak to a 
different world of risk; that is, varying aspects of the accident that impacted upon different 
avenues of society’s new ‘risk industry’,as well as upon the concept as a whole. It will be 
possible to trace the entanglements of Chernobyl with the making of risk: of risky worlds, risky 
actants, perceptions and calibrations of risk, and even glimpse of how risk gets politicised.  
	  
Throughout his career, Beck built upon his initial thesis; and, in order to capture this evolution, 
my account will predominantly focus upon Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) and 
Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk (1995). Beck was one of the first sociologists to identify the 
paradox of late-modern society, that the driving force behind the increase in risk was the very 
advancement of technology, science and industrialism, as opposed to risk being abated by 
scientific and technological progress (Jarvis 2007). Beck’s approach seeks to account for the 
untethering of social institutions, epistemological changes in the natures of risks, and the 
subsequent cultural experiences of them (Giddens 1994; Mythen 2004), all in the face of this 
historically unique context. What Beck also reveals is the pervasiveness of the concept, its 
purposeful appropriation from the top and felt impacts at the bottom; that is, the articulation/
calibration by institutions/governments and their imposition of ‘risks’ guidelines upon their 
subjects and citizens. This pervasive spread of the notion of risk has resulted in its central 
placement within globalising society, and its utilisation is a means of control, regulation and 
power (Elliott, 2002). For Beck, risk is of course not the same as destruction; rather, it represents 
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the spectre of a potentially destructive outcome. The concept of risk is a means of rendering 
visible a reality which could come to pass, one which would have adverse consequences, and 
the discourse of risk — that is, the discursive representation of said findings —  “ceases to apply 
when the potential catastrophe actually occurs” (Beck 2000, 213). This is an important aspect of 
the concept of risk in general; risk is the epistemological rendering that seeks to account for an 
ontological reality as-well-as a future material happening. This is a peculiar stance to take, 
especially when one takes into consideration Beck’s repeated deployment of the nuclear 
industry as a bedrock example for the risk society. Granted, the epistemological purchase of a 
risk discourse will be eroded when an event occurs which it was attempting to mitigate; but, 
rather than simply ‘ceasing to apply’, said risk discourse may evolve, mutate and become of 
even greater significance in light of such an accident. As will be shown in later chapters, 
developments of this kind are the result of heterogeneous nodes of actions which produce 
version ‘2.0’ of a risk discourse.  
	  
As a means of situating his conceptualisation of risk, Beck charts its progression through a 
Eurocentric history and subsequently maps out three epochs. These periods in human existence 
are characterised by the risks to which they were exposed and the nature of their creation. The 
supposed transition from one epoch to another was prompted by both the compositional make-
up of the risks experienced and structural changes within society. Fundamental to this process, 
and the risk society approach in general, is Beck’s differentiation between natural hazards and 
manufactured risks. Natural hazards, or ‘acts of God’, were a feature of the pre-industrial 
society: these damaging exhibitions of the natural world’s power caused large-scale issues for 
the early phases of human existence as the technology to mitigate them had yet to be invented 
(Beck 1992, 97). For example, a flood would have washed away entire towns due to the lack of 
infrastructure to defend against the risk, and drought could ruin an entire year’s food supply 
due to the lack of irrigation and/or weather predictive systems. 
	  
The movement into the ‘industrial society’ or first modernity, which roughly encompassed the first 
two-thirds of the twentieth century (Lash 2000; Mythen 2004; Mythen & Walklate 2006), saw 
the above-mentioned natural hazards supplemented with a host of human-made risks. Practices 
and products which arose at the time were not considered risky, but with contemporary scientific 
hindsight can be identified by their dangers. Activities such as smoking, drinking and 
occupational injuries as a result of a newly industrialised economy thereby characterise the 
changing nature of risks bound into structural changes within society. Finally, two-thirds of the 
way into the twentieth century, human existence entered into the full-on ‘risk society’ (Beck 
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1992, 1995), otherwise referred to as second modernity. This ominously titled ‘epoch of risk’ is 
epitomised by a human quasi-mastery of natural hazards, but a limited ability to mitigate the 
potentially devastating impacts of human-made, or ‘manufactured’, risks. Beck has been 
criticised for neglecting the societies of the Global South as they have yet to achieve said levels 
of mastery over natural hazards (Jarvis 2007). Thus, his writings can indeed be viewed as 
Eurocentric, especially when one considers that some developing countries use nuclear power 
stations and produce large amounts of air pollution. 
	  
Beck states that the main differentiating aspects between manufactured and natural hazards 
risks are found within creative processes that provide them with ontological existence. In other 
words, “the looming power of gods and demons … differs essentially from ‘risks’ in my sense 
since they are not based on decisions, or more specifically, decisions that focus on techno-
economic advantages and opportunities and accept hazards as simply the dark side of 
progress” (Beck 1992a, 98). Thus, Beck is seeking to set up a classical modernist dichotomy 
between Nature and Society, the former being the wrath of ‘our little blue space ship’, and the 
latter represented by complex nodes of human actions which encompass a host of spheres of 
society, resulting in the creation of a technology laden with destructive potentiality. Being a 
modernist, and unlike Latour, Beck cannot actively situate his analysis within the realm of hybrid 
objects; rather, Beck routinely deploys the ambiguous term ‘technology’, a conceptual blindspot 
which will be covered below. Manufactured risks of a catastrophic nature are, for Beck, unique 
to the latter part of the twentieth century, and the increase in techno-scientific development is 
fundamentally entwined with the spread of risk, a factor encapsulated by Virillio some years 
prior to Beck’s initial thesis:     
	  
	 Every technology produces, provokes, programs a specific accident … The invention of 
	 the boat was the invention of shipwrecks. The invention of the steam engine and the 	
	 locomotive was the invention of derailments. The invention of the highway was the 	
	 invention of three hundred cars colliding in five minutes. The invention of the airplane was 
	 the invention of the plane crash. I believe that from now on, if we wish to continue with 
	 technology (and I don’t think there will be a Neolithic regression), we must think about 
	 both the substance and the accident. (Virillio 1983, 32)  
	  
This chillingly poignant prediction of reality at the time of writing, and into the foreseeable 
future, chimes with Beck’s risk society.  For Beck (1992, 22), the movement into the risk society 
entailed, “a phase of development of modern society in which the social, political, ecological 
and individual risks created by the momentum of innovation increasingly elude the control of 
protective institutions of industrial society”.  
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Beck postulates several conceptual tools to aid within the risk society approach, and his three 
core hallmarks of risk, or ‘pillars of risk’, as Mythen conceptualises them (2004; Mythen & 
Walklate 2008), are of use to this project. The first is geographical in nature and focuses around 
the mutation of risk’s relationship with time and space. In the pre-industrial and industrial 
epochs, Beck (2000) argues that the forms of risks experienced were spatially and 
chronologically contained. Flood water will dissipate and a volcano’s emissions have a limited 
horizontal reach, and furthermore the timescale required for these damaging impacts to fade is 
contained within the lifetime of a human being. As Western societies entered into the period of 
the risk society, they implemented various structural changes, including infrastructural defences 
against natural hazards. Take, for example, the Netherlands’ world-leading flood risk 
assessment systems, tasked with supplementing the natural sand dune barriers (van der Hoeven 
et al 2009), or Japan’s ‘earthquake architecture’ philosophy, which sees the design of a 
building being tailored to mitigate the potential risks associated with an earthquake (Charleson 
& Taylor 2000). These two examples highlight both the identification of natural hazards and the 
formation of engineering solutions to minimise them.  
Things are complicated when moving into the risk society, as manufactured risks, according to 
Beck, are no longer spatially or temporally limited. Beck (1987, 1992) leans heavily on the 
Chernobyl example to illustrate this point, arguing that RBMK no4 represented a new 
paradigmatic manifestation of environmental risk. It can readily be seen why he utilised this 
example, as prior to the disaster the world had never ‘publicly’ witnessed an accident of this 
magnitude, scope and legacy. The fallout’s atmospheric journey across Europe paid no attention 
to imaginary human-geographical boundaries thousands of feet below, and the chronologically 
expansive nature of fission products rendered the disaster a risk for both current and future 
generations. In other words, RMBK no4 stands as the talismanic standard bearer of the risk 
society, the destructive monolithic monument to unchecked techno-scientific advancement and 
the unwelcome ruination of the environment by its invisible byproducts.  
	  
The second characterising ‘pillar’ of the risk society is the truly catastrophic nature of 
manufactured risks. Once again, this increase in destructive capacity differentiates them from 
their natural counterparts. Beck (1992, 1995) classifies three “icons of destruction” as the 
primary technological perpetrators with such catastrophic potentiality: nuclear power, 
environmental despoliation and genetic technology. The prospective dangers of these 
technologies “transcend temporal, spatial and social boundaries and have the potential to 
fundamentally change or even annihilate human life, at least as we know it” (Johns & Werner 
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2008, 784). Indeed, the current climate of rapid technological advancement has led to an 
environment where the risks associated with a potential malfunction have massively outpaced 
society’s safety nets — the epitome of the risk society. 
	  
Beck’s use of ‘nuclear power’, as opposed to militarised nuclear technology, is perhaps a 
strange choice, one which could be explained by the powerful effects of RBMK no4’s agency at 
the time of writing. As will be shown in later chapters, the testing of nuclear weapons has 
deposited more fission product into our biosphere than Chernobyl and Fukushima combined. 
Furthermore, the sole purpose of these weapons is mass destruction on a biblical scale. 
Everything accounted for by the risk society thus far could be applied to the weapons 
proliferation race, arguably with greater analytical accuracy. Two entire cities were wiped out 
by two of the smallest, and most technologically ‘ignorant’, nuclear weapons. Furthermore, a 
host of ‘appropriated’ islands in the Pacific were literally obliterated during the testing of US 
and UK hydrogen bombs, and the invisible legacy from both examples still rides the global 
airwaves today. Surely the risks associated with the deployment, proliferation and geopolitical 
posturing of the Cold War were of far greater significance than the accident in Ukraine? A 
plausible explanation for Beck’s choice could be the clandestine nature of military decisions and 
the development/use of atomic technologies. Networks both rarely visible within the civilian 
nuclear industry. Regardless of this empirical niggle, the use of nuclear power as an icon of 
destruction was understandable and even justifiable, especially in light of the Chernobyl 
disaster.  
	  
Beck’s arguments about risk’s regulatory systems will now be covered, partially because such 
systems become crucial in later chapters in thus thesis. Such systems marks a shift from the 
ontological heritage of any given risk to focus instead upon the human organisations tasked with 
ensuring social security, including techno-scientific protocols which seek to minimise the 
probability of a risk occurring. The introduction of entities of this nature, be it the IAEA or the 
global network of Institutes of Regulation and Risk within the financial sector, marks the nexus 
where the concept of risk becomes entangled with other actors’ interests and, subsequently, 
their agency. Since its inception, risks within the risk society are, generally speaking, 
quantitatively calculated and intrinsically connected to scientific logic/practice. As mentioned at 
the outset of this section, the scientific construction of risk is based on the probability of an event 
occurring in a specific location from a specific hazard (Cidell, 2012). Primarily, this sectioning of 
risk identification within the realms of science/engineering is due to the complexity of the hybrid 
objects, after Latour, capable of producing a catastrophic accident. It is safe to assert that only 
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a qualified nuclear engineer possesses the knowledge to assess a nuclear reactor, and only a 
biologist with decades of experience can evaluate a programme of genetic modifications.  
Nonetheless, Beck (1995, 135) argues that “no one any longer has privileged access to the 
uniquely correct way of calculation, for risks are pregnant with interests, and accordingly the 
ways of calculating them multiply like rabbits”. From this claim, it can be deduced that Beck 
believes in a heterogeneous trajectory of risk calculation, entailing many actors and maybe 
actants, and in many instances he is correct. However, his lack of detailed scientific knowledge 
and elaborative examples can arguably weaken this argument.  
As he routinely cites the nuclear industry as a fundamental risk creator within his approach, it 
might be expected that Beck cover forward several different methods tasked for calculating the 
probability of ruptures within steam inlets, or associated with stress testing the heat exchange 
mechanisms, and so on. His ‘external’ critique of a scientific practice, solely from a social 
science perspective, erodes the force of this logic due to the lack of situated examples from the 
industries that he is seeking to critique. Indeed, he provides scant examples from scientific and/
or engineering practices to legitimise his critique, but rather makes sweeping generalisations in 
order to construct his social theory. His suggestion regarding how scientific domains calculate 
risks in a strictly deterministic manner may be appropriate within some technological areas, but 
the nuclear industry has utilised probabilistic safety assessments (PRA) since the 1970s in the 
United States (Kopustinskas et al 2005; Lee & McCormick 2012) and upon the entire fleet of 
Soviet reactors after the Chernobyl disaster (INSAG 1992, 1996; EBP 1999). Granted, this is a 
case-specific example, but it does foreground the inadequacies of meta-social generalisations 
about the scientific realm. Counter to Latour’s suggestions, Beck fails to follow the actors 
encased within the ‘risky industries’ that he is seeking to critique, never really allowing them to 
influence his theory as a ‘bottom up’ approach, but instead he is imposing meta-level narratives 
devoid from, or devoid of, any situated knowledge. As a result, Beck is open to many of the 
critiques that Latour directs at mainstream social science, as explained earlier.  
	  
Throughout his analysis of regulatory systems, Beck argues that they have been constructed to 
dissipate responsibility, a new defence mechanism of the risk society to deal with catastrophic 
risks. Dense legal and bureaucratic protocols cloud the pathways of allocating responsibility, 
and parties implicit within the risky activity subsequently appropriate a calculation of risk which 
suits their interest. Beck is highlighting that the lack of universally accepted methods of 
calculation within a risky situation allows actors to squirm out of any responsibility which may be 
levelled against them. The ‘power’ of this relationship lies in the difficulties of proving a causal 
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relationship between, say, thyroid cancer and C-137, a necessity within a court of law. Thus, 
when viewed through this lens, the construction/calculation of risk incorporates the interests of 
powerful actors, and consequently their agencies will direct actions to produce a mediation of 
‘risk’ which renders invisible any causal connection between them and the issue. This type of 
hierarchical appropriation of risk is typical of the governmentality approach (Defert 1991; 
Castels 1991). Such a polemical mediation of an ontological reality has relevance within 
Chernobyl’s network; namely, the Linear no-threshold debate surrounding the ‘acceptable’ dose 
of low level radiation, a debate that will be extensively accounted for in chapter 6.   
	  
As mentioned above, ‘defining’ risk is difficult due to the ambiguity of the phenomena that the 
concept is seeking to represent. As the scientific community has been endowed with the status of 
risk identifiers within the risk society, a complex nexus is created between it, policy-makers and 
the general pubic. It is difficult to account for the mediations between policy-makers and their 
scientific advisors, but the relationship between them and the lay public is readily accessible. 
Beck (1992) sets up a dichotomy between scientific rationale and its social counterpart. The 
actions and practices of the former are governed by the dominant technical means of calculating 
the risk in question, with the attempt to achieve objectivity, and the latter comprise the lay 
public’s subjective evaluations of the ‘top down’ risk assessment by means of their lived 
experiences. Beck (1992, 28) goes on to argue that “the two sides talk past each other. Social 
movements raise questions that are not answered by the risk technicians at all, and the 
technicians answer questions which miss the point of what was asked and that feeds public 
anxiety”.  
	  
If the rather totalising rendition of this two-way relationship is glossed over, one can identity a 
fundamental issue within the risk society, and a root cause of social scepticism is thereby 
rendered visible. The perception of risk varies dependent on the levels of ‘education’ within the 
scientific discipline that can represent it, and the mediated accounts produced by experts of said 
discipline can, unintentionally, result in negative reactions from the lay public. In other words, 
the communicative bond between risk technicians and the lay public can either be inadequately 
formulated or appropriated by the agencies of ‘guilty’ parties in a bid to disperse blame. Thus, 
these nodes of actions are crucial battlegrounds within the risk society as they are the points 
where meaning — that is, the representation of a situation which requires technical knowledge — 
is publicly disseminated, and where a conflict over its legitimacy and/or accuracy can then 
ensue. Such matters are central to the later chapters of the thesis. 
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Attention will now turn to Beck’s arguments about the production of environmental risks. Within 
the risk society, due to their exponentially damaging potentiality, the hybrid objects that can 
produce manufactured risk present new forms of environmental dangers. These aspects have 
been covered above, and the reason behind accounting for the production of environmental 
risks is to address the elephant in the room — that of Beck’s modernist persuasion in light of this 
project’s belief that ‘we have never been modern’ — with the end goal of reconciling Beck’s 
approach with the research project’s methodological framework. Central to Beck’s entire 
scholarly enterprise is an unwavering separation of Nature and Society, as he believes that “the 
risk society begins where nature ends” (1998, 10). As covered in sections 2.1 and 2.2, which 
introduced the Latourian logic/methodology, the modernist project separates Nature and 
Society into two discrete poles, refusing to acknowledge the Middle Kingdom. Beck (1995) 
tentatively states that the techno-scientific advancements which prompted entry into the risk 
society have eroded the historically assumed boundaries between the two, but he does not 
situate his analysis within the realms of objects. Rather, he speaks in terms of epistemological 
explanations, rather than accounting for the ontologically networked hybrid objects which 
materially contain and produce risks. 
	 	  
Due to this research’s adoption of ANT as its method and conceptual underpinnings, the hybrid 
objects created by the merging of Nature and Society are of primary concern. Every idea from 
Beck’s project covered thus far can be of use when reassembling Chernobyl’s network, but his 
epistemological trajectories must be related to their ontological component parts. Risk is a 
constructed concept, a representation of — but also on intervention in — a material reality and 
future, one which can be materially reassembled. Simply deploying the spectre of the Chernobyl 
disaster to vindicate one’s argument without actively accounting for the object of the reactor, or 
the intricacies of its material travels, runs the risk of engendering hollow ‘explanations’. 
Conversely, Latour’s long-term fascination with ‘science’ has resulted in his ability to disclose the 
networks which construct knowledge of that nature, and subsequently to provide the social 
sciences with a means of either critiquing or supplementing the process. Without this form of 
analytical methodology, a social science project that is predominantly dealing with scientific risk 
calculation will lack any form of ontological application. In other words, the material domains of 
a risk, its object of potentiality, and the nodes of scientific action tasked with representing it: 
those elements should all be essential components within risk research. Otherwise, the analysis 
resorts to gazing upon a phenomenon that it dimly understands, producing a worryingly 
asymmetrical account. Bromley (2000) argues that Beck’s account is weakened by his routine 
use of ambiguous terminologies, such as describing Chernobyl as a ‘global threat’, when in 
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reality its sphere of influence barely covered all of Europe, and by his lack of detailed attention 
to the physical technologies. Thus, an approach which seeks accurately to represent the 
ontology of a risk, as opposed to merely accounting for the supposed ‘mediation’ of it, would 
afford the risk society approach an ontological scientific foundation. 
	  
Taking the meta-aims of the research into consideration, partial meeting of Latourian and 
Beckian projects can be made at a point post-ANT description; that is, once a materially attuned 
account of a risky object has been completed, in this instance of RBMK no4 of the Chernobyl 
NPP, its trajectories through time, space and different domains can be shown as inexplicably 
interlinked with the ideas of the risk society. Such a meeting should be seen as an attempt to 
‘counter’ the main critiques of each; these being the limitations of a pure ANT description, and 
Beck’s inability to focus upon the ontology of hybrid objects. Hence, reassembling Chernobyl’s 
network of risk, from object, to immediate aftermath, to atmospheric spread and finally to 
regulation, provides in effect an ontological backbone, for better or worse, to Beck’s talismanic 
example — his ‘ideal’ worst disaster imaginable to exemplify his tenets of the risk society. The 
representation/calibration of a risk should be viewed as the result of a heterogenous node of 
action which incorporates both human and non-human actors, as well as a host of mediations 
across several levels of society.  
2.4 Radioactive hyperobject 
We are living textbooks on global warming and nuclear materials, crisscrossed with inter 
objective calligraphy. (Morton, 2013, 88) 
Morton’s philosophical construct of hyperobjects is rooted in object-orientated ontology (OOO), 
and it seeks to provide an explanation for the widely distributed entities that co-inhabit the world 
with humanity. At the heart of this philosophical performance is another dilemma about the 
modernist project, a recurring theme within this research’s theoretical backbone. Whereas 
Latour believes that we have never been modern, Morton (2013, 19) argues the stance that we 
have been modern, “and that we are only just learning how not to be”. The catalyst behind this 
paradigm shift, for Morton, is hyperobjects. RBMK no4 may initially be conceived as a 
‘hyperobject’, but Morton delineates several interrelated qualities to identify such an object, and 
several of these parameters are incompatible with the nuclear non-human at the heart of this 
research. Thus, another aspect of the object/event is brought into focus, and with it the 
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philosophical explanation of how and why the travels of RBMK no4 have engendered the 
actions to be accounted for within Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
For Morton, hyperobjects feature five innate interrelated qualities: viscosity, nonlocality, 
temporal undulation, phasing and interobjectivity. This is not the place to provide an extensive 
account of each, but rather the key components of each will be touched upon and the 
connections between the concept and Chernobyl will be covered. Viscosity, as the name 
suggests, is linked to the attractiveness of hyperobjects; that is, the inescapable means by which 
they attach themselves to people and other things. For Morton, a hyperobject’s viscosity is 
closely linked to its relationship with time, in that time is argued to emanate from hyperobjects, 
rather than a continuum through which they merely pass. Morton (2013, 33) references 
Chernobyl as a means of illustrating this point, citing the “uncanny dead zone, The Zone of 
Alienation” as an ideal example of how hyperobjects produce time bubbles from their 
ontological form. The entity of radiation/radioactive materials is routinely used by Morton as a 
means of legitimising his philosophical negotiations, to brilliant effect when delineating his 
concept of viscosity: 
A good example of viscosity would be radioactive materials. The more you try to get rid 
of them, the more you realise you can’t get rid of them. They seriously undermine the 
notion of ‘away’. Out of sight is no longer out of mind, because if you bury them in 
Yucca Mountain, you know they will leach into the water table. And where will that 
mountain be 24.1 thousands of years from now? (Morton, 2013, 36) 
Thus, radioactive materials ‘stick’ to our society — once they are created we simply do not know 
what to do with them, outside of the standard burial practices. They are viscous to the point that 
society simply seals them in casts and commits them to the hands of time in designated spaces, 
that in turn feature a strange form of temporal distortion. Akin to the Chernobyl zone, sites of 
long-term storage for nuclear materials become imprisoned by the effects of the hyperobject’s 
emission of time. They are shaped by it and locked into a binding relationship that extends 
centuries longer than humanity has been resident on our blue spaceship. In other words, the 
hyperobjects of radioactive materials condemn their space of residence to an eternity of 
exclusion by means of the emission of temporality from their ontological form, thus binding the 
space to their half life. 
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Morton’s concept of nonlocality is slightly more difficult to grasp than viscosity, but it still has 
relevance to this research. He uses the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents as examples to 
highlight how hyperobjects are nonlocal, in that their radiation:  
	 …bathed beings thousands of miles away in unseen alpha, beta and gamma particles, as 
	 radioactive specks floated in air currents across Europe and the Pacific. Days, weeks, 	
	 months, or even years later, some humans die of radiation sickness. Strange mutagenic 
	 flowers grow. (Morton 2013, 38) 
Granted this example does highlight how these nuclear accidents have been massively 
distributed, but the simple fact remains that the objects responsible for the distribution of the 
hyperobject of radiation can be locally situated. These nuclear non-humans still represent the 
central point of a radioactive network that spread around the globe. Regardless, Morton’s 
detailing of the link between the nonlocality of hyperobjects and causality creates an interesting 
connection to the empirical work of Chapter 6; that is, the LNT debate. He argues that 
hyperobjects inhabit a Humean causal system, where associations, correlations and probabilities 
are our primary means of identifying the entity — the favoured lexicon of a nuclear risk 
technician. Hence, due to the complexities of the systems required actively to identify the 
hyperobject, it is difficult to provide direct proof of a causal link between it and another 
phenomena. As an aside, this aspect of Morton’s hyperobjects is linked to one of the tenets of 
Beck’s (1992) risk society, in that the current system of risk prevents the ready identification of 
responsibility/causality between a risk and a perpetrator.  
As a means of engaging a practical avenue of this tenet, Morton introduces the notion of local 
manifestation; that is, specific points in space-time where the agency of the hyperobject directs 
human (or nonhuman) action, perception and thought. Once again, Morton uses a nuclear 
related example to illustrate his point; in this instance, ‘Little Boy’, the atomic bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima. Morton (2013, 49) argues that when a bomb survivor produces a testimony of the 
day in 1945, it represents a “local manifestation of the bomb”, and that the constraints of human 
physicality and memory temporally displace the bomb, thereby rendering it distant and close at 
the same time. When viewing hyperobjects in this light, each of the empirical chapters of this 
thesis represent local manifestations of the hyperobject of RBMK no4’s radioactive ontology. 
These nodes of action are created by, and fully orientated towards, the hyperobject, in a variety 
of near and distant localities. They facilitate a means of physically identifying the hyperobject in 
space and time through its interactions with human actors. Morton (2013, 53) argues that “(i)n 
some sense, cancer is the physical body’s expression of radioactive materials. Such is the force 
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of the hyperobject radiation”. If this logic is extended to the empirical works of this research, 
these nodes of action are the expressions of the Soviet Union, environmental scientists, the 
atmosphere and radiological protection institutions of RBMK no4’s radiation. Their geographical 
placement in space is therefore a local manifestation.  
Temporal undulation is the third identifying characteristic, and it is rooted in the science and 
philosophy of space-time. In effect, we are all enveloped by hyperobjects, due to their massive 
distribution, but their ontology is so time-stretched that it is difficult actively to understand them. 
Hyperobjects exist within epochs so massive, in comparison to the totality of human existence, 
that they inhabit a domain of space-time that cannot be fully grasped. Once again, Morton 
(2013, 58) uses the hyperobject of radiation as a means of vindicating this aspect, arguing that:  
The half-life of plutonium-239 is 24,100 years. These periods are as long as all of visible 
human history thus far… I have decided to call these timescales the horrifying, the 
terrifying and the petrifying. 
Thus, when attempting to render visible the timescale associated with the hyperobject of 
radiation, and, crucially, operationalising the practicalities of accommodating for the half-life of 
radioactive materials, these ‘horrifying’ adjectives neatly characterise proceedings. Every action  
accounted for within this research is tackling an entity with a vast half-life, one that will outlive 
every human being alive today.  
The temporal undulation of hyperobjects leads to futural elements. Because, for Morton, time is 
not a vessel in which objects float, but rather an emission from hyperobjects themselves, he 
argues that it is theoretically possible that an object could exert a backwards causality on other 
entities. In other words, future causality flows backwards into the present, with the spectre of the 
future looming into the present. This philosophical negotiation can help to explain the actions of 
human actors within the present when dealing with the temporal undulations of a hyperobject, 
as the future needs, deviances and dangers presented by the elongated ontology of the object 
result in sustained nodes of actions in the present. Thus, as shall be covered in Chapters 4, 5 and 
6, every action was tasked with catering for the future within the present. The actions of these 
empirical chapters took place in ‘a present’, but were tasked with mitigating risk, or dangers, 
that would arise in the future. The needs of the present were clear and present, but, due to the 
next tenet of hyperobjects, the future cannot be ignored. 
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The four interrelated dimensions of hyperobjects postulated by Morton are classed ‘as phasing’, 
in which regard he argues that hyperobjects occupy a high-dimensional phase space that makes 
it impossible for humans to ‘see’ them in a regular three-dimensional setting. This inability of 
humans physically to ‘see’ hyperobjects is thus linked to the practices/actions required actively 
to account for their presence and ontological structure. Morton (2013, 73) states that:  
Process philosophy helps us visualise how high-dimensional entities execute. Thus, a 
slightly upgraded way of seeing hyperobjects would be the plot or graph… The trouble is 
that we cannot help but fail to see such high-dimensional entities when they are plotted 
this way. Software ‘sees’ them for us, then we see data or slices of that phase space, 
rendered in some way to make it usable. 
This logic is pertinent to the hyperobject of radiation, and the necessity of using objects to 
render it visible. This passage helps philosophically to explain such unavoidability, and can thus 
be extended to the actions presented within Chapter 5 — the act of airborne gamma ray 
spectrometry (AGRS). This practice was performed as a means of ‘seeing’ RBMK no4’s 
radioactive dispersion across the landscapes of the UK, and the data accrued was then plotted 
on maps and in graphs. This series of actions was tasked with combatting the phasing element of 
the hyperobject.  
Due to the phasing nature of hyperobjects, and the necessity of scientific practices to render 
them visible, mathematics inevitably also plays an important role. Morton argues that 
mathematics must be embraced when dealing with hyperobjects, but they must be viewed as a 
Latourian mediation. The mathematical processes of the sciences are a means of representing a 
hyperobject, and thus, by definition, a delineation that can be open to mediations. Morton here 
seeks to inject a modicum of critical thought into proceedings, and to direct methodological 
focus on to who, why and how a hyperobject is mediated through scientific practice/
mathematics. Furthermore, his insistence upon embracing scientific mathematical processes, 
within a more ‘socially’ orientated research project, is in line with the majority of data used in 
this research. When dealing with a ‘scientific’ phenomenon, externally gazing inwards and 
attempting to impose social theory results in the analysis viewing the material realm through a 
thick layer of epistemology. 
Morton’s final interrelated tenet of hyperobjects is referred to as interobjectivity, and it is 
intertwined with human intersubjectivity. The former alludes to the ‘abyss’ in front of things, the 
entity that emanates from objects to engender spacetime, and the latter is the shared space in 
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which human meaning resonates. Morton (2013, 81-82) clarifies this relationship by arguing for 
a thinking of:     
	 …intersubjectivity as a particular instance of interobjectivity with which humans are a 	
	 feature. In other words, ‘intersubjectivity’ is really human interobjectivity with lines drawn 
	 around to exclude nonhumans. 
This logic enables the binding of human action within the realms of nonhuman interests, cast 
under the consuming banner of interobjectivity, with intersubjectivity being the instances where 
only human actors are involved. Morton goes on to postulate the notion of a ‘mesh’; this being 
the enmeshing of objects with one another in a series of links and gaps between the links. He 
argues that these links allow causality to flow between spatially distant entities. 
The realm of interobjectivity, and the associated mesh that allows causality to flow between 
entities drawn into this type of relationship with a hyperobject, explains how action is 
engendered by a non-human. Due to their massive distribution, the various ways in which they 
manipulate time and their relationship with causality, it is not surprising to find that human action 
is a byproduct of the ontology of hyperobjects. Their very existence necessitates action through 
a host of different domains. This research has posed the question of how RBMK no4 has 
travelled, and the material actions accounted for throughout the empirical chapters provide 
examples of how its agency has produced them. Yet, this reassembling process does not provide 
a foolproof philosophical explanation. Granted, the agency of the nuclear non-human has 
powered the ANT methodological engine, guiding the analytical crosshair and tracing 
associations created by said agency, but it does not allude to the deeper philosophy of the 
situation.  
Morton’s notion of hyperobjects is hence a useful addition to this theoretical chapter, one that 
adds to the traditional ANT conceptual structure by unpacking the unusual philosophical nature 
of an entity that features prominently throughout this research. The hyperobject of RBMK no4’s 
radioactive dispersion represents, arguably, the most ‘visible’ and, ultimately, impactful 
byproduct of the accident. It connected the remote site, and its nuclear non-human, to spaces 
across Europe, and cemented its place within the global economic, environmental, political and 
scientific consciousness for 30 years. Its distribution, agency, strangeness and, in some cases, 
dangers, engendered countless nodes of actions throughout European society (and beyond). It 
suggests the very literal answer to the central research question of how has Chernobyl travelled, 
as-well-as the philosophical backbone of the methodology that has sought to connect seemingly 
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disparate human actions to an invisible entity that coated the landscapes of Europe and 
embedded itself within the biology of its citizens. For 30 years this invisible, unstable invader has 
forced citizens, governments and international institutions to think of the future, create actions 
tasked with mitigating the risk of the hyperobject in the present as a means of attempting to 
safeguard the future. It is the ever present entity that strengthens the featured associations and 
actions of this research, thus providing an ontological structure to the network in question. 
2.5 Concluding remarks: two final conceptually guiding tools 
This chapter has charted a path through philosophical debates and methodological practices, 
with the end result being a pragmatic meeting between aspects of Latourian and Beckian 
intellectual projects. ‘Risk’ permeates throughout this research. Each of the actions accounted for 
within the empirical core can be viewed as purposeful practices tasked with mitigating risk, on a 
variety of different levels, from the nuclear machines themselves (and how they were supposed 
to work) through to the explicit scientific and engineering debates around the risky nuclear 
industry. The byproduct of running Latour’s version of ANT alongside Beck’s risk society 
approach is a conceptual and methodological construct that seeks to counter certain blindspots 
of each approach, by means of the strengths of the other. The use of Morton’s, more modern, 
notion of hyperobjects is further tasked with providing a philosophical explanation to the central 
research question; that is, philosophically reframing how the accident traveled, outside of the 
material transportation of radionuclides by means of the atmosphere.  
Two final conceptual tools to be briefly deployed are Schatzki’s (2002) concept of the site and 
Shaw’s (2012) ‘evental geography’. The central research questions asks how has Chernobyl 
traveled, and without a firm understanding of the material landscape of buildings and 
settlements that spawned the accident, any answer to this question would be incomplete. For 
Schatzki, the site is a milieu where its inhabitants, both human and non-humans, are congenitally 
subsumed within its creation, existence and logic. He goes on to articulate it as “the site specific 
to human coexistence: the context, or wider expanse of phenomena, in and as part of which 
humans coexist” (2002, 147). A Latourian reading of this definition places significance on the 
inhabitants, humans and nonhumans, within a site; their practices, relations and how the 
material setting facilitates and restricts said activities. Thus, the conceptual apparatus of the site 
resists any desire to specify a neatly bounded spatial entity and instead focuses upon its multiple 
inhabitants, assessing how these entities spark ‘event relations’. These event relations have the 
potential spontaneously to produce newness, but it is the limits and restrictions embedded within 
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a site that allow the concept to account for the “relatively stable objects and practices that 
continuously draw each other into relations and resurface social life” (Marston et al, 2005, 
425). 
In other words, paying attention to sites and their social life — ‘social’ across human/nonhuman 
divides — allows the researcher to detect the orders that influence and shape the practices of 
space present within any given site. This dimension is crucial to the envisioned intellectual project 
as it facilitates the ‘touching down’ of (as previously conceived) global, or meta-level, influences, 
rules and restrictions on the immediate, local, irreducibly material level. As an aside, it can be 
argued that Schatzki’s concept of the site re-crafts older/traditional geographical ideas of ‘the 
region’; but it is not the goal of this thesis to pursue intellectual genealogy, nor to rework 
histories of the discipline. 
This attention to the materiality of the site is linked to its ontological limit, whereas how the site’s 
inhabitants are congealed and composed essentially renders visible the site’s internal logic. This 
matter is crucial as, according to Woodward et al (2010, 273), a map of a site can only be 
drawn according to its internal logic, “rather than [by] any generalizing laws”. From this 
remark, we can clearly see the desire to differentiate this concept from the universalism inherent 
within meta-level theorising, thus furthering a picture of the site as a working materiality, always 
in a process of becoming, and only identifiable by the logic of its material composition. In other 
words, the concept of the site facilitates a materially attuned analytical description of a space, 
its human and non-human inhabitants, and the governing logic that ties the ontological melée 
together. 
This logic is pertinent to the site of Chernobyl. As covered in the introductory chapter, the 
ethnographic account of encountering the Exclusion Zone prominently featured the Atomic City 
of Pripyat, a made-for-purpose settlement to house the nuclear power plant’s workforce and 
families. Its inhabitants were housed, ordered and regimented by the material ‘logic’ of the 
nuclear non-humans, meaning the reactors installed at the Chernobyl NPP. These objects 
required thousands of human actors to operate them and, due to the remote placement of the 
facility, an entire city had to be built to accommodate these caretakers. Furthermore, the Duga 3 
radar facility, the ‘Russian Woodpecker’, an awe-inspiring mass of metal and wiring, was placed 
near to the site of the Chernobyl NPP, due to its power requirements. Its thirst for electricity was 
so vast that it had to be constructed within a few kilometres of a juggernaut power source. These 
two examples suggest the site’s internal logic as manifested through its material composition. 
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Power plant workers traveled from Pripyat to the reactor facility to carry out their professional 
duties, the children went to school every day at 8 am and returned at 2 pm, and neutrons 
diligently smashed into uranium atoms to produce heat to drive steam turbines. Until, one day, 
an eruption of ‘newness’ altered the site forever. 
One further concept is hence useful in this regard, that of ‘the event’, the eruption of difference-
makings possibilities from within a site, here Chernobyl, to create newness (horrible newness for 
many) largely unforeseen. Shaw’s notion of evental geography is focused around worlds, and 
their constitution pre and post a hugely disruptive event — the geoevent. There are similarities 
between Shaw’s conceptualisation of worlds and Schatzki’s site: namely, the importance played 
upon objects and their role within the material makeup of a world/site. For Shaw, there are two 
types of worlds, ‘atonic’ and tense’, and the difference between them is based on their 
relationship to points and truths. For Shaw; 
Truths can be thought of as the process through which radical change is brought to the 
world. Badiou names a point the space of a decision or choice - when the truth 
procedure is tested, and indeed the very transcendental of a world is at stake. (2010, 
401) 
Thus, atonic worlds are totally devoid of truth, passive, controlled and free of points which 
tremble with the possibility of newness arising. Tense worlds, on the other hand, are filled with 
such points, constantly mounting a challenge against whatever forces, natural or social, that 
regulate and control. Within any given world, there are objects that exist and ones that are 
inexistent: ones that reject the normal parameters of what could and should be and happen in 
this world, and ones somehow bubbling under the surface, an excess awaiting what might be a 
catastrophic, world-changing release.The upshot is a delicate balance between the existent and 
the “infinite excess underlining the finite contours of a world” (Shaw 2010 618). Imperative to 
the approach of evental geography is hence the possibility of an inexistent object transgressing 
the barriers created by the ‘policing’ of any given world. If this rogue, inexistent entity commits 
such an act completely autonomously from this ‘policing’, its appearance into the world is 
referred to as an event-site, setting in train a whole series of event-relations that effectively flip 
that world into a whole new series of possible states (or indeed, worlds).  
Within the Chernobyl example, prior to April 1986, the site was the site was in an 
‘atonic’ (Shaw 2012) state: controlled, passive and policed. As a result of the explosion, a new 
orientation of spontaneous newness was instilled — ‘tense’ in philosophical classification. The use 
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of Shaw’s evental geography represents a conceptual augmentation tasked with philosophically 
accounting for the newness experienced within the site of the Chernobyl nuclear power station. 
The empirical chapters could be characterised as the international community’s attempts to 
return the site into an ‘atonic’ state; regaining control and reinstating transcendental control. The 
explosions of 1986 fundamentally changed the site, but also created newness across a host of 
different spheres of society. The addition of Shaw’s evental geography to this research’s 
theoretical architecture equips the analysis with one final means of rendering visible the travels 
of RBMK no4. As the empirical analysis moves outwardly from the site, the materiality of the 
Zone, and the nuclear non-human is what is driving the accountable actions. These human actors 
were being directed by the new logic of the site, drawn into the nuclear non-humans expansive 
and dangerous network of unstable atoms.  
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Chapter 3 
Slow moving neutrons, material moderators and a positive coefficient: a 
material take on the science and nuclear engineering network of RBMK no4.  
——————————————————————— 
For most people in the West, Chernobyl was simply an event - a catastrophic happening in an 
alien land populated by an intimidatingly confrontational ideological system. Its invisible 
materiality paid no homage to sovereign or territorial boundaries as the wind carried these 
human-made elements to spaces fraught with fears fuelled by geopolitical tensions surrounding 
the use of warheads of similar atomic nature. Chernobyl the event has amassed many guises 
over the last quarter century; it has become a story of Soviet technological inadequacies; a 
caricature of the perceived failings of the civil nuclear industry more generally; a spectrally 
mysterious location referred through the products of cinema and video games industries; and a 
space of forgotten wonderment to the groups of explorers who are intent on transgressing 
spaces that they are not supposed to access. In most iterations the event, and the space it 
inhabits through eternal radioactive ownership, have been awarded a form of common-sense 
status - an immortal reminder of the innate dangers of the nuclear age. These powerful mediated 
representations of Chernobyl have overtaken the material and discursive networks enrolled in 
and by the stricken station, subsequently rendering invisible the heterogeneous practices of the 
actors involved within the projects tasked with explaining, rectifying and safeguarding the object 
of unit 4. This inattention to the actions of RBMK no4’s network of scientists, engineers and 
bureaucrats attracted to the nuclear non-human as a direct consequence of the event, represents 
a missed opportunity, a unique chance to account more fully for the lessons that the non-human 
actant of unit 4 has consistently taught the civil nuclear industry. Such an avenue of enquiry 
characterises the empirical chapters of this research, the quasi-clandestine actions of actors 
dancing to RBMK no4’s new tune, the ontological answer to how the object travelled.  
As covered in chapter 2, this research is utilising an ANT methodological framework and thus 
insists upon anchoring the analysis within the material realm, but epistemic constructs, the 
gathering and arranging of knowledge, invariably play a role due to the domains of enquiry 
pursued (and the importance of risk to the research). This chapter is tasked with rendering 
visible the central actant of this research, in all its material intricacies, but the documents 
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containing the relevant data form epistemic constructs, in that they represent the finalised form 
of diverse scientific and engineering practices that sought to ‘reassemble’ the ontological form of 
the RBMK no4 and to identify how the event materially manifested itself within this particular 
object. ANT’s network concept provides the means of bridging the gap between these two 
binary entities. Latour (1999, 17) states that his network “is the summing up of interactions 
through various kinds of devices, inscriptions, forms and formulae, into a very local, very 
practical, very tiny locus.”. Therefore, the very process of performing an ANT analysis can 
provide an ontology to an epistemic structure, as it highlights the network that created it and 
keeps the object of analysis accessible. 
It is not uncommon for scientific/engineering networks of knowledge practices to be subsumed 
into the background due mainly to the exclusionary barriers associated with the necessary levels 
of expertise needed to understand their complicated methods and discourses. However, this 
research has not conceptualised the event at the forefront of proceedings; its deployment at the 
outset has been utilised as a means of engendering the contrast between the epistemic construct 
of ‘the event of Chernobyl’ and the non-human ontology upon which the analytical magnifying 
glass has been directed. The material object which caused this unfortunate phenomenon, and  
the literal centre of the network in question, is of course unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power 
Station. Thus, problematising the taken-for-granted mediations of the event are not of primary 
concern. Departing on a path of epistemological deconstruction would betray the tenets of the 
approach which provide this research with its arsenal. The route across the material plane that 
this chapter (and my research generally) will travel is altogether more technical,  more scientific, 
more ontological. A destabilisation of the aforementioned mediations may be a byproduct of 
what follows, but it is not the intention.  
Asking the question, ‘how has the object of Chernobyl travelled?’ allows this research to explore 
the vast constellation of actors who have been drawn into its network, with their actions being 
subsequently ‘directed’ by its agency. Crucially, the object itself must be taken seriously prior to 
accounting for the actions it spawned. Placing a non-human as the central actant within a 
research project requires careful legitimisation, which shall be achieved through a detailed 
exploration of both its ontology and the series of events that led to the two steam explosions of 
26th of April 1986. Only then can this ANT account identify the agency of this nuclear non-
human and thus begin the process of tracing the actions and associations it engendered and 
sustained, respectively.  
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3.1 The history and materiality of The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station 
The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station (NPP), or V.I Lenin Nuclear Power Station as it was 
known in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), is situated in northern Ukraine, about fifty miles north 
of the capital Kiev. Construction of the station, and its atomic city of Pripyat, began in March 
1970, with the initial ground works and a large scale civil engineering project tasked with 
creating the vast inland cooling reservoir initiated prior to the conclusion of the talks focused 
upon deciding which form of reactor was to be used there (Mould, 2000). Viktor Bryukhanov 
was the director of the Chernobyl installation and he proposed deploying Pressurised Water 
Reactors (PWR) at the site due to their inherently low reactivity design ethos and resulting 
manageable stability (Medvedev 1993). His view was contested by Anatoly Petrovich 
Alexandrov, a decorated Soviet physicist who was integral to the development and 
implementation of the High Power Channel-type Reactor (RBMK) across the Soviet Union. He 
was of the opinion that the RBMK was peerless in terms of safety and energy production 
(Belyaev et al, 1993); and, due to his stature, it was decided that four initial RBMK reactors 
were to be constructed at the Chernobyl site, each producing 1000mw when running at 
maximum power, with the prospect of two more to follow. In 1977, unit 1 began producing 
electricity for the Ukrainian national grid, followed by unit 2 in 1978. Units 3 and 4 were 
completed in 1981 and 1983 respectively, and the cumulative power output from these four 
reactors made the Chernobyl NPP one of the most powerful installations in the world at the time 
(Ahearne 1987). Two planned yet unfinished reactors reside in the eastern corner of the site; the 
structural carcass and internal machinery of unit 5 was in place, and the vast foundational works 
for unit 6 had been excavated by 1986. However, work was abandoned due to the events of 
April of that year. The V.I Lenin Nuclear Power Station was to be the pride of the Soviet Civil 
Nuclear Industry (Gale & Hauser 1988; Malko 2002), a six unit behemoth with the presumptive 
role of becoming their talismanic achievement, a monument to Soviet technical and engineering 
mastery of this most demanding of processes. The irony of what the word ‘Chernobyl’ now 
memorialises is plain to see.  
Prior to delineating a timeline of the accident which occurred at Chernobyl’s unit 4, a brief 
introduction to the nuclear reactors, with particular attention being paid to the RBMK, will be 
provided, since knowledge of this unique type of reactor is required in order to understand how 
the disaster manifested itself. Crucially, this descriptive process will begin to render visible the 
nature of the object’s agency; that is, the identification of the material aspects of its design, 
construction and obscured underlying role which co-mingled to spawn the heterogenous 
technological and engineering network of influence across which it has subsequently travelled. 
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Several innate design ‘deficiencies’ and/or ‘deviations’ from the international (Western ) 
knowledge practices of the nuclear industry are present within the RBMK, and these were fused 
with human operational irregularities. The result was the two steam explosions within the core of 
unit 4 (Yaroshinska 1995; Malko 2002; Salage & Milling 2006), and this complex nexus 
between the design of the nuclear non-human and the lack of proper care by its human 
operators has continuously influenced the actions of the international organisations tasked with 
ensuring the safety of all civil nuclear power stations in the immediate aftermath up until the 
present day. The descriptive passage below identifies the fundamental elements of this nexus, 
capturing the starting point for the journey across unit 4’s attracted network.  
Figure 3.1: Graphical representation of the RBMK (Source: Mara 2010)  
The RBMK was an unusual reactor design in comparison to its Western counterparts. It was one 
of two designs to come out of the Soviet nuclear industry during the 1970’s (Josephson 1999), 
with the Water Water Energy Reactor (WWER) forming its nuclear brethren. The RBMK was a 
pressurised water cooled reactor, which utilised a huge array of individual fuel channels and 
featured a graphite moderator. This unique type of reactor fell under the meta grouping of light 
water graphite reactors (LWGR), and their widespread design, manufacture and implementation 
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were almost exclusively a product of the Soviet Union. Only the British Magnox and advanced 
gas-cooled reactors (AGR) use graphite as a moderator within the civil industry (Medvedev, 
1990), but they deploy super heated gas as a coolant, rather than light water. As an aside, the 
distinction between, and subsequent use, of light water (H20) and heavy water (D20) within a 
nuclear reactor has a notable impact upon design ethos. Chemically speaking, heavy water is 
an isotope of light water, as it has two deuterium atoms (as opposed to the two hydrogen atoms 
within light water); heavy water is 10% denser than its isotope cousin (Farhi et al 2015). If a 
reactor utilises light water within its design, then it must use another material as its moderator 
because light water is not efficient in absorbing neutrons. Conversely, heavy water is a much 
more efficient neutron absorbing agent, and thus can also act as a mediator (and coolant) 
(Pershagen and Bowen 2013). The importance of this process shall be covered below. Primarily, 
graphite moderated reactors are a product of the military industrial complex which contributes 
to the plutonium production economy. Therefore, the fundamental distinguishing factor within the 
design of the RBMK, that which makes it unique within the civil industry, is the use of graphite as 
a moderator.  
Before a detailed summation of how the object of the RBMK produces electricity is provided, it is 
imperative to appreciate the importance of a moderator within any nuclear reactor: why it is 
needed, and why the use of graphite was so unusual. As with most aspects of the atomic age, it 
begins and ends with uranium. Within uranium dioxide there are two primary isotopes, U-235 
and U-238, and the latter statistically dominates the natural element in terms of the collective 
mass (Wallner et al 2014). The process of nuclear fission takes place within U-235 atoms and 
the chain reaction later spreads to the plentiful U-238atoms. A useful analogy to help visualise 
this operation can be found in the lighting of a traditional wood burning fire, be it in an open pit 
or a log burning stove. Without the use of hexamine fuel tablets, or ‘firelighters’, the fire may 
struggle, or simply not be able to achieve criticality; that is, it will not reach the temperatures 
required to ignite the natural wood fuel. Thus, in terms of the collective mass of the total fuel 
which the fire has to consume, the hexamine represents only a tiny percentage, but its 
importance to the initial reaction and subsequent inferno cannot be understated. This is the role 
of U-235: it is the atomic firelighter. This presents an unavoidable mechanical issue for any 
nuclear reactor. Due to the dominant percentage of U-238 over U-235 within uranium dioxide, a 
specialised system is required to spark the initial reaction within the subordinate isotope, which 
is achieved through the use of a moderator. In essence, a moderator slows down fast moving 
neutrons to the speed which destabilises U-235 atoms, subsequently prompting them to embark 
on their violent and atomically disruptive journey towards a self-sustaining reaction within the 
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meta structure of the uranium fuel (Glasstone and Sesonske 2012). The ideal moderator for a 
fission reactor should be roughly the same mass as the neutrons involved within the process, and 
hydrogen is the ideal element (Wagemans 1991). Thus, water represents one of the optimum 
moderators due to its atomic similarities with the neutrons involved in nuclear fission and, 
fortuitously, its innate cooling properties. The only issue with the use of water as a moderator is 
the fact that it is also acts as a neutron absorber, so it not only slows neutrons but also filters 
them away from the uranium dioxide fuel as it naturally consumes them.  
This slowing is counter-balanced through the enrichment of uranium, which specifically means 
increasing the percentage of U-235. The enrichment process requires a heterogeneous 
infrastructural network specifically tasked with re-orientating the internal isotopic balance within 
the uranium dioxide fuel (Berkemeier et al 2014), an expensive and time-consuming operation, 
one which represents a barrier on the road to the proliferation of weapons grade uranium. In 
other words, any state which uses a light water moderated reactor must have domestic, or 
internationally agreed upon, access to enrichment capabilities (Brown and Kaplow 2014). 
During the 1970’s and early 1980’s, enriched uranium was at a premium. This period of course 
played host to the tenacious nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Crucially, the keystone components needed in the construction of a nuclear missile and a nuclear 
power station are identical: enriched uranium and/or plutonium. Thus, the Soviet civil nuclear 
industry chose a design ethos for both of its flagship reactors of the era which shied away from 
the use of fully enriched uranium in a bid to ease the bottleneck between civilian and military 
demand. Hence, instead of water, the choice was graphite, a choice ultimately mired in Cold 
War logistics.  
The RBMK used slightly enriched uranium dioxide fuel at a ratio of 2% U-235 to 98% U-238, 
rather than the conventional 5% U-235 concentrations traditionally deployed within Western 
reactor design (IAEA 1999). Thus, only a partial enrichment process was required to meet the 
demand for fuel from the Soviet fleet of reactors, subsequently freeing up the more highly 
enriched product for military use. As previously mentioned, the RBMK used graphite as a 
constant moderator and light water as its primary coolant. Therefore, the need for 5% enriched 
uranium dioxide fuel was negated through graphite’s lack of intense neutron absorbency. In 
theory, the compositional make up of this type of moderator has plentiful advantages, none 
more theoretically beneficial than a permanent means of igniting the fission reaction within the 
valuable 2% (Pershagen and Bowen 2013). Regardless of these supposed benefits, the use of 
graphite as a moderator was shown to be innately dangerous through the post-mortem of the 
Chernobyl accident, to be covered in a specific section below. For now, we have gained an 
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understanding of the importance of a moderator within nuclear engineering, and attention will 
now move to the inner workings of the non-human hybrid of the RBMK.  
The RBMK is a product of its era, an example of 1950’s technology and 1970’s engineering 
(Medvedev 1990; Malko 2002; Salge & Milling 2006) which in 1986 was obsolete in both 
fields. This criticism could be levelled at most older generation nuclear reactors, regardless of 
their origin; but, unlike a mobile phone or a laptop, they cannot simply be traded in for the new 
model due to the phenomenal cost of their construction and infrastructural importance. The 
means through which the reactor produces electricity forms the bedrock on which its 
obsoleteness is fastened. The reactor’s core is constructed from closely packed graphite blocks; 
these in turn form vertical columns about 10 metres in height - there are 2,488 graphite columns 
in a RBMK-1000, with a collective mass of over 1,700 (Aden et al 1977; Emel’yanov et al 1980; 
Medvedev 1990). This array of graphite stacks forms the material structure of the core as-well-as 
the moderator, in essence tasking it with moderation and physical assemblage. The fuel channels 
are formed by the material arrangement of the graphite moderator which subsequently 
engenders 1,622 channels within the second generation RBMK present at the Chernobyl facility. 
As a brief aside, there are material differences between the first, second and third generations 
of RBMK, but this is not the place to detail the minute elements of difference. The meta-structure 
and design philosophy bridge every generational divide, with the size and support system 
forming the primary source of evolution (IAEA 1999).  
The aforementioned fuel channels house the uranium dioxide fuel, which is compressed into 
small cylindrical pellets and stacked to fill the ten metre vertical void in between the graphite 
stacks. This is not an airtight fit as each fuel channel must also house the primary coolant system. 
This results in a distinctly complex design of reactor, one split up into over 1,000 microcosmic 
cores each with its own levels of reactivity, coolant and steam generation systems. In other 
words, the structure is akin to a beehive when viewed from a position of verticality. Figure 3.2, 
taken during the research trip to the Chernobyl facility, is of the control room of unit 4, and it 
depicts the structure of the core. On the wall is the core’s primary monitoring system where 
each of the channels can be viewed, and this system was identical for unit 4. Each individual 
honeycomb within the meta structure of the hive is autonomous in terms of physical separation 
from its neighbours and its individual role of producing honey, but it feeds intrinsically into the 
interconnected governing function of the hive. Thus, the core of the RBMK shares visual 
similarities with the abode of the honey bee, as-well-as metaphorical connections to a hive’s 
division of physical responsibilities across its structure.  
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Figure 3.2: control panels of unit 1 (source: researcher’s own photograph 2015) 
Control of the reactivity is fundamental to any nuclear technology, and the RBMK utilises 211 
control rods to achieve this most imperative of operations (Salge and Milling 2006). These 
neutron-absorbing rods have their own channels within the graphite core and their actions are 
akin, allegorically, to a magnet. They are assembled using boron carbide due to its ability to 
absorb neutrons, subsequently preventing the generation of new neutrons, depending on their 
levels of insertion into the core, which in turn moderates the chain reaction (Chan and Dastur 
1989). Hence, they attract neutrons in a manner similar to how a magnet attracts ferromagnetic 
materials. Each rod can be remotely inserted independently from the control room and it is the 
duty of the reactor’s operators to perform a delicate balancing act, carefully inserting and 
retracting the plethora of control rods at different locations to ensure that the landscape of the 
core performs at optimal levels. Simply put, the further the rods are taken out of the core, the 
higher the reactivity. Thus, the chain reaction is inhibited when they are inserted. When detailing 
the obsolete aspects of the RBMK, the control rods take centre stage. The official rate at which 
they could travel into the core was 40 centimetres per second (Medvedev 1990; Josephson 
1999; IAEA 1999; Malko 2002), and so, for the entire assembly to travel the 10 metre length of 
the core, it would take 20 seconds. In the late-1980’s this was a totally unacceptable safety 
practice (INSAG 1996), and by contemporary standards it is unthinkable. One of the most 
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frightening aspects of a nuclear reactor, regardless of its design and/or origin, is the rate at 
which it can heat up to a point where the system cannot cope. The description up until this point 
has delineated an array of individual mini reactors within the RBMK’s core, each with its own 
permanent moderator and fuel assembly. Thus, if their delicate ecosystem is not dutifully 
managed, the potential for this type of system to heat up exponentially is massive. In hindsight, 
the RBMK should have been equipped with a control rod system which could have been fully 
inserted in a few seconds, not a quarter of a minute. The events of April 1986 highlighted this 
deficiency in explosive detail.  
So far we know that the core of the RBMK is primarily constructed of graphite, with a 
heterogeneous array of independent fuel channels, and an inadequate control rod system with 
its own designated openings within the graphite block. Thoughts will now turn to the unique 
ways in which its cooling system and steam generation procedures are intertwined - it should be 
noted that this generalised topic addresses several of the mechanical/material factors which 
contributed to the accident. Outwith the renewable industry, a power station can be simplified 
as a means of engendering and sustaining a heat source for the purpose of boiling water to 
create steam, which in turn drives mammoth turbines. As mentioned in chapter 1, this has always 
been the case with commercial electrical production units; even as the scientific collective strives 
towards the commercialisation of nuclear fusion, the most ambitious and celestially inspired 
creation of heat -  that is, the process that eternally powers the stars of the universe, this 
fundamental practice of steam generation to spin turbines - will remain. Typically in Western 
reactors of the era, and especially contemporary examples, there are two circuits for water; one 
tasked with cooling the fuel, and one for generating steam (Scott 2007). This design principle 
necessitates a heat exchange system as it is believed to be good practice to separate the 
radioactive coolant from the water which will eventually drive the steam turbines (Ahearne 
1987; Chernousenko 1991). This arrangement reduces the amount of physical appendages 
required (ie. pressurised pipes, welds, and so on), subsequently limiting the total area through 
which the radioactive water has to travel. The RBMK did not adhere to this practice, and instead 
it was constructed with individual cooling circuits for each fuel channel which were fed from one 
meta-water circulation system (INSAG 1996). This resulted in a dizzyingly complicated plethora 
of pipes, valves, connectors and gauges - in other words, an intense interconnected network of 
appendages which needed to be fully pressurised and operational for the reactor to function as 
intended. 
Furthermore, the immense temperatures and pressures involved within the controlled process of 
nuclear fission are difficult to fathom. Almost every aspect of the system produces statistical 
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averages delineating an object which continuously tests and stresses its engineering and 
technological framework: a wild creature paradoxically tamed through the material cage to 
which it owes its existence. This is evident in the routine ‘stress testing’ (a form of risk calculation) 
performed on all types of nuclear reactors worldwide. Within the RBMK the graphite columns 
reached 700 degrees celsius during normal operations (Medvedev 1990), and the pressured 
coolant water’s normative temperature was 170 celsius at 8.2 megapascal (Malko 2002). These 
figures portray a hostile environment, one which could potentially be mitigated through the 
separation and individualisation of crucial systems which would ease pressures and tensions 
placed upon them. However, as mentioned above, an important feature of the RBMK reactor 
was the marriage of the coolant and steam generation water circuits, meaning that the highly 
pressurised water cooling the fuel was in turn evaporated and fed into the turbine generators in 
a continuous circuit. This design decision, coupled with the permanent graphite moderator, 
resulted in the RBMK having an extremely large positive void coefficient (Afanasieva et al 
1993), and, prior to the elaboration of this technical term, it should be stated that this state can 
be extremely dangerous. The void coefficient is a measurement of how any given reactor 
responds to increased steam formation within the water coolant. The difference between a 
positive and a negative void coefficient is connected to a reactor’s relationship with water, and 
the role it plays within its fission process. If a unit which has been designed to use water as 
moderator and coolant, the increase of steam bubbles within its core will decrease the water’s 
ability to slow down neutrons (Seiler et al 1988). In other words, an unexpected rise in the 
temperature of the coolant water to a level with which the material confines of the core are not 
‘comfortable’ results in the above-mentioned increase in bubbles, which in turn slows the fission 
chain reaction due to the water’s new inability to act as a moderator. This dynamic is referred to 
as a negative coefficient, and it is fundamentally appealing due to the innate controllability of 
any reactor designed in conjunction with this line of physics.  
Even in the era of the RBMK’s design inception, most nuclear reactors were built with an innate 
negative coefficient (INSAG 1996). Even without the use of the all-seeing eye of hindsight, it 
appears misguided to have green-lit a design that did not adhere to this knowledge - especially 
when considering the principles associated with a positive coefficient. As mentioned, the 
permanent graphite moderator within the RBMK plays a telling role due to its physical 
moderating properties. If the temperatures of the coolant water rise, and an excess of steam 
bubbles begins to appear, the water loses its ability to act as a coolant, its primary purpose with 
this type of reactor. This is extremely bad for the controllability of the reactor as, without the 
habitual circulation of water of the correct temperature, the fission reaction will relentlessly 
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increase in temperature due to the material presence of its graphite moderator. In other words, 
even with the increase in steam bubbles and consequent rise in coolant temperatures, the 
neutrons are still slowed by the graphite. Furthermore, although graphite is the primary 
moderator within the RBMK, its coolant water still inadvertently acts as one too, due to its innate 
neutron absorbing qualities. Thus, when this vital pool of liquid coolant begins to vaporise, it 
relinquishes its natural absorbent characteristics, once again contributing towards the positive 
coefficient rate. During this disastrous process, the reactor’s first line of defence against an 
accident literally evaporates.  
The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) was one of several international 
groups who conducted research upon the accident at unit 4 in a bid to determine what went 
wrong, and, more importantly, how to secure the future safe running of the remaining fleet of 
RBMKs across the FSU. The report produced by the INSAG stated that the positive coefficient of 
the reactor, which was only identified in the post-disaster era, and the inefficiency of its control 
were the key material aspects of the reactor’s construction which contributed towards the 
explosion (INSAG 1992). Taking into consideration the RBMK’s unique singular water 
circulation circuit and all that has been discussed regarding its boisterous reactivity levels, the 
imperative to keep its watery life blood at the correct temperature became ‘chillingly’ apparent.  
Coolant systems within any nuclear reactor are of immeasurable importance, even within 
reactors which operate with a negative coefficient (Glasstone and Sesonske 2012). The constant 
circulation of vital water represents the first line of defence against the exponential rise in heat 
witnessed during uncooled fission products. This perpetual circulating of coolant liquid keeps the 
fuel within the operational temperatures that the object is designed to withstand. Without this 
steady flow, the fuel will rapidly heat up to a point where it will begin to melt its structural 
containment. In other words, this will cause a literal meltdown - the ultimate accident which could 
befall a nuclear facility. Therefore, due to its singular design ethos, the water circulation system 
within the RBMK was actually tasked with three integral roles: steam generation, fuel coolant, 
and the material first line of its safety systems. The RBMK featured an emergency core cooling 
system (ECCS) which was partially autonomous from the primary water circuit (IAEA 1999), and 
its role was to activate if the control systems gauged that the core was getting too hot. Every 
format of peer stations has a system akin to this; and, due to its essential role in the occurrence 
of an emergency, its electricity requirements are primarily met by the station output as-well-as by 
backup generators (D’Auria et al 2005). It is standard practice for any power station to run its 
fundamental systems from the electricity it produces, which is especially relevant to nuclear 
installations. The necessity for these non-humans to be ‘self-sustaining’ reveals itself when 
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thoughts turn towards its safety systems, be it the control rod governing systems, or the water 
circulation machinery. An innate safety precaution is hence the use of backup diesel generators 
which are capable of supplying its essential systems with the necessary power to function during 
an electricity blackout, thus completing their ‘self-sustaining’ ability. However, these backup 
diesel generators cannot guarantee an instantaneous switchover and full supply of power - there 
will always be a delay. How to mitigate this delay is of primary concern for any plant’s 
operators, particularly those tasked with caring for reactors of a similar design to the RBMK 
with its slow control rods’ insertion rate. As an aside, this relationship between the RBMK’s 
backup generators and the rate at which they can sustain the essential control systems will be 
covered below. For now, we must strive to understand further the subjective nexus between an 
efficient design ethos and a safe operational dynamic.  
Efficiency is a crucial aspect of any industrial object, and the RBMK’s singular water circulation 
system could be viewed as an efficient practice. Nuclear reactors do not form an exception to 
this rule, but their drive towards an efficient operating standard must be held to higher levels of 
accountability and innate safety standards than their non-atomic counterparts, due to the 
unwieldy nature of the beast. There are plentiful ways to increase the efficiency of these non-
humans, but they are implemented at the expense of the reactor’s intrinsic safety levels - the 
Chernobyl disaster illustrated that engineering efficiency should always be of secondary concern 
to securing a flawless operating procedure. In essence, the water and steam system within the 
RBMK can be simplified and visualised as a circular loop (as illustrated in figure 3.1 at the outset 
of this section), one which encompasses the complex fuel channel network within the graphite 
stacks and the steam powered generators. However, each RBMK-1000 has two 500MWe 
turbine generators on each side of the core (Sorokin et al 2006), and its physical landscape of 
over one thousand fuel channels was segregated into two distinct sections which fed their 
respective electricity producing appendages. This design decision subsequently split the 
territorial responsibilities of the primary water circuit in two, and, crucially, allowed the reactor 
to be partially shut down while the other half remained active (Tyapkov et al 2011).  
This partitioning of the core and the resulting ability of the RBMK to be refuelled while still 
producing electricity, albeit at half power, was another major departure from conventional 
nuclear reactor design. The material structure of a Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR) centres 
around one large, steel, pressurised vessel, which houses every fuel rod and is tasked with 
separating the coolant water from the steam generation system by means of the aforementioned 
heat exchange mechanism. Think of this system design as a titanic spherical container, 
hermetically sealing/grouping the uranium fuel within its ten inch steel outer shell, and contrast 
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this image with the aforementioned ‘beehive’ RBMK analogy. Both of these systems have their 
pros and cons: the PWR system being fundamentally more controllable, yet necessitating a 
period of full shutdown every six to seven years for refuelling (an infrastructural dilemma for any 
nation state’s national grid); while the RBMK design allowed for refuelling/repairs during half 
power operations, but also entailed a dangerously complex object which lacked full 
containment. In other words, we return to the aforementioned binary between efficiency and 
safety, with both meta-designs providing excellent ‘centre right’ and ‘centre left’ examples. As 
stated at the outset of this passage, the RBMK was principally designed around the generation 
of electricity as-well-as the production of plutonium. Plutonium is a human-made, transuranium 
element, synthesised through the conversion of U-238 into PU-239 by means of neutron 
bombardment during the fission process (WNA, 2012). In other words, it represents the 
transformation of the previously non-fissionable dominant isotope of uranium into a much more 
potent alternative.  
When this mutation takes place within the core of the RBMK, or any uranium powered nuclear 
reactor, it generates a huge amount of heat. Any ‘uranium fuelled’ reactor is actually partially 
powered by the plutonium that it inevitably produces when the neutrons from the U-235 chain 
reaction spread to the U-238. It should be noted that this is just a vastly irradiated byproduct of 
the process; the primary use of plutonium is within thermonuclear warheads. In any Western 
nuclear state, there is a separation between the military production of plutonium and the civil 
electricity producing industry. Typically, a branch of the military industrial complex will operate 
nuclear reactors with the sole purpose of creating plutonium - due to the risk of weapons 
proliferation, this process is exclusively conducted by the apparatus of the state. There are 
fundamental differences between ‘weapons-grade’ and ‘reactor-grade’ plutonium, and these 
revolve around how long the uranium has been kept in the nuclear oven. The reason that fission 
elements emit heat is a result of their atomic decay; as they are bombarded with neutrons, their 
compositional atomic structure is destabilised, which releases atoms within the element. 
Weapons-grade plutonium is produced by irradiating uranium for three months in a purpose 
built unit, and reactor-grade plutonium is irradiated, or ‘burned’, for a minimum of three years 
within a system akin to the RBMK (Hamblin et al 1998). Thus, the former is a much more potent 
example of the ‘breed’, purposefully removed as soon as it has transmutated from U-238, while 
the latter is a byproduct of a system which, due to its infrastructural importance to the national 
grid, cannot be shut off to retrieve this ‘precious’ cargo (WNA, 2012). This indeed is the 
Western logic behind the production of plutonium, particularly regarding the form that is used 
within Western iterations of three stage thermonuclear weapons - quality and safety being 
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achieved through a concept of separation of production networks, regarded as more important 
than the streamlining of manufacturing efficiency and pushing for increased quantity of the final 
product. It should be apparent at this juncture that the Soviet system did not adhere to this 
practice, and the RBMK is a non-human monument to this lack of adherence. All that has been 
described thus far cumulatively results in a nuclear reactor design which produced and 
facilitated the neat and efficient removal of readily transportable plutonium during online 
functions. The subversive purpose of this intentional design ethos can only be speculated upon, 
and it is safe to assume that Gorbachev’s policy of ‘Glasnost’, with its arguable veil of 
subterfuge and hypocrisy, would not extend to providing details of the nexus between the Soviet 
military machine and the widespread implementation of their flagship reactors.  
The militaristic importance of the Chernobyl facility is further brought to light by means of the 
Duga 3 radar facility (figure 3.3). 
Figure 3.3: Panoramic shot of Duga 3 radar facility from the roof of the control building (source: 
researcher’s own photograph 2015)  
This towering mass of wires and steel, affectionally nicknamed as ‘The Russian Woodpecker’, 
due to the distinctive ‘pecking’ noise that it made through radio waves, was the Russians’ 
primary radar complex on their ‘Western front’. The facility was shrouded in secrecy, with some 
claiming that it was the most secretive project of the Soviet Union during the Cold War 
(Evstratov et al 1994). It is situated roughly 5kms away from the Chernobyl facility, and has a 
power line directly to it from the Station. It is estimated that it consumed over a third of the 
power plant’s total output, and its placement alludes to the militaristic nature of the entire site. 
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3.2 The material pre-context of the accident  
As the essential parameters of the RBMK’s design have been described, attention will now turn 
to the sequence of events that resulted in the accident. This will be accompanied by one final 
technical exposition on the relationship between the passing of time and the controllability of a 
nuclear reactor, which will provide an excellent segue into the timeline of events which resulted 
in the explosion at unit 4 in April 1986. Once again, we return to the uniquely divergent 
characteristics of uranium. In a bid to illustrate what is being discussed, another comparison 
between easily recognisable, conventional electricity generating stations and their nuclear 
alternatives will be deployed. This comparative exercise begins with the recognition that coal, oil 
and natural gas power stations are extremely hungry non-humans. The rate at which their 
eternal furnaces consume hydrocarbons is both environmentally shocking and logistically 
impressive. This is due to the instantaneous and carnivorous nature involved during their 
production of heat - ignite a bucket of oil and it will rapidly devour itself until the total depletion 
of its mass through a simple chain reaction. Thus, there is a transformation happening within the 
‘core’, or furnace, of traditional formats of power station, one which combusts the fuel, 
subsequently transforming it into a gas which leaves the body of the object. In other words, the 
mass of the fuel is transported within the process, and the station itself is merely a means of 
conducting this action on a large and continuous scale. Therefore, the non-human itself never 
changes, it acts as a conduit through which solid hydrocarbons are combusted into gaseous 
entities. On the other hand, nuclear power stations do not require continuous nourishment in 
order to sustain their heat source. Once their cores are filled with uranium dioxide, they have 
the ability to run without refuelling for several years, and the continuous chain reaction will only 
increase in intensity as time passes.  
On paper, this seems like an advantageous aspect of splitting the atom, and when viewed in 
isolation it is. However, unlike their traditional counterparts, the fuel does not migrate from the 
nuclear reactor during a cycle - its mass, for obvious reasons, is imprisoned within the confines 
of the core. Furthermore, during the process of nuclear fission, the radionuclides within the fuel 
mutate into more volatile examples (eg. the aforementioned transformation of U-238 into 
PU-239), resulting in an evolving landscape within the non-human of the reactor. Thus, when 
compared to the above-mentioned traditional power stations, a nuclear example is not a conduit 
for the transportation of the mass of its fuel, but rather an oven which ‘bakes’ its ingredients, 
subsequently producing a new, capricious mixture of precarious elements. Hence, there is a 
direct relationship between the exponential increase of volatile radioactive isotopes within the 
fuel and the length of time between refuelling of the reactor. As time passes, the controllability 
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of the object of the reactor decreases as the radioactivity and innate temperatures rise, 
particularly within complex designs like the RBMK. When viewed with an impossible lens of 
objectivity, one would suggest that refuelling should take place at the point when operational 
safety is negatively impacted by the increasing volatility of the fission material encased within 
the core of the object. However, as previously indicated, refuelling a reactor results in it being 
taken offline (or running at 50% capacity in the case of the RBMK) for a sustained length of 
time, which will have massive ramifications on any country’s national grid, regardless of its 
economic and infrastructural development. Therefore, monetary interests inevitably play an 
influential role within a dynamic which, due to the potential dangers involved, should be 
governed purely by a perfectionist drive for safety. This nexus could provide endlessly 
interesting avenues of research across the global nuclear landscape, but, for the purpose of this 
piece, it must be recognised that unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power station had been 
running its one and only fuel cycle for three years and four months (Medvedev, 1990, Mould 
2000) since its ‘official’ date of launch on the 20th December 1983. This period, for all intents 
and purposes, brought the fuel to the end of its life cycle. Thus, on the 25th April, 1986, the non-
human of unit 4 was in an extremely volatile state.  
This technical proviso neatly summarises the inherent conditions of the non-human of unit 4, and 
provides a means of understanding why its material state at the time of the accident was, in 
effect, so difficult to control. The purpose of detailing this consideration is to contextualise the 
material landscape integral to the sequence of events which resulted in the explosion within unit 
4. This process, combined with all that has gone before, begins to renders visible the 
appendages of the object’s agency. Once the accident itself has been explained, the task will be 
to correlate the technical, mechanical and physics based phenomena which form the backbone 
of Chernobyl’s ‘scientific’ network, subsequently allowing the mapping of the trajectories 
travelled. 
 
3.3 The road to meltdown 
 
The explosion within the core of unit 4 of the Chernobyl installation was a combination of the 
aforementioned physical complexities of the object’s design and, with the benefit of hindsight, 
illogical human decisions. As the material construct of the object has been laid out in (hopefully) 
readily understandable terms, the operational irregularities will now be covered as these 
culminated in the catalyst which brought the station to its explosive demise. The Soviet decision 
to award the fallible human element a massive amount of responsibility when designing the 
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reactor safety protocols (rather than allocating these hugely important tasks to an autonomous 
machine) will be covered in a later section. What shall be referred to as ‘the test’ from this point 
on will now take centre stage. To recap, all that has been described thus far has provided a 
material situational backdrop; it has delineated the RBMK in a rather negative light, one 
illuminating the physical aspects of its design that, when added to the evental happenings during 
the test, resulted in the explosion in April 1986. 
The test — a specific procedure planned and enacted at the Chernobyl facility in April 1986 —   
represents the point in space and time where the innate design deficiencies of the RBMK co-
mingled with its ageing fuel load, and also with a questionable evaluation procedure tasked 
with exploring the nexus between the backup diesel generators and the time it took for them to 
power the station during a loss of electricity situation. This evaluation was initiated due to the 
perceived unacceptable risk incurred by the delay between the starting of the three back up 
diesel generators and the sixty seconds needed for them to reach the 5.5Mw output required to 
run the main water circulation system (Shcherbak 1989; Medvedev 1990; Chernousenko 1991; 
IAEA 1999; Mould 2000; Malko 2002; Salge & Milling 2006 etc). The station’s operators 
believed that they could mitigate this delay by utilising the residual energy within the steam 
turbine generators as a means of bridging the minute gap needed for the backup generators to 
reach full power. As a brief aside, consensus has been reached regarding  the reasoning behind 
the creation and subsequent implementation of the test, but several contrasting arguments arise 
surrounding the historical frequency of the test. But the minute details of the logistical running of 
the station were not made public - several accounts from the years that followed work on the 
basis that there were at most two tests conducted before 1986 (Medvedev 1990), and others do 
not mention the existence of earlier tests when giving their descriptions of the test and the 
accident (Mould 2000, Malko 2002). This is in contrast to the Nuclear Energy Institute [NEI] 
(2011) and the Chernobyl Gallery’s (2005) accounts of the historical frequency of the test 
procedure, both claiming that the station’s operators had sought to take advantage of the 
potential of the residual energy within the turbo generators on three occasions prior to the 
fateful day in 1986. Regardless of this lack of consensus about the historical prevalence of the 
test, its activation at the end of the object’s fuel cycle was of telling importance and suggested 
operational incompetence.  
What follows is a condensed description of the parameters of the test itself, the material 
environment within the core which was stimulated in order to conduct it, moving on to a concise 
timeline of the disaster itself: discursive structure, material practice, and translative explosion. 
The 25th April 1986 saw the first planned maintenance and refuelling period for unit 4 at 
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Chernobyl, and the test was arranged to be conducted just before the shutdown was initiated — 
this pragmatic programme, on paper, represents an efficient means of completing both 
necessary acts in one sitting. In order artificially to create the conditions required for the test to 
be situationally valid, the power level of the object of unit 4 had to be lowered from 1000Mw to 
700Mw (Mould 2000). This was no easy feat for a complex unit like the RBMK, with its vast 
independent landscape of microcosmic fuel channels and an internal fuel load at the end of its 
life cycle. The test procedure also stated that, once these levels were reached, one of its three 
turbine generators was to remain running at full speed; and when these dual environmental 
conditions were met, the steam supply was to be shut off and the generator’s residual 
performance was to be recorded as a means of determining if it would produce enough energy 
to bridge the aforementioned gap. Finally, once these readings had been taken and the 
emergency generators had reached maximum capacity, the turbine generator would have been 
allowed to freewheel down to a standstill.  
The following timeline has been taken from the INSAG (1992) official report on the disaster. This 
decision was made due to the fact that this international organisation attained the information 
upon which it based its findings from first-hand data. There are numerous timelines provided 
throughout the discourse focused upon the accident itself, many of which are analytically 
superior to the sterile INSAG report. For example, Mould (2000) expertly highlights the several 
stages of failure, both technical and operational, subsequently detailing the external influences 
which co-mingled with the mechanics of the object; whereas Medvedev (1990) takes an 
altogether more critical stance when attempting to piece together the strange happenings within 
a bureaucratic network surrounding the Soviet Civil Nuclear Establishment during the period of 
the test. Malko (2002) approaches the topic with the clinical mindset of an engineer, depicting 
the nuts-and-bolts of the unit’s systems with steely efficiency and explaining the sequence of 
events during the test with unflinching technical jargon; and finally Shcherbak (1989) provides a 
first person perspective of the event itself, produced through first hand sources attained from 
eyewitnesses and station employees. This is in no way a comprehensive listing of all the 
delineations of the test and its awful failures, but it does provide a flavour of the different 
varieties available: that is, the heterogenous mix of representations surrounding a mechanical 
phenomenon. Due to the quasi-scientific nature of my own piece of research, the decision to 
utilise the document which features the highest levels of objectivity was made in a bid to ground 
the analysis firmly within the realm of the object of unit 4, rather than being subconsciously led 
by the subjectivities of the actors responsible for other pieces of literature. Thus, taking these 
negotiations into consideration, the INSAG report was chosen as my prime source.  
 96
3.4 The Test 
The period which preceded the test itself featured a bureaucratic cluster of confusion that 
perhaps only the Soviet Union could produce. Initially, the test was to take place during the 
afternoon of 25th April as the scheduled date and time of the planned maintenance period, and 
in keeping with this rhetoric unit 4 began its slow descent from maximum power down to the 
required 700 megawatt (Mw) at 14:00. It was at this point that the Emergency Core Cooling 
System (ECCS) was manually disengaged for two reasons: firstly, it would automatically have 
stepped in as it was designed to when the reactor reached these lower power levels; and 
secondly, the test was tasked with creating a situation where the electricity supply to the ECCS 
would have been cut off, and the only way authentically to recreate the desired situation was to 
turn it off. Just before the test was about to be fully initiated, the station received a call from the 
controller of the Kiev electricity grid requesting that the shutdown of unit 4 be postponed till 
23:10 that night (this information was not provided within the INSAG report, which only 
provides the actual timescale without explanation of the delay: thus, this insert is subject to a 
reference from Mould 2000). This eleven hour delay meant that the reactor was kept at this 
lower power level and the object and its operators subsequently found themselves in an unusual 
equilibrium. Unbelievably, the ECCS was not reactivated during this extended window, which 
represented a direct violation of the station’s operating protocols. During the period between 
23:10 and 00:30, the reactor’s standard control rods (referred to as local automatic control 
rods [LACs]) were removed from their graphite housings within the core, and the secondary rod 
system (known as automatic control rods [ACs]) were switched in their place. At this juncture, 
the operators in charge of the test and the object itself neglected to reset the inertia starting 
point for the ACs; in essence, they forgot to programme them to the unique requirements of the 
test, and the reactor’s power level plummeted to only 30Mw. This, for obviously statistical 
reasons, was far below the required levels of 700Mw needed to validate the test itself.  
As stated at the outset of this section, unit 4 was in a volatile state when this experiment was 
being conducted - the last thing it, and its operators, wanted to be doing was intensely 
increasing and decreasing the reactor’s power output with purposefully artificial frequency. The 
standard natural progression of events post ACs' insertion to the levels witnessed at 00:30 was 
full shutdown with the intention of terminating the fuel cycle. However, this would obviously have 
ended any possibility of the test being conducted and a hierarchical backlash would have 
befallen the object’s seemingly absent minded operators and the station’s director. Fearing this 
outcome, the operators embarked upon the precarious stabilising mission of withdrawing the 
ACs enough to sustain the chain reaction as it was almost extinguished and also to increase the 
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total power output back to 700Mw (over two hundred times the capacity at which it was then 
set to run). This task was made difficult by the appearance of xenon gas which accumulates 
during the natural shutdown procedure. By 01:19 the operators managed to stabilise the power 
output at 200Mw and the eight pumps which fed the coolant water across the two sides of the 
core were still running at maximum efficiency. This created a unique situation within the body of 
the reactor; fractional power output in tandem with maximum coolant flow rate, which in turn 
led to a steady fall in the steam production within the singular water circuit. This situation 
resulted in a sizeable decrease in pressure within the steam drums which fed the turbine 
generators. At this point the operators attempted manually to rectify this lack of pressure and 
water level within these drums by deploying the secondary feed water pumps. It should be 
noted that this situation, under regular operating procedures, would have been automatically 
avoided by the reactor’s steam level protection system due to its preprogrammed task of 
overriding any manual inputs and tripped (kill the chain reaction through full and terminal 
insertion of fail safe control rods) the reactor due to the dangerously low pressures within the 
steam drums. However, akin to the disconnection of the ECCS, this system had been disengaged 
in order for the test to be carried out without the object’s protective systems stepping in and 
eradicating the potentially dangerous core environmental conditions.  
At this juncture, the preparations for the test were running the reactor in a perilous state. It is 
difficult confidently to assert how aware were the operators performing the test of these 
conditions, as no accounts exist. However Salge and Milling (2006) argue that the bureaucratic 
pressures being put upon these lower level staff was a telling factor within their actions; that is, 
the fear of repercussions could explain their downright dangerous actions. One cannot forget 
that the Chernobyl accident vividly highlighted that nuclear non-humans are extremely 
dangerous, and a new era of risk was ushered in as a consequence. It is easy to chastise these 
human actions in hindsight, and rightly so; but it is also easy to empathise with the mindset of a 
low level employee of a Soviet power station during an era where these objects were 
considered to be safe.  
The next three minutes and forty eight seconds sealed the station’s fate and cemented its place 
within the annals of history. This brief window witnessed a series of further attempts by the 
operators to attain the necessary equilibrium for the test to be conducted; all the while, the 
object was materially preparing itself for the eventual explosion. 01:19:30 saw a successful 
effort to increase the water level required within the steam drums, but this level was exceeded 
by one of the operators - his identity is not disclosed. This excess of cold water reverted back 
into the core and across the fuel, subsequently cooling it further and fluctuating the total power 
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output - this was accompanied by a further decrease in steam pressure. Faced with plummeting 
megawattage, the operators compensated by fully withdrawing all twelve ACs from the core in 
an attempt to rekindle the chain reaction to a level suitable for the test to begin, which was 
accompanied by the partial removal of several of the manual control rods (an almost identical 
series of events covered in the previous paragraph). After these removals only six control rods 
of any kind remained within the core, less than half of the designed safety minimum of fifteen. 
01:21:50 saw an increase of reactivity within the fuel due to the lack of neutron absorbent 
material within the core, and the manual reduction of the feed water flow rate. These two factors 
led to the water within the core, which was not pressurised to the standard levels as a result of 
the earlier drop in steam integrity, becoming rapidly hotter and raising the quality of the steam. 
Attempts to rectify this new core dynamic came in the form of the lowering of the ACs at 
01:22:10 - one minute later the operators had temporarily stabilised the object at 200Mw (a 
much lower level than the designated requirement stated within the proviso of the test).  
This entire sequence of events portrays a team of operators solving one problem only to create 
another: a rocking back and fro from one mechanical issues to another, with the attempts to 
solve them being enacted with vigour rather than the necessary finesse required when handling 
a complex machine like the RBMK, particularly in its end of fuel cycle condition. 01:23:04 
witnessed the activation of the test itself, and 48 seconds later unit 4 of the Chernobyl NPP 
experienced two consecutive steam explosions. As previously stated, the initiation of the test 
began with the steam supply for turbine generator number 8 being cut off. The unavoidable 
increase in steam within the core (due to the sectioning off of one of its key outlets) prompted 
the fuel to again increase in reactivity, which in turn raised the power output of the unit. This was 
coupled with a manual reduction of the coolant flow rate which caused an even greater build up 
of steam due to the increased temperature of the coolant liquid. At 01:23:40 these evolving 
conditions within the core produced a rapid and steep increase in power, otherwise known as a 
prompt critical excursion, and as soon as the unit’s foreman identified it he ordered an 
emergency shutdown. However, due to the almost total removal of the control rods, their 
extremely slow insertion rate and the lack of design support to contain a runaway reactor, this 
emergency termination procedure was too late in terms of time and environmental reactivity. 
Within 3 seconds the object had increased to 530Mw output, and it rose at a frightening 
exponential rate, so fast that the instruments could not keep pace with it. At 01:23:46 the 
reactor evaporated its remaining coolant and a massive steam build up ensued within its 
pressurised vessel. Nuclear reactors are built to withstand immense pressures and temperatures, 
but they still have their design limits. There are systems in place to release pressure build ups by 
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simply venting excess steam into the atmosphere, but even automated systems take time, 
physically, to open material valves. Two seconds after this huge increase in steam occurred, unit 
4 experienced two massive steam explosions caused by fuel channel ruptures.  
The force of these explosions was so massive that they tore the 1,000 tonne circular lid of the 
reactor core clean off and thrust it into the air (Mara 2011). Nuclear reactors are sealed entities 
as they have to create very specific environmental conditions within their bellies to engender, 
sustain and, crucially, control the fission process. RBMK no4 was now open to the elements, and 
as air rushed into the still reacting core several more smaller explosions ripped apart the 
remains of the reactor’s structure and its housing building (Mould 2000), thus resulting in the 
ruination of the western side of the Chernobyl facility and marking the start of a clean up/
mitigation operation that has lasted for 30 years.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This is the account of the explosive demise of unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station: the 
material prelude which physically tore the object apart, and in the same catastrophic breath, 
awarded it the agency for which this research seeks to account. This chapter has taken seriously 
the need to account for the ontology of the non-human at the centre of the research project, its 
material form and the procedures it enacted to produce electricity. Furthermore, this account has 
also highlighted the very serious design deficiencies with all RBMK reactors, innate mechanical 
features ranging from the geography of the core, and its beehive form, the operating positive 
reactivity coefficient. There is no denying that the RBMK design is extremely efficient, a literally 
powerhouse producer of electricity, but it is intrinsically difficult to control, and as a result, 
unstable to operate. The Chernobyl accident was a mixture of these ontological design 
deficiencies, and the, arguably, insane Soviet decision to conduct a dangerous test during the 
most volatile period of the young unit’s lifecycle; that is, at the end of its fuel cycle. This mixture 
of authoritarian bureaucracy and questionable reactor design commingled to produce the 
explosions of 1AM on 26th of April. As shall be seen in chapter 4, the pressures of the Soviet 
system, the expectations and the repercussions of ‘failure’, weighed heavy on the NPP’s 
operators, and this could explain their lack resistance to the timing of the test, but this is only 
part of the answer. As a result of the accident, a large international program was set up to 
assess and augment the RBMK fleet — a node of action that shall be touched upon during the 
concluding chapter — and the very existence of such a wide ranging (and costly) programme 
highlights the potential risks associated with the reactor’s design.  
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Today, all that is left in the reactor hall of the western end of the Chernobyl facility is the carcass 
of RBMK no4, a twisted mound of shattered metal infused with melted uranium fuel with an 
unfathomable half-life. However, prior to 26th April 1986, the fully functional object supplied 
electricity to millions of people across Ukraine, engendered gainful employment for hundreds of 
skilled workers, and promoted the building of an entire city just to cater for its army of human 
carers. Yet, other than the construction of its atomic city of Pripyat, it would be a difficult, if not 
impossible task to render visible a single strand of its agency and the actions it engendered 
during its short life. In essence, it simply faded into the background much like its brethren at 
Ignalina, Lenningrad and Smolensk. In the aftermath of the accident up until the present day, the 
physical object of unit 4 has served no positive societal purpose, other than effectively acting as 
a vortex for international capital. Yet its influence is still visible across a plethora of spheres of 
life, none more fundamentally important than that of nuclear engineering.  
It is rare to find a phenomenon which closely mirrors the key tenets of a theoretical approach; 
however, it seems that actor network theory (ANT) was almost purposely constructed for the 
study of unit 4 at Chernobyl. The ability to award an object the status of an actor being of 
obvious importance, with the lesser known situational checklist surrounding how to 
operationalise this conceptual manoeuvre playing an equally imperative role. Simply put, when 
an object breaks, it no longer inhabits ‘the background’, its ontological flip consequently awards 
it newfound agency, which in turn prompts a host of unique actions to rectify its material 
malfunction. That is, the object’s attracted network of actors are forced into new and dynamic 
patterns of action, all spawned by the physical disruption within the object. When this logic is 
applied to the epicentre of the aforementioned network, the object of unit 4 and its immediate 
geographical space of residence, the half a million liquidators drafted in to secure the flailing 
reactor were the first actors to bear witness to this new cauldron of agency. Granted the main 
research question asks how the object travelled, and one would assume that this would see the 
analysis move outwardly from the site. This is the case for chapters 5 and 6, but only focusing 
on the ‘external’ trajectories of the nuclear non-human would result in the glossing over of the 
most vibrant, panic stricken, heroic and important node action produced by its new agency; that 
is, the days, weeks and months immediately after 26th of April 1986, and the mission to tame 
the nuclear inferno.  
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Chapter 4 
Taming the nuclear volcano: the post geoevent stabilisation of the world of 
the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. 
——————————————————————— 
I was informed about accident at 4 o’clock [AM] by my kinswoman that lived in Pripyat. 
She telephoned me in order to find out what happened at the Chernobyl NPP. She told 
me that people say terrible stories about some explosion at the NPP…. I reassured her 
that no explosion could occur at the plant. I told her that I had on Friday a telephone 
conversation with one colleague that informed me about the planned shutdown of the 
fourth unit…. I could calm my kinswoman but I became myself the feeling of some 
uneasiness. I began to call my colleagues at the fourth unit of the plant. However nobody 
answered my calls. (Karpan, 1986, 1) 
This is an extract from the remarkable (translated) account of Nikolay Karpan, the ex-deputy 
chief engineer of the Chernobyl NPP, focusing around his personal experiences of the geo-
event. Karpan was an important actor within the station’s network prior to the events of 26th 
April 1986, a man tasked with the co-management of the engineering staff and plant machinery, 
consequently ensuring that the four reactors were efficiently maintained and mechanically 
catered for. At the outset of his account he states that he had spent the week leading up to the 
accident in Moscow, undertaking a duty business trip regarding the development of additional 
control consoles for units 1 & 2, and only returned to his home town of Pripyat on the Friday 
morning, 25th April. Upon arrival he contacted the Head of Nuclear Safety, Aleksandr Gobov, 
and was informed that his services were not required on the day when ‘the test’ was planned to 
take place. Thus, the deputy Chief Engineer for the Chernobyl NPP, the man partially 
responsible for the machinery that ‘the test’ was attempting to improve, spent the day with his 
family basking in the warm spring sunshine in Pripyat. As the above extract delineates, this 
influential actor was not immediately ‘attracted’ to the geo-event and the subsequent new 
network/world created by the explosion. He was not awoken in the small hours of the morning 
by another member of the NPP’s employee hierarchy, but rather by a member of his family, a 
person who was only indirectly connected to the station through her residence within Pripyat. 
This phone call took place two and a half hours after the explosion within the nuclear non-
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human of RBMK number 4, a notable passing of time when one considers this human actor’s 
importance to the machinery of the NPP and the magnitude of the event that was unfolding.  
	  
This is not the place retrospectively to debate and/or critique the plant’s delegation of 
employment responsibilities during the period leading up to the geo-event; this is a task that has 
been vigorously executed within the courts (Munipov, 1992), resulting in several prosecutions of 
the NPP’s key personnel (Karpan, 2001). The purpose of providing this actor’s inceptive account 
of his experience of the geo-event is to highlight the ‘climate of chaos’ that ensued, a perfect 
characterisation of the node of action engendered both by the event and the subsequent veil of 
secrecy hastily cast over the entire ordeal. It is now common knowledge that the Soviet 
administration of the period sought to hide the accident from the international community; this, in 
the geopolitical pressure cooker of the Cold War era, is not surprising. What is startling is the 
realisation that the NPP’s human actors, its fleshy and logistically central carers, were not 
immediately notified about their nuclear non-human’s deteriorating health. Thus, the personal 
accounts that are woven throughout the analysis of the material repercussions of the geo-event 
within the world of the Zone of Alienation enact one of the core tenets of the ANT 
methodological project: the maintaining of a following of the actors, subsequently facilitating 
their reassembling of the network/reality within which they were implicit. The construction of this 
ANT account entails a form of historical retrospective analysis, reassembling the materiality of 
the immediate impacts of the geo-event of unit 4 in a quasi-scientific manner, one only 
achievable due to the detachment, in space and time from the epicentre of change. The 
personal experiences of the actors ‘on the ground’ are thus tasked with engendering a window 
into this dangerous and chaotic event. In other words, they supplement the sterile material 
account by allowing the actors who, for want of a better term, were actually there, to recreate 
the reality that they experienced, suffered and produced. To retell the explosive second act.  
	  
What follows is a quasi chronological account of the post geo-event melee between the period 
of 26th April 1986, and November of the same year: the brief epoch when the nuclear non-
human’s newly awarded agency spawned a vast series of emergent actions tasked with, firstly 
regaining control of the object and, secondly, reorienting the new world it created. A fitting 
departure point for this account is with the heroic actions of the NPP’s firefighters and on-call 
staff — these were the first actors drafted on site to tame the geo-event. This account will 
conclude at the point in time when the Sarcophagus was completed and the ripples of change 
spawned by the transcendental’s replacement were calmed, resulting in the new world, the one 
which has remained for the past thirty years. During this seven month period an expansive and 
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expensive —  both in terms of finance and human life — clean up operation was set in motion, 
one that incorporated roughly half a million human actors (Gale & Hauser 1988; Medvedev 
1990; Medvedev, 1991) and fundamentally altered the physical landscape surrounding the 
NPP. This empirical account of this period is segregated into action/material product packages, 
and each example will trace outwardly from 26th April 1986; that is, the individual accounts will 
conform to the chronology of the actions and their physical end goals. The purpose of this 
segregation is to tackle the explosive heterogeneity of the material ramifications from the geo-
event, and the subsequent clean up operation, in a manner that provides each major node of 
action within the larger project a moment in the analytical spotlight. To reassemble the entirety 
of this seven month period as a homogenous whole would result in a hugely complex and 
obtusely entangled account. Thus, once all of the individual accounts have been produced, with 
their individualised chronology at the helm, a master timeline will be provided at the end as a 
form of quasi-chronological instruction manual - a means of illustrating how the various clean up 
operations took place at the same time during this seven month period.  
4.1 The first emergency and the inextinguishable fire 
We didn't know much about radiation. Even those who worked there had no idea. There 
was no water left in the trucks. Misha filled a cistern and we aimed the water at the top. 
Then those boys who died went up to the roof - Vashchik, Kolya and others, and Volodya 
Pravik…. They went up the ladder… and I never saw them again (Grigorii Khmel, The 
Dispatch, 1996) 
This extract is by Grigorii Khmel, a driver of one of the fire engines that was first on the scene 
after the geo-event and it delineates an atmosphere of confusion, desperation and death. No 
pictures exists from the night of the disaster; the figure 4.1 was taken from a helicopter on the 
morning of the 26th and it allows some grasp of the devastation caused by the explosion. The 
once gleaming white walls of the reactor hall, and the roof covered in grey bitumen, were 
replaced by a barely recognisable chasm with superheated radioactive steam/smoke billowing 
from its depths. This was the scene which greeted the NPP’s firefighters, albeit shrouded in 
darkness, with the only illuminating sources being the burning bitumen on the roof of the 
building connecting RBMK no4 to its reactor brethren. These fires had been ignited by the huge 
chunks of graphite moderator which had been violently expelled from the interior of the reactor 
(Hawkes et al 1986; Mould 1988). These vital components of the pre geo-event nuclear non-
human, once tasked with ‘igniting’ the fission reaction, subsequently fulfilled a new, similarly 
combustible role within the post geo-event world, one which endangered the still functioning unit 
3. In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, that is, the following four and a half hours, the 
suppression of these rooftop fires was the most pressing concern. The geo-event caused more 
 104
than thirty fires on the roof (Medvedev 1991, Mould 2000) and, if these rogue blazes were not 
extinguished with great haste, the structurally connected nature of the NPP could have resulted 
in the loss of the other unaffected units. In other words, these fires represented the first of many 
emergencies in the post geo-event world. What follows is an extensive account of this first stage 
in the post geo-event world building process, that is, the actions spawned by the nuclear non-
human’s new agency and their mission to bring stability to the world. In other words, this first 
section delineates the selfless actions of the NPPs firefighters during the midnight hours of 26th 
April 1986.   
Figure 4.1: Photograph taken from a helicopter of the damage and fire (source: Gould 1990) 
0I.23 AM 
The first report of the accident was at 01.23 am on 26 April 1986 by an alarm on the 
control [panel] in the Chernobyl firefighting unit…. I was at home at the time of the alarm 
and rushed to the plant to take charge. - Colonel Telyatnikov (Mould, 1988, 150) 
Colonel Leonod Telyatnikov was the Chief of the militarised fire brigade at the Chernobyl NPP 
and this statement was uttered during his visit to 10 Downing Street on 6th March 1987, to 
receive the Order of Gallantry, the highest award the British Fire Services Association can offer. 
This actor’s account of the hours succeeding the geo-event will be deployed to gain a first 
person perspective on the firefight, consequently providing actor led contextualisation of the 
event and the actions engendered by RBMK’s fledgling agency post explosion. From this extract, 
one can deduce that the fire-fighters were alerted to the existence of the geo-event by the 
material computer systems linking their base of operations to the NPP, and not by a human 
actor. There are no records of their standardised and/or regulated response time, but, in this 
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The first team of firefighters was led by Lieutenant Volodymyr Pravik (Hayes & Bojcun 1988) and 
upon arrival he was not aware of the radioactive nature of the environment. It is difficult to 
comprehend the scene that awaited these first firemen, the scale of the building which houses 
RBMK no4 dwarfs even the largest of emergency vehicles, and, as previously stated, the most 
pressing emergency was on the roof. Pravyk quickly identified this and sent the first team of men 
up ladders to the 150 foot tall reactor hall building (Hamman & Parrott, 1987). The Lieutenant 
had no way of gauging the extent of the disaster and simply ordered his men to attack the 
rogue rooftop blazes from all sides in a desperate mission to save the sister RBMK no3. It should 
be noted at this stage that the heroics of these men were not aided by sophisticated protection 
from radiation or even smoke for that matter. They put themselves in mortal danger as they knew 
that there was an imperatively important job to do, and at 01.30am, they were the only people 
who could do it:  
When the accident occurred, in spite of whatever discord there was in the guard, in spite 
of everything, the whole guard followed [Lieutenant] Pravyk, followed him without 
looking back… Everyone felt the tension, sensed the responsibility. I only had to call a 
name and up he’d run: ‘Understood!’. And even without listening to the end, because 
he’d understand what he had to do. He was only waiting for the order - Colonel 
Telyatnikov (Shcherbak 1989, 28) 
	  
01.35 AM 
Shortly after the NPP’s on-call firefighters had arrived, a second crew, Town Brigade No.6, 
stationed in Pripyat, reached the stricken RBMK no4 led by Lieutenant Viktor Kybenok. As the 
first crew were tackling the blaze on the reactor hall’s rooftop, Kybenok took a search party 
inside the building which housed unit 4 in a mission to learn of the state of the reactor. They 
discovered that the core and its surrounding reactor hall were in flames. Furthermore,  the unit’s 
water system for cooling its fission chain reaction was not functioning and the emergency 
automated fire fighting apparatus had been completely destroyed (Hayes & Bojcun 1988). At 
this stage, the two commanding officers decided that the reactor hall and the machine room 
should be prioritised - the former was primarily tackled by the Town Brigade and the latter by 
members of Lieutenant Pravik’s fire crew. As the roof of the reactor hall was completely 
destroyed (refer back to the image at the outset of this section) the Town Brigade could only 
fight the fire from inside the building. The roof of the machine room was still intact but on fire in 
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several places. Thus, Pravik’s brigade split up and fought the war on two fronts, both inside and 
from above. Colonel Telyatnikov states that the machine room was the most valuable section of 
the plant under immediate threat (Shcherbak 1989), and the majority of manpower was 
diverted to protect the unaffected objects which could still be saved. This ‘value’ was based 
purely on the monetory principles of the machinery encased within; in terms of environmental 
and human life preservation, the reactor hall was of primary concern.  
	  
Both nodes of action, above and inside the building, were fraught with danger.  The men on the 
roof had to endure a greater risk of flammable bitumen igniting around them, but the Town 
Brigade did not have to contend with such levels of combustable spontaneity. However, their 
duty involved far greater levels of radioactive material - the reactor section of the building was 
the epicentre of the release of radiation, and these men absorbed, in many cases, lethal 
amounts in a matter of minutes. According to the Soviet television ‘coverage’ of the disaster in 
the weeks that followed, the levels of radiation these crews experienced were so great that the 
rudimentary measuring devices with which they were equipped malfunctioned when attempting 
to calculate the volume (Hamman & Parrott 1987; Mould 1988). Many of the firemen who died 
were members of the Town Brigade No.6. The first victim was Volodia Pravyk, 24 years old, the 
youngest member of Lieutenant Pravik’s brigade. This actor was initially tackling the blaze inside 
the machine room, but even at this early stage mere minutes after the explosion, this section of 
the building was almost under control, that is, the crew of which he was a member could tame 
the blaze without his assistance. It was at this point that Volodia Pravyk voluntarily offered his 
services to the Town Brigade No.6, to aid them in the immeasurably more dangerous mission of 
taming the nuclear fire in the reactor room. The radiation to which he was exposed to during 
this voluntary duty resulted in his death:  
Volodia Pravyk, I think, was the youngest, he was twenty four. By nature he was kind 
and gentle, and that sometimes let him down. He never refused anyone who made any 
kind of request. He considered that he had to make concessions…. And so Pravyk then 
even went and left his guard and offered his help to the Town Brigade. Out of our guard 
[the militarised fire brigade of the Chernobyl NPP] only Pravyk died. - Colonel Telytinikov 
(Shcherbak 1989, 31) 
   
Figure 4.2: Picture of Volodia Pravyk (source: The Chernobyl Project 2010) 
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01.56 AM 
21 minutes passed and, as the two crews battled their respective blazes, Colonel Telyatnikov 
arrived on the scene and replaced Lieutenants Kybenok and Pravyk as the commanding officer 
of the operation (Shcherbak 1989; Medvedev 1990).  The Colonel had been on a 38 day leave 
when the disaster had materially manifested itself and he was roughly 6 km away from the plant 
when he received the phone call demanding his presence. As a brief aside, once again we 
uncover a vitally important actor’s non presence during ‘the test’. At no point does the literature 
surrounding the disaster claim that Kybenok or Pravyk did not perform their duties with bravery 
and efficiency, but the presence of the man responsible for the NPP’s entire fire protection 
service, its commanding officer, would have alleviated some of the ‘climate of chaos’ which 
ensued in the immediate aftermath of the geo-event:  
When the fire began, I was on leave… I was phoned at night, the transport controller 
phoned me. There was no transport all the cars were out. I phoned the town militia 
division which was on duty, explained the situation… I said: ‘There’s a fire at the station, 
on the machine room roof, please help me get one.” He asked me my address again and 
said: ‘There’ll be a car immediately.’ - Colonel Telytinikov (Shcherbak 1989, 29) 
By the time Telytatnikov arrived at the station, there were only twenty eight firemen tackling the 
blaze (Hayes & Bojcun 1988), almost half an hour after the explosion. Upon his arrival, the two 
crews present had begun to ascertain the extent of the battle ahead of them. They were not only 
battling their traditional opponent on the roof and inside the reactor hall/machine room, but a 
much more intimidating foe, one so powerful that their armaments were overpowered 
instantaneously - a run away fission chain reaction. 
	  
As covered in the previous chapter detailing the materiality of the RBMK, the temperatures 
involved within nuclear fission are difficult to fathom. During normal operations, the reactor core 
of a RBMK can reach several hundreds of degrees, but during a meltdown, they experience an 
exponential increase. 
Figure 4.3 details the ability of the RBMK-1500’s (the bigger brother of the RBMK-1000 used at 
Chernobyl) to deal with a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) - the worst kind that could befall a 
graphite moderated, water cooled reactor. The primarily means through which the authors 
accredited to this graph attained their data was from the Chernobyl disaster. The table 
delineates the temperatures need for certain aspects of the reactor vessel to break, fail or melt. 
A LOCA has several stages of severity, and the lowest point of breakage occurs within the 
cladding at 800 degrees celsius. The most extreme case is when the fuel melts, colloquially 
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referred to as a ‘meltdown’, and this catastrophic sequence is initiated at over 2,500 degrees 
celsius. Take note of the word initiated, as it is important to grasp that this is the temperature 
required to start this melting for the fuel; during a meltdown these levels could rise to 4,000 
degrees celsius. For the purposes of an easily graspable connecting example, this is the 
temperature of a sun spot on the surface of our solar system’s star.  
Figure 4.3: Graphical representation of RBMK-1500’s ability to deal with LOCA (source Kaliatka 
et al 2008) 
Even today, in the early twenty-first century, science and engineering has yet to create a means 
of tackling temperatures of that magnitude, especially in situations far outside the design 
specifications of the non-human which has engendered them. Firemen tackle fires with water -  
that is what they are trained to do, and this tactic was deployed by the team on the roof at 
Chernobyl. It proved to be a futile enterprise, though, as the fuel sustaining the blaze that they 
were predominately tackling was combusting graphite which features a combusting threshold of 
several thousand degrees. Thus, as soon as the water from their hoses came within several feet 
of the inferno it vaporised instantly, transforming it into super heated, radioactive steam. This 
posed a massive risk to these men as they were being dually exposed to steam which was so hot 
it could erode skin from their bones, and also the deadly radiation encased within its molecular 
structure. Furthermore, this aspect of the firefight highlights that the fire crews at the Chernobyl 
NPP had not received any formal training in the case of a meltdown. At the temperatures 
quoted above, water could, in effect, become an explosive agent, the polar opposite of its 
intended purpose. Two thousand degree temperatures possess enough energy to dissociate 
water into hydrogen and oxygen, culminating in an explosive mixture (Medvedev 1990, Mould 
1988), one which could have contributed to more severe damage to the nuclear non-human, the 
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emergency effort and the actors involved within it. In other words, the desperate actions of the 
firemen tasked with extinguishing the fire in the core, engendered by the emergent agency of 
the nonhuman transformed by the geo-event, were theoretically adding liquid fuel to the fire.  
	  
As this futile battle with the nuclear volcano waged on, and the traditional localised fires were 
being extinguished, Colonel Telyatnikov surveyed and assessed the event from a host of 
positions around the site. In essence, he spent roughly thirty minutes running around the various 
levels of the building, firstly detailing what was actually on fire, secondly assessing the risk of the 
existent fires spreading to vital components, and thirdly, articulating a plan for the soon to be 
arriving support from the neighbouring fire departments, and finally, conversing with NPP’s 
engineering staff to gauge the most important/threatening aspects of the emergency: 
But what about the cable rooms? For us that was the most important thing. We had to go 
all the way round and get a good look. So all this time I was running around…. and at 
the same time clarified some things with the deputy chief engineer and the operational 
staff: what was more important, what and how….. they said: ‘Yes, indeed, you have to 
put out the fires on the roof, because the third block is still working, but if the roof 
collapses and just one slab of concrete falls on a working reactor, there could be an 
additional depressurisation. - Colonel Telyatnikov (Shcherbak 1989, 29) 
Thus, from this extract one can begin to see the constellation of actors beginning to assemble 
around the broken-down RBMK no4. The Colonel physically traversed the space of the plant to 
gain the first hand information needed to regiment his own grouping of subordinate actors, the 
firemen on the scene. However, connections needed to be made with the nuclear experts, the 
human actors tasked with caring for the RBMKs, as only they could effectively guide the Colonel 
to the most important areas of the plant requiring the attention of firemen. In other words, this 
exchange represents one of the first translations of meaning engendered by the nuclear non-
human’s new agency. Prior to this, the firemen were acting in an almost subconscious manner; 
they identified the location of the fires and they went to work enacting the  knowledge practices 
awarded to them through their training. However, when Colonel Telyatnikov sought the 
guidance of the Depute Chief Engineer, he was seeking a translatable form of knowledge of 
how best to care for the still functioning units, knowledge that he would articulate in a format 
comprehensible to his men. Telyatnikov does not provide the name of the Depute Chief Engineer 
with whom he conversed; regardless, this frantic infra-actor relation provides a materially 
accountable example of RBMK no4’s emergent agency spawning a node of action, as-well-as 




Colonel Telyatnikov had been on site for nineteen minutes and the fires in the machine room had 
been extinguished, and five minutes later the blazes on the main reactor hall roof (the rooftop 
connecting the two units 3 and 4) had been suppressed to a manageable point (Mould 1988). 
Therefore, one hour after the explosive geo-event, the risk of the disaster spreading to the still 
functioning unit 3 had been minimised through the dedicated actions of Lieutenant Pravik's 
bridge on the roof. Telyatnikov states that he did not even get a chance actively to converse with 
Lieutenant Pravyka as by 02.25 am the latter had already fallen ill and had been taken away to 
hospital (Shcherbak 1989, 30). The Lieutenant’s medical removal from duty was the first 
example of a high ranking officer within Chernobyl’s network falling prey to the invisible toxicity 
of the unstable atoms pouring out of the stricken nuclear non-human, and it left only Lieutenant 
Kybenok to help Colonel Telyatnikov organise the small group of firemen. These two crews of no 
more than twenty eight men suffered the abhorrent conditions of the epicentre of the geo-event 
for a further hour until the arrival of the support teams from the Kiev, Chernobyl (town of), 
Polissia, Ivankiv, and Rozvazhiv fire departments (Hayes & Bojcun 1988).  
03.45 AM 
Somewhere around 03.45 I began to feel bad. I lit a cigarette, kept panting as before, 
and had a persistent cough. My legs felt weak, I wanted to have a brief sit down… There 
was nowhere to sit. - Colonel Telyatnikov (Shcherbak 1989, 32) 
Fifteen minutes after the arrival of the supporting fire brigades the commanding officer of the 
entire operation began to feel the physical side effects of the materiality of the radiation; that is, 
acute radiation poisoning. By 05.00 am all of the localised fires had been extinguished, with the 
aid of the now much large fire fighting force. It was at this point that Colonel Telyatnikov was 
relieved of his duties and he was taken to hospital. This is where his personal account of the pre-
dawn hours of geo-event end. Although the traditional fires had been tackled, and the roof over 
RBMK no3 secured, one massive problem still remained - the inferno within the reactor. As the 
morning sunlight of 26th April 1986 washed over the landscape of the Chernobyl NPP, the first 
of many emergencies had been successfully countered, but at a severe cost to human life. The 
UNSCEAR report (2000) on the health impacts of the disaster upon a heterogeneous range of 
population demographics concluded that the ‘emergency workers’, the actors who had battled 
to contain the immediate material repercussions of the explosion, prior to the dawn of the 26th, 
received the highest levels of radiation exposure. 145 people present that night were diagnosed 
with acute radiation sickness (UNSCEAR, 2000, 468), which resulted in 28 officially recognised 
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deaths, six of which were members of the fire brigades. The heroism of these men did not go 
unnoticed by the Soviet Union, as it presented ‘Hero of the Soviet Union’ awards to the highest 
ranked officers, including but not exclusive to, Colonel Telyatnikov, Lieutenant Kybenok, and 
Lieutenant Pravyk. It could be argued that awarding the highest accolade of the Soviet Union  
was a ‘publicity stunt’, a means of adding a layer of heroic gloss over the Government’s 
negligence. This may be partially true, since the ‘climate of chaos’ surrounding 26th April was 
engendered by a severe lack of communication ‘from above’. As soon as the station’s human 
actors were attracted to its emergent post-event network, either by mechanical warning systems 
or external means, these people acted in an articulate, calm and efficient manner, thus expelling 
some of the clouds of chaos at the material site of the NPP, the epicentre of the geo-event. In 
other words, the immediate network surrounding RBMK no4, the first actors drafted into its 
sphere of influence to rectify its flailing materiality, were unaffected by the translations of distant 
and powerful mediators. These actors, namely the firemen, represent the Latourian exception to 
the rule, the rare intermediaries within the network of mediators of RBMK no4.    
	   
No such glorifying awards were presented to the lower ranked firemen men, although they are 
commemorated within the material landscape of the town of Chernobyl by a metal monument, 
one part of which depicts their selfless actions during those crucially important four and a half 
hours. On the right hand side of figure 4.4 are the figures of the firemen and on the left that of 
the ‘liquidators’ (the men tasked with the environmental clean up operation). The inscription on 
the plaque reads ‘To those who saved the world’ - a poignant and fitting reminder of the role 
played by these actors within the new reality engendered by RBMK no4. Without their actions 
on the night of the 26th, the Chernobyl accident would have been unthinkably worse.  
Figure 4.4: Monument commemorating the fireman and liquidators (source: researcher’s own 
photograph 2015) 
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We were trying to get the fires out before the radiation got us. We are firemen. This is 
what we were trained for. We are supposed to fight fires. We knew we must stay to the 
end. That was our duty. Colonel Telyatnikov (Gale 1988, 28) 
4.2. The myth of the intact reactor 
Subsection 4.1 has detailed the actions of the firefighters who spent several hours surveying the 
inside and the rooftop of the NPP’s structural form, and they were the first to report that RBMK 
no4 was now nothing more than a twisted lump of irradiated metal, graphite and uranium. A 
large percentage of these actors had spent the pre-dawn hours futilely dowsing its super-heated 
carcass with water. Yet, as implied by the title of this subsection, mediations engendered by 
more powerful actors were circulating as dawn broke on the morning of the 26th April. What 
follows is an account of the ‘myth’ surrounding the intact reactor vessel. The vast majority of 
images of Chernobyl depict it in its current form, entombed by its steel Sarcophagus, neatly 
retrofitted and structurally sound. Pictures taken of the building before this structure was fitted 
(Figure 4.1) graphically capture the extent of the damage, and, subsequently, the ‘lunacy’ of the 
lie surrounding its status on the morning of the 26th.  
The daylight hours of 26th April 1986 are sparsely documented; only a few detailed personal 
experiences of the activities surrounding the NPP exist, with ambiguous ‘meta’ accounts 
comprising the bulk of the material. Thus it is difficult to reassemble an accurate timeline of 
events during this day. In essence, the vast majority of the information ‘reappears’ on the 27th, 
the day when the officials in charge of the clean up operations made the decision to smother the 
reactor (Marples 1988; Mould 1988; Medvedev 1990). This impressive airborne mission shall 
be accounted for in due course. For now, analysis will remain squarely focused upon the 
minimal amounts of material from the 26th as the progression from denial to action highlights an 
important theme which characterises how the Soviet Union dealt with the accident in the 
following months.  
I was very disappointed that all information gathered in the accidental zone by senior 
specialists such as Dyatlov, Sitnikov, Chugunov and Akimov was accessible only for 
Director and Chief Engineer of the plant. This was the reason that I had to gather the 




Figure 4.5: Bryukhanov (source: Karpan 2001) 	    Figure 4.6: Fomin (source: Karpan 2001) 
Victor Bryukhanov (figure 4.5) was the Plant Director of the Chernobyl facility and Nikolai 
Fomin (figure 4.6) fulfilled the role of the Chief Engineer for the NPP. In essence, these two 
actors represented the highest rung of the employee hierarchy within the station, the men whose 
professional reputation was fundamentally linked to the safe and efficient running of the 
Chernobyl NPP. It should be noted at this stage that both of these men stood trial for their role 
within the aftermath of accident, and their testimony from the trial shall be incorporated into this 
account to help reassemble the fracas of 26th April. The above extract from Karpan’s personal 
experiences of the disaster begins to shed light on the actions of Bryukhanov and Fomin, in that 
they consumed the information given to them by their team of experts but did not share it with 
their subordinate actors. The first person accounts of this period by Karpan and Grigori 
Medvedev (1990), the chief engineer of the Chernobyl facility during its construction, are the 
only two available, and they are devoid of the political subterfuge cast over the entire incident 
by the Soviet Union, including Chernobyl’s most senior employees. This veil of deception 
becomes evident within the contrasting statements between the documented experiences of the 
aforementioned actors and the testimonies of Bryukhanov and Fomin at their respective trials.  
	  
Bryukhanov arrived at the facility at 02.30 AM, roughly an hour after the geo-event, and 
headed straight to the control room of unit 4 (Medvedev G, 1990). Upon his arrival he was 
informed by Aleksandr Akimov, a Deputy Chief Engineer of the station, that there had been a 
serious radiation accident, but that the reactor vessel was still intact:  
You’re saying that there was a serious radiation accident but that the reactor is still intact.  
What’s the radioactivity in the unit now? [Bryukhanov]  
Gorbachenko’s radiometer is showing 1,000 micro roentgens per second. [Akimov]  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Well, that’s not much, [Bryukhanov]  
That’s right [Akimov]  
Can I go ahead and tell Moscow that the reactor is intact? [Bryukhanov]  
Yes, go ahead [Akimov] (Medvedev G, 1990, 113)  
 
Upon receiving this information Bryukhanov relocated to bomb shelter no1 constructed beneath 
the NPP, the safest place in the entire material landscape. This conversation represents the 
source of the myth surrounding the intact reactor, the first point in space and time when wrong 
information was passed on to the most senior official within the NPP’s employee hierarchy who 
subsequently relayed it to Moscow. There is no accountable record of how Akimov came to this 
conclusion; and how this middle level manager could arrive at this outcome at the exact same 
time that Lieutenant Kybenok’s fire crew was actively fighting the blazes inside the ruined 
reactor hall is, for want of a better term, baffling. Regardless, this extreme instance of 
communication ineptitude between the actors actively working to save the nuclear non-human 
culminated in the director of the NPP telephoning Vladimir Vasilyevich Marin, the Director of 
Nuclear Power within the Communist Party, at his private residence at 03.00 AM and relaying 
incorrect information (Shcherbak 1989, Medvedev G, 1990). This is the moment when the 
network surrounding Chernobyl exponentially expanded, the moment when this transportation 
of knowledge kickstarted the mobilisation of numerous specialists, party members and high 
ranking military personnel. This emergent constellation of actors will be covered in the following 
section. It also represents a major discrepancy between Bryukhanov’s legal testimony and the 
personal account of Medvedev. When asked in court about his actions that night, Bryukhanov 
stated that:  
The communication department manager informed me that the telephone line is ready 
and I started to report to the head of central directorate: The accident happened, 4-th 
power unit is destroyed, I don’t know any details yet. (Karpan 2001, 6) 
Akimov was, according to Medvedev, the source of the misinformation, the root cause agency 
which shaped the direction of the following hours of action, now preoccupied with cooling a 
reactor vessel which was believed to be intact. However, he never stood trial, his name does not 
appear within its transcript, and Bryukhanov does not mention him during his statement of 
defence. This is not the place to explore this omission, due in part to the invisibility of the 
decision making process which resulted in the accused standing trial. Regardless, these 
contradictory accounts of the actions of that night begin to shed light on the embarrassing and 
potentially catastrophic nature of ‘the myth of the intact reactor’. As stated above, the 
application of water to a non-pressurised, out-of-control fission reaction,could result in the 
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dissociation of water into its explosive composite elements due to the immense temperatures 
associated with this unique material situation. The fire crews were already pounding the open 
reactor with hundreds of gallons of their liquid ally from the rooftop and inside its hall, simply 
enacting their inadequate training. Due to the ‘belief’ that the reactor was still intact, the 
message from Moscow to Bryukhanov at 04.00AM was “Make sure the nuclear reactor is kept 
cool at all times.” (Medvedev, 1990, 117). So, this is what he instructed his subordinates to do - 
pump even more water into the shattered and frighteningly hot core of RBMK no4. 
  
One and a half hours passed until the Chief Engineer Fomin arrived in the bomb shelter at 
04.30 AM and he immediately demanded a status report from his higher ranking subordinate, 
Akimov. Once again, the Depute Chief Engineer relayed the same information and Fomin 
echoed the advice of the Central Directorate; that is, feed water into the system to keep it cool. 
This order was carried out by the last remaining emergency feed water system no2, a complex 
machine which shared a reservoir with RBMK no4’s sister unit. The connecting pipes from the 
tank of coolant to the reactor vessel are capable of channeling hundreds of gallons of water into 
the system in a matter of minutes (IAEA 1999, Kaliatka & Uspuras 2000); however, their 
effectiveness relies, rather obviously, upon the pipeage being intact and fastened, crucially, to a 
hermetically pressurised core. It is useful to think of the reactor vessel akin to a cylindrical tin, 
sealed at both ends, and the emergency feed water system entered this sealed container 
through pipes which burrowed through its vertical walls at specific points. When the water was 
sent through the system prior to the geo-event, the enclosed nature of the object restricted the 
liquid from escaping, thus facilitating its (pressurised) cooling properties to be enacted upon the 
vessel’s hot interior. However, the gas explosion within RBMK no4 tore the lid off the reactor 
core, and the impact of the blast forced its base down several floors into the basement of the 
building. In essence, only the vertical walls of the unit remained partially intact - the exact 
structures which housed the emergency feed water system’s intakes. Therefore, our metaphorical 
cylindrical tin now lacks a solid base, sealant lid and complete vertical walls, and hence its 
previous use as a hermetical containment structure was no more. When the emergency coolant 
was pumped into the believed-to-be intact core, all that the system now achieved was the 
catastrophic mixture of said water with the intensely irradiated graphite and twisted fuel rods. 
This violently ionised liquid subsequently seeped downwardly into lower floors of the building. In 
other words, not only was this course of action dangerous with regards to the dissociation of 
water, but it also contributed to the spread the of huge amounts of radiation on and below 
ground level.  
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Throughout this account thus far, the levels of radiation experienced by the aforementioned 
actors have yet to be actively detailed. Due to the nature of the event, it is a given that the 
exposure which they endured was extremely high, life ending in several cases. The reason that 
the presence of radiation has been ‘assumed’ up until this point is due to the obvious nature of 
its unwanted residency; that is, the explosive discharge from RBKM no4. The ontology of the 
entity of radiation will be covered in depth in Chapters 5 and 6. Prior to the brief epoch of ‘the 
myth of the intact reactor’, every action undertaken had been tasked with eradicating the 
problem. The aforementioned use of the emergency feed water system was intended to achieve 
this goal, but due to the shocking miscommunication between members of the facility’s 
management, this course of material actions heightened the level of radiation rather than 
reducing it. Thus, 3 hours after the explosion, the radioactivity within the station was awarded 
an additional mobilising characteristic, one which actively increased the charge within several 
areas of the plant. In a bid to highlight the physical danger inherent within the mediation 
surrounding the reactor’s physical form, a brief and illuminating scientific excursion shall be 
taken (the concept of radiation will be fully explored in chapters 5 and 6).  
	  
The r-Unit, or roentgen, is, by contemporary standards, an outdated unit of measuring ionising 
radiation, and it is applicable only when accounting for gamma rays, the most powerful and 
damaging form of radiation (Sinclair 1958). Its usefulness was outlived when the measurement 
of the Rad was introduced, as it could measure all ionising radiation, and not just gamma rays 
(Hodgson 1999). Throughout the discourses on the Chernobyl disaster, the roentgen is the 
predominant measurement cited, and its perpetual use alludes to the severity of the situation 
within the NPP. In 1934, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) set a 
limit of 0.2 roentgen per day, which was lowered to 0.3 roentgen per week in 1950 (Clarke & 
Valentin 2008). These figures represented the internationally recognised maximum ‘acceptable’ 
dose of gamma radiation to which an individual could be exposed, the assumption being that 
any increase could result in health issues. As with all scientific forms of measurement, the nexus 
between the statistical unit and multiplying variable is crucial, and at first glance, the relationship 
can be slightly deceptive. For example, the aforementioned decrease in acceptable level sees a 
rise in the statistical unit but a change to the multiplying variable, that is, shifting from exposure 
from a single day to a week. Thus, equipped with this slice of scientific logic, attention will now 
return to 26th April at approximately 04.45 AM.  
You had the impression you could see the radiation. There were flashes of light springing 
from place to place, substances glowing, luminescent, a bit like sparklers - Colonel 
Telyatnikov (Gale 1988, 27) 
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The above extract delineates the subjective experiences of Colonel Telyatnikov encountering the 
radiation emanating from RBMK no4. The graphite fire within the core awarded the radioactive 
isotopes a form of vertical transportation, a vehicle that subsequently spread its toxic legacy 
around Europe. However, as previously stated, the vast amounts of water being pumped into the 
shattered core by the emergency feed water system also resulted in the spread of ground level 
radiation. Prior to this unwelcome series of events, the levels experienced within the wrecked 
reactor hall reached 10,000 roentgens per second (Marples 1986; Medvedev, 1990). However, 
the material repercussions of ‘the myth of the intact reactor’ saw this horrifying level rise to a 
scarcely believable 15,000 roentgens per second due to the mixing of the emergency coolant 
with radioactive debris. Contrast these figures with the internationally regulated ‘safe limits’ and 
one can begin to ascertain the peril in which the rescue workers had inadvertently placed 
themselves. One might argue that any increase upon a starting point of 10,000 roentgens per 
second is merely hastening the inevitable, but a mindset of this nature excuses the actions of the 
NPP’s most influential actors, men tasked with the protection of the nuclear non-humans, and, 
most importantly, the people under their command: 5,000 roentgens per second is enough 
radiation to kill ten people. If every level of the rescue operation had worked in unity, Hospital 
no 6 in Moscow may have been able to save several of the firemen who died.  
	  
Hours passed as the NPP’s management reiterated the instruction to keep ‘cooling’ the reactor. 
Safe in the protective bunker deep beneath the plant where not even gamma rays could 
penetrate its walls, Bryukhanov was in constant contract with the Central Directorate and the 
incorrect consensus that he and Fomin had reached never faltered. Rather shockingly, as the 
geo-event progressed, Bryukhanov’s mediation of it mutated, subsequently alluding to a minor 
incident, a situation which should not affect the plant’s operations, nor, crucially, his reputation:  
The reactor is intact. We are supplying water to it. There was an explosion in the 
emergency water tank in the central hall. The radiation situation is within normal limits. 
One man has been killed.” Bryukhanov (Medvedev, 1990, 120) 
The above extract represents his communications to the Central Directorate, and it delineates an 
incident which would barely be representable on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). 
Up until Fukushima, Chernobyl was the only level seven nuclear ‘event’ the industry has ever 
experienced. Thus, it is galling to learn that the Plant’s Director actively sought to downplay the 
significance of the accident, particularly when one explores the material and human 
repercussions of his mindset. Said mediation delineated a level zero event, one at the most, that 
is, a ‘deviation’ or ‘anomaly’, respectively.  
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At 07.00 AM, a full four hours after the initial order to cool the reactor was given, the Deputy 
Chief Engineer Karpan arrived at the bunker. Due to the exclusionary nature of the information 
presented to the NPP’s Director, Karpan had to spend one hour actively reconstructing the geo-
event through a series of informal ‘interviews’ with eye witnesses, people who had been on the 
scene for several hours by this point. This actor’s actions during the following hours represents 
the first accountable relation which stood against the hegemony surrounding the intact reactor, 
the inceptive agency which debunked the myth and, crucially, directed action towards the ‘real’ 
material goal of taming the shattered reactor. The significance of Karpan’s arrival and his 
subsequent actions should not be understated. Upon returning from his excursion around the 
plant tasked with piecing together what had happened a few hours earlier he reflected that: 
Already before 10 in the morning I could visit together with the head of nuclear and 
physical laboratory Anatolyi Kriat the central hall and control room of the third unit, the 
control room of the demolished fourth unit and some other places. I could also examine 
just from being outside in the site of the plant the status of the destroyed fourth unit. 
(Karpan, 1986, 6) 
This extract firstly delineates a substantive ‘trip’ around the site, at a time when the levels of 
radiation were at their peak, simply to attempt to understand how the accident had occurred. 
Secondly, Karpan states that one could readily gauge the status of RBMK no4 from the outside 
of the building with the naked eye, thus casting further doubt upon the motivations and actions 
of the NPP’s Director. Upon returning to the bunker, he was assigned the task of assessing 
whether or not the natural air cooling was sufficient to prevent the fuel assemblies from melting. 
He stated that this task was assigned to him as the specialists directing the actions of the 
emergency operations, transfixed on cooling the core, were unsure if the water could reach the 
entirety of the active core.  
Due to his understanding of the techniques developed by the RMBK’s designers, Karpan could 
quickly conclude that there was no point in circulating water in and around a destroyed reactor. 
Partially due to the aforementioned mixing with radioactive elements, but also as the air cooling 
experienced during the six hours since the accident was enough to minimise the risk of sustaining 
the fission reaction. He quickly prepared his report and handed it to his superior, Fomin. This 
report represented a crucial turning point for ‘the myth of the intact reactor’, as-well-as 
rendering visible the agency which engendered the following day’s actions; that is, the airborne 
mission to ‘drown’ the reactor. Within said report, Karpan recommended that the use of the 
emergency water cooling system had to be stopped immediately, and that the neutron 
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absorbers had to introduced into the core to end the fission reaction, something to be achieved 
by dropping boron acid directly into the unit. Furthermore, he stated that a helicopter must be 
deployed to photograph the damage, and that dosimeters must be placed outside the unit and 
along the road to Pripyat, to enable the ‘following’ of the radiation and, if need be, to facilitate 
the timely evacuation of Pripyat. Akin to most of the people who were working to save the 
reactor, Karpan’s family lived in Pripyat and after surveying the geo-event, he realised that 
Pripyat had to be evacuated. However, Bryukhanov was quick to inform him of the limits of his 
power, stating that “he [Karpan] had no right to take the decision about evacuation of all these 
people.” (Karpan, 1986, 8).  
	  
Due to the power and influence of Bryukhanov and Fomin within the NPP, literally no one had 
the authority to question or override their orders concerning the state of the nuclear non-human. 
It was only when a specialist team of external experts was flown in from Moscow that the 
madness of these two men was subdued. More than one hundred men had been hospitalised 
trying to keep the emergency water system functioning (Karpan, 1986, Medvedev, 1990). 
Granted this was a physical repercussion of the geo-event, but their extreme exposure, the 
amount over and above the ambient levels experienced by all of the emergency actors, was 
based fundamentally upon the mediation of the reactor’s status concocted by Bryukhanov and 
Fomin. At 09.00 AM a YaK-40 helicopter departed from Bykovo airport Moscow with a consort 
of high ranking experts on board. This collective of actors was referred to as ‘the emergency 
task force’ and it included: Prushinsky, chief engineer of Soyuzatomenergo (the company 
responsible for the construction of the RBMK reactor fleet), Ignatenko, the deputy director of 
Soyuzatomenergo, Konviz, the deputy head of Gidrioproyekt, Polushkin, a representative of 
NIKIET, and the main designer of the RBMK, Ryazantsev (Medvedev, 1990, Mould 2000). This 
task force arrived at the site of the NPP at 01.45 PM, 26th April, and instantly surveyed the 
damage from a helicopter. This flight represents another step towards the end of ‘the myth of the 
intact reactor’; and, upon their arrival at the bunker, they brutally informed Bryukhanov of this 
‘mistake’ and physically took him out to survey the damage in the light of day. However, even 
after this journey, the emergency feed water system continued to attempt to pump coolant into 
the shattered reactor. This course of action continued until 7.00 PM, when the systems tanks ran 
dry.  
This initial task force was supplemented by a much higher ranking cohort of officials later in the 
evening of the 26th, men with sufficient power actively to relieve Bryukhanov of control of the 
emergency operation. Their flight departed from Kiev at 4.00 PM with the following personnel 
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on board: Yu Shadrin, senior assistant to the attorney general of the USSR; V Martin, the 
nuclear power secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee; A Semynov, deputy minister 
of energy; A Meshkov, the first deputy minister of medium machine building; M Tsvirko, director 
of Soyuzatomenergostroy; V Shevelkin, deputy director of Soyuzatomenergostroy; Ye Vorobyov, 
deputy minister of health of the USSR; and V Turovsky, deputy director of the ministry of health 
of the USSR (Medvedev 1990; Mould 2000). This government commission comprised extremely 
powerful actors, and it would have included the most senior members of their respective 
departments/companies if the true nature of the accident had been relayed by station Director 
Bryukhanov. Upon arrival at the site of the plant at 9.00 PM, Marin and Shasharin were 
immediately taken to the NPP to survey the damage. Prior to this journey, Marin, the highest 
ranking and subsequently more influential actor of this secondary team, was still under the 
impression that this was a minor accident, but, this impression changed as soon as he surveyed 
the scene of devastation surrounding the nuclear non-human:  
At the time we thought something was burning on the floor; it never occurred to us that it 
was the reactor. Marin was beside himself with rage, cursing, and gave a graphite block 
a heavy kick. We did not realise that the graphite was emitting 2,000 roentgens per hour 
- and the fuel, 20,000 - G Shasharin (Medvedev, 1990, 157) 
At roughly 10.00 PM on the 26th April, Marin and Shasharin had returned to Pripyat and 
gathered with the other members of their cohort in the office of the first secretary of the Party 
Committee. This meeting represents the demise of ‘the myth of the intact reactor’. Furious at 
what he had surveyed, Marin screamed “Bryukhanov! You’ve been telling us all day long that 
the radiation situation was normal. What about the graphite?!” (Medvedev, 1990, 160). 
Bryukhanov attempted to claim that he believed the graphite scattered around the landscape to 
be from the contraction supplies for the never-to-be-built units 5 and 6. However this was 
obviously not the case. Thus, equipped with the correct information surrounding the state of 
RBMK no4, this task force began to construct a new plan, one which would dictate the actions 
of hundreds of people for the following weeks. 
This account of the epoch characterised as ‘the myth of the intact reactor’ delineates an 
unknown node of emergent actions, spawned by the agency of RBMK no 4, and directed by the 
NPP’s Director in Chief Victor Bryukhanov, with the aid of his Chief Engineer Fomin. The account 
portrays a frantic, misconceived and ultimately futile mission to cool a nuclear reactor which had 
been physically destroyed by the steam explosions several hours earlier. The secrecy 
surrounding the information passed to Bryukhanov can be accounted for when one considers 
that the law within the USSR stated that any industrial accident, be it nuclear or otherwise, had 
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to be kept as a classified State secret (Lusted 2011). Thus, the station’s director may have been 
operating with this legality in the back of his mind, but this does not excuse his insistence on 
perpetually cooling a shattered reactor, thus dooming several firemen and operational staff 
members to an agonising death at the hands of unstable atoms. Furthermore, his blatant 
obscuring of the truth with regards to his communications with the Central Directorate placed the 
entire emergency operation in jeopardy, especially when considering that upon arrival, the 
emergency task force, in effect, had to spend valuable time articulating a plan of action to deal 
with the actual, ontological, situation. This team of experts had prepared for the type of incident 
described in the epistemological veil hastily cast over the geo-event by Bryukhanov, and so the 
reality of the geo-event was a shock to everyone involved. Thus, in the morning hours of the 
26th of April 1986, the first true mediator of Chernobyl’s new emergent network appeared and 
enacted influence over his fellow actors, both human and nonhuman. Years later, Bryukhanov 
was found guilty of extreme negligence and a blatant misuse of his power and was subsequently 
sentenced to ten years in prison. During his sentencing, the Judge stated that: 
Director Bryukhanov, who arrived to the station about 2o’clock in the morning, did not 
implement the Plan of measurement for protection of the station personnel although he 
knew exactly that levels of radiation were high… for private gain, [Bryukhanov] 
deliberately hid this fact (in attempt to show that everything was OK). Abusing his 
position, Bryukhanov sent a report to higher organs which deliberately understated 
estimates of radiation levels. Hiding the true information about the accident resulted in 
radiation exposure of the station’s personnel and population of the region. (Karpan 
2001, 46) 
This is a damning account of the actions of a man who produced ‘the myth of the intact reactor’. 
The purpose of detailing the events of the morning hours, post geo-event, has been to 
reassemble the material ramifications of the explosion, and subsequently allude to how the 
agency of RBMK no4 spawned and influenced the actions of the actors implicit within the 
emergency operation tasked with taming its meltdown. As previously stated, Director 
Bryukhanov embodies the tenets of the ANT mediator; a translator of meaning, intent on 
influencing other actors for specific ends. His agency, which was a hybrid engendered through 
his own subjectivities focused around self-preservation and his connection with the station, 
manifested itself within the material realm, producing several ontological realities, and as a 
result hampered the emergency operation, consequently condemning several men to their 
deaths. Indeed: 
By 3.00 in the morning of the April 26 you already knew that a level of radiation nearby 
the 4th power-unit was 200 roentgens per hour. Did you understand that the situation 
might get worse? [The Public Prosecutor]  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I knew that the dose rate was mainly determined by isotopic iodine radiation in the 
atmosphere so I was sure that the dose rate would decrease. As for 200 roentgens per 
hour, it was registered only within fields of vision. [Director Bryukhanov]  
 
Then why didn’t you evacuate people from the dangerous zones? [The Public Prosecutor]  
 
I ordered to evacuate redundant personnel, but the reactor had to be observed. 
[Director Bryukhanov] (Karpan, 2001, 10) 
Armed with the information rendered visible by means of this account, one can clearly see that 
even during his trial, sworn under oath to tell the truth and nothing but, Bryukhanov still 
distorted his representation of the event and mediated sections of his actions in a desperate bid 
to save himself.  
All of this has interesting ramifications for this world of risk, and its mediation by these two 
important actors. Many risks cannot be identified, quantified and acted upon without a 
sustained series of actions tasked with rendering visible the ontological and connecting it to 
epistemological constructs (risks). The magnitude of the pressures and agencies to which these 
two men were being subjected must be acknowledged: the responsibility of caring for human life 
and machines fell to Bryukhanov and Fomin, and the demands of the situation are difficult to 
fathom. Regardless, attempting to mediate the risks of the situation in order to protect their own 
interests cannot be viewed in a favourable light. Thus, in this instance, the world of risk was 
much more volatile and dangerous than the representation propagated by the facility’s two most 
influential actors. RBMK no4 was in fact very broken, and several treacherous actions had to be 
taken to mitigate the post-event risks. 
4.3: 27th April and the airborne battle of Chernobyl 
 
Thus far, the heroics of the firemen and the ‘madness’ of the facility’s commanding actors have 
been examined. Two sets of interconnected nodes of action, inceptively engendered by the new 
agency awarded to RBMK no4 post geo-event and subsequently guided by powerful human 
actors implicit within the network surrounding the stricken nuclear non-human. The day of the 
26th passed by in a flash, and the majority of it was spent assessing the most effective way of 
tackling the immense heat signature pulsating from the belly of RBMK no4. As covered in the 
previous section, the arrival of Karpan at 07.00 AM signalled the emergence of the following 
days’actions; that is, the incisive moment when the actor partially responsible for the agency 
that directed a new series of actions was attracted to the nuclear non-human’s new network. He 
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stated in his report that large amounts of boron acid had to be dropped into the reactor as soon 
as possible, but, to his disgust, he was informed of the “impossibility to find the necessary 
amount of boron needed in order to exclude the possibly of initiation of a self sustaining chain 
reaction” (Karpan, 1986, 8). This logistical unavoidability resulted in a series of actions within 
the town of Pripyat, and which ultimately, would unfortunately lead to an increase in the 
magnitude of the reaction occurring within RBMK no4. The next accountable set of relations 
associated with this course of actions becomes visible at 4.00 PM in the atomic city of Pripyat.   
	  
About four in the afternoon on Saturday, 26 April, the members of the Government 
Commission began to gather. The idea had been proposed of loading sand onto 
helicopters and scattering it over the reactor. Whose idea it was, I can’t say. The debates 
there lasted a long time. Was lead necessary? Was sand necessary? Commands were 
very quickly given and then countermanded. It was obvious why, there had never been a 
situation like it before. Something fundamentally new had to be found. - Aneliia 
Perkovska (Shcherbak 1989, 57) 
Perkovska was the secretary of the Pripyat Komsomol Town Committee and was present during 
this seemingly chaotic meeting designed to find a solution for taming the out of control reactor. It 
should be noted that this meeting took place before the arrival of the more senior task force 
from Moscow, when the emergency feed water system had 3 hours of coolant remaining. Upon 
conclusion of the aforementioned meeting in Pripyat, it was agreed that sand was to be used as 
a means of subduing RBMK no4 (in the absence of boron). This was not an ideal solution: the 
use of specific neutron absorbers was the preferred one, but the use of boron acid was not 
possible on the afternoon/night of 26th April. Thus, the agency of RBMK no4 sparked an 
improvised series of actions within the increasingly irradiated landscape of Pripyat, one 
involving the gathering of as much sand as possible to aid the proceeding aerial battle for 
Chernobyl: 
I was given the first task: spades were to be brought to the ‘Pripyat Cafe’; we had to go 
and get those spades, around 150 of them, and the others went to the hostels to collect 
young people. The young people came. Around eleven in the evening a truck came with 
empty sacks, and we started to fill the sacks with sand. Iurii Dobrenko (Shcherbak 1989, 
58) 
Dobrenko was an instructor within the Pripyat Komsomol Town Committee and this extract 
alludes to the ad hoc nature of the evening of 26th April. It delineates a team of actors who had 
no official connection to the NPP, except externally through their residence of Pripyat, tasked 
with gathering huge amounts of sand without the aid of heavy machinery, and loading it onto a 




The time was now approximately 9.00 pm, 2 hours after the emergency feed water system ran 
out of liquid and  the ‘poisoning effect’ within the core of the nuclear non-human had come to 
an end. This material situation occurred within the RBMK during standard operations, and it can 
be characterised as an increase in a byproduct of the Fission reaction, Xenon-135. Simply put, 
this gas acts as a neutron absorber, and it is an unwelcome visitor within the reactor vessel 
during normal operations. The appearance of Xenon-135 is a result of the decay of Iodine-135 
and an equilibrium between the two is carefully maintained so that neither gas can have a 
detrimental effect upon the smooth running of the reactor (Afanas’ev et al 1991). If one of these 
elements is allowed to gain supremacy, it will absorb a huge amount of neutrons away from the 
nuclear fuel and the end result will be a decrease in the reactivity of the core. Once again, 
during normal operations, this situation would be most unwelcome, but, in the immediate period 
after the geo-event, this gaseous absorbent of neutrons became an advantageous side effect of 
the RBMK’s design as its presence reduced the risk of a self-sustaining chain reaction. Xenon-135 
has a half life of roughly nine-and-a-half hours (Fedosov 1993), and only a huge volume of the 
gas would prolong its ‘poisoning effect’ upon the stricken nuclear non-human. By 7.00 pm the 
gas had completely decayed and its absorption of neutrons away from the fuel assembly had 
ceased. This posed a massive issue for the emergency operation, as the fast evolving material 
composition within the reactor vessel led here to a sharp increase in its production of radiation. 
This ontological aspect of the RBMK has fascinating implications for the philosophical awarding 
of agency to the nuclear non-human. This evolving materiality within its core happened without 
human intervention, and the resulting change in its form forced humans to act in accordance. 
Thus, it is another prime material example to legitimise this research’s promotion of RBMK no4, 
the nuclear non-human, as the central actant of the network in question. As a brief aside, this 
unavoidability was at the forefront of Karpan’s mind when he advised the immediate injection of 
boron acid, a neutron absorber, into the core.  
The purpose of accounting for this mutation within the nuclear non-human is to render visible the 
invisible aggressor which was coating the landscape of Pripyat, at the same time as residents of 
the city were beginning to collect sand. Approximately two hours had passed since the 
poisoning effect had run out of gas, and over that time, the levels of radiation within the 
landscape of the city had seen a notable increase. The actors collecting the sand did so without 
any protective clothing. Figure 4.7 is an image of Karpan’s (1986) personal workbook, the 
journal he used to record the levels of radiation within the sites of measurement around the 
landscape of Pripyat. No accountable information exists explaining where each ‘chosen point’ 
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represents within the city; regardless, one can readily identify from the chart that the dose rate 
doubles in almost every area, and in some cases it even triples, between the hours of 7.00 pm 
and 10.00 pm.  
Figure 4.7: Karpan’s personal workbook (source: Karpan 1986) 
The longer the core remained open to the atmosphere, the more radiation it emitted into the 
environment, and hence it was imperative to collect as much ammunition for the following day’s 
helicopter assault. The sand was taken from the ‘Pripyat Cafe’ (figure 4.8) to the river station for 
packaging, then quickly transported to Central Square (Shcherbak 1989).  
Figure 4.8: Pripyat Cafe (source: researcher’s own photograph 2015) 
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The aerial bombardment of the nuclear non-human featured two ‘phases’, characterised by both 
the different materials used to ‘drown’ the reactor and the physical augmentations made to the 
helicopters. During the first phase only sand was dropped, and the cargo of the second 
comprised a mixture of substances, each with its own specific material effects upon the core. As 
previously mentioned, the boron was included to absorb neutrons away from the fission 
material, and this element was supplemented by the sand, lead and dolomite (Hawkes et al 
1986). The lead was used as it would act as physical barrier once it had been melted by the 
extreme temperatures within the nuclear non-human, and during this material liquidation it 
would subsequently absorb heat. When exposed to high temperatures, dolomite produces huge 
amounts of carbon dioxide, which, it was hoped, would starve the combusting graphite of 
oxygen, thus extinguishing its super heated-blaze. The key logistical issue that the emergency 
operation faced was the locating of these elements, as only sand could be sourced from the 
immediate locale surrounding the NPP. Thus, the boron had to be transported from a supply 
depot in Kiev, and the lead and dolomite from neighbouring countries (Mould 1988), all of 
which took time. Rather than simply waiting for the other components to arrive, the operation 
took the decision to start dumping sand alone into the ravine where RBMK no4 once stood. 
	  
Figure 4.9: Helicopter preparing for ‘bombing’ run on RBMK no4 (source: Kostin 2006) 
The above image was taken from a helicopter hovering to the north of the NPP, patiently waiting 
for aircraft in the forefront of the picture to finish its ‘bombing’ run. As this airborne operation 
used military vehicles and airforce pilots, a high ranking member of the USSR’s military 
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appendage was drafted onto site to direct the vast series of actions required in ‘drowning’ the 
reactor from above. Major General Nikolai Timofeyevich Antoshkin, the deputy commander of 
the airforce of the Kiev military district, was the man who took control of the airborne operation 
(Hawkes et al 1986; Shcherbak 1989; Mould 2000); and, by the evening of 26th April, he had 
already been attracted to the network swirling around the nuclear non-human:  
Go immediately to Pripyat. The decision has been taken to dump sand on the damaged 
nuclear reactor. The reactor is 100 feet high. Helicopters are clearly the only technology 
suitable for this job. In Pripyat act according to the circumstances. Keep in constant touch 
with us. - Kiev Military District (Medvedev 1990, 176)  
The above extract delineates the orders issued to General Antoshkin by his superiors in Kiev, 
and it renders visible the connection between the aforementioned ‘chaotic’ meeting within 
Pripyat Komsomol Town Committee’s head office, regarding the use of sand, and the branches 
of the NPP’s network in distant spatial locations — in this instance, 50 km away in Kiev. This 
order to the General subsequently resulted in his movement into the world of the NPP, but also 
the material relocation of dozens of military helicopters, due to their normally distant base of 
operations. In other words, this set of relations represents another example of agency 
overtaking action, and the ability of a group of influential and informed actors within the city of 
Pripyat to spawn a vast mobilisation of personnel and machinery. 
	   
It was now late evening, and the spring light was fading. Due to the inaccurate system the 
helicopters would be utilising to drop the sand into the reactor, the complete lack of any radar 
or digital targeting systems, the daylight hours represented the only time when the airborne 
mission could commence. During the midnight hours of 27th April, a full day after the explosion, 
preparations were being made to facilitate the incoming aircraft. The Chernobyl NPP was not a 
military facility, neither was the atomic city of Pripyat. Nothing within the physical landscapes of 
either settlements had the natural ability to house dozens of helicopters. Thus, akin to the ad hoc 
nature of the entire operation, General Antoshkin designated a large enough space within 
Pripyat to house the incoming fleet of aircraft - the square immediately outside Party Committee 
Offices, otherwise referred to as ‘central square’.  
This location is represented within figure 4.10, a site that is both close to the river where the 
sand was being collected, and one of the few large open stretches of land partially devoid of 
trees in the entirety of the city. Due, once again, to the non militarised design of the atomic city, 
it lacked the infrastructure needed to orchestrate a single helicopter flight, let alone a huge 
operation. However, this was an extraordinary situation, and the necessity of an air traffic 
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control centre was met by means of the rooftop of the Polissya Hotel (the large building to the 
south west corner of the square), one of the tallest structures within the built environment. As 
dawn broke on the morning of 27th April, the first two helicopters arrived at the makeshift 
heliport in the central square of Pripyat, shepherded carefully onto landing pads by General 
Antoshkin, who had situated himself on the rooftop of the nearby hotel.  
Figure 4.10: Pripyat central square (source: GoogleMaps) 
	  
At this juncture, a moment of logistical elaboration is required to aid understanding of the 
difficulty and subsequent peril that these pilots had to overcome. As stated in a previous section, 
the majority of the release of radioactive material from RBMK no4 was by means of the fires 
which burned within its interior. Simply put, the material on fire was radioactive in nature, and 
had spent the past three years within a nuclear furnace being perpetually hounded by unstable 
atoms. Once the poisoning effect had ceased, the temperatures of the fuel started to rise, and a 
larger percentage of the graphite moderator began to combust, thus transporting its 
compositional atomic structure, unstable and non, vertically into the atmosphere. As a brief 
aside, this ‘type’ of radiative release is in stark contrast to the recent incident at the Fukushima 
NPP, where the vast majority of its spread of radiation was achieved through ground water and 
not a fire. This mechanism limited its global transgressions due to the restricted mobility of water, 
but maximised the pollution of its surrounding landscape through the saturation of the soil with 
intensely radioactive liquid. The verticality of the release from RBMK no4 presented General 
Antoshkin and his pilots with a logistical nightmare, as the only way for the helicopters to drop 
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their payloads into the shattered reactor was from directly above it. In other words, they would 
have to fly directly into the ‘chimney' of heat and radiation billowing upwardly from the belly of 
the nuclear non-human. Furthermore, the flightpath in and around the station was made all the 
more hazardous by the unit’s huge ventilation stack which rose one hundred and fifty metres 
into the air. The coupling of this ‘intrusive’ object with emergent cross winds and the radiation 
resulted in a semi-suicidal-mission, one akin to the heroic actions of the firefighters during the 
previous night. 
	  
The first two aviator actors attracted to the NPP’s network were B. Nesterov and A. Serebryakov 
(Shcherbak 1989; Medvedev 1990) and the helicopters they used were the USSR made MI-6. 
These two men were responsible for the surveillance of the site and, together with General 
Antoshkin, they articulated a flight plan which was followed by the other pilots who arrived on 
the 27th. These first reconnaissance flights were most dangerous, as these men were literally 
flying into the unknown. Not only did they have to chart a safe path for the bombing mission, 
they also had to measure the levels of radiation at specific heights in order to calculate the 
optimum range for dropping their payload, taking into consideration the innate velocity of the 
‘bomb’ and their exposure of radiation. After a delicate dance with altitude and unstable atoms, 
these actors agreed that the helicopters could not descend lower than 100 metres above the 
nuclear non-human, as below that height the radiation levels spiked wildly to above five hundred 
roentgens per hour. In other words, during the four minutes needed to manoeuvre into position, 
take aim and subsequently drop the packages into the reactor, these actors could receive 
between 20 and 80 roentgens baseline dose (Hamman & Parrott 1987, Medvedev 1990). A 
staggering amount when one casts attention back to the ICRP recommended limit of 0.3 
roentgens per week. These pilots were hence absorbing this limit literally thousands of times over 
in a matter of minutes.  
	  
Upon completion of these scouting flights, the time was approximately 2.00pm, and during this 
process General Antoshkin had ordered the high ranking members of the emergency task force 
to begin loading the sand into bags in preparation for the bombing runs. Labour was in 
extremely short supply by this time on the 27th as the evacuation of Pripyat was in full flow 
(which will be accounted for in the following section). Thus, high ranking and ‘intellectual’ 
actors, who found their ‘enlistment’ for manual labour a bit of a shock, began this intense 
physical duty surrounded by radiation. This node of action renders visible a tension between the 
two ‘commanding’ actors of the emergency operation, with General Antoshkin coordinating the 
military side of the effort and Boris Shcherbina, representing the highest ranking government 
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official, who was awarded the dubious honour of the event’s head investigator. When the 
aforementioned order was issued it was immediately questioned by Shcherbina, and his 
‘subordination’ was greeted by a furious General: 
Pilots don’t load sand! Their job is to fly aircraft and steer properly. They must be 
absolutely sure they’re right over the reactor, each time. Their hands cannot be shaking. 
It’s out of the question for them to be shovelling sand and dragging bags! - General 
Antoshkin (Medvedev 1990, 191) 
It appears that the General was correct in his insistence that the pilots were exempt from the 
manual labour of loading the sand, especially when one considers the aviation skills required to 
complete their mission. Shcherbina’s inquiry could have been engendered through his sense of 
pride, and that of his professional subordinates, or, more likely, by the material and biological 
repercussions of inhabiting the site of the makeshift helicopter landing pads. Radiation may be 
invisible, but its atomic structure still obeys the laws of physics, notably in this instance, gravity. 
Each time a helicopter took off and landed, its blades disrupted the ‘dormant’ radioactive atoms 
which had settled upon the ground, resulting in their transportation into the air surrounding the 
helipad. Each time one of these machines arrived or departed, the levels of radiation within the 
central square spiked wildly, and anyone present inhaled a huge amount of unstable atoms. 
Regardless, the orders were followed to the letter by several members of the emergency task 
force, and the first bombing sorties were underway.  
	  
Three of the RBMK’s designers took turns accompanying the pilots on these dangerous sorties as 
they felt better able to guide the pilots’s aim. Colonel Nesterov flew the first bombing run; he 
had already flown the flight path several times before. The first ‘phase’ of the aerial assault was 
hopelessly ill-equipped, both in terms of the ammunition they were dropping and also by the 
means through which they were expelling their cargo from the aircraft. Rather than attaching 
the bags of sand to the outer shell of the helicopter, the emergency operation loaded them 
internally, thus requiring their expulsion by hand. This also necessitated the opening of the 
aircraft’s cargo door, which resulted in the levels of radiation inside the craft spiking. 
Furthermore, the first phase of the operation did not materially alter the MI-8s, and it was only 
during the second phase that they were retrofitted with lead shielding to prevent (to some 
degree) the gamma rays penetrating the craft’s interiors (Hawkes et al 1986; Mould 2000). 
These sorties were carried out until the evening hours of 27th April, and as the light faded, 
within the halls of the Government Commission the emergency task force calculated that 
approximately eighty sacks of sand had been dropped:  
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The chairman of the Commission Borys Ievdokymovych Shcherbyna said that this was 
nothing, a drop in the ocean. It was very little, they needed tonnes…. Throwing sacks out 
by hand was unproductive and dangerous. And during the night of 27-28 April everyone 
thought: how can we do this better?… And that night an idea took shape: the load 
should be hung on the external attachments… On helicopters there are special 
attachments to suspend loads. You press a button, and it releases the load. - Nikolai 
Volkozub (Shcherbak 1989, 105) 
Volkozub was a senior inspector, airforce pilot, normatively stationed within the Kiev Military 
District under General Antoshkin’s command. He was one of the first aviator actors to arrive 
after Nesterov and Serebryakov. The above extract delineates his account of the night of the 
27th April and the morning hours of the 28th. The nexus between the new agency of the nuclear 
non-human and the material actions of this group of actors subsequently produced a series of 
retrofits to the MI-8 helicopters; that is, the physical augmentation of one object due to the needs 
of another. The consensus within the vast majority of the discussions about the starting date of 
the aerial battle of Chernobyl is the 28th April, the day that the boron and other materials 
arrived on site and the helicopters had been successfully retrofitted. It is only within sources 
telling the personal experiences of actors who were present on the 27th, or interviews with said 
people, that the relations taking place on this day become visible. Thus, the above account has 
reassembled the little known ‘first phase’ of the operations, the unheralded, yet imperatively 
important test runs which set the foundation for the proceeding sorties.  
	  
The morning of 28th April saw the first sorties of the second phase depart from Pripyat and 
journey the short distance to the NPP. Armed with their new payload and bombing mechanism, 
the end results of these flights were of much greater significance than the first phase.  The pilots 
did not fly alone, but were aided by an ad hoc ground controller situated near the plant, who 
was materially assisted by a compass and a stop watch. These two objects were used in tandem 
to ensure that each sortie dropped its payload at the exact same point, a co-ordinate which was 
agreed upon during the first phase on the 27th. Later in the afternoon, a ‘scouting’ helicopter 
was deployed and it hovered at a higher altitude over the drop zone. This secondary aircraft 
was tasked with aiding the aim of the bombers and verifying the success of each flight. 
Helicopters are not typically used for bombing sorties, a type of mission predominantly reserved 
for planes. Thus, the pilots of these machines were, for want of a better term, far outside their 
comfort zones during these runs. When the aircraft had reached the designated drop point, the 
message to release was relayed to the pilot by the ground controller and the scouting helicopter 
recorded the drop by means of a photographer. This constellation of human actors and objects 
continuously worked to finesse and improve their tactics during the course of the entire mission. 
Each time a payload was dropped, the three sources of action correlated their subjective 
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observations and attempted to ascertain if the drop point should be altered, and whether or not 
the bomb had hit its target. All the while, each of the three groups of actors, one on the ground 
and two in the air, were being relentlessly bombarded with radiation. On the first day of the 
mission, 28th April, 93 bombing runs took place (Hawkes et al 1988; Hayes & Bojcun 1988; 
Mould 1988; Lusted 2011). On the second day of the aerial battle for Chernobyl, 186 sorties 
were successfully flown. This incredible mission continued for a further six days, and, on 3rd 
May 1986, the reactor had been covered with over five thousands tonnes of material (Hawkes 
et al 1988), and its release of radioactive material into the atmosphere had been partially 
halted.  
At this juncture, a brief account of the unavoidable side effects of the bombing missions must be 
constructed; that is, the material possibilities which partially manifested themselves within the site 
of RBMK no4 as a result of the additional mass being placed over the reactor: 
On 28 April, 300 tons were dropped. On 29 April, 740 tons. On 30 April, 1,500 tons; 
and on 1 May, 1,900 tons. At 7 pm on 1 May, Shcherbina announced that the volume to 
be dropped would be cut in half. There was a reason to fear that the concrete structures 
supporting the reactor might not hold and that everything would collapse into the 
suppression pool, causing a thermal explosion and a massive release of radioactivity. - M 
Tsvirko (Medvedev 1990, 195) 
	  
Tsvirko was the head of Soyuzatomenergostroy and the above extract renders visible one of the 
material side effects of the aerial bombardment of the nuclear non-human. As previously stated, 
the lid of the reactor vessel formed the ‘ground floor’ of the facility, but beneath it lay several 
basement levels. The emergency task force feared that the geo-event had  weakened the 
structural supports of the entire building, and, even when it was not damaged, adding 5,000 
tons of extra material onto its frame could result in its collapse. This would have been 
catastrophic. Luckily, this did not happen, due in part to the type of concrete used within NPPs. 
The stresses and strains associated with the normative functioning of these facilities requires 
‘special’ concrete which is reinforced during the manufacturing process to sustain excessive 
temperatures and physical loads (Josephson 2000). This ontological necessity of the construction 
of these power stations is one of the fundamental reasons that the shattered core of RBMK no4 
did not free fall into the basement levels of the building. However, its physical robustness still 
had limits; it had withstood the mass of the helicopter sorties’ cargo, but a new concern arose as 
a result of the mission, one which constituted the other major side effect of the material blanket 
hastily cast over the core - excessive heat.  
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During the course of this mission, the temperature of the nuclear fuel within reactor had been 
steadily decreasing, but, on 1st May it began to rise once again. The risk of incubating the fuel, 
which could lead to a re-ignition of the fission reaction was very real, and on this day the 
emergency task force believed that their worst fears had come to pass. ‘The China Syndrome’ 
refers to a belief, that if a fission reactor incurs a meltdown, its super heated fuel would melt 
through the metal structure of the core and ‘burn’ vertically into the ground. The use of ‘China’ 
is an allegorical means of visualising the power of this transgression. For obvious reasons, this 
presents a host of complications, none more dangerous than the inevitability of the fuel coming 
into contact with the nuclear concrete which supports the object of the reactor. Depending on 
the chemical composition of said concrete, two byproducts can occur. If the concrete is made 
from silaceous rock, the interaction with the molten fuel will produce steam, which can mutate 
into explosive hydrogen gas. If the concrete is carbonate based, it melts at lower temperatures 
and produces explosive carbon monoxide gas (Hamman & Parrott 1987).  
	  
Neither of these material eventualities was appealing, and over the four days, the temperature 
of the core, and its subsequent release of radioactivity, rose to seventy percent of the magnitude 
experienced at  09.00 AM on 26th April, the time when the ‘poisoning effect’ had run its 
course. To counteract this uncontrolled rise in temperature within the core, the emergency task 
force decided to pump pressurised nitrogen from the facility’s compressor station into the space 
immediately below the stricken nuclear non-human on 2nd May. Over the next four days the 
temperature rose until 6th May, when, somewhat inexplicably, it began to fall from its 2,000 
degrees celsius peak (Mould 1988). This meshing between the aerial mission and the material 
impacts of their actions ‘on the ground’ represents a complex and dangerous node of action 
and physical reaction. As soon as the actors responsible for the emergency operation thought 
that they might be gaining control of the situation, the nuclear non-human fought back, charging 
up its super-heated interior as if in defiance of the human actors’ tactics. In other words, it 
routinely represented itself as a quasi-living being, full of agency and potential materialities. 
Furthermore, this brief account of the side effects of the helicopters’ mission renders visible an 
evolution in the agency of RBMK no4, highlighting that it was not static but in a constant state of 
flux. It was becoming a hybrid, impacted upon by the influences of the actions it had 
engendered in the first place. This dance of human action and non-human reaction further 
strengthens the argument surrounding its status as the most influential actant within the 
conceptual structure of this piece of research, due to its creation of a perpetually and seemingly 
endless affective loop.  
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By 7th May, the mission awarded to the helicopter squadrons was ninety nine percent complete. 
The vast majority of the pilots had conducted their duties with bravery and efficiency, but there 
was one last request to be made of the talented aviators by the scientific community of actors 
tasked with accounting for and understanding the nuclear non-human. In order effectively to 
plan the meta-operation’s next move, the necessity of being able to monitor the materiality of 
the nuclear non-human in much greater detail presented itself. Evaluating temperature and the 
types of gaseous release would provide the nuclear physicists and engineers with ample 
information to ascertain the state of the reactor, and thereby facilitate their planning of its 
entombment. However, the placement of the equipment necessary to gain these measurements 
required the physical transgression of the space of the NPP, the immediate lair of RBMK no4. 
One of the most irradiated sites on the face of the earth. Medvedev (1990) states that during his 
visit to the NPP, levels of radiation in the immediate vicinity of RBMK no4 were reported to be 
2,000 roentgens per hour, and any remnants of fuel within the site reached up to 15,000 
roentgens per hour. These scarcely believable levels restricted human movement within this 
space, thus limiting the options available with regards to the placement of any measuring 
devices. Therefore, the only conceivable way of placing the thermocouple and gaseous 
measurement container into the reactor was by means of a helicopter.   
	  
Nikolai Volkozub volunteered himself for this, the most dangerous of all of the helicopter 
missions. As previously stated, the bombing sorties dropped their cargo as quickly as possible, 
thus minimising the amount of time the pilots spent within the radioactive ‘chimney’ billowing 
upwards from the nuclear non-human. However, for this last mission Volkozub had to delicately 
manoeuvre fragile machinery delicately into place, all at a height which is not conducive to 
prolonged periods of hovering:  
A helicopter, through its aerodynamic properties, can cover the land either at a height of 
around ten meters (this is called hovering in the danger zone) or higher than 500 meters. 
From ten to 200 meters is a prohibited zone… if the helicopter is hovering at a height of 
up to 200 meters and an engine refuses, the pilot, however high his qualifications, will 
not land the helicopter, because he won’t be able to get the rotor into the autorotation, 
that is, gliding mode. - Volkozub  (Shcherbak 1989, 108) 
This illuminating insight into the logic of safe helicopter operations aids understanding of the 
peril of this mission. Volkozub had to contend with the presence of the radiation/heat as-well-as 
sustained hovering at an altitude which is essentially banned. On the afternoon/evening of 7th 
May, the pilot and the engineers of the emergency task force formulated a plan which involved 
the attachment of a long steel cable, weighing 200 kg, to the underside of his aircraft, and the 
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thermocouple was to be suspended at the far end of it. The 8th April was spent practising the 
manoeuvre and laying the necessary connecting cables needed to extract the data from the 
device from Pripyat to the site of RBMK no4. The 9th April marked the day of the live 
operations. Volkozub approached the site of the reactor at a height of 350m, and, with the aid 
of his flight assistant and scouting helicopter, took the temperature measurements: 
Evgenii Petrovich Riazantsev was himself looking through the hatch and telling me where 
I was with gestures: ‘Over the reactor’. We made temperature measurements at a height 
of fifty meters, forty, twenty and in the reactor itself…. Six minutes and twenty seconds 
had passed from the moment we had been hovering. It had seemed an eternity. - 
Volkozub (Shcherbak 1989, 112) 
On 10th April, Volkozub repeated these heroics to place the gaseous measuring equipment, 
and once again on 12th April to deploy the thermocouple one last time - three missions hovering 
above the jaws of an out of control nuclear reactor. In total, Volkozub spent nineteen minutes 
and forty seconds hovering above the ruins of RBMK no4. He does not state in his account of 
these missions the amount of radiation to which he was exposed, but conservative estimates 
would be in the region of 200 to 300 roentgens (Ushakov and Soldatov 1993).  
Figure 4.11: vehicle graveyard in the Zone (source: Solo East Company website)	  
This final node of action represents the closing act of the aerial battle of Chernobyl, the most 
impressive, dangerous and sparsely documented climax of a series of actions which claimed the 
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lives of several of the pilots. The construction of this account has highlighted that the material 
side effects of these sorties — the physical impacts on the nuclear non-human — could have 
resulted in more catastrophic explosions, but there was simply no alternative in the week 
following the geo-event. Action had to be taken to quell the vast release of radioactive material 
pouring upwardly from the shattered core and an aerial assault was the only feasible way to 
achieve this end. Today, within the world of the Chernobyl NPP, one of the most popular, and 
potentially dangerous, extreme tourist ‘attractions’ is the vehicle graveyard (figure 4.11), the 
resting place for the hundreds of industrial, military and civilian machines used in the clean up 
operation. The use of these objects in the immediate aftermath of the geo-event has rendered 
them too irradiated ever to leave the Zone of Alienation, and now they sit dormant and 
forgotten, patiently counting the centuries needed for their atomic coating to decay away. This is 
the fate of the fleet of helicopters used within the aforementioned arial battle, a depressing and 
ultimately thankless memorial to the non-humans whose importance during the stabilisation of 
the post geo-event reality cannot be understated. Once again, without the synergy between 
these objects and their human actors, the Chernobyl disaster could have been a lot worse.  
4.4: From Atomgrad to ghost town: the evacuation of Pripyat and the creation of the Zone of 
Alienation 
Figure 4.12: Pripyat sign (source: researcher’s own photograph 2015) 
At this juncture, analysis will depart from the object of RBMK no4 and focus upon another 
repercussion of the explosion on 26th April 1986; that is, the evacuation of Pripyat. In order to 
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account for this forced migration of human actors, analysis must return to the days immediately 
following the geo-event. The reasoning behind the non-linear chronology of this account is 
rooted in the theoretical placement of the nuclear non-human as the most influential and 
powerful actor within this research project. All that has been covered thus far has detailed the 
efforts of the constellated actors tasked with taming the object itself; that is, the actions spawned 
by the object’s agency, consequently being orientated towards its ontological structure. The 
evacuation of Pripyat represents one of the largest nodes of actions associated with the post 
geo-event stabilisation effort, and it featured the physical relocation of tens of thousands of 
people in a matter of hours. These material transgressions had no impact back upon RBMK no4; 
the sole purpose of this movement of human actors away from the epicentre of the geo-event 
was for their self preservation. Thus, conceptually speaking, the evacuation of Pripyat represents 
a one way node of action, one which did not form a continuous cause-effect loop with the 
nuclear non-human. In this instance, the agency of the object ‘barked’ and a vast conglomerate 
of actors jumped to its command, never to return to its sphere of influence again. What follows is 
a brief account of the process which resulted in the evacuation of Pripyat, supplemented by a 
delineation of how the entire city population of a city was removed from its urban environment 
in a matter of hours. This process began at 9.00 pm on 26th April. 
	  
During the evening of the 26th the emergency task force concluded that Pripyat had to be 
evacuated. Due to a change in the wind patterns, the radioactive plume billowing outwardly 
from the reactor had changed direction, and was now heading in a north westerly direction, 
placing the atomic city directly in the path of the unstable atoms encased within the plume. 
General Berdov was placed in charge of the operation, and he made the decision to evacuate 
the town, together with the other members of the emergency task force, in light of receiving 
measurements of the ground levels of radiation within the urban environment of Pripyat. By 
9.00pm, said level was one hundred thousand times more than the natural background 
radiation (Hayes & Bojcun 1988; Jensen 1994), which represented a massive and untenable risk 
to the human population of the city. The evacuation decision was kept completely secret from the 
general population, and all they were told was to stay indoors and keep the windows of their 
flats sealed (Hamman & Parrott 1987). The plan was to move the citizens on the morning of the 
27th, however, the logistics of sourcing and relocating the means to transport close to 50,000 
people put an end to this timescale. Thus, during the midnight hours of the 27th, a frantic search 
began to locate the necessary vehicles and to summon them to Pripyat:  
By 3am, it became apparent that a morning evacuation would be impossible, both 
organisationally and technically. The public had to be warned. It was then decided to 
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hold a meeting in the morning of representatives of all the enterprises and organisations 
in the town, so as to explain the evacuation in detail. - V Shishkin. (Medvedev 1990, 
183) 
The fleet of buses originated in Kiev and soon after midnight they began the journey to Pripyat 
in a procession over twelve miles long. One thousand two hundred and sixteen buses were used 
within the mass evacuation of Pripyat; and, upon their arrival in the world of the Chernobyl NPP, 
they spent the night just north of the village of Chernobyl, patiently waiting within the irradiated 
landscape for the call to take the final leg of the journey to Pripyat. Early in the morning of the 
27th, a city wide broadcast came over the city’s speaker system warning the general population 
of their evacuation later in the day:  
Comrades, in connection with the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station we 
announce the evacuation of the town. Have your papers, indispensable things and, if 
possible, rations for three days, with you. The evacuation will begin at 14.00 hours. 
(Schcherbak 1989, 64) 
	  
This message was broadcast four times and everyone within the city was led to believe that their 
removal from their homes would last three days. Thus, the residents planned and prepared for 
this time period. At 2.00pm, the convoy of buses arrived at the doors of the modernist inspired 
flats within the city’s urban environment. 
Figure 4.13: the buses used during the evacuation (source: Kostin 2006) 
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Figure 4.13 show part of the legion of buses and some citizens during the evacuation, and it is 
one of the few images that exists. As this operation was commanded by an actor from the 
military of the Soviet Union, the men who physically orchestrated the resident removal from their 
homes were soldiers. 
Buses rolled up outside each apartment building at exactly 2 P.M. We had been warned 
already over the radio to dress lightly and take as little as possible with us, as we would 
be returning within three days. I found myself wondering what this really meant, because 
if we had taken lots of things even 5,000 buses would not have been enough. - G Petrov 
(Medvedev 1990, 187) 
Once a bus had been filled it drove to join the end of the procession, and subsequently on to 
the reception centres, 50 km south west in Polesskoe (Jensen 1994). The entire town was 
evacuated in under three hours, with several sources stating that the total time was two hours 
and forty five minutes (Hawkes et al 1986; Mould 1988). The military command of the 
evacuation engendered this impressive completion timescale, and its evacuation of the city was 
one of the first instances when the general public was forced to ‘act’ in light of the geo-event. In 
hindsight, the clinical manner in which they were informed and moved, devoid of the frenetic 
panic encountered by the actors in charge of the emergency operation, resulted in calm and 
purposeful results. In other words, ignorance is bliss. From inception to execution, the entire 
operation was run with a militaristic attention to detail, and this calculated aura subsequently 
calmed the citizens during an extraordinary situation. Other than a few minor ‘arguments’ with 
the soldiers over their forced migration, the general population of the city accepted this 
unavoidable relocation and, as evident in the time it took to evacuate the city, swiftly carried out 
the orders of the USSR.  
	  
The departure of the last remaining ‘civilians’ from the immediate area surrounding the NPP 
allowed these militarily empowered actors to forge ahead with a spatialising form of action, one 
which, as the material effects of the geo-event rippled through the landscape, would only 
increase in scale, resulting in further impacts upon the neighbouring population centres. The 
‘Zone of Alienation’, or ‘Zone of Exclusion’, became a thirty kilometre bounded area deemed 
too irradiated for human activity. One must gain Governmental permission to access its 
boundaries, and the town of Pripyat, and the village of Chernobyl are the two most notable 
settlements within its restrictive confines. 
 140
Figure 4.14: Map of the Zone’s spatial boundary (source: chernobyl-tour.com 2010) 
Figure 4.14 delineates the spatial boundaries of the Zone as it stands today. However, its 
creation featured two phases, one initiated on 28th April, the day after the evacuation, and one 
starting on 2nd May. The first phase featured a 10 km exclusion zone, one which incorporated 
the site of the NPP and the town of Pripyat, and the second phase produced the limits of the 
zone as they are today (Jensen 1994). The order to initiate the second phase came directly from 
Moscow (Hawkes et al 1986) and it saw further evacuation, most notably within the village of 
Chernobyl. No accountable material exists from this second evacuation; this may be a result of 
the movement of the emergency task force’s ad hoc headquarters to the village of Chernobyl on 
29th April (Medvedev 1990), thus casting a veil of Soviet secrecy over the settlement. 
Regardless, by 6th May 1986, approximately one hundred thousand people had been 
permanently removed from the landscape of the Chernobyl NPP, and its transformation from its 
pre- to post geo-event demographical makeup was complete.  
	    
The evacuation of Pripyat and the epistemological creation of the Zone of Alienation were 
reinforced by ontological realities, notably, a complex network of military checkpoints, radiation 
warning signs, and a boundary fence. The removal of the vast proportion of human actors from 
the space was an obvious result of RBMK no4’s new agency, and the entire process produced a 
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unique series of actions on a host of different levels. The ‘official’ planning and execution of the 
evacuation has not been well documented, but the hybrid agency of the actors of the 
emergency task force played out in a vividly accountable and impressively efficient manner 
across the landscape of Pripyat, and the village of Chernobyl. Furthermore, the visible 
adaptation of the physical environment engendered an ‘observable by human senses’ means of 
identifying the presence of radioactive fallout, as-well-as creating the material boundaries of the 
Zone of Alienation. Today, Pripyat is a shadow of its former glory, a broken and empty urban 
landscape, devoid of human relations and slowly being eroded by the agents of time and 
nature. It has become one of the most recognisable images of the Chernobyl disaster, due to its 
uniquely desolate cityscape. Its empty streets and ruined apartment buildings serve as a 
reminder of the influence of RBMK no4 and the power of its agency over its surrounding 
material landscape/human actors. Pripyat was once the model Soviet city, premiered as far 
away as Moscow. Now, in the post geo-event reality, the only group of people who hold it in 
high regard are the people who go places/spaces that they are not supposed to go; that is, it 
represents the Mecca of Urban Explorers (as explained in chapter 1) — a stark contrast to the 
proud Atomograd status that it once enjoyed.  
Figure 4.15: Landscape view of the southern section of Pripyat (source: researcher’s own 
photograph 2015) 
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4.5 The entombment of the nuclear non-human and the environmental clean up: the final scene 
of the stabilisation effort 
Analysis will now return to the object of RBMK no4 and resume a linear chronology. Outwith 
the account of the evacuation of Pripyat, all that has been assessed thus far has detailed the 
actions towards taming the nuclear non-human; in essence, stabilising its ontological make up 
post geo-event. In the days following the completion of the aerial assault on the stricken reactor, 
the interior of the object cooled and calmed to a point where the emergency task force could 
begin to plan for the next mammoth challenge that had to be met - the quasi-permanent 
entombment of RBMK no4. The construction project required to erect the structure over the 
ruined reactor is an engineering marvel of the modern world, and its vast steel walls and 
retrofitted demeanour have subsequently become the visual representation of the once little 
known NPP in Northern Ukraine. Officially named the ‘Shelter Site of Power Unit 4 of 
Chernobyl NPP’, colloquially referred to as ‘the Sarcophagus’, this huge structure was allocated 
the imperative task of eliminating the material consequences streaming from the geo-event. Thus, 
in light of its complexity, scale, influence upon the political climate of the era, and its 
responsibility over the fate of literally millions of people, the speed with which it was designed 
and constructed is a testimony to the bravery and professionalism of the actors who contributed 
to the project. Prior to accounting for the process which engendered the steel tomb, an 
introduction on said actors must be provided, for without their actions, the object of the 
‘Sarcophagus’ would never have been realised.   
	  
Figure 4.16: Construction work on the Sarcophagus (source: Kostin 2006) 
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Figure 4.16 portrays a group of actors attempting to erect a section of the Sarcophagus, and the 
label awarded to this vast army of workers, forcefully drafted into the clean-up operation, was 
‘liquidators’. The logic behind this naming was derived from the Russian verb to eliminate, that 
is, the elimination of the consequences of an accident (Belyakov et al 2000). During the early 
period of the post geo-event stabilisation effort, the Soviet officials believed that the material 
repercussions of the disaster would be eliminated in a relatively short period. This factor alone 
discloses their lack of comprehensive understanding of the physicality of radioactive fallout, 
although this belief was rapidly dispelled through the brutal and life altering effects that this 
invisible material began to inflict upon all who transgressed the Zone of Alienation. The clean-up 
operation was doomed to fail its original objective, the task to which the mantra of ‘liquidator’ 
owed its existence; that is, ‘eliminating’ the consequences of the disaster was ontologically 
impossible to achieve. Therefore, the mission shifted its parameters and evolved into a form of 
damage limitation, a movement from eradication to the reduction of the impact of RBMK no4, 
but the nomenclature remained.  
There are various estimates about the total number of liquidators forcefully drafted into the site 
of the NPP, but the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency report (1995) on the radiological effect upon 
these actors states that their numbers totalled up to 800,000. The ambiguous label of liquidator 
incorporated a diverse demographical make up: from truck drivers, to concrete specialists, to 
construction workers, to simple labourers; no matter what duty, they all fell under the 
aforementioned mantra. Only the soldiers who braved the immensely irradiated rooftop to rid it 
of graphite moderator were provided a divergent description, that of ‘bio-robots’, a name which 
does not really reflect the immense dangers to which they were subjected during these missions. 
The environmental clean-up operation of the new world of the NPP continued until 1989, but the 
construction of the Sarcophagus was completed by November 1986. This is the period of 
greatest relevance to this account: the epoch of the stabilisation effort, the material entombment 
of RBMK no4, and the re-installation of the new synthesis of the post geo-event world. The first 
visibly accountable trace appeared on 11th May, shortly after the completion of the aerial 
battle for Chernobyl: 
Until now, the possibility of a catastrophe really did exist: a great quantity of fuel and 
graphite of the reactor was in an incandescent state. Now this is not the case. - Evgeny 
Velikhov, Scientific Leader of FSU. (Hawkes et al, 1986, 180) 
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This statement, uttered by an extremely influential actor within the FSU, represents an articulate 
and purposeful mediation of the disaster. He made it clear that the nuclear non-human was now 
under control and highlighted that the risk of a ‘catastrophe’ was now diminished. The 
paradoxical irony of this statement is plain to see, as the rest of the world would readily class 
the series of events which resulted in the explosion on 26th April 1986 as a ‘catastrophe’. 
Regardless of this instance of mediated political subterfuge, this date represents the start of the 
Shelter project, the point in time when RBMK no4’s agency experienced a further mutation and 
sparked a new series of emergent actions tasked with catering for its evolving physicality. By the 
middle of May 1986 the emergency task force, in conjunction with a Governmental committee, 
made a decision upon the entombment of RBMK no4, one which would see a short-term 
containment structure being erected around the ruined reactor. As a brief aside, the ‘short-term’ 
containment has yet to be replaced today.  
The purpose of this physical barrier between the radioactive interior of the RBMK (and its 
reactor hall) was to enclose said fallout and restrict its movement into the landscape. 
Furthermore, it was hoped that this separation would allow the radioactive substances within to 
decay to a level where further decontamination of the site could commence (Kurnosov et al 
1988). On 28th May 1986, the meta level command and responsibility of the Shelter Site of 
Power Unit 4 of Chernobyl NPP project was ‘outsourced’ to the Ministry of Medium Machine 
Building of the USSR, and the design of the containment structure was entrusted to the VNIPIET 
research institute and the Scientific supervision of the process to the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic 
Energy (Kupny 1996). Thus, the network surrounding the station expanded to incorporate a 
heterogenous range of institutions and a subsequent plethora of informed and influential actors. 
Unfortunately, personal accounts, or interviews with the actors implicit within these institutions, 
and the project in general, do not exist. The personal experiences which have been deployed 
throughout my account above end by the middle of May; and, as the Shelter project 
incorporated ‘distant’ actors, that is, men who were neither directly employed by the NPP nor 
drafted into its site immediately after the geo-event, it appears that they might have been bound 
to silence through Soviet secrecy legislation (Lusted 2011). 
	  
Due to the extraordinary situation, and the less than ideal construction conditions, no less than 
eighteen design variants were developed (Haynes & Bojcun 1988). The vast majority of these 
designs required significant economic investment in construction materials, a huge labour force, 
and the timescale associated with these designs was between one-and-a-half years to two years 
(Kurnosov et al 1988). The finance and human power was a logistical unavoidability, but the 
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time for completion was completely untenable. Leaving the nuclear non-human open to the 
elements during two winters could result in its radioactive interior being subsumed into the water 
table and, consequently, directly into the bodies of the surrounding population, most notably, in 
the city of Kiev. The key difference between the rejected design variants and the one which was 
chosen becomes visible when one accounts for the supporting structures that each sought to 
utilise. The rejected proposals required an independent foundational platform to build upon, 
which would take time, money and cost human lives due to the extended exposure to radiation 
that the liquidators would have to endure. The design variant which was chosen utilised the 
remaining structure of the reactor building as its foundational anchor, in that the steel outer 
casing would be attached to the shattered building, thus slashing the completion timescale. 
There is no accountable record of how the designers and engineers attained the necessary 
information to assess the structural rigidity of the partially destroyed reactor building. It is safe 
to assume that the decision to build on top of a weakened building was extremely risky, 
especially when one considers the importance of the retrofitted object. However, the 
Sarcophagus has stood for 30 years and its designed window of operation was to last for only 
five (Berthold et al 2002). Hence, regardless of the lack of the aforementioned accountable 
information, the fact that this retrofitted structure has withstood a period over five times its 
design specification is a testimony to the actions of its designers.  
	  
The chosen design was completed at the start of August, but it was continuously altered 
throughout the construction programme, due to the non standardised environment and 
foundational support. Akin to the nuclear non-human, the Sarcophagus was designed to cover 
as much as possible, and everything about its ontological make-up was a dizzying array of 
mammoth statistics. Over 300,000 cubic metres of concrete were laid, while in excess of 7,000 
tons of steel structures had to be manufactured, transported to the site, then erected. The 200 m 
tall walls had to be filled with concrete and rigidified by thousands of reinforcing bars. 
Furthermore, the ceiling had to be craned into position, piece by piece, with an insistence upon 
total accuracy (Kupny 1996). The general design ethos of the Sarcophagus revolved around not 
only sealing the nuclear non-human from the environment, but also creating internal barriers 
tasked with safeguarding the still functioning units 1, 2 and 3. The Chernobyl NPP was 
fundamentally important to the Ukrainian national electricity grid, and, due to the geo event, its 
meta output had been quartered. This reduction represented a huge logistical problem, because, 
without the still functioning units, there would have been massive energy shortfalls in Ukraine. A 
massive concrete dividing wall was therefore constructed between unit 3 and the destroyed unit 
4 — figure 4.17 shows this wall. This new structure reached the roof and it was supplemented by 
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a firewall to safeguard against any unforeseen incidents within the destroyed reactor hall. As 
unit 3 was the sister unit of RBMK no4, it had been affected the most by the geo-event, but units 
1 and 2 were essentially unharmed due to their placement at the opposite end of the building. 
Thus, these two reactors were the first two to be back online, and an airtight metal wall was 
constructed to separate unit 2 from unit 3. This barrier sealed off any ‘internal’ radioactive 
transgressions, and facilitated the return to normal functions of units 1 and 2 (Kurnosov et al 
1988). 
 
Figure 4.17: Corridor that leads to makeshift wall, separating unit 3 from the destroyed unit 4 
(source: Researcher’s own photograph 2015) 
The assembly of the steel outer casing of the Sarcophagus was carried out from three sides, 
and, as no one side of the original building was unaffected by the explosion, each entailed a 
delicate and conceptually autonomous process (Belyaev 1993). The west wall of the reactor 
building was damaged, but it retained a notable amount of structural integrity. Regardless, it 
was reinforced by a massive steel corset both inside and outside the building, and the interior of 
this new appendage was subsequently filled with concrete to further strengthen its reinforcing 
properties. Due to the excessive damage to the north side of the building, an entirely new 
walling structure had to be built, one which was also filled internally by ferroconcrete. This 
process was repeated on the southern facing wall, and a huge load bearing beam, weighing 
146 tons (Kurnosov et al 1988), was placed atop this new structure to form the keystone of the 
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roofing elements. The roof itself was attached to the north and south walls, and it comprised 
huge metal shields, placed individually then joined together through a series of locking nuts. This 
account of the material properties of the Sarcophagus do not do the process justice. There has 
never been a construction project like it, and, hopefully, there will never be the need for one 
again. Figures 4.18 and 4.19 depict two stages of the construction process, the first delineating 
the early stage and the second visualising the roofing elements being placed upon the 
aforementioned load bearing beam on the southern facing wall. These illustrate the discursive 
account, ocularly rendering visible the materiality of the structure and the ontological reality 
engendered by the agency of the nuclear non-human.  
 
Figure 4.18: Early construction stage of the sarcophagus (source: Kostin 2006) 
 
Figure 4.19: Roofing stage of the construction of the Sarcophagus (source: Kostin 2006) 
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These images offer a visual ‘description’ of the state of the building during the retrofitting of its 
shelter. A mass of twisted metal and shattered concrete is seemingly all that remains of the 
original structure which housed the nuclear non-human. The second image was taken towards 
the end of the process, and the devastation of the geo-event is still clear to see. The scale of the 
new object is also clear to see, and the sheer amount of materials that went into its construction 
was beginning to take its toll upon the Soviet infrastructure. 
	   
The production of these raw materials put the Soviet industrial sector under a huge amount of 
pressure, and towards the end of the process the strain began to have a detrimental impact 
upon the timescale. The final entombment of the nuclear non-human occurred in mid-November 
1986 (Mould 1988), roughly one month behind schedule. Visually, steel seemingly represents 
the majority of the mass of the Sarcophagus; when one views its exterior, this component 
dominates the object but making an assumption of this nature betrays the ontological make-up of 
the shelter. The manufacturing and construction of the steel ran smoothly and efficiently. It was 
the staggering demand for concrete that delayed the completion of it. As stated above, over 
300,000 cubic metres of concrete were used, and the bottleneck in its production was a serious 
worry for the institutions given command over the Sarcophagus’s construction. The steel outer 
casing carries the aesthetics of the Shelter, but the oceans of concrete form the dominant part of 
its total mass and the foundations to which the steel was attached. Regardless, the delay of a 
month still resulted in the nuclear non-human being entombed before winter, and the project was 
deemed a massive success. In roughly four months, this totally unique structure was planned and 
built, an impressive feature when one considers the other, invisible, and omnipresent variable 
with which it had constantly to contend.  
	  
The existence of radioactive fallout presented a massive issue for this huge construction project. 
The levels within the reactor hall averaged 600 roentgens per hour, and maxed out at 2,400 
roentgens per hour (Kurnosov et al 1988). This space had to be occupied to construct the inner 
support structure for the west facing wall, and during the erection of the segregating wall 
between the unit 3 and 4. Dependent on the exposure levels, the army of liquidators worked in 
very short shifts, typically two hours, but when transgressing the most irradiated spaces of the 
NPP, these shifts were shortened to under an hour (Belyakov et al 2000).  
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4.6 Conclusion 
This is a fitting way to conclude this account, with the actors who braved these conditions to 
build the Shelter, and also to revert thoughts back to the actors implicit within the other sections 
of this account. The helicopter pilots, firemen, army generals, scientists, engineers, soldiers and 
construction workers were all forced to act by the agency of RBMK no4, and they did so in the 
knowledge that they were likely shortening their lives due to their exposure to unstable atoms. 
The completion of the Sarcophagus signalled the reinstallation of stability to the world of the 
Chernobyl NPP, the moment when the agency of the nuclear non-human was almost completely 
tamed and after it experienced its final mutation, one which denied it the powerful influence that 
it had ‘enjoyed’ for the previous seven months. Today, RBMK no4 is still a powerful actor, still 
profoundly influencing human actors and a host of societal domains. Arguably, its ‘reach’ is 
wider as its ontological needs have to be met by the intentional community; however the actions 
it spawns are not as direct, purposeful or heroic as they were in 1986. This chapter has 
rendered visible the heterogenous melee of actions tasked with catering for the object in the 
immediacy of the geo-event, some well known, other less so. Outwith the evacuation of Pripyat, 
the actions of these human actors formed an intriguing loop with the shattered reactor: a series 
of cause, action, effect, and reaction relations; a material dance between an immeasurably 
powerful nuclear non-human and its fleshy human puppets, all performed under the invisible 
spotlight of radioactive fallout. Not long after the geo-event, units 1 and 2 of the facility were 
charged up and put into service once again, followed later by RBMK no4’s sister unit 3. The 
stabilisation effort, the material implementation of a new transcendental in the form of the 
Sarcophagus, facilitated elements of the pre-geo event world to return to the fray. However, as 
a RBMK reactor had catastrophically malfunctioned, the fear that this type of accident could 
recur began to manifest itself. The Chernobyl facility was only one of several other Soviet 
designed NPPs which operated the RBMK reactor. This emergent agency, and subsequent node 
of action, shall be covered within the concluding chapter, as the programme tasked with 
evaluating the risk of the RBMK fleet represents a fitting instance with which to cap this research. 
For now, analytical attention will turn to the material transportation of RBMK no4’s radioactive 
innards across the landscapes of Europe, seeking to provide a very literal answer about how the 
nuclear non-human travelled.   
“Chernobyl was, is and will always be one of Ukraine biggest problems.” Oleh Andreev 
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Chapter 5 
Rendering visible the invisible: the clandestine world of radiation and the 
atmosphere. 
——————————————————————— 
We travel together, passengers on a little spaceship, dependent on its vulnerable 
reserves of air and soil, all committed, for our safety and its security and peace. 
Preserved from annihilation only by the care, the work and the love we give our fragile 
craft. (Stevenson 1965) 
This chapter seeks to account for the travels of charged materiality from RBMK no4; that is, the 
physical transportation of radioactive material from the stricken reactor across the landscapes of 
Europe, and a selection of the actions spawned by this transgression. The key complication for 
the work conducted at the time of the disaster, tasked with registering the aforementioned 
spread, and by proxy, for this piece of research, is the fact that both radiation and its vehicle of 
transportation, the atmosphere, are invisible. In order to render these agents visible, a series of 
practices, developed across decades, and in some cases centuries, must be enacted, and a host 
of specifically designed objects must be used to facilitate these materially affective relations of 
making visible. 
	  
The empirical core of this chapter is the European Commission’s (1998) Atlas of Caesium 
Deposition on Europe after the Chernobyl Accident, an impressively constructed tome, one 
which correlates the research of several prominent environmental physicists from a range of 
European countries, that delineates the dispersal of caesium-137 across Europe. By means of an 
empirically analytical journey, this chapter will conclude with a Latourian discussion, asking 
whether this internationally constructed Atlas represents either a Latourian oligopticon or 
panorama - a decision which can only be reached through the reassembling of its composite 
parts and network. This process, for a social scientist, treads what might appear to be 
exclusionary and sterile discourses of the hard sciences, particularly that of atomic physics. Thus, 
in order to provide a base of situated knowledge with regards to this body of scientific logic and 
the entity of radiation, a condensed history of the development of atomic theory/physics will be 
provided, one which encompasses a small selection of key actors and their impact upon the 
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development of the science which renders visible the invisible and utilises it for destruction and 
electricity. 
This initial account will be supplemented by a sustained exploration of the ontological entity of 
ionising radiation, one which takes seriously its impacts upon biological organisms and, through 
an ANT account, will connect scientific/medical concepts to a real world node of actions 
engendered by RBMK no4. Furthermore, this two part process is tasked with providing a means 
through which this research can ‘render visible’ the invisible agent of radiation, firstly through its 
effects on biological organisms, and secondly through the practices of environmental physicists. 
The overarching purpose is to attune the social science sensibilities of this research with the key 
developments which culminated in commercial utilisation of ‘the atom’, its unavoidable side 
effect of radiation, and the practices deployed to gather the data encased within the Atlas.  
5.1 The journey of the concept of the atom across the millennia. 
The material world, or at least the version of it that is perceivable by the sensorial equipment of 
the human body, is compositionally constructed by a vast combination of objects. These range 
from the mammoth products of state led civil engineering works to the mundane utilities of 
everyday life. Some objects are manufactured from one piece of material, no joins or seals, just 
a uniform structure, and others are the meta form of several interwoven parts, the sum total of a 
series of specifically designed ‘minor’ objects tasked with materially co-operating to engender 
something larger. Regardless of their ‘meta’ ontological composition, every object within the 
material realm renders itself visible to human senses - we can feel, smell, touch, taste and see 
them. This perceivability, outwith the philosophical baggage surrounding their status, facilitates 
the ability to research them; that is, the incorporation of objects into any number of analytical 
endeavours. Taken at this level of existence, objects freely open themselves to such enquiries, 
but, akin to the aforementioned ‘jigsaw’ composition of certain examples, there exists another 
scale, another realm, inhabited by incomprehensibly small entities which represent the most 
fundamental building blocks of the material world. Thus, every object, be it massive or tiny, 
complex or simplistic, is the end product of a bonding together of billions of minuscule material 
ingredients.    	 
	  
This ‘invisible’ realm is, ultimately, that of the atomic, the birthplace and bedrock of sensorially 
recognisable matter (McCormack 2007). Every substance in the universe, be it gaseous, liquid, 
or solid, is composed of a numerically vast interconnected network of atoms. This has always 
been the case, and, unless the universe experiences a paradigm shift with regards to its 
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ontological make up, it will always be the case. However, humanity’s knowledge of this minute 
field of existence is fleeting, in that our ability to identify scientifically its presence and, by proxy, 
render visible its intricacies, is a relatively contemporary one. The idea of the atom, that is, the 
philosophical negotiations surrounding its existence, dates back to Ancient Greece. The term 
atom was first penned by Leukippos and the two general assumptions made in this period stated 
that matter is composed of extremely small corpuscles, and that their structure is infinitely hard, 
bordering on unbreakable (Justi & Gilbert, 2000). 
In the period after the Greek interest in the make-up of matter, a millennium of speculative 
research was conducted upon this subject. This endeavour ranged from Aristotle’s critique of the 
ancient model of atomic theory in 200 A.D, through to the works of the eleventh century, when 
Bacon and Magnus used the teaching of Aristotle as a foundation to probe further into the 
invisible realm of the atomic (Partington 1939). An interesting facet of this historical 
development is that the genealogy of contemporary atomic theory originated within the 
discipline of chemistry, and not physics. This is evident in the works of the first actor of 
significance within the network of atomic science, John Dalton. He was one of the first chemists 
(later a physicist) to create a theory which sought to explain the principles of the atomic realm. 
His work was influenced by the logic of the early Greek philosophers, and the origins of his 
theory are historically and personally ambiguous, with several events being proclaimed as the 
incisive moment of articulation (Nash 1956). Regardless, in 1808 he published a book, A New 
System of Chemical Philosophy, which detailed the sum total of his work thus far.  
Akin to the Greek notions, Dalton summarised that matter is comprised of minute entities called 
atoms; that the atoms within any given elements will be of identical size and mass; what within 
chemical reactions atoms are combined, separated or rearranged; and that the bond which 
unites the structure of atoms is unbreakable. In other words, atoms cannot be divided, created, 
fused or destroyed (Dalton 1808). Furthermore, within his New System, Dalton actively 
calculated the atomic weight of a section of elements and, crucially, articulated/invented 
symbols to represent atoms and molecules - a system which, in a notably different and simplified 
guise, is still utilised today. In essence, Dalton began the building process to construct the 
periodic table, the drive to identify, distinguish and chart the differences between elements by 
their atomic structure (Melsen 2004). Outwith the creation of an initial framework of an atomic 
theory, the important development here was the movement from philosophical negotiations into 
the area of semi-stringent scientific testing; that is, the use of purposefully designed methods, 
experiments, and objects to probe at the atomic realm. 	  
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Dalton’s atomic theory was in no way perfect. In fact, it had as many detractors as proponents, 
primarily due to the fact that it did not predicate itself upon an arbitrary set of laws. Granted 
the above mentioned ‘tenets’ could be classed as such, but in the hard sciences regimented and 
universally tested/applicable laws far outweigh the assumptions based on a series of non-
repeated experiments (Partington 1939; Justi & Gilbert 2000; Melsen 2004). Rather than chart 
the journey through the entirety of the nineteenth century, accounting for the scientists who built 
upon the framework provided by Dalton, this historical account will refocus its gaze upon the 
final decade of the period and the landmark discoveries of Roentgen and Becquerel, two of the 
founding fathers of the nuclear age/physics. On 8th November 1895, Wilhelm Roentgen 
discovered that certain chemicals glowed fluorescent when exposed to cathode rays. These 
elements were the anticathode within a Crookes glass tube, a vacuum sealed device which 
channeled electrons between its positive and negatively charged ends (Bertin 1978). This 
fluorescent glow was not a result of electrons, but instead an entirely new form of what was later 
referred to as radiation - Roentgen named these new and strange rays, X-rays (Kriz 1995).  
	  
Crucially, the discovery of the rays’ immunity to the electromagnetic forces within the tube was 
groundbreaking, but the full extent was not fully realised until Henri Becquerel, almost by 
chance, stumbled upon the phenomenon of radioactivity one year later. He observed that plates 
wrapped in photographic material were blackened when placed near certain luminescent 
minerals. In essence, an invisible and, at the time, totally unexplained phenomenon was 
interacting with this photographic material. The element emitting these strange rays was uranium 
salts (Martins 1997), and, as the science here subsequently spawned the nuclear industry, this 
element would play an integral role in its development. Becquerel’s discovery arguably marks 
the inceptive moment in spacetime when the movement from classical physics to the modern/
contemporary iteration of physics was initiated. Prior to the discovery of radiation, the disciple 
of physics knew of, and could prove, the existence of two fundamental interactions: gravity and 
electromagnetism (Wong 1998). As Roentgen’s x-rays and Becquerel’s radiation were not 
physically or materially impacted by these two core tenets of the discipline, an entirely new 
phenomenon had to be explored and accounted for.  
Granted, all three of these interactions are invisible to the human senses, but of key relevance to 
this piece of research is the fact that radiation is ontologically material in nature. Gravity and 
electromagnetism are forces: they may be produced by objects, be it a planet or a magnet, but 
their effects on matter are not the result of transgressing atoms. In other words, these 
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fundamental forces affect matter/atoms, but they are not ontologically comprised by them. We 
may not be able to register the presence of radiation without the aid of a host of measuring 
objects, but that should not exclude it from any materially orientated research/theorisations. 
Radiation is simply unstable atoms, and these renegade entities affect the stable atoms with 
which they come in contact. Thus, when Becquerel placed his uranium salt beside the 
photographic paper, the radiation/unstable atoms emitting from the uranium were what caused 
the physical change. This logic is retrofitted to Becquerel’s discovery, but in reality it took a 
further three years of research until Pierre and Marie Curie theorised that radioactive particles 
cause the systematic breakdown of stable atoms with which they come in contact. This 
conclusion was reached in 1898 through their experiments with polonium and radium, and their 
subsequent successful separation, a feat once believed to be impossible (Belloni 2011). In 
essence, these two human actors were the first to create an artificial, radioactive element by 
means of nuclear physics: that is, making a transuranic element.  
At this point this condensed history will fast forward seven years, passing in its wake J.J 
Thomson’s discovery of electrons (Falconer 1987) and Max Planck’s work which would later be 
known as quantum theory (Klein 1961), and arrive in 1905 with one of the most influential 
actors within the network of the atomic sciences. Albert Einstein is arguably the most well known 
physicist who has ever lived. Together with Pythagoras’ theorem concerning triangles and 
Newton’s law of dynamics, his equation which unites the entities of matter and energy is 
arguably the most famous ‘natural law’ ever calculated and published (Frischkent et al 1998). 
The reason for accounting for Einstein’s work is due to its importance to the process and 
development of nuclear fission, the means through which nuclear power stations, and the early 
nuclear weapons, derive their power. Einstein stated within his theory of special relativity that 
there is a fundamental connection between energy and matter, in that the two are equivalent. 
Thus, inert matter contains huge amounts of latent energy, and if certain structural/fundamental 
building blocks are removed, this pent up energy can be released - energy can be created and 
matter destroyed. This general principle of relativity represents the core idea at the centre of the 
science which would develop into the nuclear industry (Murray 2001). However, in 1905, it was 
nothing more than a theory. To understand its significance, this historical account of the atom 
must proceed to 1938 and into the cauldron of the Second World War.  
	  
No one, including Einstein, had managed actively to put this theory into practice before 1938, 
although, the revolutionary works of Lise Meitner, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann in Berlin and 
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Enrico Fermi in Rome changed this. These teams were experimenting with uranium-238 and, by 
means of neutron bombardment, discovered that the nuclei within the uranium atoms, if hit at the 
correct speed, would split apart and release a huge amount of energy, in accordance with 
Einstein’s theory (Anderson 1997). Thus, if a large enough mass of uranium-238 was present, 
this process could ignite a chain reaction within the element, a self sustaining ‘fissioning’ of one 
atom to another. Scientific reasoning shaped and characterised the following eighty years of 
human existence, the first point in history when the invisible realm of the atomic had been 
rendered visible and its material appropriation begun. As with many scientific discoveries, if it is 
useful to the military in any way, this sphere of society will utilise it first and in war time this fact 
reigns supreme. So much so, that on 2nd August, 1939, Einstein, fearful of the material 
ramifications of his theory of special relativity, composed a letter to President Roosevelt, 
detailing the impact and danger of this new epoch of science. This letter represents the inception 
of the nuclear age, the event which would, over the decades, fundamentally change our society, 
and commence the era characterised by the invisible realm of the atom. It reads: 
Sir: 
Some recent work by E.Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been communicated to me in 
manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and 
important source of energy in the immediate future. Certain aspects of the situation seem 
to call for watchfulness and, if necessary, quick action on the part of the Administration. I 
believe therefore that it is my duty to bring to your attention the following facts and 
recommendations: 
	In the course of the last four months it has been made probable - through the work of 
Joliot in France as well as Fermi and Szilard in America - that it may become possible to 
set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of 
power and large qualities of new radium-like elements would be generated. Now it 
appears almost certain that this could be achieved in the immediate future.  
	This new phenomenon would also lead to the constitution of bombs, and it is conceivable 
- though much less certain - that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be 
constructed. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in port, might 
very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory. 
	In view of this situation you may think it desirable to have some permanent contact 
maintained between the Administration and the group of physicists working on chain 
reactions in America. One possible way of achieving this might be for you to entrust with 
this task a person who has your confidence and who could perhaps serve in an unofficial 
capacity. His task might comprise the following:  
a) to approach Government Departments, keep them informed to the further development, 
and put forward recommendations for Government action, giving particular attention to 
the problem of securing a supply of uranium ore for the United States.  
b) to speed up the experimental work, which is at present being carried on within the limits 
of the budgets of University laboratories, by providing funds, if such funds be required, 
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through contracts with private persons who are willing to make contributions for this 
cause, and perhaps also by obtaining the co-operation of industry laboratories which 
have the necessary equipment.  
I understand that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium from the 
Czechoslovakian mines which she has taken over. That she should have taken such early 
action might perhaps be understood on the ground that the son of the German Under-
Secretary of State is attached to the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute in Berlin where some of the 
American work on uranium is now being repeated. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 Yours very truly, 
	 	 	 	 	 	 Albert Einstein. (in Stoff et al, 1991, 18-19)  
The importance of this document cannot be stressed enough - it reflects the agency of one of 
humanity’s most important thinkers and his self-appointed mission to engender action at the 
highest level of Government, at a time when the world was teetering on the brink of bloody 
conflict. Every nuclear phenomenon of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries can, in some way, 
be traced back to this communication. President Roosevelt replied to the famed physicist on 19th 
October, 1939 (it seems even Professor Einstein had to wait a few months for a reply), and it 
read: 
My dear Professor, 
	 
	I want to thank you for your recent letter and the most interesting and important 
enclosure. 
	 
	I found this data of such import that I have convened a Board constituting of the head of 
the Bureau of Standards and a chosen representative of the Army and Navy to 
thoroughly investigate the possibilities of your suggestion regarding the element of 
uranium. 
	I am glad to say that Dr. Sachs will cooperate and work with this committee and I feel 
this is the most practical and effective method of dealing with the subject.  
	Please accept my sincere thanks. 
	Very Sincerely yours,  
	Franklin D. Roosevelt. (in Stoff et al, 1991, 20) 
This short but informative reply marks the beginning of The Manhattan Project, one of the most 
secretive transatlantic, techno-military operations that the world has ever seen. Once again, this 
is not the place to account for the scientific and engineering developments of the project, but 
what must be highlighted is the purposeful means by which the military industrial complexes of 
the United States and the United Kingdom sought to engineer objects to harness the innate 
power within uranium atoms. Four years and six months of feverish research were conducted 
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prior to the first material utilisation of the atom, when on 16th June, 1945, the first atomic 
weapon was tested at Alamogordo in the New Mexico desert (Gale & Hauser, 1988). This 
event marks a new set of relations when one considers the atmosphere and humanity’s 
conscious/subconscious usage of it, one which plays second fiddle to the material impacts of 
these weapons upon the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but one which - when thoughts arrive 
at the civilian utilisation of atomic science - triggers a reconceptualisation of the thin blue layer 
of gases surrounding around the earth. In other words, what becomes enrolled here was the 
relationship between the invisible byproduct of the atomic era, and the atmosphere which 
encases our planet.  
5.2 The elephant in the room: the proliferation of human made ionising radiation. 
In and of itself, radiation is quite common. The Earth was born in a radioactive 
explosion. We live in a radioactive world. Every man and woman is slightly radioactive, 
since all living tissue contains traces of radioactivity. Still, despite its ubiquity, radiation is 
dangerous because the particles and waves emitted can alter other atoms integral and 
important to living organisms. (Gale and Hauser, 1988, 18-19) 
The invisible agent of radiation is everywhere. As the reader reads this piece of work, they are 
being bombarded by radiation, silently and invisibly bouncing off and passing through their 
body. The universe is an intensely radioactive place - the solar winds which are emitted by every 
star in the cosmos are comprised of massively charged, radioactive particles, so much so that, 
without our protective magnetic field, the magnetosphere, produced by our planet’s molten 
core, life as we know it could never have developed due to the damaging, if unmediated, 
impact of our star’s energetic discharges. This interwoven phenomenon is one of the few 
instances when human beings can see radiation without the aid of a measuring object, and it is 
known as the Aurora Borealis - the deflection of the solar winds by the magnetosphere at the 
poles of our planet. However, there is an important difference between the type of radiation 
pulsating around the celestial plane and the form engendered as by-products of human-made 
nuclear fission. Simplistically put, this difference is predicated around the binary between 
natural and human-made radiation - nuclear fusion in the heart of stars and nuclear fission in 
human-made reactors (and bombs).  
Figure 5.1 shows the contemporary periodic table, the different colours representing the half-life 
of each element’s most stable isotope, with blue representing stability in its most natural guise, 
and purple being the most extreme radioactive elements, with half-lives of less than a few 
minutes due to their rapid rate of decay.  
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Figure 5.1: The Periodic Table (source: Scerri, 2012) 
The number above the element’s abbreviation identifies its respective atomic number; that is, the 
number of protons within the nucleus of an atom (Herrmann, 2014) - otherwise known as the 
proton number. For the purposes of the distinction between natural and human-made radiation, 
an ideal departure point is the separation of elements into natural examples and human-made 
iterations. Uranium is the heaviest (in terms of the number of protons in its atom’s nucleus) 
naturally occurring element and it can be identified by its symbol 92U - every element which 
comes before, consequently having a lower atomic number than 92, is produced within the 
natural world. In other words, no human-made process resulted in its ontological existence and 
form.  
Since the beginning of the nuclear age, scientists have been attempting to manufacture elements 
heavier than uranium and these new and super heavy elements are referred to as transuranic 
elements. As the classification suggests, they include every example with a larger atomic number 
than 92, that of uranium. From neptunium (93Np) to ununoctium (118Uuo) and all that lie in 
between, all are human-made through a process of neutron bombardment. Rhodes and Stanley 
(2008, 2) summarise these contemporary ‘discoveries’ thus: “Most of these elements are highly 
radioactive. This group includes the chemically toxic plutonium and americium. Up to now 26 
elements which do not occur in the natural environment have been artificially synthesised”. 
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All of the transuranic elements were, rather obviously, discovered/synthesised after the historical 
period accounted for above, post-1945. The scientific movement into the nuclear age brought 
about a new and incredibly problematic issue of terrestrial ionising radiation; that is, the form of 
radiation which possesses enough charge to liberate electrons from other atoms. This in turn 
destabilises these once secure atoms and causes them to ionise. If this happens within a 
biological organism the end results are mutation, cancerous growths, radiation sickness and 
maybe death. Prior to human-kind’s experimentations with the invisible realm of the atomic, 
dangerous ionising radiation was a predominantly celestial issue. However, once the two atomic 
bombs were dropped on Japan, and the fleet of research reactors tasked with producing 
weapons grade nuclear material and later electricity increased in number, the amount of 
ionising radiation which was being produced on the planet’s surface grew exponentially. Our 
electromagnetic guardian, the magnetosphere, protects us from cosmic ionising radiation, 
forming a protective arch around the earth which extends into space - akin to a huge 
electromagnetic umbrella. Any radiation of a similarly charged nature which is produced on the 
surface of our planet, will not be impeded by the magnetosphere in any way, and is therefore 
free to transgress across the material realm if it can attach itself to a suitable ‘vehicle’.   
	  
The three most common forms of radiation emitted by radioactive material are referred to as 
alpha, beta and gamma (Holbert & Murray, 2015), and their charge and penetrating power 
varies with each form. Alpha particles are the heaviest of the three and pose little to no threat in 
terms of penetration as they can be halted by a few centimetres of air or a layer of skin. They 
are created when two neutrons and two protons are ejected from an atom’s nucleus, referred to 
as ‘alpha decay’, and this discharge of neutrons is one of the fundamental ingredients required 
to create and sustain a fission chain reaction. This type of radioactive decay is the common 
mode for elements of a high atomic number, typically over 83 (Gilmore 2008).  The real danger 
from this type of radiation is inhalation or ingestion, as once inside the human body the 
particle’s positive charge and heavy structure results in it releasing its ionising energy quickly 
and concentratedly. Thus, it is useful to view an alpha particle as a hugely powerful and 
cumbersome person struggling to carry a very large object in their arms - as soon as this 
metaphorical person runs out of innate kinetic energy, they must drop their cargo where they 
stand and, due to its weight, the ground may be damaged by the force of this mass.  
Beta radiation has much less mass and charge than alpha; in essence, this form of radiation is 
much smaller and nimbler. Therefore, at identical levels of kinetic energy, beta particles will 
travel at a much faster rate than alpha, which results in them having much more penetrating 
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power than their alpha brethren, able readily to pass through human skin. However, as beta 
particles are essentially high energy electrons, they are negatively charged. This physical trait, 
when taken in conjunction with their considerably lower mass, results in them being repelled by 
other positively charged atoms, reducing their impact upon biological material. It may help to 
visualise beta particles/radiation akin to a Scottish Highland midge, reviled by most, constantly 
repelled and not as biologically impacting as their warmer climate sibling the mosquito. They 
can cause harm in particular situations, but much of the time the damage caused is superficial 
due to their lack of toxins and physical might. One facet of this account which must be 
highlighted before pressing forward is the variable of charge. If a beta particle has an identical 
charge to an alpha, it will be just as harmful, if not more so due to its penetrating abilities (Okun 
1987). 
Gamma emission/rays, unlike their alpha and beta cousins, are nondeviable by a magnetic 
field, due to their neutral charge (as apposed to the positive alpha and negative beta forms), 
and they are of an extremely penetrating character (L’Annunzita & Micheal 2012). Whereas 
alpha radiation can be halted by skin and beta by a few inches of metal, gamma rays can 
penetrate several inches of lead. They are hence the strongest iteration of the three and are a 
form of electromagnetic radiation of an extremely high frequency, which is therefore massively 
ionising (Siegbahn 1965). The fundamental difference between gamma rays and the other two 
examples comes down to their materiality. Alpha and beta radiation are both particle based, in 
that they have an incredibly small physical ontology, but gamma rays are pure energy and do 
not rely on a material object to travel (Rhodes & Stanley 2008), hence the ‘ray’ naming. They 
are engendered within the decay, either alpha or beta, of certain subatomic particles. In these 
instances, the new nucleus is created in a high energy state, and subsequent movement into a 
lower energy state results in the emission of a gamma-ray photon. This loss of surplus excitation 
energy grants gamma rays existence. Thus, when certain elements experience radioactive 
decay, they can emit a combination of alpha (or beta) and gamma (Khabaz 2012). As 
previously mentioned, gamma radiation is a form of electromagnetic radiation, akin to the likes 
of radiowaves, microwaves and light visible to humans.  
All of these forms of radiation are charted within the electromagnetic spectrum, presented in 
figure 5.2. As one moves from the right to the left of the table, the energy contained within each 
entry increases, and gamma rays represent the most energy-laden on the spectrum. The process, 
accounted for above, through which they attain this power is referred to as nuclear transitions 
(Gilmore 2008); that is, the release of excess energy post radioactive decay.  
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Figure 5.2: Electromagnetic spectrum (source: Stedwell & Polfer 2013) 
Although gamma rays are immaterial in nature, they are produced by atomic evolutions within 
matter itself. Thus, the appearance of gamma rays represents a means to render visible the 
presence of radioactive particles within a landscape, due to their symbiotic connection to 
radioactive decay. Furthermore, terrestrially orientated, naturally occurring gamma radiation is 
a rarity, with the dominant emitter being thunderstorms (Smith et al 2011). As the main producer 
of gamma rays in our celestial neighbourhood is the spherical fusion furnace at the centre, the 
appearance of such rays on terra firma can be linked to the presence of radioactive substances, 
typically those created from the fission process. This interconnected relationship between 
radioactive matter and gamma rays forms the foundation of techniques used to map the spread 
of radioactive caesium from RBMK no4, and it is referred to as gamma-ray spectrometry. This 
scientific method of identification and analysis will be comprehensively covered in the following 
section, which accounts for the European Commission’s (1998) Atlas, as it has become the 
staple means to render visible the blanket of invisible radioactive particles across the landscapes 
of Europe.   
At this juncture, a moment of reflection is required to consolidate and focus all that has been 
covered thus far. Prior to this chapter, the research has been squarely focused upon the object 
of RBMK no4, the event of the disaster, and the material actions spawned by the object’s 
agency. The quasi-scientific account of the development of atomic sciences and the invisible 
agent of radiation is tasked with identifying the means to render visible this tiny, and horrifyingly 
dangerous realm of the material world. At this point, these abilities have only been hinted at, 
but what has begun is the process of describing what radiation entails, in its most fundamental 
form. It is now known that there is a divide within the periodic table between natural and 
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human-made/synthesised elements, and this divide is crucial when allocating an ‘origin’ to 
radiation; ionising radiation is dangerous as it is laden with energy which can destabilise atoms 
within biological entities; the existence of terrestrial ionising radiation is interwoven with the 
incorporation of nuclear technologies; there are three prominent forms of radiation, with 
varying abilities and dangers; and the relationship between the material/particle nature of 
alpha/beta and the appearance of gamma rays is a fundamental tool to account for the 
presence of invisible radioactive material.  
Prior to exploring the huge body of work conducted upon the spread of radioactive material 
from Chernobyl, a brief journey into the toxicology of these substances also required, primarily 
to instil analytical balance, one which takes seriously the impacts that these unstable elements 
can have upon biological organisms. The following section hence completes the account of 
radiation, that is, rendering visible the material impacts upon biological organisms of the 
‘invisible’. 
5.3 The fleshy material dangers of ionising radiation. 
The accident caused the largest uncontrolled radioactive release into the environment 
ever recorded for any civilian operation; large quantities of radioactive substances were 
released into the air for about 10 days. The radioactive cloud dispersed over the entire 
northern hemisphere…. Two radionuclides, the short-lived iodine-131 (131I with a half-life 
of 8 days) and the long-lived caesium-137 (137C with a half-life of 30 years), were 
particularly significant for the radiation dose they delivered to members of the public. 
(UNSCEAR 2008, 47) 
The above quotation is taken from a UN report on the radiological impacts of the Chernobyl 
disaster. Iodine-131 and caesium-137 were the radioactive elements of greatest concern and 
danger in the post-event epoch, with the former requiring a rapid response due to its short-lived 
decay, and the latter representing the most pressing material issue due to the longevity of its 
half-life. Furthermore, the spread of the isotope caesium-134 was also a concern; however, due 
to its shorter half-life, roughly half that of caesium-137, it only played a ‘supporting role’. This 
factor is represented within the European Commission’s (1998) Atlas, the multilateral project 
which represents the empirical core of this chapter. Although every chart, table and map is 
focused upon delineating the spread of the longer-lived isotope caesium-137, the deposition 
patterns of the two were identical and caesium-134 is therefore subsumed into the 
geovisualisations. As the spread of this radioactive element represents the core of the Atlas, the 
following section will account for its impacts upon biological organisms. It should be noted at 
this stage that the following account is predicated around doses of radiation akin to those 
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delineated within the Atlas, meaning a dose which a member of the public could have received 
as a consequence of the Chernobyl disaster, meaning low to medium doses. In the case of the 
firemen, whose actions were covered in the previous chapter, the doses received were so out-of-
the-ordinary that the trajectories of damage enacted upon their bodies were so extreme, and so 
uncommon, that the process of meticulously accounting for them would, in effect, represent a 
morbid excursion, one which would only be applicable to a handful of people in the history of 
the atomic age. 
As early as the 1960s radiobiologists had begun scientifically to test the impact of ionising 
radiation upon animals, typically rats. In a series of experiments which administered several 
radioactive elements to rat test subjects, Burykina found that, when the rats:  
received 134c in a dose of 40 cu/g subcutaneously, quickly occurring death was 
observed on the 9th day (rat No.19) and on the 11th day (rat No.16). In addition to the 
symptoms of an acute radiation syndrome and of all above-mentioned changes 
(weakness, lack of reactivity, reduction of appetite), dysentery, sanguinolent discharge 
from the nose, and actor dispelea were also observed. Several of the other subjects 
received a 20cu/g dose, half of that given to the above mentioned group, and these rats 
lasted for 42 days post administration. In one case, the rat died after 251 days. The 
conclusions gained from this experiment were that 134c causes death of rats in a case 
complicated by pneumonia on the 99th day, in a case free of complications on the 328th 
day of observation. (1962, 85) 
Thus, from this early experiment we begin to recognise a few characteristics of radiation and its 
effects upon biological organisms, notably that it engenders a host of embodied adverse effects, 
a series which slowly degrades the quality of life within the affected organisms, and 
subsequently causes death in all of the test subjects. What it does not indicate, however, is how 
it produces these harmful effects; that is, what its material trajectories of damage are, and how 
these impacts can be rendered visible. As an aside, the geographies of the ethics of animal 
testing have received a wealth of attention, predominantly within the sub-discipline of more-than-
human geographies (Miele et al 2005; Veissier et al 2008; Roe 2010 etc). 
	  
Blood is the great workhorse of all mammals, the oil that drives their ‘engines’ so to speak - if 
the quality of blood decreases, then it cannot power/feed the body’s vital organs, which leads 
to their failure. What is of key relevance to the task of rendering visible the devastating impacts 
of the invisible realm of radiation is the identification of the types of cells which compose blood. 
Simplistically put, the two cells of significance here are red (granulocytes) and white 
(lymphocytes), with the former outnumbering the latter roughly five hundred to one in humans 
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(Bain 2006). Over the course of the liquid’s ‘working life’, its compositional cells will 
deteriorate; when this occurs, the now useless cells are subsequently disposed of by the spleen - 
if the body is working as it should - and the replacement cells are produced by cell division of 
stem cells. This happens in two different bodily areas, dependent on which cells are being 
replaced (Kitchen 2007). Red blood cells are predominately manufactured within bone marrow, 
and white are engendered within lymphoid gland tissue, which is spread across the body. The 
biological impacts of ionising radiation features a latency, in that, unless an unfathomable 
amount of radiation is absorbed in one short sitting, the detrimental health effects it can cause 
will not be immediately apparent. Thus, one of the most efficient means of identifying its 
presence within the body is through its adverse relationship with blood.  
Alexander states that:  
it is almost impossible to irradiate any part of the body without exposing some lymphatic 
tissue. Lymphocyte counts are therefore a very sensitive biological indicator for detecting 
radiation… The fall in circulating lymphocytes in the blood is so early and so marked 
because these cells are extremely sensitive to interphase death. Radiation causes their 
rapid lysis and this means that a large mass of lymphoid tissue disintegrates (1965, 
139-140) 
Red blood cells do not have such an immediate reaction to the presence of ionising radiation as 
they are not as susceptible to interphase death, but, as there are a far greater number of red 
cells, in comparison to white, they collectively deteriorate at a naturally faster rate. This process 
is hastened by the appearance of ionising radiation (Kitchen 2007). Akin to the white cells, the 
bodily system for replenishing the red cells is damaged by the circulation of radiation. As 
mentioned above, bone marrow is the primary producer of red blood cells and, after exposure 
to radiation, only a limited number of new cells can be produced, and the vital biological work 
that blood has to enact which the bodily system cannot be completed due to its now inferior 
cellular structure. In other words, radiation can be identified within the body by contrasting the 
universal statistical average of red and white cells within the blood, taken from a healthy 
organism, with a sample from a patient suspected of being exposed to ionising radiation. If 
there is a marked decrease in white cells and, after 24 hours, also a decrease in red cells, one 
can conclude that invisible atoms of a radioactive substance are being circulated around the 
patient’s system. Blood and its intricate circulatory and replenishing systems enter into a vicious 
cycle with ionising radiation: the liquid provides the invisible invader with a vehicle to travel 
around the body, causing huge amounts of damage in the process. Akin to a parasite, ionising, 
particle-based radiation embeds itself within the body’s ‘great workhorse’, rapidly eroding its 
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biological usefulness and, crucially, destroying the organism’s ability to reproduce the cells 
which have been destroyed.     
	  
The cited works of Alexander were conducted fifty years ago, and medical science’s 
understanding of this process has increased greatly over this period. Pratt (2013, 4) states that 
this nexus between ionising radiation and blood creates chemical intermediates which damage 
the DNA, in essence destabilising its compositionally stable atomic structure, and that these 
events include “mitoitc cell death especially in bone marrow and mucosal tissue, and the 
activation of inflammatory responses that can lead to blood vessel damage”. Thus, these two 
accounts from two very different eras of scientific research allude to the same phenomenon, 
albeit in a different language.  
Furthermore, if we return to the experimentation upon the rat test subjects in the 1960’s, 
Burykina (1962, 97) observed the same results, in that the levels of white blood cells within the 
rats plummeted after the administration of caesium-134. Exploration of the radiobiological 
impacts of radiation tracks its primary path of damage, identifying what aspects of the 
interconnected system are impacting first and foremost. It has also provided one means of 
casting aside its cloak of invisibility, engendered a means of accounting for its ontological 
affects. Granted, it is through a scientific process of educated deduction, but this logical practice 
is one of the cornerstones of the radiological sciences. In theoretical terms, this account also 
creates a connection to the entity of the atmosphere and its role within the Chernobyl disaster. 
Without the aid of the thin blue layer of gases, and the weather patterns of the time, the 
caesium which poured upwardly from RBMK no4 could not have travelled far - the atmosphere 
was its material vehicle, one which carried the object’s materiality and agency across the 
landscapes of Europe. Blood and its circulatory system performs a similar role on the scale of 
the body. Thus, within this example, the physical transgressions of caesium and its ionising 
ontological impacts were facilitated by two primary vehicles: one at the planetary scale, the 
atmosphere, and at the other end of the scale the individual body, blood and its ‘hydraulic’ 
pump, the heart. They were both tragic ‘natural’ regions of RBMK no4’s network.  
At this juncture, bolstered by these biological insights, the second half of the descriptive account 
of radiation will return to the Chernobyl disaster, and the practices of the doctors and nurses of 
Hospital no 6 in Moscow, in a bid to connect these quasi-abstract medical concepts with the 
material realm. What should have become apparent from the above cited experiments (with rats 
and caesium-134 exposure) is the lack of a chronologically linear scale with regards to the 
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impacts that ionising radiation has upon biological organisms. Furthermore, its biological 
impacts are not universal, in that they do not adhere to a linear trajectory of damage (counter 
to the claims of the Linear No-Threshold model of radiological protection which is covered in 
chapter 7). For reasons that the medical sciences are yet to understand, every animal, plant, 
insect and human reacts to its destabilising impacts differently, in that one person might exhibit 
catastrophic health problems from a relatively small dose, while another could live a full and 
unaffected life despite a far greater exposure. This is graphically evident within the memoirs of 
Dr Peter Gale (1988), the American bone marrow transplant specialist who traversed the Iron 
Curtain, at the height of the Cold War, to treat the victims of the Chernobyl disaster. 
The damage caused by ionising radiation to bone marrow is one of its key trajectories of 
damage; thus, transplanting bone marrow into an irradiated patient is one of the primary means 
of tackling the spread/harm cause. In the 1980s, bone marrow transplants were state of the art 
medical procedures, due primarily to the nexus between the logistical complications of finding a 
suitable donor, with an identical physiological make up to the patient, and the appearance of 
‘graft-versus-host disease’ (Tai et al 2008). The former is predicated upon genetic viability, and 
Gale (Gale & Hauser, 1988, 43) states that, “The ideal bone marrow donor is an identical twin, 
the automatically perfect genetic match. Other siblings offer a twenty-five percent chance of 
compatibility, the probability of a genetic match between two unrelated people is about one in 
ten thousand”. Thus, the logistics for the identification of suitable genetic matches for a patient 
are sizeable, and in the 1980s the global donor register had only 150,000 donors on it. Graft-
versus-host disease is the condition that occurs when the immune system of the host attacks the 
donor bone marrow as it views it as an invading presence (due to the mismatch of genetics), 
and begins to enact its genetically programmed biologically defensive mission. Le Blanc et al 
(2004, 1411) state that a severely acute case of graft-versus-host disease, post “allogeneic stem-
cell transplantation is associated with high mortality.”. In other words, if a patient suffers from 
this condition after a bone marrow transplant, even today, there is little chance of saving them. 
Thus, when Gale embarked upon this mission to help the irradiated victims of the Chernobyl 
disaster, he faced not only the biologically devastating effects of ionising radiation, but also the 
logistics of finding donors and the misguided defence of the patient’s immune systems. 
5.4 “I’m going to the Soviet Union on behalf of the International Bone Marrow Transplant 
Registry.”  
The following subsection recounts this human actor’s time spent treating a selection of victims, a 
cross-section of patients, which highlights the non chronologically/damagingly linear 
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characteristics of ionising radiation. Furthermore, Gale’s memoirs reassemble a part of 
Chernobyl’s network where he played a central role. His relocation to Moscow represents the 
first ‘action’ in a series engendered by the object of the reactor; and, upon the commencing of 
his work, he put in motion a heterogenous node of action tasked with tackling the materiality of 
the nuclear non-human. This node was a little-known section of RBMK no4’s network, and, for 
this purposes of this chapter, it renders visible the biological impacts of the invisible realm of the 
atomic through a case specific example. It should be noted at this stage that the only detailed 
record of Gale’s visit is that of his published memoirs, and any quotation cited is taken from 
them.  
	  
Gale’s journey across the Iron Curtain is unique, and could be described as the personal mission 
of a medical doctor, provoked by the agency of a broken nuclear non-human. At the time, he 
was a world-leading expert in bone marrow transplants, a technique used to combat leukaemia. 
Gale learned of the disaster on 29th April, and deduced that his expertise would play a pivotal 
role in keeping patients alive, due to the potential exposures to ionising radiation. Through a 
network of influential actors he had met throughout the years, notably an international business 
man named Dr Armand Hammer, he extended the offer of medical help to the Soviet Union, a 
bold — and considering the geopolitical context of the period — very brave action.   
Gale arrived in the Soviet Union on 2nd May, 1986, six days after the explosion in RBMK no4, 
and was informed that thirty of the most seriously injured patients had been transferred from  
Ukraine to Hospital no 6 in Moscow. The successful implementation of bone marrow transplants 
is further complicated by the variable dose of radiation received: “less than a certain radiation 
dose, a bone marrow transplant is unnecessary. And over a certain dose, it’s useless because 
the patient will die anyway for reasons other than bone marrow failure.” (Gale & Hauser,1988, 
52). Thus, the need for an accurate and efficient system to quantify a patient’s inner levels of 
radioactive particles was essential. Gale found that the Soviet medical industry had a pre-
established system in place, one which accounted for three haematological variables, and made 
an educated judgment based on these three variables. One he claimed to be very impressive, 
another example of the use of blood work to render visible the invisible realm of unstable 
atoms. The process of bone marrow transplants features two stages (three if you count the 
identification of a donor); the first is the extracting of bone marrow from the donor, and the 
second is the administration of it into the patient’s system. These are the two main tasks that 
Gale conducted until 12th May, 1986, the date of the last transplant - after this date, his time 
was spent enacting the complex aftercare work.  
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Although there were over 200 members of Chernobyl staff present at the time of the explosion, 
the majority of the people he treated were the surviving firemen, whose heroics have been 
covered in chapter 4. He states that, due to the aforementioned latency of radiation’s effects, 
and the internalised nature of its attack upon the body, there existed a form of denial with 
regards to the severity of their predicament. Granted, every firefighter had suffered terrible 
burns at the hands of unstable atoms, typically beta radiation, but, anyone who has been 
physically burned before knows that, unless they cover the vast majority of the body, burns are 
not life threatening. However, out of the five fire fighters he first examined, none were chosen 
for bone marrow transplants as the incredibly high dose to which they had been exposed had 
resulted in their organs being damaged beyond repair. For eight days the hospital suffered no 
deaths, post bone marrow transplants, but, on the 10th May, Vladimir Pravik, one of the 
firefighters whose actions were described in the previous chapter, died. Pravik’s death was not 
unexpected as he was only awarded a transplant because a viable donor was immediately 
available, one who offered a genetic match well above average. His death highlighted that, 
even with such a match, his body was simply not equipped to combat the unstable atoms that he 
had endured.  
Gale returned to the United States at the end of May, then a week later flew back to Moscow. 
Upon his return he learned of several more deaths, but three firefighters, Versinian, Tarmosian 
and Palmarchuk, were showing signs of improvement after their transplants. The fascinating, 
albeit tragic, aspect of this is that several of the patients who had died received a notably 
smaller dose of radiation than the patients who remained. At this point, the official disaster 
death toll had reached twenty-six. For Gale, “many of the victims had been [his] patients, and 
[he] felt a special sense of responsibility and loss” (Gale and Hauser, 1988, 127). This statistic 
further highlights the ambiguous nature of radiation’s impact upon biological organisms. Gale 
was a world leading expert in the primary means of combatting exposure to radioactive 
substances, and yet even he could not save the majority of his patients.  
Over one month passed before the next event of significance to this account, and it features the 
death of Versinian on 17 July. As mentioned above, Gale had believed that this patient was on 
the mend, and that the transplant had been a success, but seemingly overnight his blood count 
had fallen rapidly and he succumbed to his injuries. Versinian’s death was a prime example of 
the aforementioned latency of radioactive impacts. Over two months had passed since his 
exposure and in that time he had received marrow from a genetically suitable donor, but, due to 
the longevity of caesium-134/137, it had remained in his system and begun to erode the new 
 169
cellular material administered to him by Gale. This decrease in the quality of his blood had 
resulted in mass organ failure, due to the blood’s inability to supply the organs with the nutrients 
required to function. Tarmosian and Palmarchuk survived their ordeal and were two of the few 
whose transplants effectively saved them. There is no record of their dose rate, but, as they were 
firemen, it is safe to assume that they were subjected to some of the highest levels out of any of 
the emergency workers who arrived in the immediacy of the explosion. Thus, two of the few 
survivors of the actions of Gale in Hospital no 6 were among the group which had received the 
highest dose, a fitting example to highlight the non linear nature of impact that ionising radiation 
has upon biological organisms.  
	  
For some, the health effects of Chernobyl’s radiation were so catastrophically impacting that 
nothing could save them. As mentioned earlier, all that has been described thus far has been 
within the remit of a quasi-normative dose of radioactive material; that is, a dose under 100mSv, 
one which is, say, 50 times that of a background dose. Granted the above mentioned 
firefighters would not fall into that category, as the levels of radiation to which they were 
exposed were thousands of times the magnitude of natural background rations, but, Dr Gale 
and his team made the educated decision that these men were in the ‘Goldilock’ dose range for 
a bone marrow transplant, and thus treated them accordingly. However, to conclude this 
section, we must account for the victims who had exposed themselves to suicidal doses, as a 
means of firstly rendering visible their heroism in the face of the invisible aggressor of unstable 
atoms, and secondly to highlight the worst case scenario. This will be achieved by means of the 
contexualisation provided by the actor present and responsible for the lives of these patients. As 
Gale explained: 
Of all the patients I saw in the Soviet Union, it was Dr Orlov who affected me the most. 
A young man about my age, he’d gone to the reactor building after the explosion to 
help stabilise the condition of injured firemen prior to their removal. As a doctor, he 
understood the nature of radiation. Yet he stayed in the reactor area for three hours, 
sacrificing himself to save others. Finally, feeling what he termed ‘a metal taste in his 
mouth and headache sickness’, he retreated to the triage area. But even there, he 
continued his efforts    
	When I first saw Orlov, he already bore signs of severe radiation sickness. Black herpes 
simplex blisters scarred his face and his gums raw…. Then, over several days, the skin 
peeled away and his gums turned fire-engine red like raw beef. Ulcers spread across his 
entire body. The membrane lining his intestines eroded and he suffered bloody 
diarrhoea. We administered morphine to ease the pain, but even when delirious, he 
remained in agony. The nature of radiation burns is that they get worse rather than 
better, because old cells die and young ones are unable to reproduce as a result of the 
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damage. Towards the end, Orlov was barely recognisable and his death, several weeks 
after the disaster, was merciful.” (Gale and Hauser 1988, 58) 
 
Figure 5.3: Mitinskoe Cemetery, Moscow - the resting place of the ‘officially recognised victims 
of the accident (source: Butyrin 2013) 
The purpose of this chapter thus far has been to characterise the entity of radiation, and to 
engender a quasi-scientific means through which the social sciences can grasp its ontological 
intricacies, subsequently providing a means to comprehend its dangers. This account has been 
conducted primarily to contextualise the previous chapter’s accounts of the event of the 
Chernobyl disaster, to render visible the very damaging impacts that radiation can have upon 
biological organisms. Furthermore, albeit much less noble yet no less important, has been the 
identification of a means through which the invisible realm of unstable atoms can be rendered 
visible, reflecting the conceptual alignment with this research’s ANT theoretical and 
methodological sensibilities. We have seen that alpha and beta radiation is particle-based and 
thus achieves an ontologically material existence, and that one of the fundamental means 
through which to identify its presence within biological organisms is through its nexus with the 
cellular composition of blood. Hence, on the scale of the body, radiation’s cloak of invisibility 
has been cast aside, and its material presence rendered visible.  
	  
With this empirical and conceptual logic covered, and the biological significance of radioactive 
elements, such as caesium, documented, thoughts will now turn to the European Commission’s 
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(1998) Atlas. This shift in perspective encompasses an impressive multilateral project, as-well-as 
another invisible agent, one which played a crucially important role within Chernobyl’s network 
- the atmosphere.  
5.5 Radioactive atmosphere - the meteorological transportation of unstable atoms from RBMK 
no4 
Terrorism, from an environmental perspective, voids the distinction between violence 
against people and violence against things: it comprises a form of violence against the 
very human-ambient ‘things’ without which people cannot remain people. In other words: 
air and atmosphere - the primary media for life, in both the physical and metaphorical 
sense - only became an object of explicit consideration and monitoring in domains such 
as aero-technics, medicine, law, politics, aesthetics and cultural theory in response to 
their terrorist deprivation. (Sloterdijk, 2009 25) 
The above extract from Peter Sloterdijk’s compelling historically-guided philosophical journey 
through the twentieth century focuses upon the aggressive appropriation of the atmosphere, a 
process he names ‘atmo-terrorism’. The context, with regards to this quotation, is the 
development and utilisation of gas warfare during the Great War - the production of poisonous 
gases, and their subsequent highjacking, as means of transport, of the ‘local’ atmosphere 
surrounding the trenches in France. The core argument of Sloterdijk’s work is structured around 
three distinctive hallmarks of the century, actions and practices supposedly distinguishing it from 
all that has come before. These are: the practice of terrorism, the concept of product design, 
and environmental thinking. The heterogenous range of contemporary engendered objects, their 
material impacts, and the actions spawned by their purposefully detrimental utilisation has 
resulted in a truly new era of techno-socio existence, one which has the scope and power 
fundamentally to alter the thin blue layer of gases which encase our little blue spaceship. Thus, 
the products, actions and effects of these three characteristics are interwoven and 
interdependent, in that the significance of each is heightened when set alongside its two 
brethren. Each one is credible in its own right, but when taken as a whole, they mutually support 
each other, resulting in a distinctive and potentially very dangerous network of things, actors 
and actions.    
	  
The concept of terrorism is of key interest to this chapter, and the possible ambiguity surrounding 
the intentionality of actions of this nature. Sloterdijk (2009, 28) states that terrorism, “can only 
be understood when grasped as a form of destructibility. It exploits the fact that ordinary 
inhabitants have a user relationship to their environment, that they instinctively and exclusively 
consume it as a silent condition of their existence.” He goes on to classify a terrorist as an actor 
who gains an explicative advantage over an enemy/target’s life world and exploits it to cause 
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harm. From this elongated definition of the act and the actor responsible for it, one can deduce 
that said exploitation is predicated upon an intention to harm or disruption of the conditions of 
life of the target. This could be in the form of a gas attack, atmospheric engineering or, on a 
smaller scale, the utilisation of the ‘atmosphere’ of a specific localised space to rid it of a pest. 
The last example is accounted for by Sloterdijk as he explores the peace time (between the two 
world wars) development of the pest control industry, a sector of capitalism which owes a 
technological debt to the military industrial complex. The parallels between this sector and the 
civilian nuclear industry are plain to see. 
Throughout his philosophical journey, Sloterdijk accounts for a host of examples which vindicate 
his interconnected hallmarks of the period, and the insistence on terrorism being an intentional 
act never wavers. Due to the phenomena he provides as evidence, this classification is readily 
justified, particularly when he accounts for the nuclear era. Radioterrorism began with the 
United States’ bombing of Japan, humanity’s first and only use of atomic weapons in anger. This 
term captures the ushering in of the era of invisible aggression of both unstable atoms and the 
rays of pure energy produced by their decay. This development forms a new branch, or 
subsection, of his meta-conceptual structure of atmo-terrorism, a more specific means of 
identifying the ontology of the atmospheric appropriator.  
When theorising radioterrorism, Sloterdijk only provides the example of the Enola Gay’s 
atomically destructive mission and chooses not to branch into other, more ambiguous aspects of 
the nuclear age. It could be argued that this decision was made to protect the conceptual 
foundations of his arguments; the ‘difficulties’ that these other nuclear-orientated phenomena 
could pose to it may challenge such a steadfast conceptualisation. However this seems like a 
missed opportunity. Granted the dropping of Little Boy and Fat Man was one of the most pivotal 
moments in the history of the twentieth century, formulative for the era of atmoterrorism, but the 
simple fact remains that these two weapons were of the weakest and most feeble ever produced 
by nuclear-equipped states. In reality, the amount of radioactive material released into the 
atmosphere, and by proxy the ‘level’ of radioterrorism, was low, so much so that both cities 
have been completely rebuilt and today house millions of people. Obviously, one cannot ignore 
the material impacts that these bombs had upon the human population, but this section of this 
chapter is focused upon the atmosphere and its appropriation/irradiation.   
	  
Therefore, in the history of radioterrorism, its meta-impacts upon the atmosphere and the global 
public, two main phenomena, are of much greater significance. These impacts are indexed by 
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the extensive testing of three stage thermonuclear weapons by, but not exclusive to, the United 
States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War; and also the nuclear non-human at the heart 
of this research project, RBMK no4 of the Chernobyl NPP. The meltdown at the Japanese 
nuclear power plant at Fukushima in 2011 should arguably join these two as another significant 
instance of radioterrorism; but, due to its ‘liquid’ orientated transportation of radioactive 
material, a fitting label for it would be ‘terrorism from the water’, rather than the air. The Cold 
War weapons tests was a practice of testing state-of-the-art technology as-well-as a pompous 
exhibition of destructive might - an unfathomably carnivorous black hole for monetary/human 
resources and a futile race towards a passive-aggressive stalemate of mutually assured 
destruction. The latter, RBMK no4, arguably represents the worst human-made accident the 
world has ever seen, the universally feared yet scarcely believed catastrophe of both machine 
and atmosphere. The former was a series of actions by the respective countries' military 
industrial complexes, and the latter was an event produced within the civilian sphere of society. 
Regardless of the orientation of these events, both released huge amounts of radioactive 
material into the atmosphere which, unavoidably, impacted upon the life worlds of the civilians 
of a range of different countries. So, the question remains, were these actions an act of 
terrorism? The testing of thermonuclear weapons could be readily classed as such, although, the 
‘terror’ was intended to be evoked by the might of the weapons, with the pollution of the 
atmosphere as an unavoidable side effect. Beck et al state that:  
From 1945-1980, over 500 weapons tests were conducted in the atmosphere at a 
number of locations around the world. These tests resulted in the release of substantial 
quantities of radioactive debris to the environment… the impact of weapons fallout will 
continue to be felt for years to come since a contaminant baseline has been imposed on 
the ambient radiation environment that will be an important factor in the assessment of 
past and future releases of radioactive materials into the biosphere. (2002, 591) 
The two aspects of note within this statement are the number of atmospheric weapons tests and, 
crucially, the imposition of a contamination baseline on the ambient radiation environment. This 
imposed baseline is an epistemological construct, one which raises the accepted ambient level of 
radioactive emission within the environment of the United States. Thus, in this instance, the user 
interface between the environment and the residents of the areas within the immediate 
atmospheric sphere of influence of the weapon test sites has been damaged, and the 
implementation of a new level of accepted ambient radioactivity is a means of obscuring this 
fact. In other words, erecting mirrors and clouding their gaze with smoke in a bid legally and 
politically to cover up the existence of ‘unnatural’ radioactive material. 
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The Nevada Test Site was the primary location within continental North America where  
hundreds of controlled explosions were conducted, the majority of which were underground, but 
a notable percentage were atmospheric detonations. Each resident of the surrounding area was 
issued with a booklet produced by the United States Atomic Energy Commission in 1955, titled 
Atomic Test Effects in the Nevada Test Site Region. In an open letter to the recipients, the test 
manager, James E Reeves, stated: 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	                    February, 1955 
A MESSAGE TO PEOPLE WHO LIVE NEAR NEVADA TEST SITE: 
 
You are in a very real sense active participants in the Nation’s atomic test program. You have 
been close observers of tests which have contributed greatly to building the defenses of our 
country and of the free world. Nevada tests have helped us come a long way in a few, short 
years and have been a vital factor in maintaining the peace of the world. They also provide 
important data for use in planning civil defence measures to protect our people in event of 
enemy attack.  
Same [typo within original document] of you have been inconvenienced by our tests operations. 
At times some of you have been exposed to potential risk from flash, blast. or fall-out. You have 
accepted the inconvenience or risk without fuss, without alarm, and without panic. Your 
cooperation has helped achieve an unusual record of safety. 
In a world in which free people have no atomic monopoly, we must keep our atomic strength at 
peak level. Time is a key factor in this task and Nevada tests help us ‘buy’ precious time.  
That is why we must hold new tests in Nevada. 
I want you to know that in the forthcoming series, as has been true in the past, each shot is 
justified by national and international security need and that none will be fired unless there is 
adequate assurance of public safety. 
We are grateful for your continued cooperation and your understanding. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 James E Reeves 
	   	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	  	 Test Manager 
Due to the twentieth century being the era which spawned the nuclear age, and by extension 
radioterroism, it appears that Sloterdijk could/should have added a fourth hallmark to his list; 
that of targeted and sustained political subterfuge regarding the risk, dangers and 
environmental presence of ionising radiation; that is, the use of an ever evolving propaganda 
machine tasked with comforting citizens in the face of state-led atomic practices. Not only does 
this letter metaphorically connect the surrounding population to the nation’s test programme, it 
can, with the aid of hindsight, seem rather blatantly to obscure their very real material 
participation within them. Akin to any locale which has experienced some form of 
 175
radioterrorism, the rates of thyroid cancer increase within the surrounding population, and 
Nevada is no different (Gilber at al 1998). 
It is safe to assume that the United States Government did not intend to harm its civilian 
population during these tests, or to cause destructive damage to the life worlds encased within 
its borders. However, the fact remains that both of these material eventualities were a by-
product of the practices of the atmospheric testing of atomic weapons at Nevada (and of course 
the Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean). As presented within the above letter, the official line 
was that these tests were of paramount import to national security, and this claim, if it was to be 
believed, rendered visible the intentionality of the acts. However, claiming this import within an 
open letter to the general public who were exposed to state-created ionising radiation does not 
obviate the fact that the United States Government committed an act of radioterrorism upon its 
own people. Therefore, when contextualised against the backdrop of the Cold War arms race, 
the intentionality surrounding the act of ‘terrorism’ is blurred, particularly with regards to the 
actions of the United States.  
In contrast, the Soviet Union also conducted hundreds of atmospheric tests within their own 
borders, including the detonation of the AN602 hydrogen bomb on the island of Novaya 
Zemlya in northern Siberia. Nicknamed ‘Tsar Bomba’, this nuclear non-human was the largest 
and most powerful weapon humanity has ever produced (Hutchinson, 2003), notably larger 
than anything produced by the United States. This relentless drive for megatonnage power was 
a hallmark of the Russian model of atomic weapon development, where the classic mantra of 
‘bigger is always better’ perfectly describes their technological trajectory, whereas the United 
States chose to focus on a more challenging aspect of the technology, namely accurate delivery 
of smaller, more compact bombs. Mother Russia has never been kind to her residents; the 
winters are brutal, the terrain inhospitable, and her vast resources are locked away in mountain 
ranges hundreds of miles from population/industrial centres. Nonetheless, the expansive nature 
of her geography, and the uninhabitable conditions of her northern regions, presented the 
Soviet Government with ideal test facilities for weapons of this nature. The site of the Tsar 
Bomba test is 1,417 miles from Moscow, and a distance of 880 miles away from Arkhangelsk, 
the closest settlement of significance (population of 348,000). The distance between John o’ 
Groats and Land’s End is 874 miles, so it is safe to conclude that the distances between the 
major population centres and the test site of the Tsar Bomba were significant. When these 
distances are placed in contrast beside the spatially connected relationship between the Nevada 
Test Site and the city of Las Vegas; that is, the minimal milage between the United State’s main 
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testing facility and a major population (and tourist) centre, the awarding of the label of 
‘radioterrorism’ is further legitimised.  
Figure 5.4: GoogleMaps image of Las Vegas and the Nevada Test Site (source: GoogleMap) 
Figure 5.4 is a satellite image delineating the landscape and the two sites of significance, with a 
separating distance of just eighty eight miles. Furthermore, three national parks are within close 
proximity, as is the city’s primary drinking water reservoir. Today, fifty years on from the main 
testing within the Nevada site, the radioactive elements will have decayed into oblivion; but, 
akin to the numerous victims of Chernobyl, genetic mutations caused by ionising radiation from 
these weapons test could have been biologically embedded within the surrounding populations, 
notably the residents of Las Vegas. Interestingly, minimal research has been conducted upon this 
nexus between human genetic mutations and the dosage from the weapons testing. Several 
studies have focused upon such a phenomenon within the area’s wildlife (Theodorakis et al 
2001), and a huge amount of work has been conducted upon the migration of radionuclides 
within the region’s groundwater (Bentley et al 1983, Rush et al 1983, Cole et al 1996, Smith et 
al 2003 etc). Yet, for reasons one cannot confidently assert, a lacuna exists with regards to the 
radiation’s impacts upon human actors. Beck (1991), when speaking about his risk society, 
states that regulatory systems are designed to dilute and mitigate responsibility with regards to 
risks. This lack of sustained scientific enquiry into the genetic impact of the weapons testing upon 
the population of Las Vegas provides tentative evidence of this type of hierarchical protection 
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system of the risk society; that is, if no research has been conducted upon this invisible issue, 
then the state cannot be held accountable for the biological damage caused.  
Thus, it could be argued that the biological legacy of these atmospheric tests, unavoidable due 
to their placement so close to a large population centre, will live on within the generations that 
followed the civilians residents within this area at the time. In other words, the explication of the 
user interface between these residents and the atmosphere that they breathed to subsist on the 
most basic level had been eroded by these acts of radioterrorism: a biologically destructive act 
by means of vastly complex objects specifically designed to exploit the forces within atoms, 
supplemented by the casting of an obscuring veil of political subterfuge, one which 
epistemologically alters the ontological impacts on the environment. It is the perfect 
encapsulation of Sloterdijk’s three hallmarks, as-well-as the proposed addition of a fourth.  
 	  
All of the above is not intended to exempt the Soviet Union from this discussion, or from being 
classed as radioterrorists, but is merely a means of problematising Sloterdijk’s conceptual 
structure and furthering what he began by means of materially orientated, historical examples. 
As this research is centred upon the Chernobyl disaster the above account is tasked with 
engendering a form of impartiality, one which takes seriously the United States’ acts of 
radioterrorism upon its own citizens, and thereby avoids ( or even reverses) the normal 
geopolitical representations of the disaster by ‘the West’. Without this discussion about the 
atmospheric testing of nuclear bombs, the conceptual construct, arguably, would be 
asymmetrical as the release of radioactive material from these tests is of a comparable nature to 
that of Chernobyl. Now, this account is not seeking to cast the United States as intentional 
radioterrorists, and a more fitting title might be pragmatic radioterrorists; in that they had (in 
their opinion at the time) to test these weapons, and the Nevada facility represented the best 
option. On the other hand, the Soviet Union seemingly took every precaution to situate their 
testing grounds as far from major population centres as possible, and therefore within the 
weapons testing context, their classification as ‘radioterrorists’ is a stretch. However, within the 
context of the Chernobyl accident, an event outside of their control and desires, but with huge 
radiological consequences, the Soviet Union did in fact become radioterrorists, but not by 
choice. Thus, intentionality is of key importance, in that a country could inadvertently become a 
‘terrorist’ of radioactivity without actively intending to do so - an unintentional radioterrorist. 
In order to ‘achieve’ this unwelcome status, the Soviet Union was not alone, they had a willing 
accomplice, one that cannot be controlled, bargained with or accurately predicted. This invisible 
 178
transporter played a pivotal role within RBMK no4’s impact upon the countries of Europe, yet it 
is rarely spoken about. We are now talking directly about the atmosphere, and its weather 
patterns of the weeks following April 26th 1986.  
5.6 Rendering visible the atmosphere and the reassembling of the geography of the Chernobyl 
accident   
5.6.1 Stage one: stationary appropriation.  
Figure 5.5: Visual delineation of the atmospheric layers of construction (Source: UNSCEAR, 
1962, 238) 
Figure 5.5 is taken from the report of the UN’s Scientific Committee on the effects of atomic 
radiation. Produced in 1962, it was an international effort to understand the emerging dangers 
which ionising radiation, produced by atmospheric weapons tests, posed to the general 
populace. It is a visual representation of the earth’s atmosphere and the various layers which 
comprise it. Barry and Chorley (2009, 13) state that air “is a mechanical mixture of gases, not a 
chemical compound,” and note that its varying compositions have different densities. This results 
in their vertical ‘stacking’, which in turn forms the different ‘spheres’ of the atmosphere. The 
presence of water substances is of great importance to the continuous ‘movements’ within its 
structure, and also to the study of radioactive fallout, especially with regards to the Chernobyl 
disaster. Saha (2008) states that water substances exist in three phases, vapour, liquid and 
solid, and climatic changes in heat prompt the change in structure of water. This results in a 
vertical movement between the different spheres: the lower the density of the water substance, 
the higher it resides. When water is in liquid form, it transgresses into the low levels of the 
atmosphere where it can bond with “quantities of dust, smoke and toxic gases.” (Saha, 2008, 
10). If these two situations align, the risks associated with these hazardous material entities 
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being transported downwardly to terra firma by a mixture of gravity and liquid water are 
greatly increased. 
It should be noted at this stage that the attention being paid to the bonding of radioactive fallout 
with liquid water in the troposphere is firstly down to the uniqueness of the Chernobyl disaster, 
and secondly, due to its subsequent difference from nuclear weapons tests. ‘Wet deposition’ of 
RBMK no4’s toxic innards - that is, the scattering of this material across the landscapes of 
Europe by means of rainwater - has been the primary concern of the scientific community. Kinser 
(2001,4) adds that, “Case studies of wet deposition are difficult and rare… [and] nuclear 
weapons tests are performed on clear days, avoiding dangerous radioactive hot spots 
associated with precipitation”. Therefore, the ability to render visible the material processes 
which resulted in the absorption of radioactive elements within this moist ‘wet’ layer of the 
atmosphere are crucial.    
A simple assumption would be that, when in liquid form, the subatomic particles (alpha and 
beta particles) are simply trapped within this form and subsequently bonded. A description of 
this kind is simply not enough to satisfy analytically the scientific community; rather, for instances 
both celestial and terrestrial, Kirchhoff’s Law is used to account for this material absorption. This 
law is predicated upon the fact that certain media absorb radiation of a particular wavelength, 
but, at the same time, emit radiation of the same wavelength. This binary is dependent on the 
residual energy contained within the ionising radioactive element (Liou, 2002). Furthermore, the 
rate of emission of radiation is contingent on both temperature and wavelength; this rate is 
intrinsically connected to how the absorbing element reacts under conditions of thermodynamic 
equilibrium within the atmosphere (Oliveira 2013). This equilibrium is not universal within the 
atmosphere, and only appears at certain heights and gaseous compositions; thus, “in a localised 
volume below about 60—70 km, to a good approximation, it may be considered to be isotropic 
with a uniform temperature” (Oliveira 2013 14) and said balance/radiation absorption is 
achieved. Looking back at figure 5.5, the ‘local’ area of the atmosphere being referenced here 
includes the stratosphere, tropopause, and troposphere. 
For the purpose of this account of how the atmosphere appropriated and transported RBMK 
no4’s radioactive legacy across the landscapes of Europe, these three layers are all significant, 
the troposphere being the most so. It is crucial to note at this stage that different media are 
‘transparent’ to specific types of radiation and this material characteristic allows them to be 
selective of the frequencies with which they interact, such that they will thus not absorb or emit if 
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their ontological structure is not attuned to a certain wavelength.  However, rather unfortunately, 
water vapour “is almost transparent to short-wave solar radiation but absorbs heavily in long-
wave radiation” (Saha, 2008, 82), the latter being the frequency variant of gamma-rays and 
certain types of beta decay, both of which were released from RBMK no4 in abundance. In 
other words, Kirchhoff’s Law facilitates the explanation and subsequent calculation of the 
amount of radiation absorbed within sections of the atmosphere. It is dependent on a uniform 
temperature, which in turn allows for the identification of specific heights/spheres within the 
atmosphere where this binding can take place. Finally, certain elements interact with particular 
formations of radiation, and, for the disposition of radioactive fallout, liquid water’s penchant 
for long wave radiation, the type most common within the fission process, results in the vertical 
transportation to the ground level of ‘terror from the air’.  
5.6.2 Stage two: horizontal transportation 
At this juncture, the material process of how radiation is bonded with elements within the 
atmosphere is known; however, thus far, this description is somewhat of a ‘stationary’ account. 
As the ‘horizontal’ transportation of radioactive debris from RBMK no4 is of primary concern, 
that is, the atmospheric processes/movements which connected the site of the Nuclear Power 
Plant in the Ukraine to the distance landscapes of Europe, thoughts must now turn towards 
turbulent and ever-changing dynamics of the different spheres of the layer of gas which encase 
the earth. Such a quasi-scientific account uncovers the physical processes which produced the 
most impactful aspects of the nuclear non-human’s geography. Akin to the act of showing the 
articulations of the fractional stages of a calculus equation, prior to the provision of the final 
numerical output, this process reassembles the geography of RBMK no4’s radioactive spread 
from the reactor from a meteorological perspective.   
	  
As previously mentioned, the troposphere was of key importance, primarily due to the format of 
the first stage vertical transportation in the ten days which followed the accident. This release 
was in the form of a ‘traditional’ fire, in the sense of an element combusting at ground level, one 
which conducted itself in a similar fashion to others of this nature. The smoke from such a blaze 
reaches a ceiling, with regards to the height it can travel into the atmosphere, a major departure 
from the disposition of fallout from atmospheric weapons tests. One may believe that the more 
powerful a bomb, the greater the absorption  of radiation within the atmosphere, and to an 
extent this is the case. However, once a weapon reaches a certain megatonnage/yield, its 
verticality results in the breaching of the uppermost limit of the atmosphere and a notable 
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percentage of its energy and radioactive fallout is simply cast off into space. The UNSCEAR 
report (1962) states that ‘partitioning’ of radioactive debris between the local, troposphere and 
stratosphere occurs during atmospheric weapons tests, and this process is governed by three 
factors: “[the] weapon yield, height of burst, and the meteorological conditions” (1962, 238). 
Thus, as most atmospheric weapons were tested at a position of verticality -  that is, the majority 
of their radioactive material was transported ‘upwards’ - therefore, this debris comfortably 
reached the stratosphere. The report predominately focuses on the stratosphere, the primary 
and long term place of residence for radioactive debris from weapons tests, but there is a 
notable section detailing the movement between it and the troposphere -  the section of the 
atmosphere where such debris can be appropriated by liquid water or reaching a height where 
gravitational forces may pull it to ground level.  
Figure 5.6: graphic representation of global movement of atmosphere (source: Mohanakumar, 
2008) 
Due to the combustable nature of the Chernobyl release, transgression into and, by proxy 
residence, in the stratosphere was not achieved. Figure 5.6 depicts the transportation and 
movement processes in the atmosphere from the tropics to the poles, and the process of 
combustion release is represented by the factory and its smoke chimney on the x axis. One can 
identify that the uppermost limit of its reach is the top of the troposphere and its mass is filtered 
into this first sphere and moved either in a northerly or southerly direction, depending on which 
hemisphere the phenomenon inhabits. Chernobyl’s coordinates are 51°23’22.1N 30°05’58.7E, 
and so the left side of the diagram is of relevance here, and its innate atmospheric directions 
and systems highlight that air is moved towards the poles. The tropospheric, that is, the climate 
of the tropics at the equator, is the driving force of the atmosphere, the area of the globe which 
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pumps warm air through the troposphere and into the stratosphere. If the Chernobyl NPP was 
geographically situated closer to the Equator, its vertical reach would have been magnified 
significantly, and the catastrophic potential for its radioactive fallout to reach the jetstream, ‘the 
motorway of the sky’, could have been realised.  
	  
This northwardly moving circulation system is the ‘meta’ physical force which governed the 
patterns displayed by the surface deposition of radioactive fallout from Chernobyl. As one 
travels down through the atmosphere towards surface level, the direction of the wind is not as 
completely regulated, albeit it is still governed by the higher tropospheric system, and the 
importance of high and low pressure, and warm and cool air masses, increases. The 
meteorological situation of the ten days following the accident epitomised this ‘dynamic’ nature 
of the lower atmosphere, that of the lowest reaches of the troposphere. Knap’s (1988) analysis 
of the four days following the accident highlighted that a prevailing cold continental pressure 
system was situated to the north east of the Nuclear Power Plant, and also that, crucially, a 
North Atlantic low pressure system was situated off the west coast of Britain. The appearance 
and consequent interaction of these two systems produced a series of precipitating troughs 
across west and central Europe, during all phases of the release from RBMK no4. These two 
contrasting pressure systems were responsible for the far reaching spread of fallout, and the 
divergent microcosmic wind patterns at local levels were the result of the macro interaction 
between the two systems. The filtration of the meta air circulation system dragged these two 
pressure systems into close proximity, and the creation of rain water within the clouds facilitated 
its bonding with the fallout.  
Figure 5.7: Prevailing wind trajectories in the days after the Chernobyl accident (source: 
European Commission, 1998, appendix A) 
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Prior to providing an account of the practices which produced the European Commission’s 
(1998) Atlas, and here facilitated the rendering visible of ionising radiation, one final aspect of 
the meteorological system of the immediate days after the accident has to be represented: that 
of the aforementioned dynamic wind conditions which carried the radioactive plume in several 
directions (figure 5.7). These changes in the wind’s direction were the most influential ‘action’ of 
the atmosphere, the driver which steered the physical transportation device. The most 
comprehensive account of these winds is, unsurprisingly, given in the Atlas. Figure 5.7 is taken 
from the Atlas and it shows the sum total of the trajectories of the plume at various points, up 
until 1st May 1986, with inputs 1-4 taking place on 24th April, 5-8 on the 26th, and 21-24 on  
1st May. The document does not account for the 9-20, but, one can deduce that these wind 
trajectories will have taken place during the four day period between 26th April and 1st May. 
The two dominant patterns are of a northerly and south westerly orientation, towards 
Scandinavia and central Europe respectively. Graziani and Zarimpas (1988) further analyse 
these conditions, stating that up until the end of the major radioactive release from RBMK no4 
on 8th May, a predominantly northerly wind resulted in the transportation and disposition of 
material over regions and countries to the south of the Nuclear Power Plant. This ever changing 
pattern of wind direction produced distinct spatialities, an evolving landscape of exposure and 
fallout hot spots across the entirety of Europe. It was these divergent actions of the atmosphere 
which resulted in the most geographical aspects of the disaster - mappable material 
transgressions produced by geophysical phenomena. Furthermore, when network thinking is 
applied to this spread, the spatial visualisation of the nuclear non-human’s physical reach comes 
into focus. Prior to this meteorological account, the agency of the object had been shown to be 
inwardly orientated, in that, after the explosion, it rapidly drew human actors towards its 
physical form. This influx of people was tasked with primarily stopping the emission of 
radioactive elements from the core of RBMK no4. Thus, when taken together, these two parts of 
the meta account begin to render visible the collective whole of the nuclear non-human’s new 
agency: the frantic attempts to calm its newly tenacious innards and the widespread radiological 
material impacts of its transgressions.  
This section has detailed the ontological atmospheric modes of transport that carried the 
radionuclides from the bowels of RBMK no4 and deposited them across the landscapes of 
western Europe. Thus, a fitting way to conclude this section, prior to moving onto a detailed 
evaluation of the Atlas is with an account of the research conducted upon the material and 
biological impacts of these unstable atoms. This short empirical journey is tasked with attaching 
the scientific processes of section 5.6 with a real world example, one intrinsically connected to 
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RBMK no4. As section 5.4 dealt with the human/radiation nexus, this exploration will detail 
aspects of the ‘natural’ world; that is, the biological impacts of radionuclides, transported by 
means of the atmosphere, upon the wildlife of the Exclusion Zone.  
In 2006, the IAEA published The Chernobyl Forum Report, a significant document that 
evaluated, among other things, developments within the Exclusion Zone in the two decades after 
the accident. One of the report’s concluding arguments stated that, within the Exclusion Zone, 
the effects of radiation from RBMK no4 were negligible, relative to the impacts of human 
inhabitation. Mousseau and Møller (2011) took exception to this stance, claiming that the report 
was based on very limited empirical data. They go on to argue that the Exclusion Zone 
represents an ideal site for analysis, as high and low dose areas can be found in close spatial 
proximity, hence within a singular ecosystem. They state that; 
There is really no other place on the planet that provides such potential to address 
fundamentally important questions at a spatial scale that is of relevance for scientists and 
policymakers wishing to understand the effects related to a nuclear disaster. (2011, 39) 
Granted, in order to transgress this 30km space, the radionuclides did not require much 
‘transportation’ from the atmosphere, but its closed borders and static (from human activities) 
woodland areas allow for an evaluation of how these invisible, ‘unnatural’ and unstable 
invaders impacted the natural environment. In other words, the Exclusion Zone could be seen as 
a petri dish: a site with sections of unchecked radioactive contamination, an ever present 
migration of animals and a vibrant biosphere, a metaphorical melting pot of noteworthy 
biological processes caused by the agency of ionising radiation. Thus, akin to how the data from 
the survivors of Nagasaki and Hiroshima has been used as a scientific ‘benchmark’ to study the 
impacts of ionising radiation on humans (this shall be covered in chapter 6), the empirical data 
from the Zone has been used to gain an understanding of how the radioactive dispersion could 
impact the other forms of organic life.  
The Chernobyl Forum Report (2006, 137) states that “the populations of many plants and 
animals have expanded, and the present environmental conditions have had a positive impact 
on the biota in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone”. This statement, when taken at face value, does 
seem valid, due to the reclamation of the space by natural processes. In Chapter 1, the 
ethnographic account of the researcher’s most recent trip to the Zone represented Pripyat as a 
forrest, rather than a city, due to the surprising growth of the space’s trees/plants. However, this 
chapter is interested in the scientific; the difficult, complex and dangerous invisible realm of 
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ionising radiation, the molecular (McCormack 2007) so to speak. Simplistic accounts of the 
increase in biota does not render visible the molecular/genetic impacts of the radioactive 
dispersal. Thus, to satisfy the analytical appetite of this chapter, deeper we must travel.  
A sizeable body of work has been conducted upon the vegetation within the Exclusion Zone. 
Kovalchuk et al (2004, 357) plainly state that “constant exposure to mutagens, such as UV and 
ionising radiation, chemicals, heat, drought, and cold, forces plants to either adapt or die”; and 
within the Zone, multiple examples highlight the evolutionary prowess of biotic life. Kovalchuk et 
al’s research assessed the rates of mutations within Arabidopsis plants, and found that, as time 
passed, plants that grew within high dose concentration areas had developed resistance 
mechanisms to deal with their new unstable neighbour. These plants thrived in areas with dose 
rates several times the magnitude that killed identical examples within the team’s control group. 
Their conclusion highlights the ability of this type of plant to regulate their genome in the face of 
the energy from the ionising radiation - in other words, their genetic structure fortified itself over 
the generations to combat against mutations. Thus, in this instance, the biotic is shown to be 
resilient in the presence of high-dose rates, a conclusion shared by several other studies 
(Abramov et al 1992, Kovalchuk et al 2003, Yoschenko et al 2011). 
The genetic resilience of plant-life is not directly transferable to red-blooded creatures. Mammals 
are the most radiosensitive group compared with other terrestrial animals (Geras' kin et al 
2008). This is due to the processes covered in section 5.3, notably the blood circuitry acting as 
a bodily vehicle for the transportation of radiation. Hinton et al (2007) calculated that the 
number of rodents inhabiting the area around the nuclear non-human fell drastically in the years 
following the accident; and, even with the innate high breeding patterns of the species, this fall 
in numbers would result in the unlikely probability of long term manifestations of mutations.  
Mobility, it seems, is a crucial prerequisite of a species being able to combat an influx of ionising 
radiation. In essence, if a creature can remove itself from the site with ease, then the likelihood 
of survival increases. This is the case with the birds of the Exclusion Zone, but, even with 
increased mobility, several species still exhibit radiation damage. Camplani et al’s (1999) 
analysis of the Zone’s barn swallow population found lower levels of leukocytes and 
munoglobulins within subjects that reside within the space. These findings are in line with the 
account of section 5.3, and the impacts of radiation on the human body.  
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The concept of ‘mutations’ evokes certain, sensationalist, images, whereas the scientific meaning 
of the term refers to genetic deviations from an entity’s norm - microscopic changes that could 
lead to cancers and other conditions. The research conducted upon the red-blooded creatures of 
the Exclusion Zone highlights the similarities between the effects of radiation upon them and 
upon humans. Generally speaking, a decrease in white blood cells is an ever-present byproduct 
of ionising radiation. The purpose of detailing these non-human impacts of ionising radiation is a 
means of connecting the atmospheric transportation of RBMK no4’s radioactive innards to 
another domain of reality or another ‘world’. It creates an alternative window on the 
ontological impacts of the radioactive cloud prior to exploring empirically the internationally 
constructed tome tasked with mapping its physical deposition. 
5.7 Radioactive agency and scientific actions: the final ability to render visible the invisible 
Figure 5.8: European deposition patterns of C-137 (source: European Commission, 1998, plate 
1) 
Figure 5.8 delineates the sum total of the monitoring works conducted by European scientists 
after the disaster - the actions tasked with identifying, categorising and mapping the spread of 
caesium137. As the red areas represent the most irradiated sites, one can partially reassemble 
the wind patterns discussed in the previous section. The northwesterly arcing winds of 26th April 
resulted in deposition over Scandinavia and the United Kingdom, and the predominantly 
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southwesterly winds during the remainder of the release period account for the higher and more 
concentrated levels of fallout over eastern and central Europe. Sanderson et al (1997) state that 
twenty-five percent of the total amount of material released occurred during the first day after 
the accident, a much larger mass than on any of the subsequent days.  
This factor explains the semi high deposits of caesium-137 to the north of the NPP, particularly in 
Finland, Sweden and Norway. When figures 5.7 and 5.8 are taken in conjunction, they provide 
an excellent insight into the actions of the atmosphere and the emergent material situation that 
its winds engendered: a melee of wind and radioactivity, one which, when visualised in the form 
of a map, renders visible the physical trajectories of the wind and its radioactive passenger. 
These maps allow for a geographic/geophysical reading of the event, one which reassembles 
the activities and accounts for their coating of the landscape. In other words, they form a 
cartographic discourse. 
As previously mentioned, caesium137 was chosen as the element of identification due to the 
longevity of its half-life, its beta and gamma decay modes, and the simple fact that it is a 
product of nuclear fission, one which does not occur naturally. Furthermore, aerodynamics and 
size came into play, in that, for a particle to be suspended and carried on the wind for days on 
end, it must be sufficiently tiny, and of modest weight, otherwise the gravitational pull of the 
earth would have torn it from its lofty mode of transportation. Kinser states that: 
The Chernobyl fire generated massive quantities of submicron particles carrying Cs-137. 
Small particles, 1um in aerodynamic diameter and smaller, have a fall speed of less than 
about 1.0mm/s… [these] particles from the Chernobyl accident containing Cs-137 are 
mainly confined to the small category because of how they were formed in the fire and 
smoke. (2001, 5-6) 
In the case of countries situated over 500 miles away from the site of the explosion, and who 
subsequently experienced fallout from RBMK no4, the only type of element ontologically 
equipped to reach them was Caesium-137. This was most definitely the case for the United 
Kingdom. The section below represents a tracing of an influential human actor who contributed 
heavily to the Atlas, and who, more importantly, was prompted to create a new practice of 
radiation monitoring. In other words, this actor’s actions represent another emergent series 
prompted by the agency of the nuclear non-human - actions which resulted in the now 
widespread deployment of his system. Professor David Sanderson is the actor, and his practice 
is known as Airborne Gamma Ray Spectrometry (AGRS). 
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It should be noted that several measuring techniques were deployed to create the data within 
the Atlas, and all seemingly depended on the expertise of the scientists of each participating 
country. For example, the primary mode of detection in Norway was ground-based, featuring 
the collection of precipitation at designated sites (Backe et al 1986), whereas scientists in 
Germany chose to sample susceptibly absorbent biological organisms under the trajectories of 
the radioactive plume (Spettel & Palme 1987). This disparity within the research techniques 
resulted in a mishmash of sampling maps, and a heterogenous blend of data sets; this 
culminated in an overall deposition map of Europe being difficult to calibrate, due to the varying 
statistical inputs and the non-universal means through which caesium was accounted for, a factor 
not officially recognised within the Atlas. 
The purpose of focusing on AGRS is firstly its deployment within the United Kingdom (one of the 
countries furthest away from the site), secondly its relationship with the agency of the nuclear 
non-human, and finally the logistical accessibility of the actor responsible for its creation and 
utilisation. Furthermore, the practice of Gamma Ray Spectrometry (GRS) in general represents 
the final piece of the puzzle, the crucial method which facilitates the scientific rendering visible 
of invisible ionising radiation within the Chernobyl context. Tyler states that the GRS is 
fundamentally based on the principle that the detection of gamma photon energy points to the 
presence of radionuclides within a landscape, and that “the detection of gamma rays is critically 
dependent upon the gamma ray photon undergoing an interaction that transfers all or part of 
the photon energy to an electron in the absorbing material.” (1994, 41). Thus, the object of a 
gamma ray spectrometer - that is, the ontological device needed to perform the practice - must 
include this type of material in order to account for the presence of this form of radiation.  
Tyler goes on to state that spectrometers of this nature have two detectors, one inorganic 
scintillator, and one solid state semiconductor - and the larger the size of these two detectors, 
the greater the accuracy of the spectrometer. These objects are, by design, reactive in nature, in 
that they are constructed with two materials within them that actively absorb the photon energy 
within the gamma rays. In other words, the material byproducts, or the physical ‘translations’, of 
this interaction are the first means of accounting for the presence of these dangerous rays. Due 
to the rarity of naturally produced gamma rays, this mutation within the detectors discloses the 
presence of radiation - in the case of Chernobyl caesium-137 could therefore be readily 
identified within any given landscape due to its beta and gamma decay modes; a deductive and 
very clever system, metaphorically akin to the work of a detective, tracing backwards to their 
target using the evidence available. 
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The above account of these objects, and the practices associated with their usage, has so far 
been devoid of any notions of mobility, or the issues therein. If, hypothetically, one possesses 
situated knowledge which points to the presence of an invisible radioactive source within a 
distinct spatial location, a gamma ray spectrometer can be placed within the space and it will 
diligently amass any evidence available to it. However, without prior knowledge/evidence of 
this nature, spatially informed actions cannot be conducted, in that, they have no ‘directing’ 
script from which to read. This was most definitely the case in the post Chernobyl epoch. The 
total area associated with the deposition of fallout from RBMK no4 was simply not known, and 
the specific locations of the wet deposition were of even greater uncertainty. Therefore, the need 
for a rapid means of rendering visible these radioactive hotspots was required, one which could 
produce results more quickly than practices being conducted on the ground level. In other 
words, the script had to be written in an extremely short period of time.  Attaching the object of 
a gamma ray spectrometer to a vehicle, or simply walking around with one in the hand, are the 
only two feasible means of conducting this type of research on the ground, both of which are 
time consuming and place the actor in charge of the object in close physical proximity to the 
radioactive element emitting the gamma rays. Furthermore, as previously stated, the necessity 
for large mass detectors is required for the spectrometer to reach ‘high sensitivity’ levels, 
resulting in a heavy and cumbersome object which is not conducive to easy mobility. Set within 
the context of nuclear accidents, where time is very much of the essence (as the necessity of 
stopping radioactive elements entering the food chain is paramount) a means through which 
large areas can be mapped in a short period of time was needed.  
The issue of mobility, the limited timescale and, of course, the presence of caesium-137 from 
Chernobyl prompted Sanderson to ‘pilot’ a new technique for the deployment of gamma ray 
spectrometers. AGRS has now emerged as a premier means of accounting for the presence of 
radioactivity over large areas in the response to nuclear emergencies (Scott et al 2000). In 
essence, a suitably large spectrometer, typically containing sixteen litres, or more, of inorganic 
scintillator, and at least one semiconductor detector (Cresswell et al 2005), is attached to a 
plane which can comfortably fly at around 100m in altitude. This aircraft is then flown in straight 
lines over an area where it is believed that radioactive nuclides are present, and the readings 
gained can ‘prove’ their presence. Sanderson et al (2004) state that this approach to 
environmental radioactive mapping has several key advantages, namely that: 
 190
High sensitivity y-ray detectors, typically large volume NaI(T1) scintillators optionally 
combined with Ge semiconductors, installed in the aircraft are capable of taking 
environmental radioactivity measurements every few seconds, thus providing a sample 
rate some 10 2- 10 3 times greater than other approaches. The radiation detector 
averages signals over fields of view of several hundred dimensions, resulting in area 
sampling rates some 10 6 - 10 7 times greater than ground base methods (2004, 214)  
Furthermore, the recording of the height/ground clearance of the flights and the data from the 
gamma ray spectra are used to quantify the sources of the emission, consequently narrowing 
down the accurate geographical location of them (Sanderson et al 1994). In other, less scientific 
words, this mixture of RBMK no4’s agency, and geophysical/physics logistical techniques 
produced an adaptation of an existing system of measurement: one which produced a 
‘discourse’ that could be mapped, and, by proxy, prompted the agency to direct a series of 
actions which would impact upon these spatial locations, as-well-as the lives of the people 
connected the sites. Prior to the Chernobyl disaster, the world had never encountered a situation 
where this type of practice was essential on such a large scale. 
The translations of the data accumulated by these AGRS flights produced distinct spatialities, and 
contributed towards the meta cartographic process of mapping the disposition of caesium-137 
on the European scale, as highlighted in the plate at the outset of this section. Figure 5.9 is of 
the region of the United Kingdom which experienced the highest levels of caesium-137 
disposition, and thus the most dangerous radioactive hotspots. The area delineated is the west 
coast of England, between Carlisle in the north and Preston in the southernmost tip of the map.  
The two most affected areas are highlighted with orange markings. Due to its distance from the 
site of the NPP in Ukraine, the United Kingdom only received a tiny amount of the total mass of 
radioactive release, some 0.83% (European Commission, 1998, 24), the highest concentration 
of which was situated in the northern region of this map. The larger highlighted area to the 
south is unique in its origin, in that the radioactivity was not transported to the United Kingdom 
by means of the atmosphere from the nuclear non-human at the centre of this research project. 
Sellafield is one of the world’s premier nuclear waste reprocessing facilities, and within the plant 
are the Windscale Piles, a reactor once tasked with creating weapons grade nuclear fuel. In 
1957 a fire broke out in the facility and released radioactive substances into the surrounding  
area. It was ranked category 5 in severity on the International Nuclear Event Scale (Chernobyl 
was a category 7).  
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Figure 5.9 Map of caesium-137 deposition over the north west of England. (European 
Commission, 1998, plate 34) 
The Sellafield incident was the United Kingdom’s first act of ‘unintentional radioterrorism’ on its 
home soil: the accidental, yet environmentally damaging, release of ionising radiation into the 
atmosphere surrounding the facility. At the time, akin to the above mentioned tactics utilised by 
the United States during their Nevada bomb tests, the severity of the accident/release was 
politically mitigated. Therefore, a publicly available map of the disposition was never released. 
Sanderson claims that when he started his AGRS of the United Kingdom, looking for 
caesium-137 from Chernobyl, his actions were greeted by pressure from the United Kingdom 
government as they were not keen for a map of this nature to be produced and universally 
disseminated. He also stated that, during some of his first flights, he had discovered radio 
caesium in a condition which highlighted that it had been decaying for several years, which, 
rather obviously, ruled out its material connection to the newly destroyed NPP in the Ukraine.   
One can readily see why the British Government were not keen to see this actor (Sanderson) 
conducting his measuring practices, outwith their control, as one of the two major radioactive 
hotspots in the United Kingdom was bound up in older government energy policies (and military 
interests). This is an important facet of the Atlas, one which only becomes visible when the scale 
of the regional level is analysed. Relative to the meta-map of Europe (figure 5.8), the size of the 
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UK hotspot in question is dwarfed by the huge areas of dark orange, produced by RBMK no4. 
However, the significance of this site to the United Kingdom is paramount, in both its origin and 
the actors responsible for its creation. It is unclear whether or not the authors of the Atlas were 
aware of the political complications surrounding the site, and only during the description of the 
Chernobyl disaster is the Windscale accident referenced (for means of a contrast to highlight the 
severity of Chernobyl). Therefore, whether intentional or accidental, the inclusion of data 
pinpointing this nuclear accident in the United Kingdom has resulted in a mediation, one which 
subsumes the ontological impacts of it into the meta ‘Chernobyl discourse’. Without the 
information attained from Professor Sanderson, one would not be able to affix the correct 
source of this radioactive hotspot within the English landscape, even though it is geographically 
represented within the Atlas. Thus, in this instance, the ethos of ‘following the actors’ has 
resulted in the ability to render visible information that would have been out of reach of the 
analysis; here, oddly, Chernobyl has still travelled, but not through its own radioactive fallout — 
rather through what measuring that fallout has inadvertently also measured.   
This example of the process of scientific data translation into a cartographic language, and 
subsequent mediation through subsuming of it into a wider, more focused discourse, has 
interesting connections to the philosophical works of Sloterdjik. The collective whole, that is, all 
of the works conducted across the entirety of Europe and Russia, reassemble the material 
spread of the former Soviet Union’s most damaging act of radioterrorism. The outcome is an 
internationally constructed tome of translations of statistical measurements into cartographic 
images which reassembles, arguably, the most fundamental geography of the accident. The 
ontological reach of RBMK no4, facilitated by its atmospheric vehicle of transport, was so 
inescapably massive that no political control could be imposed upon it, particularly (but not 
exclusively) from the Soviet perspective.  
Granted, in the immediacy of the days which followed the explosion, the Soviet government did 
attempt to layer the quasi-standardised veil of political subterfuge over their atmoterrorist 
actions, and to keep invisible the carpet of unstable atoms that they inadvertently spread across 
the landscape of Europe. However, the abilities of the medical and geophysical experts to 
render visible these tiny invaders cast these evasive actions into the realm of futility. It could be 
argued that this continental movement, and its series of scientific actions, in effect produced the 
evidence which forced the Soviet Union fully to embrace its policy of Glasnost; that is, a new 
focus on ‘openness’. The aforementioned British example is not as black and white, but it does 
further illustrate the additional characteristic of atomic political subterfuge. The material 
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evidence of its actions is statistically and visually represented within the Atlas, yet the meaning 
behind its presence is omitted. As mentioned above, at the time of the Windscale accident, the 
Government of the United Kingdom obscured its very real environmental impact, or, to put it 
another way, their pollution of the atmosphere/environment by means of atomic processes. 
Although the Atlas explicitly accounts for the existence of this radioactive hotspot, it does not 
delineate its true source, and simply subsumed it into ‘the deposition of radio caesium from the 
Chernobyl disaster’: for the government of the United Kingdom, a serendipitous mediation of 
meaning, and one which places a further epistemological layer of subterfuge on their iteration 
of the 1950’s. 
The Atlas is an impressive body of work, and facilitates the ready identification of the 
geographical spread of RBMK no4’s radioactive fallout. It is the end product of a large number 
of actors’ actions, all engendered by the agency of the nuclear non-human. It extrapolates, 
condenses and subsumes various research methods, techniques and their subsequent findings 
into a meta-discourse and creates a version of reality guided by the (assumed) objectivity of 
science. It is the product of a network, the final discourse of a constellation of actors all acting 
with the shared goal of rendering visible the invisible. It is a totalising account of the material 
spread of radioactive fallout, a viewpoint into a realm that human beings are not biologically 
equipped to explore in person. The multiplicity of the sites measured and scrutinised contributes 
towards this dominant view, the all-seeing depiction of the catastrophic wrong-doings of a once 
mortal enemy of ‘the free world’. It zooms in on specific locales, telling the story of how this 
distant nuclear non-human cast its toxic legacy on their flatlands, and immediately zooms back 
out to the continental scale, colouring its topographical landscape in bright orange warnings of 
unstable atoms. This description appears somewhat facetious, but that is not the intention.  
The very real material actions taken as a result of the findings which make up the Atlas stopped 
unstable atoms entering the food chains of most of the countries who took part. For example, in 
Norway, meat raised in affected areas underwent stringent radiological measurements 
procedures (Brynildsen et al 1996); a similar tactic was deployed in England and Wales (Nisbet 
and Woodman 2000); and, in Italy, bans were placed on milk with elevated caesium levels 
(Venuti el al 1991). Regardless, the viewpoint portrayed is not one devoid of subjectivity, nor, as 
has been highlighted above, splashes of political subterfuge. Furthermore, France’s participation 
is almost completely non-existent, and any account of the disposition within its landscape 
highlights minimal exposure. One may suggest that it was simply too far away from the site of 
the NPP to experience any fallout, and at first glance, devoid of any sustained critical thought, 
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one may be fooled by such a suggestion. Akin to the experiences of Sanderson with the British 
Government, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the French Government restricted 
research of this nature, especially that using AGRS, due to their total dependence on nuclear 
energy. As a world leader in the technology, France would have a lot to lose if her reputation 
was damaged by the rendering visible of its radioactive hotspots, if the origin of them was not 
that of RBMK no4.  
  
What is shown within the Atlas has been, and will continue to be, crucial in the mitigation of the 
extended geography of the Chernobyl disaster. What is obscured may not be as important, but 
the simple fact that it is not a 1:1 representation of the environmental reality created by the 
RBMK no4, in that it points attention to a specific viewpoint at the expense of others, resulting in 
the conclusion that it can be classed as a Latourian panorama: a powerful contraption which 
takes on the challenge of solving the question of staging/representing the totality of a reality by 
subsuming the micro, meso and macro into one another. In the words of Latour:  
they collect, they frame, they rank, they order, they organise; they are the source of 
what is meant by a well-ordered zoom. So, no matter how much they trick us, they 
prepare us for the political task ahead. Through their many clever special effects, they 
offer a preview of the collective with which they should not be confused. As we now 
begin to realise, there is always a danger to take the building of those panoramas for 
the much harder political task of progressively composing the common world.  (Latour, 
2005, 188).   
This concept is applicable to a raft of different entities, and its application here is not without 
one last disclaimer. The ‘special effects’ at work are the above mentioned spatial implications of 
the Atlas’s findings, the very real and very important actions tasked with safeguarding the 
general populace from the fallout. However, this necessity of the emergent reality should not be 
taken as the totality of it. As has been shown, there are always political and economic 
mechanisms turning the gears of perception behind every articulated viewpoint. 
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Chapter 6 
Risky networks: RMBK no4’s role within the scientific controversy over the 
Linear No-Threshold model of radiological protection 
——————————————————————— 
An important, but relatively unknown avenue of Chernobyl’s network remains. This trajectory of 
the NPP has endured the passing of time and features nodes of sustained scientific action which 
sought to construct a new conceptualisation of risk for the impacts of radiation. This chapter will 
account for the scientific battleground regarding the use of the Linear No-Threshold (LNT) model 
of radiation protection. Conceptually, this phenomenon draws interesting connections with 
Beck’s Risk Society (1992), his notion of re-modernisation, and Latour’s (2003) writings. In 
essence, it represents an empirical point of contact between the concept of Beck, and the 
methodology of Latour. For Latour, “A perfect translation of ‘risk’ is the word network in the 
ANT sense” (2003, 36); the iteration of a ‘finalised’ risk is the result of a heterogenous, and 
unexpected maze of connections and relations between human and non-human actors. Thus, 
akin to a network, a risk features a double movement, a two stage process that incorporates its 
construction and function. Latour (2013) provides the example of the railroad network to 
illuminate this conceptual stance, in that the finalised function of the rail network, that is, the 
transportation of humans (and things) along tracks of metal by non-human vehicles, does not 
account for the network of construction. The constellation of actors, institutions and machinery 
required to plan, design, apply and actively construct the final ontological rail network (Latour, 
2013). It should be noted that this distinction does require certain levels analytical accuracy, or, 
at least, a delineation of what network is under analysis. Construction or purpose, as the actions 
of each movement are different. In this instance, two stages of construction shall be accounted 
for: the construction of LNT’s ‘risky network’, and the creation of its leading competitor.  
As mentioned in a previous chapter, this conceptual means of viewing ‘a risk’ provides a 
purposeful methodology, one that is lacking within Beck’s overarching project. Thus, the 
highlighted connection between Latour’s network and Beck’s notion of a risk prepares the 
ground for the deployment of the ANT toolset. Latour goes one stage further and seeks to utilise 
this connection to identify material instances which ‘prove’ the emergence of what Beck 
describes as ‘reflexive modernity’, (or re-modernisation for Latour (2003)). For Latour, the 
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benefits of this ‘recalibration’ of modernity, ignoring the more fundamental differences he has 
with the meta modernist project, reside in this instance on moving attention away from ‘the 
mainstream’, and directing it upon the “discrepancies, cracks, failures and side effects” (Latour, 
2003, 46) that are barely visible to the lay public. In so doing, re-modernisation seeks to 
produce an account of a world that has outgrown the framework of progress.  
This is a powerful articulation of Beck’s project, and it speaks to his instance that the material 
outcomes of manufactured risks have outpaced the established systems of protection and 
insurance (1992). We reside in an era characterised by invasive techno-social developments, or, 
in other words, the Risk Society. An epoch where complexities increase, and agreement on 
definitions, regulations and even the ontologies of objects become entangled throughout a host 
of different domains. This seepage has been a hallmark of this entire project, as this account has 
shed analytical light upon Chernobyl’s travels, or more accurately, RBMK no4’s transgressions, 
across, within and through a number of different domains of reality. This chapter marks its 
movement through the classical Latourian dilemma associated with the mutation from matter of 
facts, into state of affairs (1992, 2003, 2013 etc). The subversive philosophical aim of this task is 
to fill the role of a never-been-modern social scientist, relinquishing the mission to instil a master 
narrative, to instead provide alternative viewpoints engendered by means of empirical analysis. 
In other words, provide synthesis of a situation that resides within the blindspot “of common 
ignorance so typical of the pubic sphere” (Latour, 2013, 45).  
Taking this into account, what follows is a brief history of the LNT theory — its core premise, and 
an account of its hegemonic network (prior to the Chernobyl accident) — which will feed into its 
complicated entanglement with the Chernobyl accident. The two sides of the debate surrounding 
its validity will be articulated, their key arguments accounted for, and this will be routinely 
interlaced with an explanation of how the agency from the nuclear non-human provided the 
initial impulse to engender this scientific polemic. As shall be shown, there is no finalised 
outcome to this node of action, no master narrative has emerged to dethrone LNT, and, 
conversely, several works have been published that further legitimise the assumptions of LNT. 
Evidently, this is in direct contrast to the post-Chernobyl movement that has sought to 
problematise LNT’s hegemony status, and it results in a curious back and forth polemic, with 
both sides of the debate forwarding evidence to support their claims and no clear ontological 
‘winner’. As will be shown below, LNT is the gold standard of radiological protection, and its 
position is as close to unmovable as is institutionally possible (Calabrese, 2009, 2013). Thus the 
movement seeking to replace it will always be swimming against the current. This represents an 
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interesting dynamic, and one that adds to the confusion surrounding the relationship between 
damage to biological entities from low level radioactive doses and the role RBMK no4 played 
within this node of action. The agency from the Chernobyl accident produced several new 
worlds of risk, and in every other instance accounted for within this thesis, the general 
conceptualisation of ‘risk’ has increased in severity, heightened the necessary protection 
measures and directed much more attention to their mitigation. These reconfigurations of risk 
have been a direct result of the material realities RBMK no4 unleashed upon the globe. The LNT 
debate is unique as it represents a very rare instance when actors are attempting to decrease 
the risk associated with a byproduct of the accident, namely low dose radiation. Thus, it could 
be argued that, due to the host of interested and powerful stakeholders involved, the account of 
this specific travel of RBMK no4 was destined to be elongated, complex and, ultimately, 
contradictory.  
It should be noted prior to departure that this chapter has been constructed using the principles 
for scientific study laid out in Latour’s Science in Action (1987). The reason for using these 
methods at this stage, rather than continuing with ‘vanilla ANT’, is centred around the domain of 
study. Prior to the Chernobyl accident, it could be argued that LNT enjoyed the status of a ‘black 
box’ with the scientific disciplines working within radiation protection; however, the impact of the 
disaster upon its standing has been disruptive. Since the accident, attempts have been made to 
open the box, and other competing boxes have been built. Thus, an empirical analysis of this 
polemic, prompted by the Chernobyl disaster, facilitates the study of ‘science in action’. The 
systematic attacks and building of defences, around scientific programs. 
6.1 The deliberately conservative radioactive context: an introduction to LNT and Chernobyl’s 
global ranking 
This subsection details LNT’s network of construction, the various component theories, actors and 
events that commingled to establish the approach as the gold standard of radiological 
protection. Since the discovery of radiation the discipline of health physics has sought to 
articulate practical scientific guidelines for radiation protection standards (Sanders 2009). The 
production of epistemological systems to quantify the risk associated with ionising radiation and 
set acceptable levels of exposure for the general public and occupational limits for actors 
working within industries that feature radionuclide exposure (eg the workers of a NPP or an 
operator of an x-ray machine). Ever since Roentgen discovered the X-ray in 1895, and 
Becquerel radioactivity one year later, the guidelines for protection standards have changed 
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repeatedly (Vaiserman 2010). But, at for least four decades after 1972, the underpinnings of 
these standards have been the linear no-threshold dose-response model (Kathren, 1996), or LNT 
for short. In 1956, the US National Academy of Sciences Committee (NASC) on Biological 
Effects of Atomic Radiation Genetics Panel published a comprehensive recommendation 
regarding the risks associated with ionising radiation, and it states that evaluation should adhere 
to a linear dose-response model (Calabrese, 2013).  
	  
This recommendation represented a paradigm shift within the discipline, as prior, a threshold 
based dose-response model was regarded as the gold standard within medicine and physiology 
(Calabrese 2009). In essence, the threshold model stated that under a certain threshold, 100 
mSv, the dose should be classed as acute, and as there was no empirical evidence that could 
prove the appearance of biological damage, regulations were made in accordance. On the 
other hand, the LNT argues that risk scales perfectly with dose rate, and although the risks are 
lower at low doses, such levels still present unacceptable risks. Thus, there is no threshold dose, 
and any radioactive dose is classed as potentially risky/harmful. As an aside, at the time, there 
was no empirical data that emphatically highlighted a causal link between biological damage 
and acute doses of radiation, therefore, LNT was predicated by estimations, rather than 
ontological data (Calabrese, 2013).  
	  
What is important to highlight at this stage is the role of ‘institutions’ within LNT’s risky network 
of construction - governmental bureaucracies tasked with setting the protective limits of 
externalities, with the aim of safeguarding a country’s citizens. Professor Edward Calabrese 
(2005; 2009; 2011; 2013), of the University of Massachusetts (an important actor within the 
LNT and Hormesis network), has spent his entire career exploring the nature of the dose 
response in low dose instances, and has written extensively about the origins of the LNT model. 
Throughout this historical work, the theme of Institutional agency features prominently as he 
routinely cites appendages of the U.S governmental system as being crucial actors within LNT’s 
network of construction. Two years after the aforementioned advice of the NASC in 1956, the 
National Committee for Radiation Protection and Measurement (NCRPM) accepted the findings 
and extended the logic to somatic cells and cancer risk assessment (Calabrese 2011). This 
represents the first major building block within LNT’s radiological prevalence, as soon thereafter 




The power of network thinking frees analysis from individual domains (Latour 2013) and instead 
promotes an exploration of how the phenomena in question progressed through different 
domains. The late 1950s features one of the first instances when LNT began to migrate from its 
scientific origin and seep into politics. The Delaney Amendment, promulgated in 1958, and 
named after Congressman James Delaney of New York, forbade the addition of agents to food 
that was known to cause cancer within animals or humans (Huff, 2007). Prior to this 
amendment, Delaney had met with Dr Wilhelm Hueper, a scientist within the National Cancer 
Institute (Calabrese 2009). Dr Hueper was a leading expert within environmental and industrial 
carcinogens, and the meeting between these two representatives of their respected domains 
provided LNT with the combined political and scientific agency to further its stake for hegemony. 
The use of Dr Hueper’s ideology, philosophy and scientific credentials allowed Delaney to 
legitimise his amendment within the political domain, and subsequently pass it through the 
necessary channels. What is important to highlight at this stage is the differences between the 
Delaney Amendment and the linearity at low-dose methodology - the former was focused upon 
the food industry and the latter radiological protection. The crucial point of philosophical 
contact is the insistence on zero to minimal risk exposure. In other words, the Delaney 
Amendment set the political foundations for this new paradigm of risk assessment within the 
United States.  
	  
After this evental moment, the next significant event within LNT’s risky network of construction is 
found in 1972, arguably the most important year within the entire enterprise. The 
aforementioned BEAR Committee was renamed the Committee on the Biological Effects of 
Ionising Radiation (BEIR), and in 1972 it issued its first report (Gottfried & Penn 1996). This 
report did not attempt to evaluate the shape of the dose-response curve, however it did provide 
estimations of cancer fatalities from low doses, extrapolated from the high dose data of the 
Japanese atomic bomb survivors. The main conclusion of the report states that:  
If our estimates of risk are too high, the only dangers are those which might derive from 
excessive caution, such as regulation which might permit greater hazards from other sources 
to replace the overestimated radiation hazard thus avoided. A more serious error would be 
to underestimate the effect… We remind all who may use our estimates as a basis for policy 
decisions that these estimates are an attempt to take into account only known tangible effects 
of radiation, and that there may well be intangible effects in addition to whose cumulative 
impacts may be appreciable (NAS/NRC, 1972, 58).  
This extract encapsulates the underlying mantra of the LNT model: the overestimation of risk in a 
bid to provide comprehensive safety precautions. It goes as far as casting cost-benefit 
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calculations as a crude means of assessing safety, and states that if a risk can be reduced it must 
be, even if the cost-benefit is minimal. This report also marks the first major instance when LNT 
was used as a means of estimating cancer deaths, rather than simply being used as a model for 
radiological protection standards. Granted the two are mutually reinforcing, however, as we 
shall see, when the approach is used as a means of epistemological projections, scientific 
disagreement occurs. Today, the digital version of this report resides within the IAEA’s website, 
an interesting inclusion that highlights the report’s role within the Agency’s adoptions of an LNT 
framework of radiological protection. 
	  
As mentioned above, 1972 was a significant year for LNT’s network of construction, 
predominantly as it featured two important events. The second features the U.S Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC), the talismanic Institution within radiological protection within the U.S, and 
the forerunner of the current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). A few months after the 
BEIR report, the AEC introduced the concept of ‘as low as practical’, otherwise known as 
ALARA (Krathren, 1996). Fundamental to the implicit logic of this risk mitigating concept was the 
LNT model. In essence, ALARA built upon the logic of the BEIR report, and moved towards a 
stance of ‘better safe than sorry’, when dealing with low-dose radiation. The wider implication 
of the ALARA programme was the belief that any dose, no matter how small, follows a linear 
trajectory and therefore has the potential to cause injury, or mutations, within exposed 
individuals (Gottfried & Penn, 1996). Thus, the deliberatively conservative approach to low-dose 
radiation had been set, and the following twenty years saw its gradual, and totalising, 
international adoption. It should be noted that, in 1972, the world had yet to experience a 
nuclear accident that challenged the concept of ‘as low as practical’, in that, LNT existed within 
a scientific vacuum. Chernobyl represents the first instance when vast amounts of low level 
radiation was dispersed across the general public, and this new phenomenon has led to many 
questioning if setting risk assessment levels ‘as low as practically possible’ is still the best way to 
move forward.  
	  
The U.S National Academy of Science has been unwavering in its support of LNT, and still 
endorses the approach in the twenty-first century. This internationally respected institution 
represents, arguably, the longest, and most steadfast supporter of the approach. Therefore, the 
institutions status within LNT risky network of construction, and purpose cannot be understated. 
The list of major scientific bodies that have followed the National Academy of Science in 
endorsing the LNT is comprehensive, including governmental (and non-governmental) institutions 
with agency within policy creating processes, and the political realm. In the U.S, the National 
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Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP, 2002), the National Radiation 
Commission (US NRC, 2006), and the Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA, 2008) 
continue to use the approach. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC, 2009), the 
institution that directly informs the Canadian government of radiological issues, supports its 
continued use, and the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP, 2006) (based in 
Canada) echoes these recommendations. The European institutions that back LNT are arguably 
even more influential, due to the international scope of their agencies. In this instance, the 
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR, 2000) and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 2007) argue for the validity of the approach. 
Thus, two appendages of the United Nations continue to promote an policy of purposeful 
conservatism (as low as practically possible) when encountering lose-dose radiation. 
	  
The appearance and significance of institutions within this network draws connections to Latour’s 
arguments surrounding the renewal of trust within such bodies (Latour 2013). He argues that the 
time for universal scepticism has passed, and when faced with a phenomenon on a global scale, 
with high levels of innate technological and scientific controversies, the integrity of institutions 
should render their accounts/findings/representations as trustworthy. This tangent of 
Chernobyl’s network provides an opportunity to examine the advice of Institutions through a 
scientific controversy. Contrast their airtight discourses with the conflicting and argumentative 
works of individual scientific actors who stand to challenge the estimations of the approach. The 
Chernobyl accident provided the spark for this controversy around the validity of the LNT — the 
polemic is a node of actions engendered within the new world created by the explosion. Over 
the decades, the LNT has achieved the status of the gold standard of international radiation 
protection guidelines, so much so that some believe the approach is untouchable (Truta et al 
2012). The fact that the accident promoted nodes of action which sought to challenge LNT’s 
black box status is further evidence of its potency, and a valuable instance to account for how it 
has travelled since 1986.          
6.2 The global average exposure, and the difficult entanglements with the LNT    
It is important to make a distinction between high and low doses of radiation, and in the interests 
of clarity, high doses are represented by Sieverts (Sv), and low doses are accounted for in 
microsieverts (mSv) - there are 1000 mSv in 1 Sv. A whole-body dose of more than 5 or 6 Sv is 
typically lethal (Land 1995), and this would be the upper limit of a ‘high’ classification. There 
are not many places on earth where such levels exist, outside of the hearts of nuclear reactors, 
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their irradiated spent fuel, near the epicentre of an atomic explosion, or the Elephant’s Foot that 
resides within the innermost bowels of the ruins of RBMK no4. In other words, dose levels of this 
magnitude are the epitome of Beck’s manufactured nuclear risks, the invisible byproduct of 
advanced technological hybrids, created through the breaking of nature’s strongest bond found 
within the structure of atoms. Now, the LNT debate does not centre round such levels as it is 
accepted that exposure to them would cause irretrievable damage to a human’s biological 
vehicle. On the other hand, low level dose rates, and the consequential relationship to risk, are 
much more ambiguous and therefore open to diverse mediations by the hands of interested 
actors. 
         
Prior to articulating the basic premise of the LNT model, we can take a moment to account for 
the unavoidable radioactive realities that the passengers of earth currently face. Since its 
creation in 1955, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation has 
periodically produced a review of the sources of ionising radiation, and in 2000 it incorporated 
the Chernobyl accident into its calculations. The report (UNSCEAR, 2000) provides a detailed 
summation of the global average exposure, and it breaks this figure down into the component 
parts. It states that natural background sources contribute to 2.4 mSv of the total, inhalation of 
radon 1.2 mSv, terrestrial gamma rays 0.5 mSv, cosmic rays 0.4 mSv, ingestion 0.3 mSv, 
diagnostic medical examinations 0.4 mSv, atmospheric nuclear testing 0.005 mSv, the 
Chernobyl accident 0.002 mSv, and nuclear power production 0.002 mSv. These individual 
sources contribute to a figure of 5.209 mSv per year as a global average dose rate for each 
person. 
         
The vast majority of radiation indeed comes from natural sources from materials within the 
earth’s crust, and this figure has remained relatively constant throughout the totality of Homo 
Sapiens’ evolutionary curve. Furthermore, the four largest producers of ionising radiation are 
natural processes, with only medical examination procedures coming close to achieving similar 
levels. On the other hand, Chernobyl’s contribution to the global average is 200 times smaller 
than medical examinations, and the accident accounts for 0.03840% of the total dose rate. 
Difficult questions surrounding the faithful production of risk resonate throughout this chapter 
(and the thesis in general) and statistics of this nature further complicate proceedings. Chernobyl 
was routinely deployed as Beck’s talisman of nuclear manufactured risks, and in numerous ways 
he was justified, but when one accounts for the disaster’s contribution to the global whole, a 
number that will decrease year on year (while the others remain constant), it does erode the 
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legitimacy of such a representation. In blunt quantitive terms, Chernobyl’s global contribution 
here is minimal.  
         
I feel that, at this juncture, a moment of self reflection is necessary. As this chapter is being 
constructed through the lens of Latour’s Science in Action, the fundamental tenet of this 
approach surrounding the treatment of ‘facts and machines’ cannot be ignored. Latour argues 
that their fate is in the hands of later users and that one should not focus upon the intrinsic 
quality of a statement, but rather direct attention to the “transformations it undergoes later in the 
other hands” (Latour, 1987, 59). This format of analysis is a hallmark of all that follows, 
however, the researcher must never be blind to their own transformation. The above contrasting 
percentages did not appear in the UNSCEAR 2000 report, but were instead calculated by the 
researcher, and thus they are translations of the core ‘statement’. It would be a stretch to class 
them as mediations as they merely translate the information into a different format without 
deformation. However, they do render visible a relationship that was not immediately apparent 
within the document. My purpose here is to engender a pragmatic context, one that seeks 
faithfully to represent the ontological reality, devoid of sensationalist or ‘external’ interests and 
agencies. Regardless, doing so could be perceived as an attempt to represent the Chernobyl 
accident, and its impacts, in a less risky manner. Thus, sustained self reflection is an essential 
component of an ANT scholar during the production of a faithful account of a phenomenon, and 
I will return to this contradiction in the conclusion.  
         
One may have noticed similar numerical values being deployed throughout this chapter with 
huge variations between the outcomes. In a previous paragraph, 4 - 5 sv dose rate was 
attributed to a fatality and 5.2 mSv was found to be the average global rate. Thus, a bit of 
housekeeping is in order. There are 1000 mSv (millisieverts) in 1 sv (sievert), therefore we can 
assert that the global average dose is roughly five thousand times lower than a fatal level. 
        
If we aside the fact that the Chernobyl disaster’s contribution to the global whole is significantly 
less than medical diagnostic examinations, it is instructive to return to the UNSWEAR report 
(2000), and particularly the section dedicated to the dose rates experienced by the liquidators, 
the Pripyat evacuees, and surrounding population. It states that the average dose for the 
liquidators was 100 mSv, 30 mSv for the 116,000 evacuated people from inside the Ukrainian 
exclusion zone, and 10 mSv during the first decade after 26th April, 1986, for the people who 
continued to reside in the contaminated area. This figure is applicable to both the self-settlers 
who chose to return to their homes within the 30km zone, and the workers of the town of 
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Chernobyl. The figure 6.1 is of a self-settler, a group of people who the Soviet Government let 
return to their homes, as long as they were over 50 years old and promised not to have any 
more children. 
Figure 6.1: A ‘self settler’ of the Exclusion Zone (source: researcher’s own photograph 2015) 
There is no reason to doubt these calculations, but, they are averages and thus the final output 
will be impacted by the lowest and highest inputs. For example Kesminiene et al (2008) state 
that some liquidators were subjected to 250 mGy absorption rate (250 mSv) in 1986, and 
between 50 and 100 mGy (50 - 100 mSv) in 1987. This figure is further dwarfed by the levels 
experienced by the Complex Expedition team as its members routinely worked within areas 
featuring 200 - 300 roentgens (1865 - 2798 mSv), or between 1.5 and 3 sv (BBC, 1991). As 
there is no mention of these actors within the UNSWEAR report, the figures regarding the clean-
up actors/liquidators should be treated with a dose of critical thought. That being said, these 
examples are the exception and not the rule, and the vast majority of the liquidators worked 
outside the reactor hall and never experienced anything close to these levels. 
         
Regardless, the purpose of accounting for these figures is to render visible the levels 
experienced during the worst nuclear accident imaginable and its subsequent contribution to the 
global average. I am not trying to claim that they are acceptable, nor welcome. Their inclusion 
merely creates a scientific rational outlook, a pragmatic means of assessing the meta-risks 
associated with the accident and radiation in general. The average dose rate the liquidators 
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experienced was 100 times lower than a fatal dose, and these men and women worked within 
the epicentre of the accident. Furthermore, the average doses experienced within the 
neighbouring countries was under half that of naturally occurring background radiation. 
Everyone agrees that Chernobyl was a horrific accident, but when the dose rates are contrasted 
with natural phenomena, or fatal doses, rather than being viewed in isolation, an argument 
could be made that the international reaction to the appearance of RBMK no4’s unstable atoms 
was an unfaithful epistemological mediation of the ontological reality. 
6.3 Linear no-threshold model: the underlying scientific logic 
LNT assumptions are rooted within the relationship between dose and risk (Cohen, 2005), or, in 
other words, the nexus between the ontological reality of ionising radiation and the 
epistemological negotiations of risk construction. Due to the fact that manufactured radiation is a 
product of the 20th century, the sciences have had little opportunity to access empirical data 
surrounding its long-term impacts on the human body. As mentioned briefly in Chapter 5, the use 
of data from Japanese atomic bomb survivors has generally been considered as the gold 
standard for estimating cancer risk from radiation (Doss, 2013). This view was due to the 
exposure being non-selective (children, adults and both sexes were subjected to it), the 
heterogenous range of doses (from low to high), and, crucially, the continuous performance of 
systematic monitoring of the survivors’ health since the bombs were dropped (Hall & Brenner, 
2008). This unique ‘case study’ has been an essential tool within the production of radiological 
protection systems/protocols, because epidemiological studies, a quantifiable means of 
ontological analysis, are the fundamental component when setting said protection standards 
(Gilbert, 2009). Releases of manufactured radiation upon a large population have, thankfully, 
been a rarity within the epoch of atomic technologies, and the first event to provide another 
‘case study’ after the two atomic bombs of WW2 was the Chernobyl accident. Due to ambiguity 
of low dose biological impacts, epidemiologic methods cannot be used in isolation as the data 
are often conflicting (Jaworowski 1999). Thus, as the sciences could not solely rely on 
ontological studies they had to incorporate an epistemological system to articulate the risks 
associated with this phenomenon. The underlying logic of LNT is extrapolation, that is, deducing 
the risk of low doses through the use of data accrued from high dose case studies (Land 1995) - 
the atomic bomb victims. 
         
The LNT relationship is predicated upon the proportionality between dose and cancer risk. 
Tubiana et al (2005) state that the approach is based on one set of data and two hypotheses:  
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“(a) The relationship between dose and DNA damage in vivo seems linear from 1 mGy to 
100 Gy with use of H2AX foci as a marker for DNA double-strand breaks (DSBs)… (b) each 
DSB is hypothesised to have the same probability of inducing cell transformation, irrespective 
of the quality of DSBs present simultaneously in the cell; and (c) each transformed cell is 
hypothesised to have the same probability of developing into an invasive cancer, irrespective 
of the dose delivered to the tissue.” (2005, 13).  
Linearity is king here, and it trumps case specific developments. In essence, the model states that 
the impacts associated with 1mGy will scale perfectly to 100 Gy, and the same can be said of 
probability, a risk technician’s favourite calculation. Thus, one can begin to identify the 
connection between high dose data and the extrapolation to low dose. Granted the model is 
articulated from the ‘ground up’, conceptualised from low dose to high, but the scientific reality 
of its articulation was from the ‘top down’. What is crucial to recognise at this stage is that LNT 
states that the deposition of physical energy (ionising radiation) into a biological entity increases 
carcinogenic risk linearly with an increasing dose, at a 45 degree slope, and that this biological 
prophecy remains constant irrespective of dose (Averbeck 2009). 
	  
The BEIR report of 1972 featured prominently within the previous section, as it was shown to be 
one of the first instances when an influential governmental institution appropriated the approach 
and produced guidelines in accordance to its logic. Thus, in a bid to attain a level of scientific 
accuracy, the information within its pages shall be accounted for, and consequently, the inner 
workings of the LNT model will become fully illuminated.  
	  
In order to ready the foundations, the report accounts for the ‘kinetics of mutation’, and states 
that DNA is “organised into larger linear nucleoprotein structures” (NAS/NRC, 1972, 64), and 
these structures are comprised of a series of triplets of nucleotides. This complementary 
formation results in the ‘ladder like’ popular image of a gene. It is argued that mutation occurs 
when the linearity of DNA’s ontological form is disrupted, damaged or added to. Furthermore, 
the report argues that a more significant class of mutational events arise from breakages within 
the chromosomes of the nucleotides. This could be caused by an injection of energy into the 
DNA from an external source: for example, when a person is subjected to a high dose of 
ionising radiation (Jeggo et al 2016). Finally, the report argues that at the very bottom of the 
range, “it is impossible to define just where a deletion should be considered a point mutation in 
the gene rather than a chromosome breakage type of mutation. For most of the chromosome 
rearrangements considered in this context, with low LET irradiation, the frequency of induced 
rearrangements is proportional to the dose over the dose range of interest. (NAS/NRC, 65). 
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What must be taken from this extract is the insistence of damage to DNA at low doses, even 
thought the exact ‘type’ cannot be identified — lesser mutation or more significant breakage.  
	  
By accounting for the different types of damage at both high and low dose ranges, the report 
has introduced a linear dose-response relationship without any threshold. It goes on to state that 
if no threshold exists, then “the curve, when extrapolated to lower doses, should intersect the 
zero-dose ordinate at a value equal to the spontaneous rate” (NAS/NRC, 66). The report uses 
data from experiments upon mice to conclude that observations are compatible with the above 
assumption, and that the statistical error is too large for it to be tested with any rigour. 
Interestingly, the report does not feature sustained calculations that would represent the 
‘workings’ of the approach, nor does it delineate an account of it being used in practice. It 
appears that its authors expect certain levels of knowledge on its principles. Thus, in order to 
reassemble such an account, other sources must be explored.  
	  
Figure 6.2: Graphical representation of the LNT risk/dose relationship (source: World Nuclear 
Association, 2016) 
Figure 6.2 graphically expresses the relationship between collective dose and the excessive 
relative risk, and the dotted horizontal line represents zero on the y axis. It should be noted that 
this is the universal representation of LNT, and the ratio of the relative risk with the amount of 
dosage is always a constant. This is a fundamental assumption of LNT, that is, that risk can only 
increase with dose. The area in question, that is the section of the graph where the dosage has 
sparked contemporary scientific controversy, is below 100 mSv, otherwise known as acute 
doses. This upper limit of 100 mSv is where the model derives its name, the ‘no-threshold’ is 
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tasked with countering the claims of the threshold model that stated that a threshold existed at 
this dosage (Hoel 1998). As we shall see in a later section, some members of the scientific 
community argue that there is no correlation between the risk of cancer and radiation below 
100 mSv, that is, no causal relationship. LNT on the other hand argues the relative risk of cancer 
is proportional to radiation dose, and it increases linearly from zero. This assumption therefore 
assumes that the processes for cancer production are the same at low and high doses (Tubiana 
et al 2006).  
	  
In terms of fundamental calculations, LNT uses the aforementioned concept of ‘collective doses’ 
and the correlating excess relative risk (Cohen 2012). Sanderson (2009) provides an example 
to highlight how these calculations are performed. He uses the ICPR (2006) annual public dose 
limit of 1mSv, and then uses this figure to identify the excess risk by means of the NCRP Report 
No. 115, in this instance, it is 5 x 10^-5 (0r 0.000005) and he subsequently multiplies it with the 
population size, 1x 10^6 (1,000,000), and this provides a collective dose of 50 Sv. He goes on 
to state that the collective dose is then used to calculate excess cancer deaths by means of 
simple linear extraction. In this example, a population of 1,000,000 multiplied by the collective 
dose of Sv year^-1 (0.02) would contribute to 20,000 excess cancer deaths per years. This 
simple mathematical sequences represents the core of the LNT approach, and it has been 
utilised numerous times to calculate prospective deaths. One of the most famous studies was 
conducted by Brenner et al (2003), when they used the collective dose of CT scans, 10 - 20 
mSv, and the population of the United States, to argue that 1.5 - 2% of all cancers in the 
country are attributable to the use of CT scans.  
	  
In essence, this is a two stage process: the first entails the discovery of the individual dose. This 
value is then applied to the NCRP’s iteration of LNT’s relationship between dose and excess 
relative risk to identify the probability matrix. This number is then multiplied by the population of 
the affected area, and this produces the collective dose. The second stage then uses this 
collective dose and multiplies it with the population once again, and the end figure is the 
estimation of cancer deaths. There are no finer details to the inner workings of LNT, the entire 
programme of purposeful conservatism is founded upon these calculations. 
	  
When taking all of this into consideration, it seems logical to class LNT as a discourse of risk 
(Beck, 1992), the ‘accepted’ rhetoric of radiological risks at low doses. For Beck, the concept of 
risk is a means of rendering visible a possible future reality, and that once a possible reality has 
come to pass, the discourse representing a risk ceases to apply (Beck 2000). As mentioned in a 
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chapter 2, this totalising account features several empirical blindspots, especially within the area 
of nuclear engineering (this shall be accounted for in the following chapter). However, when it 
comes to LNT, his argument is semi-correct. As we shall see in the following sections, the 
material appearance of a massive nuclear accident drew scientific critical gazes onto the 
assumptions of LNT, consequently questioning its continued validity. Granted LNT never 
‘predicted’ a nuclear accident, but its primary purpose was to set guidelines in the wake of a 
dispersion of low dose radiation, a phenomenon which had yet to pass during its construction. 
Thus, its relevance, utilisation and black box status is fundamentally linked to manufactured risks 
of this nature. 
6.4 The linear no-threshold model and Chernobyl: a case of science in action and the 
unintentional eroding of a blackbox 
What must be accounted for at this stage is the output created when LNT’s calculations are 
applied on a population scale, as this nexus represents the introduction of RBMK no4’s agency. 
Once a statistical output has been created, and an estimation of excess cancer deaths published, 
the resulting agency is powerful and potentially very damaging. This reasoning brings us to a 
very important and influential publication, one that calculated the global impacts of the 
Chernobyl accident by means of the LNT model. The significance of this article to the network 
cannot be understated as its statistical output was deployed as a means of attaching ready (and 
sensationalist) understandings to the complex and multifaceted risks associated with the 
accident. In other words, the article represents the construction of a statistically possible 
ontological outcome for this catastrophic manufactured risk.  
         
In 1988, Dr Lynn Anspaugh of the University of Utah, Professor Marvin Goldman of the 
University of California and Professor Robert Caitlin published The Global Impact of the 
Chernobyl Reactor Accident in the very influential journal Science. The paper itself has attracted 
a large network  dually due to its usefulness for LNT proponents and its ‘controversial’ nature for 
the approach’s detractors. The significance of the texts can be accounted for in an examination 
of its citation network. GoogleScholar highlights that the article has been cited 321 times, and it 
has become one of the foundational building blocks of an argument’s fortifications, as well as 
the target of assault for those who do not agree with the LNT assumption. In other words, it is 
both revered and reviled, and in the face of the Fukushima accident, its longevity has been 
extended by several decades. 
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Prior to detailing the text’s finer details, an exploration of its network must be conducted in 
order to render visible the actors drawn to it. In order to assess the nature of the publications 
citing this article, the 28 years since the article was published were split into two, one from 1988 
to 2000, and 2001 to 2016. The reasoning behind this was to attempt to identity any 
‘breakages’ within the discourse, that is, an evolution of the tone of article citing this text. In 
essence, as medical technology has progressed/developed, the arguments against the continued 
use of LNT have increased in number, thus, this chronological segregating will allow this account 
to provide an empirical backbone to this statement. Methodologically, the articles citing 
Anspaugh et al (1988) were ranked in order of their publication’s ‘influence’, in accordance 
with Bergstrom’s system (2007), and the number of times the article had been cited. This dual 
process renders visible the scope of the networks of these texts, as-well-as the non-direct reach of 
Anspaugh et al (1988).  
	  
The first period saw the article cited 103 times, roughly one third of the overall total. There is a 
notable correlation between the influence of the journals and the number of citations within the 
top 20 cited articles within this period (excluding books). The most influential publication that 
positively cites Anspaugh et al (1988), is Human minisatellite mutation rate after the Chernobyl 
accident (Dubrova et al 1996), published in Nature (15.88 influence points) and cited 399 
times; this article accounts for the increased number of mutations within the heavily populated 
areas of the Mogilev district of Belarus. It references the statistical output of Anspaugh et al 
(1988) as a legitimate possible outcome of the accident. Interestingly, the majority of the 
article’s authors are either Ukrainian or Russian, and the lead author, Professor Dubrova was 
once a member of the NI Vavilov Institute of General Genetics in Moscow. He published this 
article two years after leaving Russia for The University of Leicester.   
	  
The second article within this period was again published in Nature, and has been cited 230 
times. Fitness loss and Germline mutations in barn swallow breeding in Chernobyl (Ellegren et 
al 1997) uses Anspaugh et al (1988) as a means of providing a human context of the accident’s 
potential damage. The authors are all Swedish (the only European country to register a 
radioactive release in the days after the accident), and this publication represents the most 
influential ‘merging’ of human orientated LNT statistical outputs, with research conducted upon 
the wildlife.  
	  
The third publication was published within the Annals of Internal Medicine and was cited 254 
times. Thyroid cancer: a lethal endocrine neoplasm (Robbins et al 1991) is one of the few 
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articles not directly researching impacts of the Chernobyl accident, but inevitably mentions the 
accident due to the type of cancer involved. Its reference of Anspaugh et al (1988) is somewhat 
critical, however it predominantly uses it to highlight the number of potential cancer cases 
produced by environmental radiation. This publication is interesting as it highlights the scope of 
both the accident and the article under analysis, in that both appear throughout a generic 
publication that researches thyroid cancer. Chernobyl has become synonymous with this type of 
cancer, and within this period Anspaugh et al (1988) had become the predominant means of 
legitimising an argument ‘supporting’ the damaging material by-products of the accident.  
	  
As mentioned above, 103 articles citing Anspaugh et al (1988) were published within this 
period. 74% of these articles directly referenced the Chernobyl accident within their title, and 
90% of this total utilised the reference without critical comment. That is, used its findings as a 
means of validating and vindicating their own arguments. In other words, within this period, the 
publication was predominantly used as a means of fortifying arguments. 
	  
The second period, between 2001 and 2016 saw the article cited 218 times, over double the 
amount of the first. This total is inflated by a large percentage of publications focused upon the 
Fukushima accident of 2011. Granted this influx of work conducted upon the most recent major 
nuclear accident skews the Chernobyl relevant findings, however it does highlight the continued 
use of the enacted systems within Anspaugh et al (1988). By far the most influential text within 
this period is Life exposed: biological citizens after Chernobyl (Petryna, 2013), a book cited 
954 times. The author is an anthropologist and she puts forth bold arguments around the 
accidents biological impacts. She goes as far as claiming that “More than 3.5 million people in 
Ukraine alone, not to mention many citizens of surrounding countries, are still suffering the 
effects.” (Petryna, 2013, 3). As the author is an anthropologist, she relies on scientific references 
to vindicate her social science arguments, and the outputs of Anspaugh et al (1988) feature 
throughout this book. It is not surprising to find a publication of this nature utilising the statistical 
outputs of LNT without much critical insight into the polemic surrounding its usage; regardless, 
this example highlights how useful the article has become within the discourse seeking to 
demonise the nuclear industry.  
	  
The second and third publications of note in this period are two books, Fundamentals of 
ecotoxicology (Newman 2009) and Sustainable energy: choosing among options (Tester 
2005). These two textbooks deal with the intricacies of environmental toxicology and the energy 
market. The former adopts a mediated outlook on Anspaugh et al (1988), citing increasing 
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complexities and the inability of health physics to either prove or disprove mutations under 100 
mSv. Within the latter’s chapter on nuclear energy, the spectre of the Chernobyl accident is 
routinely deployed, and the statistical output of the LNT framework used as a means of 
highlighting the potential damage to human health. It should be noted that the inclusion of this 
article within any publication is valid. As mentioned above, the LNT is the bedrock of the world’s 
international radiological protection system, it is difficult to imagine such a system being in place 
without it. However, the new emergence of evidence that contradicts the model’s assumptions 
should, at the very least, force academics to treat its statistical outputs with a modicum of critical 
thought. As we shall see, there is a body of work that critiques Anspaugh et al (1988), however,  
my analysis has found that the majority of publications citing the article use it in a positive 
manner.  
	   
Within the 218 articles citing Anspaugh et al (1988), 51% directly referenced Chernobyl, and 
68% used the reference without sustained critical reflection. This figure is smaller than the 
percentage within the first period, however it is not a massive change. Well over half of the 
publications still use the publication as a means of validating an argument. This majority could 
be explained by the aforementioned ‘gold standard’ role LNT plays within radiological 
protection, however this is mere speculation. Regardless, this empirical exploration of the 
article’s publication network has uncovered that the 20th Century has seen a small movement of 
academics begin to question the LNT’s outputs. Thus, this article should be viewed as an evental 
moment; it dealt with the impacts of the world’s worst nuclear accident, and it represents the first 
time LNT was deployed onto a massive population base. In essence, although its outputs are 
epistemological in nature, they allude to an ontological reality, one where tens of thousands of 
people could die.   
	    
As previously mentioned, research of this nature marks the fusing of LNT assumptions with data 
on the scale of a country’s population. The authors divided their analysis between the entire 
population of the affected regions, and categorised it into to the most notable ‘cancer sites’ — 
spaces that were subjected to higher doses. In order to identify these spatialites, and the 
techniques needed to make a connection between excessive risk and carcinogenic impacts, the 
authors used three respected reports as a means of equipping their analysis with the statistical 
data required to calculate the expected rate of cancers.  
the U.S Congress-mandated National Institute of Health report on the development of radio 
epidemiological tables, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG report on the ‘summed 
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health’ effects models for nuclear power plant accidence-consequence analysis… and the 
recent UNSCEAR report on the genetic and somatic effects of ionising radiation. (1988, 
151).  
They argued that these three reports are consistent due to their similar conclusions/results. The 
use of these reports, produced and published by the US government, Harvard University, and 
the United Nations, represents the keystone within their defences. What they go on to claim 
could have been impactful upon the nuclear industry, the Soviet Union, and the physical and 
mental wellbeing of the people who resided in the affected territories. Thus, the authors had to 
base their expected cancer calculations on strong foundations, and the use of these three 
respected reports achieved that goal. If anyone sought to question their findings, they had the 
ability to ‘call on’ these reports for analytical and empirical back up; or, in Latourian terms, they 
could “bring friends in” (Latour, 1988, 31) 
         
The geography of the article is ‘global’ in nature, with the authors routinely deploying concepts 
such as “the world’s citizenry”. In order empirically to construct a ‘global sense’, the authors 
include the populations of 40 countries in their analysis (including East and West Germany), 
ranging from every European state to Asia and the United States. The statistical workings of LNT 
have the ability to condense diverse spatialities into unified figures as-well-as provide segmented 
analysis, the nature, or scale, of the output is dependent on how the user has orientated its 
‘demographical’ structure. Thus, the spatial component of the approach is at the whim of the 
actor at the helm. As this article is tasked with accounting for the ‘global’ implications of the 
radioactive spread, the meta outputs will be the cumulation of each country’s estimation of 
cancer deaths. Thus leading to the production of a more ‘sensationalist’ number. Furthermore, 
there is a temporal element within this article, in that the calculations allude to a 50 year 
radiation dose; this is a generalised account of how each radionuclide decays over time, with no 
assessment of each space’s deposition/dose. 
	  
When seeking to explore the minutiae of the Anspaugh et al’s (1988) methods, a section (that is 
less than one page of A4 paper) contains an excellent example of the LNTs’ hegemonic status 
within health physics, and the international radiological protection systems of governance. In 
essence, the authors provide no explanation of the approach’s finer details, and instead state 
that:  
For latent health effects such as fatal cancers and genetic disorders, the scientific 
community has reached general consensus on a model derived from a linear-quadratic 
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dose relation for low dose… It is assumed that no threshold dose exists below which 
there is no risk, although the data do not eliminate the possibility of zero risk a low 
doses. (Anspaugh et al 1988, 1515).  
This lack of methodological elaboration is a common theme within the LNT discourse: the 
provision of generalised accounts, as opposed to reassembling the intricacies of the approach/
calculations. Throughout this thesis, numerous scientific domains have been explored, and the 
principles of their methods accounted. Several have shown disputes, or controversies, during the 
creation of a black boxed consensus. However, LNT’s journey to a hegemonic powerhouse has 
seen no major debates, and this is epitomised by the routine simplified explanations within 
publication’s methods sections — similar to Anspaugh el al (1988) example. As we shall see, it 
took an event of truly unseen damage to begin to shake the foundations of this approach. It 
required a new world, with original ontological parameters to challenge the question of its 
continued validity. 	  
	  
In terms of Anspaugh el al (1988) results, the team calculated a 50 year radiation-dose for the 
affected areas, and the exposure rate for a number of radionuclides was accounted for, 
including C-137, the disposition measurements for which were taken from national and World 
Health Organisation reports (another block in their arguments’ defences). The temporal element 
of the article’s analysis involved radioactive decay calculations, and the identification of the 
decreasing curve, over the 50 years. Over this period, the authors accounted for the three 
primary cancers created by exposure to ionising radiation: leukaemia, bone and thyroid. The 
underlying inclusion of these excess solid cancers is also linked to the source material used, and 
the absolute risk projections associated with them. Due to LNT’s status, its tenets reside within 
institutional discourses, and these texts are used as the guidelines for research projects. In this 
instance, the probability matrix within the aforementioned NUREG report was used as the 
baseline statistical inputs.  
	  
This is another interesting facet of LNT’s network of purpose, in that its unified formation is so 
intrinsically ‘black boxed’ that it is stored and disseminated by institutions. There is no plurality, 
there is one system, a singular means of calculating radiological risk at every dose. The 
probability matrix for a dose rate has a universally accepted numerical representative, and 
these relationships provide the statistical bedrock for any research project seeking to estimate 
the excess cancer instances of a phenomenon. This is not to say that there are no competing 
approaches -  the contemporary model of hormesis shall be covered in the following section - 
however, within LNT, there is no deviation from the central reasoning and logic.  
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The Anspaugh el al’s (1988) final means of calculation involved the multiplication of the varying 
dose rates within each country with the aforementioned risk projections/coefficients, and the 
output of this calculation is then multiplied by the population of the area. When each country’s 
excess cancer deaths were computed, and each added together, the final figure of 53,400 
possible deaths was attributed to the Chernobyl disaster (Anspaugh et al 1988). 
         
As a brief aside, prior to an evaluation of this figure, it must be noted that the authors explicitly 
state that their findings are estimates, and that “one of the most misunderstood concepts 
encountered in the analysis is the way in which probabilistic or stochastic risks are perceived 
and presented” (Anspaugh et al 1988, 1518). They highlighted that their statistical output are 
increments of a probabilistic distribution, and thus not a degree of certainty as “frequently 
reported in the media” (1988, 1518). At the time of publication, several newspaper headlines 
wielded the ‘fifty thousand dead’ figure with unabashed sensationalism, and thus it could be 
argued that this is a mediation of the original article - thus alluding to Latour’s second rule of 
researching scientific discourse. However, the use of the article’s statistical output is devoid of 
translation, for the use of said figure is merely transporting information without deformation, but 
also without acknowledging the summary paragraphs that detailed the ‘estimation’ nature of the 
entire piece is moot. In essence, the final section represents the final block within the authors’ 
defences, the failsafe, perhaps. Due to the geopolitical context of the period, and the ever 
present agency of the ruined reactor, the authors, three intelligent and credible scientists, must 
have been aware of the ‘potential impact’ of an article of this orientation. They were writing 
about one of the greatest ‘controversies’ of the late-twentieth century, an “icon of destruction” to 
use Beck’s (1992) terminology. The incorporation of a section that, qualified, even undermines 
their entire research project effectively produced a degree of separation from ‘responsibility’, 
providing a means of ‘excusal’ in the face of external appropriation of the statistical outputs. 
Therefore, akin to the European Commission’s Atlas for the Deposition of C137, this article 
should be viewed as a Latourian panorama, a restrictive window into the representation of 
reality, one fused with the subjective interests of the actors responsible for its creation. 
         
As mentioned above, the global dose rate accredited to the Chernobyl accident was 0.0046 
mSv, a figure over double the figure quoted within the UNSCEAR report (2000) referenced 
above. This increase could be explained by the 12 year gap between the two publications; 
regardless, the dose rate in question is minimal at best (especially when considering the average 
background and medical examination dose rates). A paradox resides within these calculations, 
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in that they are both useful and inaccurate: useful to the stakeholders with interests that could be 
furthered by public fear, negative opinions towards the nuclear industry or geopolitical 
leverage. And inaccurate on a scientific level as they are nothing more than (mere) estimates. 
        
 I will conclude this section with some arithmetic. Once again, we return to the UNSCEAR figures 
(I am aware of the similarity in tactics to the Anspaugh et al, in that I am using a ‘well 
respected’ publication to fortify my argument) and pose a question: if 0.0046 mSv global dose 
rate from Chernobyl is to account for 53,400 deaths, and medical examinations procedures 
contribute 0.4 mSv, some one hundred times the amount of that attributed to Chernobyl at its 
highest, will that dose rate cause 5,340,000 cancer deaths across the world? As the global 
average natural dose rate is 2.4 mSv — over five hundred times larger the 0.0046 mSv of 
Chernobyl — should this figure not contribute to over 26 million deaths every year if we are to 
accept and extend the LNT core assumption? These figures may seem outlandish and 
unbelievable, but they are merely the result of an extension of logic the LNT model, the standard 
for radiological risk systems, to the other sources of global ionising radiation. 
         
Relentless pragmatism is the hallmark of this chapter, with the production of an informed context 
the goal. Granted such an account can be produced thirty years after the event with the aid of 
hindsight, but the desire to construct a faithful representation of risk should always be of primary 
importance. As mentioned above, LNT has become a fundamental appendage of the risk 
industry, a willing and capable accomplice within the formation of epistemological constructs 
tasked with representing the invisible and, for some, frightening process of radiation. As we shall 
see in the following section, an unwelcome byproduct of this linear calculation has been within 
the realm of ‘risk perception’, and the latter’s impacts upon the populations coated with C137 
has been much more damaging than the unstable atoms. 
6.5 Risk perception, LNT and Chernobyl: the case of radiophobia 
The term ‘radiophobia’ has been used within the former Soviet union to describe the 
psychological distress experienced by the liquidators (Pastel, 2002). And although the term has 
the hallmarks of being a clinical classification, the discipline of psychiatry has not recognised it. 
The concern about large doses is obviously justified. However, the fear of small doses, such 
as those absorbed from the Chernobyl fallout by the inhabitants of central and western 
Europe, is about as justified as the fear that an atmospheric temperature of 20C may be 
hazardous because, at 200C, one can easily get third degree burns - or the fear that sipping 
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a glass of claret is harmful because gulping down a gallon of grain alcohol is fatal 
(Jaworowski, 1999, 24) 
The above quotation, from one of LNT’s most persistent detractors, highlights his take on the 
ontological reality of low doses of radiation, and alludes to an unwelcome outcome of LNT 
calculations of risk — the perception that even minute doses of radiation can be harmful. 
      
In order to fully grasp the intricacies of a ‘phobia’, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM) 5th Edition (2013) provides several criteria for the diagnosis of phobia:  
“(A) Marked fear or anxiety about a specific object or situation. (B) The phobic object or 
situation almost always provokes immediate fear or anxiety. (C) The phobic object or 
situation is actively avoided or endured with intense fear or anxiety. (D) The fear or anxiety 
is out of proportion to the actual danger… (F) The fear, anxiety, or avoidance causes 
clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas 
of functioning.” (2013, 135).  
Criteria A and D are of key relevance here; that is, the avoidance of the phobic stimuli and the 
knowledge that the fear is of proportion to the actual danger. As radiation is invisible, the 
possibility of avoidance is only gained when one is equipped with a Geiger counter (and 
situated knowledge of how to operationalise its readings), or ‘top down’ guidelines of the risks/
depositions present within a landscape. Thus, the fear of radiation is fundamentally linked to risk 
perception, and, therefore, the process of production of risk itself as this is the primary means of 
a population’s gaining knowledge of its presence.  
         
The nexus between proportionality and the actual danger is of key relevance to LNT. The DSM 
states that “individuals with specific phobia often recognise their reactions to be 
disproportionate, they tend to overestimate the dangers in/of their feared situations, and thus 
the judgement of being out of proportion is made by the clinician.” (2013, 137). When dealing 
with radiation, the ability to recognise one’s disproportionate fear is granted through 
knowledge of the carcinogenic and radiological sciences. Both disciplines feature dense and 
exclusionary texts which reside within academic journals hidden behind paywalls. The 
combination of high knowledge barriers and monetary requirements renders this ability out of 
the reach of many, and thus the lay public must rely on ‘top down’ delineation of the existence 
of radiation, dose rates, and the subsequent risks. This relationship taps into the realms of the 
ontological and the epistemological, as opportunities for mediation, be it purposeful or 
subconscious, are ever present.  
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Cultural approaches to risk (eg Douglas 1992, Adams 1995, Puckett et al 2015) have stressed 
the significance of factors such as trust within institutions delineating the risks, the perceived 
fairness in exposure to risk, and people’s intrinsic views as influences in how collectives 
formulate their different opinions on what constitutes a risk. Constructivist approaches place 
significance upon the subjective negotiations between individual actors and risk discourses, 
especially within the era of ‘the risk society’, as the majority of manufactured risks require 
situated knowledge to fully comprehend their dangers. Thus, when risk technicians utilise a 
model of radiological prevention that delineates a reality where even the most minute amount of 
radiation is dangerous, this relationship, arguably, becomes asymmetrical, and irrational fears 
take hold. For Jaworowski, this process of risk overestimation, by means of LNT, has led to the 
irrational fear of low level radiation — radiophobia — a psychological impact of RBMK no4.  
The final part of this empirical journey returns to late August, 1986, four months after the 
accident. At this time, the IAEA held a private conference between the East and West to discuss 
the event, the first international summit tasked with technically discussing the accident. Dr Valery 
Legasov, the deputy director of the Kurchatov Institute, and the man responsible for the entire 
clean-up operation (Meshkati 2007), prepared a report for the IAEA. The 388 page document 
was, for the Soviet Union, uncharacteristically detailed and honest, and it claimed that roughly 
45,000 cancer deaths could be attributed to Chernobyl. This figure was reached by means of 
the LNT model (Patterson 1986). In an interview in the 1990s Hans Blix, the former Head of the 
IAEA, reflected upon this figure and the model in general. He stated that,  
“These are theoretical calculations, based upon the Hiroshima model, that you say that if 
you have a set of radioactivity, you know from Hiroshima that some many will die from it, 
and if you increase it by ten fold, you assume that it will be a ten fold increase. Well that is 
the calculation, this is not exact and nor empiric.” (Blix 1990).  
	  
This statement, and personal reflections on a significance conference, by one of the most 
influential actors within Chernobyl’s network, renders visible the desire, or agency, to tackle the 
unnecessary fear of radiation by the IAEA. By flat out refusing these Soviet figures, the IAEA 
was attempting to mitigate the public’s risk perception process, and inject a modicum of scientific 
reality into the charged moment in history. As will be obvious by this point, the Anspaugh et al 
article of 1988, which used the same model, arguably damaged this process.  
	  
As an aside, the resistance of the IAEA publicly to acknowledge the statistical outputs of Dr 
Legasov produces a confusing position. As mentioned in a previous section, the IAEA are 
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proponents of LNT, therefore one would assume the institution would vindicate such ‘findings’. 
Without access to the actors responsible for making this executive decision, there is no way of 
uncovering why it was made. Regardless, it does highlight the two ways LNT can be used: 
setting regulatory parameters, and statistical model of projection.     
        
There is a relatively large body of literature on radiophobia and the linkages to the Chernobyl 
accident, with many claiming that the most damaging effects of the accident upon the affected 
populations has been psychological (Drottz-Sjoberg & Persson 1993; Girard & Dubreuil, 1996; 
Jaworowski; 1999; Zykova 2007). Goraczko & Latek (1999) argue that the need for better 
education is clear, and this should be underpinned by a pragmatic radiological model for safety 
guidelines. As without such a move, this unwelcome and damaging dynamic between lay actors, 
risk technicians, and the material presence of low dose radiation will persist. The body of work 
exploring radiophobia suggests that the current model of radiological protection is in fact 
causing unintentional harm to the very people it seeks to protect. In essence, this forms a 
connection between health physics, clinical psychology and the general public. Thus, one could 
tentatively conclude that the actors who know the most, with regards to atomic science and 
technology, fear the least, and those who know the least, fear the most. 
6.6 Enter hormesis: the contradicting counter argument of LNT 
I shall conclude this chapter with a look at the competing carcinogenic model that contradicts 
the assumptions of LNT. It should be noted at the outset that the event that sparked a counter 
movement to the LNT model, and open its black box, was the Chernobyl disaster. The model 
previously existed in an epistemological vacuum, safe from material reality as no event has 
prompted its deployment on a large scale. Obviously, the Chernobyl accident changed that. 
     
In short, the term hormesis is derived from the Greek meaning ‘to excite’ (Henschler 2006) and 
the process entails an adaptive response by biological organisms to external invaders (Sanders 
2009). For ionising radiation, it is “interpreted to be adaptation to background radiation 
exposures, combined with adaptations to higher radiation exposures dependent on metabolic 
protection from the array of other abiotic stresses in the environment” (Hooker et al, 2004, 
443). The process depicts the human body as a reflective entity, capable of strengthening its 
evolutionary defences (to ever-present background radiation) to deal with an increase in 
environmental exposures. Thus, this model envisions the fleshy units of humanity as able to 
withstand and resistant low dose radiation, as opposed to LNT which, due to its total reliance on 
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the Hiroshima data, states that we are totally at the mercy of any form of radiation. In other 
words, hormesis takes note of the fact that humanity has evolved within a crucible of radiation. It 
is literally everywhere, and if one was to leave our blue spaceship, and go outside of the 
protective shield provided by magnetosphere, the dose increases exponentially. Background 
radiation from the stars and the earth has been an ever-present throughout humanity’s evolution, 
and the hormesis hypothesis argues that our bodies have developed innate biological defences 
over the millennia to protect us from its unstable energy (at low levels). In order to visualise the 
change in logic, a dose/risk graph is best placed to highlight the differences, and similarities, 
between LNT and hormesis. In a previous section, figure 2 delineated LNT’s trajectory, not 
surprisingly in an arrow straight line.   
Figure 6.3 represents the underlying logic of hormesis, and the primary departure from LNT is 
the area referred to as an acute dose, that is, under, in this instance 200 mSv. Above that range 
the trajectory is identical to LNT due to scientific consensus regarding the damage to biological 
entities at high doses. The most interesting aspect of this graph is the line below the risk 
coefficient, thus alluding to a beneficial component to low dose radiation (Mattson & Calabrese 
2009). This is obviously in direct contrast to LNT, which argues that any dose of radiation is 
dangerous. 
	  
Figure 6.3: graphical delineation of Hormesis logic. (source: Sanderson 2009) 
Feinendegen (2005, 159) characterises the mood of the change by grounding his argument 
through the use of an accepted reality, “that cellular responses to low values of absorbed doses 
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of ionising radiation are not readily predictable by extrapolation of responses observed at high 
doses”. This statement, some 19 years after the accident, highlights the shift within some parts of 
health physics away from LNT, due to the fact that extrapolation, and linearity assumptions, 
simply do not align with the empirical data. This unassuming argument is a challenge to the 
black box status of the LNT model. In essence, this move sees a reversal in logic. As mentioned 
previously, LNT is based on ‘top down’ extrapolation, from high dose data to low dose - or, 
conceptually speaking, ‘meta’ing downwardly towards the material’. Now, health physics still 
agrees that radiation induced DNA damage and genomic instability increases with absorbed 
dose (Feinendengen, 2015). However the relationship is no longer linear, rather, the trajectory 
is curved. Thus, at menial and low dose rates, the probability of engendering cancers is minimal. 
	  
The aforementioned Professor Calabrese is the talisman of the hormesis movement, and due to 
his extensive writings upon LNT’s trajectory to the radiological gold standard, he is a well 
informed actor within this competing network. Outside of charting the history of LNT he has 
written extensively about the qualities of the approach (Calabrese & Ricci 2011, Calabrese 
2011, Calabrese 2012a, Calabrese 2012b, Calabrese 2013), and won numerous grants to 
research the underlying logic. His publication history started in 1986, and over the years his 
research interests have evolved, yet, the notion of risk assessment has been a mainstay.  
Evidence of this is found within the defence of his Doctoral thesis, titled A single exposure to a 
carcinogen can cause cancer. Documentation, limitations and implications for risk assessment. 
(1989). Since 1998 he has, firstly, tested the hypothesis, and secondly championed it, as “a 
generalised biological phenomenon” (Calabrese & Baldwin, 1998, 357). Despite these efforts 
from a world renown scientist, LNT is still used as the foundations of radiological protection 
systems. Thus, one must pose the unavoidable question of why? 
	  
At this juncture, it is useful to consider how governmental institutions ‘frame’ risk, in this instance 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) of the UK. Within its report upon societal concerns about 
risk (2002), three framing devices for risks are provided, each pertaining to the heterogeneous 
melee of risks a society encounters. These categories are directly perceivable risks, those only 
perceivable with the help of science, and virtual risks - the second and third are of relevance 
here. Institutions akin to the HSE reply heavily on scientific advice, and when the sciences have 
reached a consensus regarding a specific risk, it is then classed within the second category. 
Virtual risks are delineated risks that “range from unconfirmed scientific hypotheses derived 
within conventional science, through speculations by ‘alternative specialists’, popular fears, 
superstitions, to theological speculations… the risks that conventional science cannot 
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convincingly confirm or refute cause the greatest difficulties for regulators” (HSE, 2002, 3). As 
mentioned several times throughout this chapter, LNT is the gold standard of health physics for 
radiological protection, even to this day. Thus, environmental radiation, and the risk it 
engenders, would comfortably reside within the second category. However, arguably, with the 
emergence of the hormesis hypothesis, and the empirical studies that highlight its existence, risks 
from low-dose radiation should have migrated into the realms of ‘virtual risks’. In the past twenty 
years, there have been more publications seeking to disprove LNT’s assumptions than arguing 
for its continued use. Yet the approach’s position holds steadfast.  
	  
Scientific controversies are complex, multifaceted, and at times contradictory. In the interests of 
producing an impartial account, the other side of the argument must be elaborated upon, 
primarily as it helps answer the above question of why has LNT remains the gold standard. 
Unfortunately for the proponents of hormesis, a vast body of empirical data has shown alarming 
mutations within humans and wildlife, post April 26th 1986. Jensen et al (1995) identified an 
increase in the frequency of glycophorin within human subjects, Santoro et al (2000) discovered 
evidence of gene rearrangement that has produced increases in thyroid cancer, and Weinberg 
et al (1997) accounted for mutations within the offspring of the liquidators of the NPP. This is just 
a tiny cross section of the publications that claim empirical evidence of genetic mutations caused 
by low dose radiation, originating from Chernobyl. Yet, contradictions are everywhere, as 
numerous pieces of research vigorously claim that such mutations are not increasing as a result 
of the radioactive dispersion. For example, Lima et al (2004) argue that child thyroid cancer 
cases have not increased within the affected areas, and Thomas et al (2002) find contradictory 
results within their own study, concluding that due to the passing of time “the overall HPRT 
deletion spectrum gives little evidence of a radiation signature.” (2002, 184). It is essential to 
consider all of these works that account for the damage caused by the accident.  
	  
Furthermore, in the past five years, a body of empirical research has been conducted that 
actively contradicts the hypothesis of hormesis. For example Ozasa et al (2012) found no 
evidence of hormesis occurring within Japanese atomic bomb survivors, and in fact concluded 
that the data highlighted “the risk of all causes of death was positively associated with radiation 
dose.” (Ozasa et al 2012, 230), thus, their results were directly in line with the LNT 
assumptions. One year after this study, Metz-Flamant et al (2013) discovered a significant 
relationship between low-doses (a mean of 22.5 mSv) and myeloid leukaemia, which prompted 
them to conclude that the LNT EES relationship with that dose was accurate. The research 
participants were French nuclear workers (France is the only country on Earth that has 
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contradicting institutional opinions on LNT), and therefore subject to that dose on a daily basis. 
2015 has seen several studies of a similar nature, in scope, subjects of analysis and aligning 
conclusions. Richardson et al (2015) explored the risk of cancer from occupational exposures 
within British, French and the United States nuclear industries. This was a large study with 
308,297 participants, and the authors concluded that “Although high dose rate exposures are 
thought to be more dangerous than low dose rates exposures, the risk per unit of radiation dose 
for cancer among radiation workers was similar to estimates derived from studies of Japanese 
bomb survivors. Quantifying the cancer risks associated with protracted radiation exposures can 
help strengthen the foundations for radiation protection standards.” (Richardson, 2015, 1141). It 
therefore appears that this study claims to have empirically discovered a link between low dose 
exposures and excess cancers, thus validating LNT’s risk/dose matrix. The final sentence of the 
extract alludes to the author’s objective, that is, scientifically quantifying the estimations and 
assumptions of LNT.  
	  
Finally, Spycher et al  (2015) explored the relationship between background radiation and 
childhood cancers, in an attempt to uncover a causal linkage. The authors made the bold 
conclusion that background radiation may contribute towards the risk of cancer in children. This 
is in direct contradiction to the principles of hormesis that claims a positive biological outcome 
from low-dose exposures, the epitome of which is the eternal bombardment of energy from our 
planet’s surface, and the celestial domain. The findings from all of these studies directly 
contradict the hormesis hypothesis, thus clouding the debate, and miring it further within the 
realms of uncertainty.	 
	  
The previous section detailed the arguments that claim that psychological impacts have been 
one of the most harmful consequence of the Chernobyl accident, however this account would be 
asymmetrical if it did not account for the works of reputable scientists that argue for a 
connection between low-dose exposures and biological mutations. The discursive ordering of the 
chapter, with the psychological arguments being presented ahead of those of health physics, 
was chosen based upon the contradictions within the latter. The controversy over LNT, the 
conflicting works/opinions on the actors on each side of the debate has created a, for want of a 
better term, messy landscape. Even with the steadfast support of powerful national and 
international institutions tasked with creating protection systems, the continued and contradicting 
debate surrounding what actually happens to biological organisms when exposed to low-doses, 
renders the phenomena as unpredictable. This is in direct contrast to the consensus regarding 
the psychological impacts radiation can have upon a population.     
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In light of these contradictions, and the inability of health physics to universally identify empirical 
damage, or repair, with an acceptable degree of accuracy, it seems that the innate logic of LNT 
is beneficial. In essence, if we are not confident, then a purposefully conservative regulation 
system is worthwhile, and indeed necessary. The key issue, or problem, is found when the 
approach is when it is used to ‘estimate’, or predict possible empirical outcomes. This is the point 
when safeguards transform into soothsayers, and with it, vast numbers of potential deaths based 
on models. Thus, in this context, LNT lives a double life, one practical, intent on protection in 
light of scientific ignorance, and the other, as a utensil for estimation, by means of scientific 
assumptions. On the other hand, hormesis, for some, should become the replacement for LNT, 
however, it has yet to come close to building enough support to challenge the titan of LNT. The 
Chernobyl disaster provided the agency to begin to question LNT, yet, not even its agency is 
powerful enough to alter the gold standard.  
	  
Regardless, this inceptive movement towards hormesis, and the subsequent change in scientific 
logic marks a significant movement within the radiological scientific community, and should be 
viewed as an empowering paradigm shift for the lay public. Vulnerability is a hallmark of the 
risk society (Beck 1992), suggesting the inability of a single actor to have agency with reference 
to phenomena that impact upon them. Manufactured risks in the scope of Chernobyl are the 
epitome of this condition, and the mediated representation of the risks is a node of action which 
needs to be addressed. The work on horemesis, and the subsequent construction of defences 
and networks to support its new ‘gold standard’ claims could be viewed as a move in this 
direction. It can also be argued that the LNT model feeds the fires of vulnerability without 
conclusive empirical to support the assumptions. As previously stated, this chapter is tasked with 
providing a pragmatic context. It represents the point in this thesis where the assumed risks, the 
taken-for-granted and a scientific by product of the accident are set against an account of the 
material. The contradictory and, at times, confusing discourse, that which reinforces LNT, and 
the those that seek to dismantle its hegemonic position. The production of a faithful account of a 
network is an unwavering necessity for an ANT scholar, without this quest, the output reverts into 
the realms of fiction and mediation. What has been constructed within this chapter is a relatively 
unknown avenue of risk within Chernobyl’s network, one of the only times that said risks have 
sought to be ‘decreased’ in the name of argued empirical accuracy. It is not attempting to claim 
that the accident was not absolutely horrific, rather it is merely promoting another scientific 
outlook upon the radioactive dispersion and the epistemological construction of risks. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, this example of RBMK no4 ‘travelling’ is ultimately 
ambiguous in nature. It is possible to render visible the nuclear non-human’s agency within the 
little-known scientific polemic, but the extent to which it has actively altered the course of the 
debate is more difficult to uncover. LNT is a powerhouse, it would be difficult to imagine an 
international system of radiological protection without the approach’s implementation and 
spread throughout the powerful, standard defining institutions of the world. Thus, when viewed 
in this light, it may not come as a surprise to find that the counter movement has been 
unsuccessful in its attempt to dethrone LNT, even in light of the influx of empirical ‘opportunities’ 
engendered by RBMK no4, and a host of research delineating results contrary to LNT’s 
assumptions. Radiation is a difficult phenomena: it obscures its existence from human senses, it 
requires a diverse portfolio of knowledge and instrumentations to register and measure its 
presence, and as the science’s understanding of it is in relative infancy, we are unable to make 
totalising assertions about its impacts upon biological organisms. 
This is a fitting concluding sentiment to the empirical heart of this thesis, the realisation of the 
countless ambiguities created in the wake of the event of the Chernobyl accident. From actions 
that sought to actually ascertain what process caused the explosion, to the confusion 
surrounding the ‘intact reactor’, and the panoramic view of the Caesium-137 deposition over 
Europe, each of the empirical chapters has accounted for nodes of actions engendered by the 
travelling of RBMK no4’s agency, and each features ambiguous elements. This is not surprising 
as an event of this magnitude is so disruptive, and creates so many new worlds in its wake, that 
the attracted network of diverse interested parties is bound to produce confusion, deviation and 
ambiguities. As mentioned above, the empirical chapters of this thesis have stayed true to 
Latourian principles, and faithfully allowed the actors to reassemble the network of RBMK no4 
as they experienced it. Thus, the end product is at times conflicting, but any other representation 
would become unfaithful. 
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Chapter 7 
Returning to the site: a decade of change or stagnation? 
——————————————————————— 
Throughout the empirical core of this thesis, the analysis has routinely moved away from the site 
of the Chernobyl facility, both in space and time. Chapter 3 explicitly detailed the ontology of 
the object of RBMK no4, and the sequence of events that led to the accident, but from that point 
onwards the accounted nodes of actions have been staged in increasingly distant spaces and 
times. This literal and chronological, horizontal movement, in effect, accounts for how this object 
has travelled outwardly from the site in northern Ukraine, since April 26th 1986. In this 
concluding chapter, attention returns to the reactor site as a means of capping the research, and 
will feature a discussion on how it has evolved since the researchers’s first and last visits to the 
site. This spatial return is fused with a sustained reflection on what the research has achieved, 
the successes and failures of the conceptual framework, and a more general discussion about 
the site of the reactor facility. This section attempts to provide a concise answer the central 
research — how has RBMK no4 traveled? — and, additionally, considers the extent to which the 
nuclear nonhuman, and its physical landscape, have now been ‘settled’. In a bid to colour this 
discussion, two last nodes of action shall be interwoven into this, somewhat personal, process of 
self critique: two fundamentally important series of actions that could be classed as the epitome 
of the ‘lessons learned’ from of the accident; two instances that fuse risk and practice within the 
ontological form of RBMK no4, with both seeking to return the object, and the site, to a mode of 
stabilisation.  
7.1 The juxtapositions of the Zone of Alienation: the curious guarded emptiness of Pripyat 
The site of the Zone of Alienation is a perplexing place. Its classification as the site of a level 7 
nuclear incident, and a landscape of heightened levels of radiation sealed off from the outside 
world, evokes images of a baron wasteland of crumbling buildings, devoid of human 
interactions. In many instances, these assumptions are correct, but, when one is exposed to the 
normal operating procedures of the reactor facility, can also be misguided. It is indeed useful to 
think of the Zone as a collection of smaller sites. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Zone is split 
into two officially recognised areas, the 10km and 30km Zones, but even within these spatial 
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confines, the site is multifaceted. Pripyat and the reactor facility reside within the 10km zone; 
both have been affected by RBMK no4, yet the two have lead very different lives since 1986.  
Chapter 1 reassembled my first trip to the Zone in 2009, and the account was coloured by 
pictures taken during my last visitation. The majority of my time, on both occasions, was spent 
within the confines of the 10km zone, and in 2015, I returned to several of the Pripyat landmarks 
previously visited as an Urban Explorer, albeit now in the format of an official tour. As recalled 
in Chapter 1, the only space I visited during my first trip was Pripyat, due to the city’s 
importance within Urban Exploration circles. My encounter with the city during my recent 
excursion to the Zone was an ultimately depressing experience. It featured none of the 
excitement, danger and wonderment of  my first exploration, with these engaging emotions 
replaced with sadness and healthy doses of guilt. As I wandered around the city’s empty 
boulevards and crumbling buildings with the tour guide, recreating several of my favoured 
highlights from my first trip, I felt guilty for participating in the industry that has turned Pripyat, 
the once proud Atomgrad, into a tourist attraction. This is not a slight of the tour company, 
which was professional and informative, but is more a reflection on what Pripyat has come to 
mean: a ‘bucket list’ excursion to many, a ghost town to most, and a veritable hotspot of 
radiation to all.  
The material landscape of Pripyat — that is, its human made built environment — has seen very 
little change since I first set foot in the city. The buildings are a little greyer, more windows have 
been smashed, and the once vibrant red paint of the ferris wheel has continued its regression 
into a rusted brown. The two trips were almost a decade apart, and I was initially surprised to 
witness this lack of ‘movement’ within the city’s material makeup. I wasn't expecting freshly 
painted walls, but I did expect something different, or perhaps new, within the ruination of the 
buildings. To be sure, 1960’s Soviet architectural standards are not renowned for their structural 
integrity, particularly within a modernist inspired, purpose built settlement, but Pripyat’s 
monolithic flats and community buildings have been, in many cases, reluctant to relinquish their 
minimalistic charm. Regardless, the biggest surprise of my most recent trip was the vegetation’s 
relentless reclamation of the space.  
This visit was in late September, yet the trees still clung to their greenery, and the smaller 
shrubbery rendered some large pathways inaccessible. When walking through certain areas of 
the city, particularly the region north of the Cultural Palace, it is easy to forget that one is even 
in a city as the density of the foliage is, at times, unbelievable. From the main doorway of one of 
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the high-rise flats, it is difficult to see its neighbouring tower through the foliage, which can be no 
more than 20 meters away. Some of the roads of the city have trees sprouting through the 
concrete, and the main courtyard outside of the Cultural Palace has experienced similar 
instances of biological reclamation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, today, Pripyat is more of a 
forest than city, and the only means to view its cityscape is from the roof of some of its tallest 
buildings. Only when atop of one of these structures does the scale of the city reveal itself to an 
intrepid explorer. I am unsure how long Pripyat will withstand the onslaught of erosion by 
greenery, wind and water. It owed its existence to the power station, and with the demise of the 
facility’s usefulness, and the extremely remote nature of its geographical placement within 
Ukraine, the city serves no purpose to anyone, other than ‘disaster tourists’, and the people who 
go places they are not supposed to go.  
Schatski’s (2002) notion of the site forms an integral part of this research’s conceptual 
backbone. As covered in Chapter 2, when the reactor facility (and the Duga 3 complex) was 
operating as designed, the site of Chernobyl can be readily identifiable by the internal shared 
logic of its material landscape. Pripyat was built for the nuclear power station, its material 
structures designed to house, feed, entertain and educate the carers (and their families) of the 
reactors. Yet with its fleshy residents long since evacuated, militarised operations ceased (eg the 
launchpad for the helicopter sorties covered in Chapter 4) and the abolition of electricity 
production, what role does Pripyat now play within the site of the Chernobyl facility?  
It is a difficult question to answer. When viewed from the outside, through an ‘uneducated lens’, 
the Zone is a geographical blackhole — a mysterious and dangerous space that spawned one of 
humanity’s worst ever accidents. I have been asked countless times about the dangers of visiting 
the zone, and most of the people asking seem to regard the space as some kind of mutant 
infested hell-scape entirely outside and beyond human control. This may be a byproduct of the 
combination of the cultural industry’s delineations of the accident, the radiation, and the 
inaccessibility of the scientific discourses that account for the real dangers of the site. Even a 
terrible movie has greater scope to permeate throughout the social consciousness than an 
informative academic journal, hidden behind exclusionary knowledge and pay barriers. The 
reality of the site could not be further from such negative imaginaries. Granted, my initial 
excursion featured a somewhat advantageous Governmental official, and a scene that would 
not be out of place within the Fallout video game franchise, but I could still identify the 
regimented nature of the Zone. The large armed guard population, the tense inspection of our 
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paperwork, and the orders to be back at the 30km main entrance by a specific time; these are 
not indicators of a lawless site.  
As covered in Chapter 1, during my most recent trip to Ukraine we passed through the ‘official’ 
entrance to Pripyat (a small facility featuring a road block, guard post, and, as usual, an armed 
military guardsman). Throughout this trip I was routinely surprised by these normal regulatory 
procedures, as they were such a contrast to my initial exploration of the site. I found myself 
perpetually asking why Pripyat was guarded? Yes, behind this small barrier lies an entire city, 
but it is nothing more than a decaying shell. Everything of value has been either stolen or 
removed, and, as far as I can tell, the site did not have any militaristic importance (outside of its 
temporary role within the initial cleanup operation). The levels of radiation within the Zone, 
particularly on the main road networks, are in fact now lower than in most European capital 
cities, but the tour guide informed me that any worker within the zone is paid a substantial 
‘bonus’ to do so — a form of danger payment for their services. Thus, the guardsman, who likely 
sits idle for 95% of his shift, was being employed, and paid at an inflated rate, to ‘guard’ a 
ghost city.  
It should be noted that this guarding tactic is a hallmark of the Zone. Duga 3, the mammoth 
radar complex, and its purpose built town (Pripyat 2), resides a few kms away (as the crow 
flies) from the power plant, and it is neither signposted, nor easily reachable. One must travel 
tiny backroads for around 30 minutes to reach it, yet; when the tour bus arrived, we were 
greeted by three armed guards (and two exceptionally well trained German Shepherds wearing 
adorable, Ukrainian military branded, dog body armour). During the tour of the compound, the 
guide told me that Duga 3 was, arguably, the most secretive of all Soviet Cold War facilities, but 
today, nothing of real value is left. The installation’s control room would have resembled 
something akin to the bridge of the Starship Enterprise, but it has been completely stripped of its 
computing innards, leaving nothing but their empty steel housing frames. Again, I found myself 
asking why this remote and inaccessible part of the zone was so heavily guarded? I could list 
more instances where the tour bus was greeted by armed guards, demanding paperwork prior 
to letting us into a forgotten space, but these two will suffice.  
Upon reflection, this militaristic insistence on guarding these spaces seems almost paradoxical, 
especially when one considers how difficult it is to gain access to the Zone through the main 
entrance. As unusual as it may appear on the surface, the Pripyat guard post, and, by 
extension, the guard network spread throughout the zone highlights the role of these forgotten 
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spaces within the site of the Zone. Other than the reactor facility, the human-built landscape of 
the site has not been fundamentally changed by human hands. It has been coated in radioactive 
nuclides, and vast amounts of top soil have been removed, but structurally speaking, the Zone is 
the same as it was before to the accident. Pripyat was once the stage of countless human 
interactions, mundane daily activities that imbued its concrete structures with purpose and 
meaning. It hosted the reactors’s carers; and, as they commuted the short distance to the power 
station, they sustained the link between the purpose built city and the four mammoth fission 
machines. In other words, they performed the internal logic of the site through this short journey 
and their workplace activities. Now, 3 decades later, the material logic of the site remains — that 
is, the purposeful placement of objects and buildings in a pattern designed, ultimately, to 
produce electricity — but its fleshy inhabitants do not. As a result, a new performance is played 
out.  
For want of a better term, Pripyat is now a constellation of objects, both big and small, that have 
to be babysat: a once vibrant, self legitimising cityscape, that has been reduced to an empty 
shell that, apparently, needs constant supervision. The exact reason why it must be under 
supervision is unclear, but as my first Urban Explorer trip revealed, this guarding ethos appears 
to be rather shallow. We spent roughly 16 hours in Pripyat, wandered round the majority of the 
city, spent the night in an abandoned flat, and yet the only people we came across were would-
be-raiders. Furthermore, the fact that these men had managed to gain entry into the Zone, 
presumably without official permission, suggests limits to the guarding of the city.  
At one point, 50,000 people performed the material logic of this space within the site, but now 
the only permeant actor is the guardsman at the gate. Metaphorically speaking, Pripyat has 
become the appendix of the site; no readily identifiable use to the system, but one that nestles 
neatly into its material form. Its placement within the 10km zone renders its future use extremely 
unlikely, and the city’s unfortunate future will continue to see it excelling as one of the world’s 
premier time capsules. Other than requiring guarding, Pripyat has no productive role within the 
site of the zone. It is almost as if it simply does not exist anymore. Granted, some research has 
been conducted within the city’s streets, but the vast majority of academic, international, and 
political attention has been paid to the other significant structure within the 10km zone. 
This focus is understandable, due to the unwieldy nature of the reactor facility, and the 
difficulties of ‘settling’ it post-accident, and the following section will feature one final exploration  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of its significance and role within the site. One of the successes of this research has been its 
steadfast insistence on grounding the analysis within techno-engineering discourses, and a 
byproduct has hence been the minimal attention placed on Pripyat. The majority of the 
research’s objects of analysis have been in a constant state of flux, both physically and 
metaphorically. Pripyat featured an intensive moment of change, but once this epoch concluded, 
the city stagnated. I believe it is fitting to spend a moment reflecting upon the city, particularly as 
its mysterious allure prompted this Urban Explorer down the academic rabbit hole, but this is 
indeed where the real significance of the space ends. Pripyat owed its very existence to the 4 
RBMKs: without the agency of these machines dictating the daily actions of the city’s residents, 
its concrete structures became useless,  or, perhaps even lifeless.  
A hallmark of this project has been the insistence that the nuclear non-human, RBMK no4, is 
markedly different from other, non-sentient manufactured products of our collectives. In that, it 
forced humans to act in a manner that could not be ignored. As a result, its significance should, 
arguably, be elevated above human existence. This type of object, powerful in terms of agency 
and uncontrollably destructive in its materiality, thankfully, is not a common occurrence, and this 
reflective account of Pripyat creates a constructive contrast: one that highlights the difference 
between ‘normal objects’ and nuclear non-humans. If humans had vacated the reactor facility in 
a similar manner as experienced by Pripyat, more ‘destructive potentiality’ could have erupted 
from the building’s walls. In essence, the reactor facility retains its fundamental role within the 
site, with or without human attention/occupation/participation. In terms of physical size, Pripyat 
dwarfs the reactor facility, but to this day the rectangular building still commands respect and 
attention from human actors, while Pripyat is nothing more than a reminder of how devastating a 
nuclear non-human can be to our way of life.  
7.2 The surprising daily reality of the Chernobyl nuclear power station, and the new importance 
of the town called Chernobyl  
At the outset of this project, I did not expect to gain access to the reactor facility. I had never 
seen any pictures of the interior, and had not heard of any tour companies offering the chance 
to explore the innards of the world’s most (in)famous power station. Thus, to my delight, I was 
informed that Solo Tour East could gain access (for a price). Our tour lasted two days, and the 
excursion inside the reactor facility took up the majority of the second and final day. I had never 
been inside a nuclear power plant, and so I had no idea what to expect. I knew that the facility 
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was operated until the year 2000; and, with the new containment project under construction, I 
expected to see a few employees, but the reality was a surprise.  
The main entrance resides in the eastern side of the building, the opposite end to RBMK no4. I 
was instructed not to take any photographs of the entrance (for reasons that were never fully 
explained), and from the outside the building is similar to any ageing industrial complex. As the 
tour bus arrived, I was flummoxed to see a full carpark, with several vehicles parked on grass 
verges. As anticipated, the bus was stopped at a guard station, our papers inspected, and we 
were ushered into the building by two armed personnel. We passed through a row of 
dosimeters and then stopped at a line of metal detectors, accompanied by several more armed 
guards. This inspection was the most intense of the trip. Our passports were assessed and 
photocopied, mugshots taken, our fingerprints were digitally scanned and a comprehensively 
invasive body ‘pat down’ was performed. Furthermore, the guards of the power plant seemed 
to be a private militia. They wore different uniforms to the guardsmen positioned around the 
Zone, their body armour looked significantly more advanced, and they carried modified AN-94 
rifles (weapons used by the Russian special forces), a notable upgrade, both in terms of 
technology and price, to the ‘normal’ guard’s short stock AK-47s. 
It was at this point that the reality of the facility revealed itself. The sheer number of people 
walking about was completely, for want of a better term, shocking. Men and women in suits 
conversing on the move, scientists in traditional Soviet white lab coats pouring over stacks of 
paper, and labourers moving large boxes. During the initial entrance inspection, at least 40 
people passed through the hallway, and, as we moved throughout the building, countless more 
personnel passed us. At no point did it feel like a decommissioned nuclear power station, one 
that had experienced a catastrophic malfunction. It felt like a normal working environment, with 
only the dosimeters and armed guards portraying differently. Several of the facility’s more 
mundane spaces reinforced this feeling. The tour visited a fully operational canteen within the 
confines of the reactor facility — a huge building serving food that I had never eaten before, 
operated by a large kitchen staff, and is a space that could accommodate several hundred 
customers at a time. Furthermore, just to the right of the main entrance stood a large smoking 
shelter, presumably erected in the years following the accident. When we were leaving the 
facility after the tour, roughly 100 people were crammed into the small space, in a scene no 
different from those played out at any large commercial/industrial place of work. I do not think I 
am over-exaggerating in claiming that, without prior knowledge of the accident, or the timeless 
aesthetic of the Sarcophagus of Western side of the building, one would struggle to identify the 
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turmoil that the space has experienced over the years. Even the makeshift wall that separates 
unit 4 from the rest of the building appears as if it was part of the original design, with only the 
small shrine/memorial to the control room operators, giving some kind of indication of the 
challenging history endured by the facility.  
The sheer number of people working in the facility was unexpected to say the least. I knew 
several thousand people worked within the confines of the Zone (Mould 2000), but I had 
assumed that the majority of them were construction workers, tasked with finishing the new 
containment project. The tour guide told me that over 1000 people still work within the reactor 
facility, but I could not easily ascertain what these employees are actually doing there. It has 
been 16 years since unit 1 was taken offline, and its fuel ‘settled’, literally years ago, so I 
struggle to hazard a guess as to why such a large, skilled workforce is needed on a daily basis. 
Regardless, one of the missions of this research has been to uncover ‘little-known’ aspects of the 
accident, areas of engineering and physics that were only understood by the experts tasked 
with actively participating within RBMK no4’s network. Some may find the tone and content of 
these works ‘surprising’, as some of them are in contrast to the generalised beliefs surrounding 
the accident, and radiation in general. It is safe to say that witnessing the extensive staffing of 
the reactor facility, for me, was the biggest jolt of the entire project.  
Outside of my personal surprise, this staffing system highlights just how difficult it has been to 
‘settle’ the site, and has interesting repercussions for Schatzki’s (2002) notion of the site. As 
mentioned above, the reactor facility has undergone widespread material change over the 
years, namely due to the explosions of April 1986, but also due to more technically subtle 
transitions, which will be covered in due course. To gain a fuller understanding of how the site 
has evolved over the years, one has to take a short excursion outside of the 10km zone, into the 
town of Chernobyl.  
The traditional Jewish settlement of Chernobyl resides within the 30km zone, but was spared a 
large radioactive coating due to the wind direction during the days that followed the explosions. 
The town itself is traditionally Russian, and markedly different from the modernist inspired 
architecture of Pripyat.  Chernobyl is evidently now the main population hub of the zone, with 
the majority of its daily workforce findings residence within its rows of diminutive flats. The town 
has everything one has come to expect from a modern settlement: two supermarkets, several 
pubs, a community hall, a magnificent historical church, institutional buildings, an impressive 
number of lovely stray dogs, and outstanding wifi. Our tour group stayed in Chernobyl in a 
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small, recently built hotel, which had a fully stocked bar and restaurant. Nothing overly fancy, 
but still a pleasant place to stay.  
This geographical movement of power plant-associated human actors from Pripyat to Chernobyl 
highlights the main shift experienced by the site of the Zone. As stated in the previous section, 
Pripyat’s material form remains essentially just as it was when the site was functioning as 
designed, but without its fleshy inhabitants, the city is now rendered useless to the site. It is now 
a mere collection of objects, without sustained human coexistence — a burden to the zone 
authority. The town of Chernobyl had limited use for the reactor facility prior to the explosion, 
being merely the closest ‘established’ settlement to the construction site of the reactor facility 
(and Pripyat). Today, it is the arguably one of the most important spaces to the site. Without its 
flats and community services, the Zone’s huge workforce would have nowhere to stay. That is, 
these human actors would not be able to commute to the reactor facility, thus performing the 
amended material logic of the site. The reactor’s electricity production days are over, but, as 
was disclosed during my most recent trip, these mammoth nuclear nonhumans still require 
notable amounts of skilled human action, for one reason or another. RBMK no4 will always be 
the problem child, an intensively radioactive object that will require monitoring by future 
generations, but the once normally functioning reactor brethren still pull thousands of people to 
their material form on a daily basis. Arguably, since the closure of the reactor facility in 2000, 
the site has had no output, not in the traditional sense. In the ten days following the explosion, it 
spewed a radioactive hyperobject across huge sways of Europe; and, as the empirical chapters 
of this research have highlighted, this seepage should be viewed as the most significant ‘output’ 
of the site. Thus, the output of the site of the zone has evolved over the years, and the material 
placement of its human components altered, but, crucially, the draw of the reactor facility 
remains, and the daily performance of its slightly radioactive actors continues.  
A tenet of Schatzki’s notion of the site is its ability to resist spatial bounding, as it focuses upon 
how humans and non-humans spark relations. This insistence can, logistically speaking, be 
fantastically expansive, but also methodologically unruly/impractical. The Zone is, unavoidably, 
a spatially bounded space, and akin to the layered nature of matryoshka dolls, it features an 
internal spatial segment (the 30km and 10km zones). Thus, I believe it would be a mistake not to 
see the Zone-as-a-site; in that, when attention returns to its material landscape, the researcher 
must spatially bind its outer limits.  
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It should be noted that this is an exception to the rule. This entire project has explored how 
RBMK no4 has travelled, how the site has travelled; that is, accounting for how the site has 
permeated throughout a host of spheres of reality, physically traveling around the world. Yet, 
when seeking to reflect upon, and to give insights into how the Zone-as-a-site has evolved over 
the years, one must stay within the bureaucratic circumference of ‘the Zone of Alienation’. When 
viewed through this limiting lens, the zone is a time capsule in places, intensely radioactive in 
others, but also the space of ‘normal’ working/residential practices. The site of the Zone 
somehow manages to be paradoxical, and yet its material logic, the intricate interplay between 
the nuclear nonhumans and their fleshy counterparts, still makes sense. Prior to the accident, full 
families inhabited the site, and as a result, the interactions that it staged were more diverse, and 
mundane. Today, outside of the self-settlers (covered in Chapter 6), everyone present within the 
site is there to fulfil a purpose, a role, an action. Arguably, when thoughts turn away from the 
reactor facility and focus predominantly on the human element of the zone, the more pragmatic 
actions/placement of these residents represents the largest shift experienced within the Zone-as-
a-site.  
These past two subsections have provided a moment of reflection, and attempted to identity any 
change within the zone between my first and last visits. Now, two final nodes of engineering and 
scientific action must be approached, as both have resulted in vitally important alterations to the 
material form of the zone. It is fitting to close this these with these final two examples as their 
nature is in keeping with the research’s techno-engineering interests, and both represent the 
most valuable augmentations made at the site since 1986.  The first sought to right the 
engineering wrongs of the RBMK design ethos, and the second is the international mission to 
settle the site finally, for good.  
7.3 Augmenting Soviet nuclear non-humans in wake of RBMK no4’s agency. 
Valuable lessons can be learned from incidents and accidents, as was demonstrated after 
the accident at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in the United States of America in 
1979, when far reaching follow-up actions were taken to minimise the risk of a 
recurrence and to improve procedures for accident management. The accident at 
Chernobyl demonstrated that the lessons from the Three Mile Island accident had not 
been acted upon in the USSR: in particular, the importance of systematic evaluation of 
operating experience; the need to strengthen the on-site technical and management 
capability, including improved operator training; and the importance of the man-machine 
interface. Hans Blix, Director General of IAEA. (INSAG 1992, 3) 
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As mentioned above, this research has sought to render visible aspects of the Chernobyl 
accident that were not ‘mainstream news worthy’; that is, obscure scientific and engineering 
practices that were, for want of a better term, extremely important to the safeguarding of 
humans and machinery. The above quotation is from Hans Blix, the former Director General of 
the IAEA, and he highlights, arguably, the most important aspect of any post-accident period, 
the lessons that must be learned in order to mitigate the risk of a repeat occurrence. Such 
lessons are hence the invaluable ‘silver lining’ of a massive nuclear accident, the instances when 
the entire industry can assess technical, engineering, physics and human protocol standards in 
an attempt to increase safety and to mitigate risk. As can be seen from the above quotation, it is 
the opinion of the head of the IAEA that the Soviet Union did not learn any lessons from the 
Three Mile Island accident in the United States.  
As covered in Chapter 3, the RBMK reactor was the pinnacle of the Soviet nuclear industry, and 
consequently, several other facilities utilised this type of unit. In fact, a total of 5 facilities 
operated this type of reactor: Chernobyl, Ingalina in Lithuania, Kursk in western Russia, 
Leningrad and the Smolensk facility. Across these five nuclear power plants, a total of 17 RBMKs 
were constructed, with 11 still in operation in 2016 (World Nuclear Association, 2016), 
predominantly in the Kursk, Leningrad and Smolensk facilities.  
 
Figure 7.1 Geographical placement of RBMK nuclear power plants. (source: GoogleMaps) 
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Figure 7.1 delineates the geographical network of RBMK facilities: the first pin identifies the 
Smolensk NPP, the second Ingalina NPP, the third Kursk NPP, the fourth Chernobyl, and the fifth 
the Leningrad NPP. All of these facilities feature a similar, if not identical, internal material logic 
to the site of Chernobyl. In that they were built in remote locations, with each having their own 
purpose built Atomgrad to house the workforces. As was explosively highlighted by unit 4 of the 
Chernobyl facility, and the detailed account of its ontology/innate material deficiencies within 
Chapter 3, the risk of a critical malfunction within the cores of these nuclear non-humans in their 
original guise is a very real possibility. This risk, for obvious reasons, was an untenable one with 
which to live, especially after the international community witnessed the unprecedented 
disruption and human toll of the Chernobyl accident. Thus, something had to be done in a bid to 
counter the deficiencies of these monster machines, a programme that would cross the ‘Iron 
Curtain’ and form an international technical forum, the first of its kind for the predominantly 
secretive realm of state-produced nuclear technology.  
In 1990, four years after the accident, and at the request of the member states of central and 
eastern Europe, the IAEA initiated the Extra Budgetary Program (EBP) on the safety of WWER 
and RBMK Nuclear Power Plants (EBP). This expansive node of bureaucratic, scientific and 
engineering action, one that involved skilled and experienced human actors, was tasked with 
evaluating the risk posed by the continued use of the Soviet fleet of nuclear reactors, its creation 
clearly a direct result of the Chernobyl accident. Specifically, the EBP’s objectives were: 
 
1. to identify safety shortcomings in design and operation of WWER and RBMK NPPs, 
either as deviations from IAEA standards and international practices or from operating 
experience, as safety issues to evaluate the safety significance of these deficiencies with 
respect to their impact on the defence in depth of the plants; 
2. to establish international consensus on priorities for safety improvements; 
3. to provide assistance in the review of the completeness and adequacy of safety 
improvement programmes with respect to IAEA recommendations; 
4. to undertake specific studies of unresolved topical safety issues. (EBP 1999, 9)  
Four interrelated meta-objectives were thereby distilled into focused action and, ultimately, 
physical change the sites that comprise the network of Soviet RBMK nuclear non-humans. The 
most interesting aspect of these objectives is the creation of international consensus regarding 
the priorities for safety improvements, and also the concept of ‘defence in depth’ at nuclear 
power plants. At the time, the former had never been attempted due to the militaristic nature of 
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nuclear technology and the tensions of the Cold War. The latter refers to the IAEA risk mitigation 
philosophy, and it still forms the backbone for all reactor safety standards (INSAG, 1997). The 
IAEA delineates its foundational principles thus”    
To compensate for potential human and mechanical failures, a defence-in-depth concept 
is implemented, centred on several levels of protection including successive barriers 
preventing the release of radioactive material to the environment. The concept includes 
protection of the barriers by averting damage to the plant and to the barriers 
themselves. It includes further measures to protect the public and the environment from 
harm in the case these barriers are not fully effective. (INSAG 1999, 1 
The defence in depth philosophy is a twofold process: the first is to prevent accidents, and the 
second, if prevention fails, to limit their potential consequences and to prevent unwelcome 
evolution into a more serious condition (Carnino & Gasparini 2002). The philosophy was 
articulated in the INSAG 3 (1988) report, two years after the Chernobyl accident. RBMK no4 is 
perpetually used as the exemplar of the worst accident imaginable throughout the INSAG 
series, and the material spectre that emanates powerful enough agency to force the nuclear 
industry to search for maximum defence in-depth for any nuclear non-human. This is a 
fascinating travel of the accident; that is, the articulation of a system designed to guard against 
the risk of another malfunction of this nature, and the routine use of RBMK no4 as the 
ontological validation of this process.   
Logistically speaking, it is useful to think of the ‘defence-in-depth’ philosophy, the object of a 
reactor, and its cocoon material systems as an onion. The reactor vessel itself is the centre of the 
metaphorical vegetable and the material levels of defence are the successive layers wrapped 
tightly around the core. If an accident were to manifest itself within the centre, each layer would 
act as a barrier tasked with containing the malfunction, and the outermost skin of the onion 
represents the final layer between the hazardous material and the wider environment. The 
RBMK had a very poor defence-in-depth rating, one that would never pass contemporary risk 
standards (INSAG 1997), and one of the primary goals of the EBP was to increase this rating 
through a series of material retrofittings.  
Interestingly, the EBP was initially set up to assess the Soviet designed WWER type of reactor 
and not the RBMK. This somewhat surprising fact highlights the severity of the dent RBMK no4 
put into the confidence in Soviet nuclear engineering. The WWER bears little resemblance to the 
RBMK — due to its use of light-water as a moderator and cooling system it is more in line with 
the PWR ethos of the United States nuclear industry. Regardless, the IAEA member states which 
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depended on the unit were influenced enough by the agency of the accident that they requested 
technical assistance/assessment from the world’s leading nuclear authority. This is not the place 
to detail the intricacies of this part of the EBP, but what must be recognised is that this large 
international programme was initiated to assess a totally different type of nuclear non-human to 
the one that blew up on 1986. In other words, the material network of suspect Soviet nuclear 
non-humans was expanded to incorporate another product of their nuclear industry — a 
veritable travel of RBMK no4.  
1991 saw the extension of the EBP to the RBMK, and the year also saw the fall of the Soviet 
Union (Dunlop 1993). It does not appear to be a coincidence that Russia only asked the 
international community for assistance with its flagship reactor after the fall of its old political 
system. Regardless, in 1993, two years after the initial request, the first safety mission took place 
within the Smolensk nuclear power plant, and work began on RBMK no4’s nuclear non-human 
brethren.  
In total, four safety missions took place at facilities operating RBMKs (IAEA 1996), with 23 
missions to WWER facilities; while 27 nodes of intensive human action focused upon a diverse 
cross-section of the Soviet reactor fleet, tasked with assessing and evaluating the risk of their 
material form. The key areas of study on the RBMK fleet were the reactor core (reactivity 
coefficient), component integrity, instrumentation/control, safety and support systems, internal 
and external hazards, accident analysis, and finally, operational safety (EBP 1999): a 
comprehensive list of integral material and human components for the operational lifecycle of 
the fleet. Each of these areas had a specific cast of international experts charged with their 
assessment, a diverse group with each individual being world leading experts in their chosen 
field (EBP 1999; INSAG 1999).  
These actors heralded from Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and ten IAEA secretariats. Frustratingly, 
there are no acknowledgements, or listings, of these actors’ names, anywhere. Thus, they are 
left as nameless entities, imperatively important and informed cogs in the larger machine tasked 
with identifying, assessing, evaluating, recommending and, ultimately, creating international 
consensus on the safety requirements of machines with massive destructive potentiality. This 
omission speaks to Hull’s (2012) account of the varying ways in which anthropology has 
explored bureaucratic documents, most notably in this case the processes through which they 
are constructed. He states that, “Discursive logics, concepts, norms and social relations can 
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account for classification schemes, the criteria for bureaucratic determinations of what sort of 
person or thing fits within them” (2012, 259). Thus, during the process of creation, the 
bureaucratic structure can closely integrate regimes of control, dually with regards to the 
individual subjects upon whom the document/discourse is impacting, and also, crucially in this 
instance, the actors tasked with constructing it. There is no way to ‘explain’ the anonymity given 
to these acts without the addition of a redundant layer of epistemological reasoning over the 
facts. Regardless, the omission of the actors’ names provides an interesting insight into the 
workings of the EBP, and the IAEA more generally. An artefact depicting the actors of a safety 
missions (to Smolensk on the 7th - 18th of June 1993) is a single photograph found within an 
article of the IAEA’s bulletin series (Lederman 1996). Figure 7.2 is the eerie snapshot of this 
large group of actors, the human components of this particular node of action. 
As an aside, another interesting omission from the final report of the EBP is the safety mission to 
the Chernobyl facility in 1994. The mission appears in the meta-itinerary, yet no details are 
provided regarding the works completed. Anatolij Nosovsky (1995), the (new) Deputy Director 
of the Chernobyl facility, wrote that two IAEA safety missions took place in 1994, finding that 
“Chernobyl operates well compared with other former Soviet nuclear stations”. Furthermore, 
during his opening address at the IAEA meeting on Chernobyl on the 1st April, 1994, Hans Blix 
(Blix, 1994) stated that:  
the safety review of the mission documented a large number of factors which affect the 
safety situation at the plant … The review documented numerous safety shortcomings in 
the plant’s two remaining operational units. Among these shortcomings are some well 
known problems in the design of the first generation RBMK Unit 1, which have not so far 
been dealt with. 
This statement is further evidence to support the notion that the mission took place, but the lack 
of publicly available information is, for want of a better term, baffling. No explanation has ever 
been provided regarding this omission. One would assume that this particular safety mission 
would be presented as the ‘poster child’ of the EBP, due to its assessment of the facility 
responsible for the worse nuclear accident in human history; but nothing can be confidently 
asserted as no associations can be rendered visible — any explanation regarding the omission 
would be nothing more than speculation.  
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Figure 7.2 Human actors of the Smolensk safety mission (source: Lederman 1996, 17) 
This is not the place to provide extensive technical details of the recommendations made by the 
EBP, nor a totalising account of the material augmentations. This section is simply designed to 
produce an account of an imperatively important node of action created by RBMK no4, one that 
is a relative unknown to anyone that has not spent years researching the accident. The EBP 
allows for a returning to the object, the nuclear non-human, and highlights several ‘lessons 
learned’ as a consequence of the accident that resulted in a huge number of material 
augmentations to the Chernobyl facility and its RBMK brethren. The vast majority of these 
retrofits were to systems deep within the belly of the objects, although some are still clearly 
visible.  
Figure 7.3 Retrofitted control panels within the control room of Unit 1 of the Chernobyl facility. 
(source: researcher’s own photograph 2015) 
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The EBP graded safety issues in a four category model, ranging from minor to “issues of high 
safety concern” (EBP 1999, 44). A worrying number of systems fell into the third and fourth 
category, with the control instrumentation being one of the worst offenders (as was highlighted 
in Chapter 3). Thus, the EBP recommended that said systems were modernised, which was 
subsequently carried out extensively throughout the control rooms of every RBMK. Figure 7.3 
was taken during the researcher’s trip to the Zone, and it delineates the control rod operating 
system for unit 1. Where the original panel has been cut and the new operating system has been 
bolted into place can be clearly seen in the image. Granted even the new, augmented system 
still looks obsolete by modern digital standards, but this image represents a microcosm of the 
larger and more extensive alterations made to the totality of the nuclear non-human.  
These material augmentations to the reactor facility dually account for how the site has evolved 
over the years, but also highlights another way in which the site has travelled. Until the year 
2000, the electrical output from the Chernobyl facility remained, in that, predominantly, RBMK 
no1 and no2 continued to supply electricity to the Ukrainian national grid. Due to the 
infrastructural importance of the facility, a delicate process of risk identification, mitigation and 
material augmentation had to be conducted upon the facility. The mere possibility of another 
incident akin to the explosions of April 1986, manifesting within units 1,2 or 3 was domestically 
and internationally untenable. In an ideal world, it could be argued that the facility should have 
been closed immediately (as well as its brethren sites), due to the impossibility of 
comprehensively increasing its defence-in-depth. Take, for example, the dome-like structures that 
one associates with a nuclear power station. These spherical domes are designed, amongst 
other things, to contain a possible explosion within the reactor core — they represent one of the 
most fundamental material manifestations of the defence-in-depth concept. Now, it may be 
theoretically possible to install these protective domes in a RBMK facility, but, as no research 
exploring this augmentation exists, one can assume that the logistical complexities of doing so 
far outweigh the cost/benefit matrix. Regardless, the small but important incremental 
improvements to the operating systems of the RBMK fleet (akin to those represented in Figure 
7.3) — a direct result of the actions of the EBP — arguably represent the most important changes 
experienced within the site. Finally, the very need to assess engineering deficiencies of this type 
of reactor, and the consequential adaptation of the other RBMK facilities, represents an 
imperatively important travel of the object and the site. Without the agency of RBMK no4 to 
force the international nuclear community towards a thorough risk mitigation process, the world 
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may have experienced ‘The Ingalina/Smolensk/Leningrad/Kursk nuclear power station 
disaster’.  
The fact that there are other RBMKs still being operated today, without major incident since 
1986, is testimony to the work and material augmentations of the EBP. In other words, it is no 
coincidence that an innately unstable series of nuclear non-humans have functioned perfectly 
since the worst accident imaginable befell one of their mechanical brethren. This is the ‘silver 
lining’ of the accident, the actions produced by RBMK no4’s agency that resulted in the 
mitigation of risk, and the consequential improvement of safety of 16 fissioning behemoths 
spread across eastern Europe and Russia. 
7.4 How best to contain the eternal? The mission to settle the site  
Figure 7.4 The construction site of the new containment structure. (source: researcher’s own 
photograph 2015) 
The physical qualities of the hyperobject of radiation can, at times, appear to be taken from the 
pages of science fiction: an invisible, damaging and invasive entity that will remain dangerous to 
biological entities for millennia. Morton (2013, 58) describes the timescales associated with 
radioactive materials as “the horrifying, the terrifying and the petrifying”, and suggests that 
these relatively new objects, in effect, project the future into the present. Thus, when dealing with 
the safekeeping of the byproducts of the fission process, humanity must attempt to cater for 
thousands years into the future, periods of time that dwarf homo sapiens’s residence on our little 
blue spaceship. This is an ever-present issue, one that is difficult to overcome when dealing with 
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normally functioning nuclear power stations, and even more challenging when thoughts turn to 
nuclear accidents akin to Chernobyl and the more recent Fukushima incident of 2011. The 
nuclear industry has developed several methods for ‘reprocessing’ nuclear waste. Take, for 
example the UK fleet of Magnox reactors. Their spent fuel is reprocessed at the Sellafield 
facility, where it is boiled down into its component parts, then the waste elements are fused with 
molten glass in a bid to seal their material form from any external stimulants, such as water 
(Buchan 2014). One of the main difficulties associated with the question, ’what comes next?’, is 
centred upon the nexus between computer models, processing what the industry thinks will 
happen to this fuel/glass mixture over the passing of millennia, and what will actually happen to 
it: a reality which no living creature today will ever physically witness.  
This vignette is a condensed account of the process enacted at a normally functioning nuclear 
power station, one where the fuel can be extracted from the core in an orderly manner; that is, 
as the design ethos of the facility allows. Yet, when dealing with a malfunctioning facility, design 
protocols are rendered useless, and new, emergent, nodes of pragmatic action have to take 
precedence. RBMK no4’s longest standing material manifestation of this reactionary ethos is its 
iconic original sarcophagus. As covered in Chapter 4, this hastily designed and constructed 
shelter partially sealed the material form of the nuclear nonhuman from the outside world. It 
was never designed to be a permeant solution to the issue, merely the improvised method of 
dealing, for all intents and purposes, with the eternally dangerous materials suffering the 
reactor hall of unit 4.  
Some 30 years have passed since the accident, and it is still not fully mitigated. The hastily 
constructed sarcophagus was designed to stand for no longer than five years, but it has held its 
steely resolve for 3 decades; an impressive engineering feat, but one that highlights the 
worrying bureaucratic impotence experienced when the international community has sought to 
take action to solve a major problem that really should have been tackled decades ago. The 
troubled political life of the facility since 1986 could provide more than enough material for a 
full PhD, but this is not the place to detail this particular travel of the nuclear non-human. We 
have come to the point of physical and metaphorical final entombment: the physical covering of 
RBMK no4, and the last travel of the agency of the nuclear non-human.  
Due to the structural inadequacies of the original sarcophagus, it has been known for decades 
that it did not represent a permanent solution of entombment. The main issue is that, over the 
years, the rigidity of the structure has weakened significantly. Thus, in 2003, the stabilisation 
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project was initiated, and three years later the strengthening of the shelter, and the surrounding 
building was completed (Kovan 2006). This process was, in effect, tasked with preparing the 
rickety building for its final resting state, and it should be viewed as the first stage of the new 
containment project.  
The new containment structure was designed by a consortium of Bethel and Battelle of the 
United States, Electricite de France, and the KCK Consortium (Lyubchenko et al 2003). It stands 
257 metres wide, 150 metres deep and 108 metres high, and when it is finished it will be rolled 
over the entire building that houses RBMK no4. It is, hence, the largest moving object on Earth 
(Kovan 2006) and it is designed to sealing the highly radioactive materials that cannot be 
removed from the shattered reactor for the next 100 years. Figure 7.4 was taken during the 
researcher’s trip to the Zone, and it delineates the western face of the structure. The sheer scale 
of the object is difficult to fathom. It sprawls in every direction and it has come to dominate a 
landscape that has remained relatively unchanged for 30 years. When it is finished and finally 
moved into place, this event will represent the returning of the site of Chernobyl to an atonic 
state — peaceful and stable engendered by a new transcendental object. The iconic skyline of 
the reactor facility will forever be hidden (the original chimney has already been removed) 
under this mass of steel and aluminium, and RBMK no4 will likely never see the light of day 
again. In other words, this massive nonhuman will finally put the genie back in the bottle and, 
hopefully, the Chernobyl accident will be assigned to the annals of human history.  
In theory, this is the planned trajectory for the site, but nuclear accidents have a worrying ability 
to ignore our best mitigating efforts. This week, for example, has seen radiation levels spike to 
perviously unseen heights within the Fukushima facility — years after the tsunami. The discourses 
surrounding the new containment structure of Chernobyl are definitive, and allude to the 
conclusion of the accident. There is no reason to disbelieve these sentiments. The original 
sarcophagus, a hastily designed structure, and one constructed in truly abhorrent conditions, has 
been an exemplary shelter. The only real issue that has befallen RBMK no4 in the past 10 years 
occurred when a section of the sarcophagus’s roof collapsed; but, as the structure was only 
designed to stand for 5 years, one incident of this nature in 30 years speaks to a favourable 
risk/reward ratio. It must always be remembered that the original shelter is a product of 1980s 
design and a truly unique set of circumstances. The new containment project has featured none 
of the panic of 1986 and has benefited from international finance/design collaboration.  
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For all that, there can be no ignoring the potential destructive/disruptive abilities of 
malfunctioned nuclear nonhuman, nor the hyperobject radiation, and as a result RBMK no4 will 
require constant supervision throughout the years. The new containment project has been 
designed, at great expense, to assign RBMK no4 once more to ‘the background’ — a stable and 
protected final place of residence. Thus, at least for the time being, it appears that RBMK no4 
has been settled under its new shelter, and international nuclear attention should be directed 
upon the far more pressing matter of the Fukushima incident. This research has revisited the first 
major nuclear accident that the world has ever seen, and there is no escaping the historical 
nature of the study. Fukushima is the current problem, one that has raged for years longer than 
RBMK no4. For all intents and purposes, now, in light of the achievements of the EBP and the 
new containment project, we should view ‘the Chernobyl accident’ as settled, finished, 
mitigated, and begin to help with the ever expanding check list of issues created by the nuclear 
nonhumans, BWR no1, 2 and 3, of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station.  
7.5 A moment of conceptual consideration 
A concluding passage would not be complete without a moment of critical reflection upon one’s 
methods and conceptual framework: a valuable process, and one which can lead to more 
nuanced future deployments. Latourian methods, philosophy and sensibilities form the backbone 
of this analytical endeavour. From his meticulous foundational work, which focused upon the 
difficulties of the modernism project, to his most recent book that finesses his version of ANT, 
Latour’s overall project has allowed this research to conceptualise an object at the centre of the 
analysis, and provided a means of accounting for the scientific works tasked with actively 
‘doing’ nuclear practice. Fundamentally, I believe that the choice of theorist and method has 
been a success, as it is through Latour’s intellectual project that this account has been produced, 
but I am not blind to the other ANT variables that may have coloured my interpretation of the 
accident.  
Latour’s ANT is very much concerned with the ‘nuts and bolts’ of a network, the ‘normal’ 
workings of a situation and how these machinations play out to assemble the interconnected 
constellations of humans and nonhumans. This characteristic of the approach has served the 
empirical chapters well, due to the methodical nature of scientific and engineering practices. As 
has been highlighted throughout the empirical core of this research, the discourses of these 
areas of enquiry speak in purposefully efficient language, and, from the outside, seem to be 
enacted in an orderly manner. Thus, Latour’s ANT is suited to the following of scientific actors 
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within their network, no doubt a byproduct of his own interest with ‘the sciences’. Furthermore, it 
would appear that the style of ‘reassembling’ present within this account has been, perhaps, 
influenced by the ordered nature of these works; in that the narrative follows a similar 
chronological trajectory to the style within the discourses of nuclear engineering/physics. 
Personally, I prefer an ordered account, one that allows the actions of the actors to take centre 
stage, as apposed to a more creatively divergent take on the material. Personal preferences 
aside, I am not blind to the different styles of account that could have been produced with this 
material, but I feel that when dealing with a phenomena as  important as a level 7 nuclear 
accident, for want of a better terms, one should shy away form experimental discursive tactics 
and instead ground the empirical work within a structured narrative. 
The main point of friction within the research’s conceptual structure is found when 
conceptualising the event of the explosion. As covered above, Latour’s version of ANT has 
diligently allowed the empirical chapters to reassemble the intricate actions of the post-accident 
epoch, but the ‘explosive newness’ of the event is under-theorised. The augmentation of Latour’s 
ANT with Shaw’s evental geography was tasked with equipping the methodology with a means 
of identifying the event, a violent explosion that fundamentally altered a host of different 
‘worlds’ in the process. While I do believe that this merging was a partial success, other, maybe 
more streamlined, tactics could have been deployed, arguably, to achieve a full account of the 
phenomena. ANT is more than just Latour, and I have to admit that I suffered from tunnel vision 
when choosing which version to deploy. The works of Law (2004) or Callon (1986, 1999), two 
of the central figures of the ANT project, could have been utilised as a means of conceptualising 
the event ’in house’, as opposed to attempting a merger with a foreign body of work. 
Regardless, the merging of Latour’s ANT with Shaw’s evental geography should be viewed as 
one of the successes of this research. It represents a chance taken, one which sought to improve 
Latour’s mythological project, and to award Shaw’s theoretical structure with a methodological 
backbone. In other words, I use the strongest assets of these two conceptual constructs to tackle 
their respective weak spots.  
One of the most frustrating aspects of the entire project has been its unavoidable historical 
nature. Due to the viscosity of the hyperobject of radiation, the Chernobyl accident can appear 
to be an ever present issue, in that, due to the lengths of time associated with radioactive decay, 
— coupled with the issues experienced by international community when trying to settle RBMK 
no4 — the accident has appeared to be an ever present issue for some 30 years. This duration is 
true in some cases, but I found that the vast majority of people professionally connected to the 
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mitigation of the accident have either retired or been left unidentified within the discourses. Due 
to the severity of the situation, it appears that only experienced scientists, engineers and medical 
professionals were drafted into the network. Such actors at the pinnacle of their respective fields 
tend now to have one thing in common, an advancing age. Thus, a 50 year old professor in 
1986 is now 80 and long since retired.  
This historical dimension presented a methodological issue, especially when considering the 
adopted approach’s mantra of ‘follow the actors’. Yes, it is relatively easy to do so within 
documents, journal articles and, international reports, but I wanted to speak to more people 
during this process. The ‘travelling archive’ that was identified, and duly navigated through, 
does answer my central research question, but I would have preferred to supplement this 
analysis with several in-depth interviews with human actors involved within RBMK no4’s risky 
network. Regardless, I believe that the backbone of this research’s conceptual and 
methodological architecture represents a means of analysing ‘current’ industrial accidents. The 
extensive discursive exploration — that is, the charting of the actor of RBMK no4 through the 
pages of documents — could be repeated within another context, and the use of Latour’s ANT 
equips the analysis with the ability to introduce sustained engagements with both human and 
non-human actors. This meta-charting is the biggest success of the research, representing a 
blueprint to explore other nuclear non-human related incidents: situations where a nuclear 
nonhuman has massively malfunctioned and, in the process, forcefully directed huge sways of 
human action, all tasked with understanding, rectifying and, ultimately, settling a fissioning or 
otherwise disintegrating object.  
7.6 The final concluding remark 
A lot has happened since the explosion of 1986. Entirely new worlds of risk were created, 
assessed, developed upon, and mitigated. Heterogenous nodes of action have been 
engendered throughout a host of domains of reality, and vast swathes of environmental 
radioactive material have decayed. This research has taken seriously the materiality of the 
accident, and embraced the sciences of the disciplines tasked with actively mitigating the 
accident and the risks that it created. It has detailed arguably the worst nuclear accident that 
has ever befallen our little blue spaceship, but it has done so pragmatically. At no point has this 
research tried to claim that Chernobyl was anything other than a horrendous phenomena, but it 
has sought to engender an actor-led contextualisation that presents a representation of its real 
dangers/impacts devoid of geopolitical/environmentalist mediations.  
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This researcher, I myself, believes in nuclear energy. Humanity stands on the brink of irreversibly 
altering the thin layers of gas that protect us from the borderline inconceivable harshness of 
space. Carbon emissions are a bigger threat to our shared residence on this ball of dirt than the 
AIDS epidemic, terrorism and another round of economic self destruction brought about by the 
villainous combination of neoliberalism and innate human greed. There is no singular means of 
combating these issues, for they require a systematic process of self-assessment and 
pragmatically educated actions. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (2015) 
estimates that 65% of the world’s total carbon dioxide emissions are a product of fossil fuels 
and industrial processes, with 25% of that figure a product of energy production. Fossil fuel 
power stations are inefficient, polluting and based upon an archaic technology — we possess the 
technology, within the current iteration of nuclear fission and renewable methods, to phase out 
‘traditional’ means of producing electricity. This move alone would put a significant dent in 
global carbon emissions.  
This research has focused upon the absolute worst in class: a poorly designed, dangerously 
operated and, essentially, unlucky nuclear reactor. It has also highlighted the ways in which the 
nuclear industry has learned from the accident, improved safety precautions and moved into a 
new era of intense risk mitigation. The entire industry is now significantly safer due to RBMK 
no4. Taking this fact into consideration, can we, as a species, move away from a technology 
that could meet our every growing energy needs for the next 2000 years, one that produces no 
carbon in the process of producing electricity? Granted the issue of the waste is an ever-present 
issue, a hyperobject that will ontologically outlive anyone living today, but as big a problem as 
the eroding of our planet’s atmospheric protection? We can store nuclear waste deep 
underground, and in the future we might even develop a means of closing the fuel cycle, but, as 
things stand just now, we have no way of repairing the damage caused by unchecked carbon 
emissions. Pragmatism in the face of an entire civilisation’s worth of agencies is required.  
A doctoral research project is a sustained practice of ‘researching’ a chosen phenomena and 
also, crucially, a personal training exercise. This thesis project has forced me to consume huge 
amounts of technical information, from disciplines distant from my own academic training. This 
process of self-tuition has resulted in a thesis that provides detailed accounts of several technical 
and engineering aspects of nuclear technology, environmental radiation and the physical 
composition of the atmosphere. It has been achieved through a relentless belief in, and 
commitment to, ANT and its methodological apparatus. The final product, outwith this thesis, is a 
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human geographer attuned to and ready for interdisciplinary research. As covered in section 
7.1, this research could have focused upon a host of other travels of RBMK no4, but an 
altogether more serious scientific direction was chosen as it was believed that this type of 
enquiry would force the researcher to become accustomed with the disciplines that actively ‘do’ 
nuclear related activities. Nuclear related issues are multifaceted and complex, therefore 
requiring the skill sets of a diverse pool of academics if they are to be comprehensively tackled. 
An ANT social scientist’s role within such a team is obviously orientated around accounting for 
the ‘social’ dimensions of the situation, but this role would be compromised if he or she could 
not articulately converse with the scientific members of the team. An educated understanding of 
the science behind radiation, the engineering of nuclear reactors and the practices of each 
domain are essential components of a social scientist’s skillset that seeks to operate within such 
an interdisciplinary setting.  
This research project represents this researcher’s journey to this point, and in the process it has 
reassembled the imperatively important travels of RBMK no4. From positive reactivity 
coefficients, atmospheric processes and the ontology of radiation, this thesis provides a window 
into a learning process, one that has produced an interdisciplinary-ready human geographer. 
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